Japan-Iraq Relations: The Perception Gap and Its Influence on Diplomatic Policies.

JAPAN'S DIPLOMATIC POLICY TOWARD Iraq is only a dependent variable within its policy toward the Middle East region as a whole. Following the Second World War Japan has been largely influenced by its unique relationship with the United States. Many scholars have argued that "the Japanese-U.S. bilateral relationship was the most important external factor upon which all of Japan's foreign policies have been based," (1) while others go as far as to regard Japan as a client state of the United States, and to note that "Japan had to follow the United States' Middle East policy." (2)

During the decade starting in 1973, however, Japan began to pursue its own economic policy, keeping some distance from that of the United States. While the "majors" controlled the oil market, there was no contradiction between Japan's policy toward the United States and its energy policy but the 1973 oil crisis forced Japan to consider an independent energy policy. Japan's policy toward the oil-producing countries at that time was understood as a pro-Arab policy, aimed at securing an oil supply from the region. The Japanese approach to Iraq was an extension of this policy resulting in a honeymoon period for both nations.

It was on the basis of the experience of this period that Japan and Iraq established their first impressions of each other. The experience of this honeymoon period molded mutual understanding, and influenced the diplomatic policies of both states in the ensuing years. This remains so, despite the dramatic changes following the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s and especially after the Gulf War of 1991. In this paper I would like to clarify the types of images that each state developed through its experiences during the decade of Japan's pro-Arab policy. Then I will briefly observe how the actual relationship between Japan and Iraq has changed from the 1970s until today, and try to elucidate why the relationship worsened after introduction of the Oil-for-Food Program.

GENERAL TRENDS OF JAPANESE POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

Prior to the Second World War Japanese contacts with the Middle East were limited; namely limited to minor transactions in textiles between Japan and Egypt, Iran and Iraq. (3) During the Second World War, the Japanese government attempted to mobilize Muslim forces -- mainly in China and Indonesia -- against the Allies, and prominent ultra-nationalist ideologues within Japan espoused sympathy with Muslims in the colonized Middle East. (4) There was also an attempt to buy oil from the Gulf as a way to break through the oil embargo imposed by the Allied forces on Japan. These efforts failed, however, and Japan lost all contact with the Middle East when the War ended.

In 1953, the government of Japan dispatched its first postwar economic delegation to the region. Visiting Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey the delegation called on Middle Eastern governments to abolish their discriminative economic policies established to thwart war-time Japan. In 1956, the Middle Eastern Room was established as a first subsection in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter, MOFA) to observe the situation in the Middle East region. Previously the Fifth Section of the Europe and American Division had followed political affairs in the Middle East, and the Sixth Section of the Economic Division the economic affairs there.

Some private companies attempted to secure oil supplies from the Middle East without going through the "majors", and the Japanese Tanker Nisshoumaru arrived at Abadan port to buy oil from Mosaddeq's Iran in 1953. In the late 1950s, the Arabian Oil Company successfully gained oil exploration rights in the Neutral Zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. These were exceptional cases, however, and other similar attempts were unsuccessful until the 1970s, as the Japanese oil industry had not been an essential industry until it proved indispensable to sustain the rapid Japanese economic growth in the 1960s. In 1960 Japan depended on oil from the Middle East for 80.1 percent of its imported crude oil and this share had risen to 84.7 percent by 1970. During the 1960s, the Middle East emerged as a large market for Japanese goods and the volume of Japanese exports to the Middle East increased ten-fold from 1960 through 1970. At the same time the Japanese government spurred rapid industrial development through a governmen t policy encouraging exports.

With increasing petroleum prices a threat to the Japanese economy the government started to reconsider its relationship with the Middle East through its own energy needs rather than through an American prism. However, many Japanese firms failed to obtain large-scale plant projects in the Middle East due to a lack of coordination with the government. Government officials still held the view that those who supplied the Middle Eastern oil which "we were heavily dependent on" were "certainly not the Middle Eastern countries ... but the so-called major oil companies." (5)

After The First Oil Crisis

It was the first oil crisis in 1973 that led Japan to take a more positive approach to the Middle East. Concerns arose throughout the country when the price of oil soared and Japan came to be seen as an "unfriendly country" by Arab governments. The Japanese government was quick -- unusually so given its bureaucratic nature -- to respond. The government issued the Nikaido Statement, (6) which emphasized guidelines for future Japanese diplomatic policy toward the Middle East. It focused on the necessity for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the 1967 war, and on respect for the right of Palestinians to self-determination. (7) The new Japanese attitude, distancing itself from the United States, was evidenced by its abstention from votes in the United Nations acknowledging Palestinian rights and through its 1974 recognition of the PLO. These actions were seen as a first attempt for Japan to intertwine the Palestinian issue within its own energy policy. This does not mean, however, that Japan dramatically shifted its stance vis-a-vis the Palestinian question as the aforementioned policy toward the Palestinians had already been articulated prior to the crisis. Furthermore, Japan did not cut its ties with Israel.

