Jefferson Davis's Generals.

Edited by Gabor S. Boritt. Gettysburg Civil War Institute Books. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. [xviii], 217. Paper, $14.95, ISBN 0-19-513921-6; cloth, $27.50, ISBN 0-19-512062-0.)

In this volume, which consists of eight essays that were originally presented at a 1998 Gettysburg Civil War Institute conference, Craig L. Symonds leads off with an examination of the "fatal relationship" between President Jefferson Davis and General Joseph E. Johnston. Symonds argues that their troubled, dysfunctional partnership was rooted in their personalities and experiences, took the form of a lack of communication, greatly hampered the Rebels' war effort, and was "primarily Johnston's fault" (p. 14). Emory M. Thomas then examines the "ambivalent visions of victory" held by Davis and Robert E. Lee. Thomas maintains that in 1862, when the secessionists adopted an "offensive defense" strategy (p. 31), Lee emphasized the former part of the formula and Davis the latter. For this reason, the president and his general found themselves "operating in less than concert" (p. 37), and that lack of strategic coordination hampered military operations in Virginia.

In his essay T. Michael Parrish maintains that although General P. G. T. Beauregard disliked Davis personally, lacked confidence in the president's conduct of the war, and expressed such feelings in private, he fully accepted Davis's authority as commander-in-chief and did not break openly with Davis until after the war. Parrish thinks that most historians have misjudged the wartime relationship between the two. Steven E. Woodworth evaluates General Braxton Bragg, pronouncing him a much better commander than most have thought. The real problem, Woodworth argues, was Davis's refusal to deal with Bragg's troublemaking subordinate Leonidas Polk, who "spread the poison of discontent" inside Bragg's army (p. 79).

Herman Hattaway describes John Bell Hood as a general whom Davis "elevated too high" when he named him to army command in July 1864 (p. 84). Lesley J. Gordon explores the role of Varina (Mrs. Jefferson) Davis and the wives of four Rebel generals (Johnston, Bragg, Beauregard, and Lee). Harold Holzer describes Davis's image as it was portrayed in the popular prints of the period. James M. McPherson closes the collection with an essay on Davis and Confederate strategy that asks, "Was the Best Defense a Good Offense?"

As always with such collections, these studies vary in quality and readability, but all are thought-provoking and informative. Gordon's is arguably the weakest, but the fault lies with the lack of sources for her topic. Her thesis--that generals' wives can and often do play a significant role in their husbands' careers--is certainly valid and cries out for more study. (We should note, however, that Mrs. Beauregard spent the war in New Orleans, a city under Federal occupation after April 1862, and for that reason she could have played virtually no role in her husband's Civil War career, even had she not died in March 1864.)

I think the collection would have been greatly improved had it included a study of the man who may well have been the most important general to Jefferson Davis--Albert Sidney Johnston. An index would also have helped, since many individuals and topics pop up in two or more of the essays. The real problem here, however, is one of focus and subject matter. "Jefferson Davis," an adjective in the book's title, becomes a noun insofar as he is the major subject of all the essays except Gordon's. Three of the essays (Gordon's, Holzer's, and McPherson's) have almost nothing to do with Davis's generals. The book really needs a title that more accurately reflects its subject matter.

RICHARD M. MCMURRY
Roanoke, Virginia