Joint Targeting DOCTRINE.

Joint fire support includes those fires that assist land and amphibious forces to maneuver and control territory, populations, and key waters.

Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

The US Army is undergoing many changes based on the Army Chief of Staffs transformation initiative. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) ensures these changes are reflected in Army doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), and, through the Department of the Army's Strategic Plans and Policies Division, integrates them into joint doctrine. One significant challenge for Army fire supporters is adapting to the many doctrinal manuals that provide detailed approaches to joint operations.

This article discusses the most significant aspects of two bedrock joint doctrine manuals: Joint Publication 3-09 Doctrine for Joint Fire Support (12 May 1998) and Joint Pub 3-60 Joint Doctrine for Targeting (Final Coordinating Draft, 5 April 2001).

Joint Fire Support. The purpose of Joint Pub 3-09 is to provide fundamental principles and doctrine for the command and control ([C.sup.2]) of joint fire support for US forces throughout the range of military operations. It accomplishes this first by defining "fires," "joint fires," "fire support" and "joint fire support." It then explains the joint fire support system and its intended effects; describing guidelines for planning and coordinating joint fire support operations and the responsibilities and considerations for executing joint fire support.

Key aspects of the manual include the integration of effects and nonlethal terminology in joint fires doctrine, the introduction of the joint fires element (JFE), and the presentation of the Air Force's targeting cycle phases fused with the Army's and Marine's decide, detect, deliver and assess ([D.sup.3]A) targeting methodology.

Effects-Based Fires. The transformation of the Army is introducing effects-based fires that encompass lethal and nonlethal fires (means). The concept was first introduced in the "Field Artillery Vision" presented at the 1998 Senior Fire Support Conference, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. It was further defined in article "Effects-Based Fires--The Future of Fire Support Coordination and Execution," by Colonel Jerry C. Hill and Major Carl R. Trout in the November-December 2000 edition.

A discussion of nonlethal fires appears in Joint Pub 3-09 under "Nonlethal Means" in Chapter I, "Overview," and is defined in Chapter II, "Joint Fire Support System" under "Attack Resources." Nonlethal fires include fires from electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PSYOP) (e.g., leaflet drops), information operations (e.g., disrupting the enemy's information networks) and nonlethal weapons. Nonlethal weapons are those designed and employed to incapacitate personnel or material while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel and undesired damage to property and the environment (Page 11-16).

Joint Pub 3-09 addresses nonlethal fires in only a few paragraphs. However, we believe the concurrent development of effects-based fires concepts in the Air Force and Navy that also encompass nonlethal fires is the beginning of more detailed doctrine and TTPs for joint effects-based operations.

An area that deserves more consideration and could become part of a future revision of Joint Pub 3-09 is examples of nonlethal means supporting operations. An example of nonlethal means supporting operations would be the employment of PSYOPS and information operations (IO) during Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. Elements of this included civil affairs teams living and operating with the local populace in selected areas, distribution of local language pamphlets and leaflets discussing the dangers of unexploded ordnance and mines, and implementation force (IFOR) radio broadcasts, which included interviews with IFOR commanders at various levels. The purpose of these nonlethal approaches was to create effects to positively influence the populace, thereby enhancing peace enforcement operations.

Joint Fires Element. Currently, the JFE is an optional staff element that provides recommendations to the J3 to accomplish fires planning and synchronization. However, future coordinating and executing effects-based (lethal and nonlethal) fires in support of the commander's intent require close planning, execution and analysis cycles supported by a permanent, integrated joint element or cell. Any "stovepipe" organizational walls that currently exist must be broken down to facilitate joint operations.

The development of a joint effects coordination cell (JECC), linking lethal, nonlethal, targeting and intelligence elements, would meet those needs and help the joint force commander dominate any future adversaries in full-spectrum operations.