The second alteration to the Japanese policy orientation was for Japan to actively develop its own diplomatic and economic relationship with the oil producing countries in the Middle East, rather than continue to rely on its American ally. High-ranking MOFA officials were shuttled between the Gulf countries and the volume of Japanese imports from the Middle East (except North Africa) in 1974 increased by 242 percent from that of the previous year, while exports to the Middle East in the same year increased by 126 percent. The peak of these transactions came in 1982, when the Middle East held an 11.4 percent share of total Japanese exports and 28.4 percent of total imports. Japan had relied on the "majors" for more than 70 percent of oil imports in 1973/4, but had reduced this figure to 55.7 percent by 1979. (8) Many of the Japanese oil refiners and trading houses searched for business opportunities in Saudi Arabia and Iran resulting in a petrochemical project in Saudi Arabia (with Mitsubishi), and IJPC in Ira n (with Mitsui) among the most successful examples. This sudden flurry of diplomatic efforts was called, rather disdainfully, "oil-begging diplomacy", and illustrated clearly that Japan's policy toward the Middle East was only a dependent element of its oil or energy policy. The Agency for Natural Resources and Energy was established in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (hereafter. MITI) immediately after the oil crisis.

When oil prices dropped sharply in 1986 because of the oil glut, however, concern over another oil crisis decreased. In the years leading up to that time, the Japanese economy had become less vulnerable to oil prices in the Middle East as it succeeded in diversifying energy sources, and in shifting from oil-guzzling to energy-saving technology in its manufacturing industry. An increase in its strategic oil stock and strengthened relationships with non-OPEC oil producing countries also contributed to lessening Japanese vulnerability. As the flow of oil money into the Middle East decreased, business there became less attractive.

The Impact Of The Gulf War On Japanese Policy

The Gulf War did not cause any grave deterioration in the Japanese economy or depress international prices for crude oil. The major change in Japan's policy toward the Middle East did not emerge from economic-commercial factors but rather from political factors. The Gulf War left Japan undecided in how to play its increasing role as one of the leading actors in international society.

Japan was swift in denouncing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, and took a stance of clear support for the United States led multinational forces, to which it contributed U.S.$9 billion to help finance military operations. While the Arab countries were split into two blocks, Japan's policy was to side with the pro-United States Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Japan then decided to provide support to Iraq's neighbors - such as Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt - offering them U.S.$2 billion in aid. These expenditures raised the Middle Eastern share in total Japanese Overseas Development Aid (ODA) to 20 percent; before that time, this figure had been approximately 6-7 percent on average. (9)

Furthermore, Japan's approach toward Israel gave the impression that it had shifted its stance from being pro-Arab to that of a pro-Israeli orientation, as then Prime Minister Kaifu suggested the possibility of improving bilateral relations between Japan and Israel regardless of the Arab-Israel conflict. This statement was followed by the decision of the Toyota Motor Co., which was once a main supplier of vehicles to Iraq, to rescind its trade ban with Israel, which had been imposed in accord with the Arab boycott. (10)

Increasingly, the main concern of Japanese policy-makers was focused on how to deal with growing United States pressure for increased Japanese contributions to international security, and on how to deal with its constitutional restrictions on military spending and overseas deployment. The Japanese Ambassador to the United States proposed an expanded role stating, "Japan will have more than just an economic role." (11) He continued "the [Gulf War] made a great impact on our attitude toward international problems." This indicates that the Gulf War saw Japan at a point where a decision had to be made on whether it could be involved in international peace-keeping operations, by deploying military forces, which according to the Constitution were prohibited from operating outside of Japan. This developed into a nation-wide controversy, which went as far as including the possibility of 'amending Article 9' (the "peace clause") of the constitution which had been a sanctuary for a long time. (12) Since the Internation al Peace Cooperation Law went into effect in 1992, Japan has dispatched personnel to peace-keeping operations (PKOs) in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador, as well as to international humanitarian relief operations for Rwandan refugees in the former Zaire and international election monitoring activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The dispatch of Self Defense Force troops to the Golan Heights in 1996 as ceasefire observers was also one of the symbols of the new Japanese policy for establishing security in the Middle East.

