Joint Targeting for Time-Sensitive Targets.

To Boldly Go Where No Army Has Gone Before

When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11 September 1941

Joint Pub 3-60 Joint Director for Targeting (Draft), Page IV-1

Time-sensitive targets (TSTs)-- ever heard of the term? TSTs are hot topics among the services in the joint targeting arena.

With improving technology and our enemies sharing lessons among themselves (as the Serbs did with a few unfriendly Middle Eastern countries after our Balkan campaigns), there is a surge in enemy efforts to make our targeting more difficult. Potential enemies are making their most critical targets more mobile and harder to track--therefore, more survivable and threatening. Increasingly, every commander-in-chief (CINC) faces new challenges targeting TSTs.

This article examines ongoing efforts to deal with this challenge and outlines some considerations for targeting officers working the problem at joint headquarters. Those who recently have worked with targeting and fires in Kosovo or Bosnia and those who man the outposts in Southwest Asia and Korea know the challenges well.

TSTs Defined. Joint Pub (JP) 3-60 Joint Doctrine for Targeting (Final Coordination Draft, 5 April 2001) defines TSTs as "air-land- or sea-based targets of such high priority to the friendly force that the JFC [joint force commander] designates them as requiring immediate response because they pose (or will pose) a danger to friendly forces or because they are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity. TSTs, such as airborne aircraft and missiles and submerged submarines, may be handled by separate components while others, including those on the surface of the earth, may require detailed inter-Service and/or functional component planning and coordination" (Page B-1).

TSTs are high-payoff targets (HPTs) identified by a JFC or joint task force (JTF) staff. They can be anticipated targets and planned for on the joint integrated priority target list (JIPTL) or managed on a separate TST list, depending on procedures in the theater. They also can be unanticipated targets, needing immediate responses. They all have limited engagement windows, usually due to short dwell times or limited acquisition or tracking times.

There has been confusion in the field about TST terms. Previous manuals and drafts used the additional terms of time-sensitive surface targets (TSSTs) and time-critical targets (TCTs) as subsets of the TSTs. The distinction was that TSSTs are targets on the surface only, vice airborne or submarines. TCTs are those TSTs that have even shorter windows of engagement. JP 3-60 uses one term to define all time-sensitive targets (surface, air or sea-based): TSTs. The focus of this article is surface-based TSTs with very short presentations times.

Joint Doctrine. Except for JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (23 March 1994, Page 364), few doctrinal references tell us much about TSTs and attack operations against this critical target set. JP 3-03 Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations(l0 April 1997) and JP 3-09 Doctrine for Joint Fire Support(12 May 1998) do not mention TST attack operations. JP 3-01 Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threat (19 October 1999) talks to TST-type targets in a general discussion of the changing threat but does not discuss any special considerations in conducting TST attack operations (Page 1-4). In JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, target types typically included in the TST set, again, are discussed in general terms (Chapters I and Pages 111-10 and III-11).

So where do we turn for anything definitive? FM 90-36 The Targeting Process and Procedures for Time-Critical Targets (July 1997) is the current Army "word" on TSTs. It is a tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) manual being integrated into JP 3-60. The FM 90-36 version contains the heart of the TST attack operations process, which needs to be amplified and integrated into the targeting effort outlined in Appendix B of draft JP 3-60.

TST Targeting. Regardless of the actual individual target type, operations against these targets cross the boundaries of many of the other target categories we are so familiar with. A proactive targeting process in a theater will identify the proposed TST targets in the enemy order of battle and examine each in relation to the proposed enemy courses-of-action (COAs) or campaign goals and objectives.

For example, if an enemy's doctrine espouses first use of tactical chemical weapons to enable tactical and operational successes, then it is a pretty good bet that chemical munitions development, production, transport, storage, delivery and any other system that enables the use of chemical weapons goes on a target list. Based on chemical weapons tactical and operational effects as well as their strategic impact, many of these targets would be added to the TST target set for the campaign.

The most important action taken will be the JFC's approval of the TSTs recommended by his staff based on his campaign and the impact the TSTs may have on it. The JFC must not only agree to the targets, but also concur with his staff's proposals for conducting streamlined operations to attack the TSTs--from acquisition, to immediate engagement, to allocation of resources and other considerations, such as rules of engagement (ROE) and collateral damage.