Joint Planning and Coordination. Similar to brigade-level fire support, a key aspect of joint fire support is continuously including fire support in the planning process and thorough coordination to deconflict attacks, avoid fratricide, reduce duplication and shape the battlespace. Here, Joint Pub 3-09 introduces the fusion of the [D.sup.3]A methodology, commonly used by the Army and Marine Corps, with the targeting cycle phases used by the Air Force. The fusion is shown in the figure as a complementary process to achieve joint targeting. Although the two targeting processes overlap, the steps are aligned as depicted in the figure.

The alignment not only reflects the application of joint targeting to fire support, but also the conceptual elements of effects-based fires. This means coordinating and executing fires that focus on the terminal effects of lethal and nonlethal capabilities against high-pay-off targets (HPTs) to achieve a joint and combined arms purpose supporting the commander's intent.

Joint Pub 3-60. In the manual Doctrine for Joint Targeting, a reader will see more detail on how the targeting process outlined in the Joint Pub 3-09 is executed. JP-3-60 is an effort to separate targeting as a distinct function at the joint level and give it its own doctrinal reference. This publication also seeks to incorporate elements of the previous Air Land Sea Application Center's FM 90-36 The Joint Targeting Process and Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets (July 1997). Time-critical target attack operations are addressed in more detail in the article "Joint Targeting for Time-Sensitive Targets--To Boldly Go Where No Army Has Gone Before," May-June.

Joint Pub 3-60 is in final coordinating draft and is expected to be published as this magazine is published. The FA School submitted its comments on the final review of Joint Pub 3-60 in June of this year.

The manual has three major points. First, it is clear that the doctrine writers are transitioning to effects-based fires. Second, it shifts the centralization of the joint targeting effort away from the joint force air component commander (JFACC) to the JFC and his J3. And finally, time-sensitive targets are significantly unique to warrant special attention and unique TTP. Last, we discuss shortcomings of Joint Pub 3-60.

Effects. Beginning with the "Fundamentals of Targeting" in the "Executive Summary" and in Chapter 1, "Creating Effects," the effects-based approach is reflected in most references to the purpose of targeting and to translation of the JFC's objectives and guidance. The key link to effects-based operations and targeting is found in Section 6 of Chapter 1: "Effects-Based Targeting" (Pages I-11 through I-16). Effects are not defined in this section as much as they are described. Based on this description, attacking targets serves no purpose unless attacking the targets alone or in concert with other targets achieve a specifically planned effect on the enemy.

Our conversations with joint doctrine writers and Army Staff action officers indicate this publication may be getting ahead of efforts to define and codify effects at the joint levels. Although the days of true attrition-based targeting are gone--where we just defined the targets and destroyed them as quickly as we could without regard to greater impact--no real joint definitions of effects-based operations and procedures have been decided to date.

Joint Targeting Responsibilities. Evident in reading the manual is a shift of responsibility for executing targeting to the JFC staff level (Page III-2). Aided by the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) and the JFE, the JFC J3 now "...conduct[s] execution planning, coordination, and deconfliction associated with targeting" (Page III-2). Section 6 of Chapter 3 identifies the J3 as the primary developer of the joint integrated priority target list (JIPTL), which shifts the responsibility away from the JFACC's automatically serving as the primary developer.

An even more subtle indicator of a reduction of the JFACC's primacy in targeting is the revision of "Service and Functional Commander Responsibilities," Chapter 3, Section 7. Here, separate functional component sections were integrated into one, and previous guidance that each would submit emerging or immediate target nominations to the JIPTL via component liaison organizations to the JFACC's joint air operations center (JAOC) was modified.

As a final indicator, under "Target Nomination Procedures," Section 8 of Chapter 3, the service or functional component submissions of target nominations to form the JIPTL are now directed toward the"...joint force staff or component to whom the JFC delegated joint target execution planning..." (Page III-14). The JFC can designate the JFACC as the component lead for his targeting, but the JFACC is no longer the defacto lead for theater targeting.

In the past, the USAF generally had both the acquisition and strike assets to locate and engage the widest range of targets and, frequently, was or could have been the first on the scene. Increasingly, JFCs have multi-service visibility on target acquisition and national asset reach-back capabilities that present the most coherent picture of the enemy.