Along with this new pattern of involvement in the Middle East Peace Process, traditional tools were also mobilized; primarily investment and financial aid. The Japan-Palestine Development Fund was established within the UNDP, and Japan contributed U.S.$7.1 million to the Fund by 1991. In 1993, Japan pledged a donation of U.S.$200 million to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), and began direct support for the PNA. Japan's amount of Overseas Development Aid (ODA) disbursement to Palestine in 1997 was the largest of any country but the United States. As for Egypt, Japanese disbursements consistently held third or fourth place among the DAC countries during 1995-7. For Jordan and Syria, Japan was also at the top of the donors during the same period.

Makoto Mizutani points out "the gravity of [the] new challenges ... in the area of aid policy," quoting the White Paper on ODA of Japan as follows; " ... Japan is determined to make ODA a medium for its participation in these order-building efforts of the world. This determination was put to the test during the Gulf Crisis. Japanese aid ... was designed to contribute promptly ... to the restoration of peace in the region." (13) The idea of "order-building" in Japanese economic policy signaled the introduction of political ethics into its ODA policy, and reflected its expectation of being a leading actor in constituting a "new international order". In other words, "efforts for promoting democratization and the introduction of a market-oriented economy, as well as efforts to secure basic human rights and freedoms" turned to be major principles for the new Japanese ODA policy, as then Prime Minister Kaifu announced in the guidelines for future ODA in April 1991. At this stage, Japanese policy toward the Middle E ast was apparently subordinated to its new policy toward international society in general, or to building an image of responsibility toward international society, especially in the eyes of the United States.

JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

Japan's relationship with Iraq has been determined by its policy toward the Middle East region as a whole. Japan's approach toward the Middle East oil-producing countries was most typically reflected in its relations with Iraq after the first oil crisis in the early 1970s. After the Gulf War, however, Japanese policy toward Iraq was determined by that toward the United States. In this section, I will follow this transformation in Japan-Iraq relations.

After 1973: The Honeymoon Period

After the first oil crisis, Iraq was in great need of foreign financial assistance, as it was suffering from a lack of funds following the nationalization of the Iraqi Oil Company. Adding to its troubles in negotiations with British and French companies, the country's tough policy against "imperialists and Zionists" brought a cool reaction from Western Europe and the United States. Only the U.S.S.R. had agreed to a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Iraq, which was concluded in 1972.

In this situation, the Japanese government started active diplomatic overtures toward Iraq. In 1973, Takeo Miki (14) was appointed as a special envoy to major Arab countries, including Iraq. In the next year, Yasuhiro Nakasone, then Minister of International Trade and Industry, made an official visit to Iraq, which was followed by a visit to Japan by Hikmat Azzawi, then Minister of the Economy in Iraq, to conclude the agreement on bilateral cooperation. In this agreement it was decided that Japan would supply mixed yen credits to Iraq. Settling the conflict with Kurdish opposition groups in 1975 was also one of the reasons that Iraq began preparations for the establishment of nation-wide development projects. The volume of trade between Japan and Iraq climbed as Iraq's oil exporting capacity increased and as its huge development plan proceeded.

When Iran's oil exports fell after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iraq took advantage and expanded its exports (See Figure 1). Even as the Iran-Iraq War broke out, Iraq continued to increase its imports, without abandoning its ambitious development plan. Japan was the largest exporter to Iraq during 1977-81 and again in 1985-86; and in 1982 was second to West Germany (See Figure 2). During this period, it is said that one-fourth of Japanese overseas projects were concentrated in Iraq. (15) This means that Iraq proved to be an essential partner for Japan, not only as a supplier of oil but also as a market for Japanese exported goods. A similar structure could also be seen by the historical fact that Iraq's imports from Japan were the second largest, following only those from Britain, during 1935-1940, representing approximately 20 percent of total Iraqi imports. Ninety percent of these imports from Japan were textiles. By contrast, Japan's imports from Iraq were as small as 0.15 percent in 1935. (16)

As the war with Iran continued and the primary Iraqi pipeline (via Syria) was closed in 1982, Iraqi oil exports dropped, forcing Iraq to hold down its expenditures. Iraq requested the deferment of project payments to major Japanese companies, of which the most active were Mitsubishi, Marubeni and Sumitomo. To cover the Iraqi financial crisis, Japan agreed to an extension of the term of validity of yen credits, which had been left unused since 1973.