A key issue related to these targets is they must be located precisely, tracked, attacked and assessed in a joint environment using a multitude of joint assets. These assets have varying capabilities, and the JFC requires support from component commanders and national assets to conduct attack operations. He also needs a detailed concept of operations for accessing, tasking and deconflicting the assets involved.

TST TTP. A prudent targeting effort begins with planned targets against which both intelligence collection and delivery assets can be allocated and, second, a deliberate process that acquires, tracks, targets and assesses damage on TSTs.

TST attack operations also must take into account special procedures to allow the rapid, effective attack of unplanned and unanticipated TSTs. The most critical aspect of these targets is they are fleeting and, therefore, of limited dwell or presentation time. They do not give the joint force enough time to react upon discovery by traditional means--find them, task attack assets and move the assets into attack range, all with assets already occupied in other parts of the battle or otherwise not being used. The joint force requires some established system of attack that can minimize command and control requirements and the time needed to engage the TSTs.

Appendix B of JP 3-60 offers a number of options to improve the rapid attack of TSTs. They include methods for referencing planned joint targets and options for establishing real-time links for command and control, streamlining organizations and pre-positioning acquisition and strike assets.

The following is a sample scenario for TST attack operations. During an examination of the enemy order of battle and operating procedures, the joint force identified the strong likelihood that enemy long-range tactical missiles that can deliver chemical munitions would be in one area. Without specific point targeting data, multiple intelligence assets still have to be assigned a "sector" collection effort and both surface and air attack systems pre-positioned to respond.

One or more dedicated rocket or missile batteries, offshore surface support ships, airborne TST strike aircraft, or all these assets could be ready and waiting to attack the targets once they are identified. The most rapid and effective means of attacking the TSTs would be to maximize sensor-to-shooter links and tie pre-arranged collectors to command and control platforms or nodes that can instantly transmit target locations to dedicated delivery systems.

So if one suddenly were assigned to a JFC or JTF targeting cell, what are the key pieces of TST attack operations to know or consider? Including information culled from a number of sources, the figure lists JFC or JTF targeting considerations, a beginning framework for the development of TTP to attack TSTs.

These efforts, as well as procedures for various weapon systems and platforms (Army tactical missile system, called ATACMS; fighter/attack assets; C-130 gunships; and attack helicopters) are briefly discussed in JP 3-60, but there is truly little "meat on the bones."

The services must address the issues in the figure on Page 28 and many more to successfully attack this challenging target set. JP 3-60 does not provide TTP or even a working concept for JFCs and JTFs to plan and execute TST attack operations. It also does not address the growing trend to centralize and automate TST attack operations.

Joint Developments. Each of the services is working on this targeting challenge. These efforts hold much promise not only for service-centric approaches to TST targeting, but also to provide venues where joint procedures and interfaces can be explored and developed.

The Navy has been working on attack operations in several of their experiments to examine new procedures, intelligence collection, weapons and capabilities. Among other efforts, the Navy also has been integrating TST attack operations into the development of its concept for future Naval fires, named "Poseidon's Fury." An explanation of this and other related concepts are available on the Navy's Warfare Development Command web site at http://www.nwdc. navy.mil/ProductsEx/ConceptsFr.htm.

The Air Force has been working TST attack operations for some time under various organizations, to include their Aerospace Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center at Langley, Virginia. Among the many efforts are its concepts for"Defeating Theater Time-Critical Targets" as a "Family of Systems Requirements Document" (11 January 2000). The USAF also is conducting joint expeditionary force experiments and developing new automation and tools, such as its Attack Operations Decision Aid (AODA).

The Army is working TST attack operations at both Fort Bliss, Texas, under the umbrella of Theater Missile Defense operations, as well as at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, via the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab. The Battle Lab is supporting the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) for the Joint Continuous Strike Environment (JCSE) and for Theater Precision Strike Operations (TPSO).

The JCSE ACTD will improve automated software to facilitate targeting TSTs. The software automatically will prioritize targets, constantly updating the list of emerging targets, and monitor the status of joint force weapons. It will pair the most effective weapon per target, based on the Joint Munitions Effects Manual (JMEM) and status/availability of the weapon. It then will deconflict airspace to engage TSTs immediately. JCSE was briefed and demonstrated at the Battlefield Coordination Detachment-Deep Operations Coordination Cell (BCD-DOCC) Conference hosted by the Battle Lab in April 2000.