Each service also is adding to its weapons suites, extending their abilities to attack deeper and with more precision, giving the JFC more options. For example, the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) already can achieve ranges out to 300 kilometers, and the Navy has the land attack standard missile (LASM) that ranges to 100 kilometers and the tactical tomahawk (TACTOM) which, depending on length of loiter, can range to 1,000 kilometers, among other weapons. Based on weapons and acquisition capabilities and enhanced [C.sup.2] automation, it appears "centralized control, decentralized execution" may become standing operating procedures (SOP) at joint commands like it exists at lower level commands today.

Time-Critical Targets. It is significant the doctrine writers believe this subset of HPTs are valuable enough to address separately in this publication. Because these targets are of such high interest to theater commanders-in-chief (CINCs) around the globe, integrating this unique aspect of joint targeting into this manual is a timely action.

Shortcomings. Joint Pub 3-60 has two main shortcomings: lack of detail on the JFE and no solid cross walk of [D.sup.3]A targeting methodology with other methods.

The manual includes no details of the JFE's composition and responsibilities. The JFE would include much of the JFC staff as well as matrix-aligned members from components and other organizations as tasked by the JFC. This organization would essentially become the JFC's fire support element (FSE) or, based on the direction of the future fires organization, the JFC' s effects coordination cell (ECC). It would, in fact, conduct most of the continuous daily targeting work and support the efforts of the JTCB, which likely would meet daily as required, but not necessarily be a standing organization.

Joint Pub 3-09 cross walks the [D.sup.3]A methodology with the established six-step targeting methodology of other services, which usually is referred to as the joint process. It is clear that the [D.sup.3]A fits within this joint process and includes the same six basic steps. Writers for Joint Pub 3-60 may have believed including a crosswalk in this manual would have been a duplication of Joint Pub 3-09. However, ensuring the service targeting procedures are meshed into a commonly accepted joint construct should be one of the prime objectives of the publication as the overarching joint reference for the targeting process.

Integrating different service targeting approaches is vital to joint success, and it is most appropriate to put the crosswalk in this publication. In various sister service white papers and concepts, many different processes are being proffered--observe, orient, decide and act (OODA); find, fix, track, target, engage and assess; or even assess, plan, find, fix, track, target, engage and assess. The doctrine needs to address these developmental methods, in terms of future operations, and specify the one joint targeting process to be accepted by all. When it does so, it must also come to grips with the definitions of effects-based operations and how they impact this targeting process, providing guidance.

Joint Doctrine--A Must Read. Commands and units around the globe must read, incorporate into training and operations, and sustain a dialogue on evolving joint doctrine and TTPs. Corps, and even division and brigade staff officers must become versed in joint doctrine that will buttress the joint and multinational operations we most likely will conduct in the future.

The review of these two publications shows both common issues as well as variances in focus and direction. Obviously, any disparities must be resolved and common ground found as both manuals define basic doctrine used in joint targeting and attack operations.

One thing that is obvious from recent operations in war and in peacekeeping is that future operations will continue to be joint and coalition, and we must remain ready to interact with other services and national forces to be successful. We predict that as the targeting effort in the past has been key to tactical successes, understanding and executing joint targeting will be key to future successes in complex multinational operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Murphy, until recently, was the Chief of Experiments and Demonstrations at the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He is now the Commander of 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, part of Ill Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. His previous assignments include serving as the S3 of the Division Artillery and S3 of the 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, both in the 1st Armored Division in Germany, and Commander of C Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Field Artillery, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) at Fort Lewis, Washington. He is a graduate of the Australian Army Command and Staff College, Fort Queens Cliff, Australia.

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Bernd L. Ingram is an Action Officer in the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab for the Theater Precision Strike Operations (TPSO) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and Joint Fires and Targeting. He retired as the Chief of NATO Enlargement at the Headquarters of the European Command in 2000. His previous assignments include service as a Tactics and Fires Author/Instructor at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and Executive Officer of 1st Battalion, 82d Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. He commanded A Battery, 1st Battalion, 94th Field Artillery, 1st Armored Division. He holds a master's degree in Management from Webster University of Kansas City, Missouri.