The Gulf War and its Aftermath

The initial reaction of the Japanese government to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was to place a freeze on the use of the yen credits, which was imposed the day of the invasion. At this stage, it seems that Iraq misjudged the extent to which Japan would go along with the United States and other Western European countries, and kept preferential treatment in place for Japanese interests and nationals inside Iraq. (17) After 14 August 1990, however, Iraq stopped issuing exit visas and banned all Japanese from leaving Iraq. (18) This was the turning point in Iraqi-Japanese relations, as Iraq started regarding Japan in the same light as other Western countries.

As a consequence of the Iraqi maneuver the focus of Japanese diplomacy shifted to liberating the Japanese hostages, and this focus continued until the simultaneous release of foreign nationals was achieved in December 1990. Several members of the Diet, including former Prime Minister Nakasone, were dispatched to Iraq in order to negotiate on the hostage issue. As hostilities came to be seen as inevitable, arguments in Japan centered on Japan's participation in the military operation, whether directly or indirectly, as a means of solving the crisis (as noted above), and went far beyond the bilateral relationship between Japan and Iraq. Japanese business leaders did not dare to remind the government of their assets and investments within Iraq, nor the future economic potential of Iraq. Only a few rightist nationalist political groups supported Iraq overtly, in the context of their opposition to the United States.

After the war ended, there was almost no exchange of communications between Japan and Iraq on their bilateral relationship, and Japan maintained a firm stance that it could not resume official talks until Iraq complied with relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions. According to data from the MOFA (19) Japan donated funds for humanitarian purposes with the total amount of Japanese disbursements to Iraq from 1994 to 1998 reported to be U.S.$970,000. In March 1999, Japan decided to extend emergency aid in the amount of U.S.$950,O00 to UNICEF and U.S.$600,000 to ICRC for easing the plight of Iraqi people. These figures are, however, much smaller than the annual ODA disbursements to Iraq by Germany (U.S.$59 million on average for 1995-97), Sweden (U.S.$35.8 million on average for 1995-97) and the United Kingdom (U.S.$8.2 million on average for 1995-97). (20)

After the Introduction of the Oil-for-Food Program

It was the Oil-for-Food Program that reminded the world of the significance of Iraq as an oil supplier. Since the middle of 1995, Western companies had begun to launch negotiations concerning future projects in Iraq, taking its limited trade for granted. Japanese companies were also keen to join this program of buying Iraqi oil. MITI did not, however, issue a clear policy on whether it would allow Japanese companies to purchase Iraqi crude until August 1996; two months after the British government did so.

In this period, the attitudes of Japanese firms began to differ from that of the government in their approach to Iraq. In December 1996 Mitsubishi, acting as an agent for five Japanese oil companies, was the first Japanese company to announce it had signed a deal with Iraq (40,000 bpd) within the Oil-for-Food Program. Marubeni, Itochu, and other major oil wholesalers also started to negotiate for the purchase of Iraqi oil at the same time. The government's decision to offer $1.46 million in emergency aid to Iraq in the beginning of 1997 can be understood as a move that was supportive of these negotiations.

Nevertheless, the basic policy of the Japanese government was to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States and Britain against the Iraqi regime.

The government expressed its support for the United States' military attack in September 1996, condemning Iraqi military operations in Iraqi Kurdistan. This quick response was welcomed by the United States "as a sign that Japan is becoming more confident about showing its views on international issues." (21) Seeing the tough stance of the government, Japanese firms understood that it would not "step out of line politically."

However, it was the Iraqi government that wanted the Japanese government to "step out of line politically" against American designs and in August 1997, it decided not to allocate any oil to Japan. Iraq started to use the Oil-for--Food Program as a political tool to give preference to countries and companies which had assisted it. However, neither MITI nor MOFA tried to influence for Iraqi crude purchases, and instead worked to discourage comments from business circles on Japan's diplomatic stance toward Iraq. (22) Major trading houses avoided any communication with Iraq and took a stance of "wait and see" until Iraq changed its policy, fearing possible political retributions.

With increasing tension over U.N. weapon inspections in Iraq, Japan asked the United States and Britain to observe an Olympic Truce in February 1998, but this did not mean that Japan had changed its stance. Rather, the Japanese government proceeded in cosponsoring U.N. Security Council resolution No. 1154 with Britain, warning that Iraq would face "the severest consequences" if it failed to fully meet its obligations. Sending a Japanese diplomat to join UNSCOM and a researcher to join a nuclear inspection team of the IAEA in 1998 was also a part of new efforts to play up Japan's political role in the security of the Gulf. At the end of that year, Japan cosponsored another U.N. Security Council resolution (No. 1205). which urged Iraq to resume cooperation with UNSCOM unconditionally. Finally, when the military attack was carried out by the United States and Britain, Japan was the first country to express its support for the operation.