The purpose of the TPSO ACTD is to develop and experiment with technological solutions to fully integrate US and coalition force counteffire and strike operations from the forward line of own troops (FLOT) to the forward boundary. To date, the ACTD has developed the automated deep operations coordination system (ADOCS), which some units are experimenting with. The Battle Lab is evaluating and helping to further develop ADOCS to target rapidly, share situational awareness, enhance command and control and decision making, and provide responsive weapons delivery. Targeting nodes at the Army corps and above would use ADOCS with these capabilities. Army efforts have lagged behind in other areas as TST attack operations have been primarily addressed through the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and, therefore, primarily led by the USAF.

Army targeteers needing to address TSTchallenges can contact the Battle Lab at DSN 639-4229 or (580)-422-4229 or email me at [e-mail]. We welcome input on procedures and TTP to support manual as well as automated joint attack operations against TSTs at the JFC or JTF staff levels.

Advancing technology in joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; weapons; automation; and other areas make efforts to devise a TST attack process with supporting resources difficult. The good news is that it is a top priority for the services to come up with a process to help ourjoint forces dominate the battlefields of the future.

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Bernd L. Ingram is a Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab Action Officer for Joint Continuous Strike Environment (JOSE) and Theater Precision Strike Operations (TPSO) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) in the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He retired as the Chief of NATO Enlargement at the Headquarters of the European Command in February 2000. His previous assignments include service as a Tactics, Advanced Tactics, and Fires Author/Instructor at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Executive Officer of 1st Battalion, 82d Field Artillery, and Division G-3 (Rear), both in the 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; and Executive Officer and Force Modernization Officer in the Directorate of Combat Developments in the Field Artillery School. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and holds a master's degree in Management from Webster University of Kansas City, Missouri.

* The JFC sets TSTs as priorities in his objectives, guidance and intent and identifies specific TSTs for immediate response. The JFC's objectives and guidance set the procedural framework for components to expedite targeting TSTs. The JFC's guidance must allow the components flexibility in selecting attack options for the TSTs.

* Based on the commander's guidance and target details, the JFC must determine how he will task subordinate units to attack the TSTs and execute the plan. For example, will he retain authority for the TSTs or delegate some or all of the target set to one or more components? Command and control for attacking TSTs must be streamlined to meet time constraints.

* Components execute attack operations after conducting technical fire control. The JFC staff (most likely the joint fires element, or JFE) exercises tactical fire control of TST attack operations.

* The JFC still must plan for and conduct combat assessment.

* Once TSTs are detected, responsiveness is critical to take advantage of brief windows of target opportunities.

* No single weapon system/capability is the best to deal with every TST encountered by a joint force. The JFC has several options for attacking TSTs, each with varying degrees of effectiveness, responsiveness, range, accuracy and effects. The JFC staff must devise a system for considering and optimizing all attack assets and recommended attack solutions.

* The nature of the threat, avoidance of collateral damage and rules of engagement (ROE) may limit or severely constrain TST attack options.

* Given the capabilities of current and future sensor systems, each component can locate and attack surface TSTs in mutually accessible areas of interest. As such, the JFC must consider how to prevent fratricide or duplication of effort among components and where he is willing to accept risks.

* The length and complexity of planning procedures for attacking surface TSTs determines the probability of the joint force's success. The fleeting nature of surface TSTs are more difficult to execute with traditional mechanisms for planned targets. The joint force must compensate for this by using various fixes, such as having Army tactical missile system (ATACM) fire missions on call, conducting airborne surface TST combat air patrols (CAPs), establishing procedures for diverting attack aircraft assets and other fixes.

* The execution of attacks against immediate surface TSTs requires the JFC to establish procedures for components to carry out attacks. Planned procedures must include, but are not limited to control and coordinating measures, fire support coordinating line (FSCL) procedures and associated attack options, airspace coordination area (ACA) options, and weapon systems procedures.

Considerations for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) or Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander in Attacking Time-Sensitive Targets (TSTs). Doctrinally, very little is written about how to attack surface TSTs with short presentation times. These considerations were taken from a number of sources and constitute an attempt to lay the groundwork to begin developing tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for attacking TSTs.