THE PERCEPTION GAP BETWEEN JAPAN AND IRAQ

During the post-Gulf War period Japan has been condemned by Iraq more than any other country, even more than the United States. No other country has seen its relationship with Iraq deteriorate so remarkably following the Gulf War. Meanwhile, Japan seems to have little consciousness about the reason why it receives what it feels is undue condemnation. Messages were exchanged between the two countries, but each received these messages according to its own perception of the other. The source of the tension between them may be ascribed to the fact that the both failed to change their images of the other even after Japan had changed its attitude toward Iraq; that is, a perception gap existed between the two countries.

Japan's Perception of the Middle East, and of Iraq in Particular

It is quite significant that Japan's full-fledged communications with the Middle East began in the 1970s, and especially on the occasion of the oil crisis, which many of the Middle Eastern countries were using as a chance for nationalization and real independence from the European colonial (or ex-colonial) powers, and as a challenge to U.S.-Israeli dominance. In order to join in the business with the oil producing countries, Japan naturally underlined its historical lack of colonial experiences. (23) In a word, it emphasized its apolitical, purely commercial stance as a political advantage to European powers. This understanding is apparent from the memoirs of Japanese diplomats. Ex-Ambassador to Sudan Toshirou Ogushi pointed out that during the 1950s there was a general feeling among the Middle Eastern countries of expectation toward Japan's return to international society following the Second World War, and that it was a kind of reflection of their hostility and opposition toward Britain and France. He also recalls that Egypt welcomed Japan's neutral policy toward Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. That is why such individuals tend to recall that "it was unexpected for Japan to be recognized as an unfriendly country under the [Arabs'] oil strategy," when Japan was condemned by the Arab countries in the first oil crisis. Japanese diplomats at that time "thought they had already demonstrated a pro-Arab stance in the Arab-Israeli conflicts," (24) and felt "discontent as [they believed] Japan had done nothing wrong to the Arabs.... It was strange to see that both ex-colonial powers, Britain and France, escaped punishment." (25)

The Japanese hostages in Iraq shared similar feelings during the Gulf Crisis; "even the hostages from the countries which were strongly against Iraq, or from those with guilty pasts with Iraq have already been released.... Why not those of us, from Japan, which never had any experiences of being an enemy of Iraq, but contributed to Iraq's industrialization and was once a good customer of Iraqi oil?" (26)

Behind the above-mentioned perception lies a notion that people in the Middle East would categorize the Japanese people in the same group as themselves, as both of them are "non-white, Asians." (27) Japanese diplomats as well as scholars specializing in the Arab world often refer to stories like the Turkish enchantment with the Japanese victory over Imperial Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, and Egyptian poems with the title of "Japanese Ladies" in the era of Muhammad Ali. (28) These stories imply that Middle Easterners sympathize with Japan, which achieved the economic and military development to compete with the Western industrial countries even though it was non-Western. (29) A Japanese diplomat recalls that "the Arabs feel friendly to Japanese because ... they admire the miracle of Japan's economic recovery from the disaster of the Second World War."

Another reason why Japan believes it is needed by the Middle East is the myth of the superior quality of Japanese products. When the government of Iraq launched a campaign against greedy private merchants after the Iran-Iraq War, it often denounced them as dealing in "cheaper imported goods from Korea or Taiwan, instead of importing Japanese goods of better quality." (30) This perception still exists, as can be seen by the present Iraqi Trade Minister "Japanese cars are most acceptable in the Iraqi market in terms of spare parts and maintenance." (31) On the basis of this reputation for good quality, many Japanese firms expected that Iraq would prefer Japanese goods in the end to industrial products supplied by other countries for purely political reasons.

Of course, Japan ceased to be apolitical toward Iraq and clearly sided with the United States after the Gulf War. A consciousness of being in "political confrontation with Iraq" has not developed, however, and Japan still often ascribes the source of its tension with Iraq as technical. Japan's understanding was that Iraq was irritated about things that it did not do intentionally, and that it was Iraq that was interpreting bureaucratic and apolitical procedures by Japan in a very political way. In 1997, Iraqi Vice Prime Minister Tariq Aziz mentioned in a condemnation that Japan has halted its exports of humanitarian provisions to Iraq. (32) Japan argued that "the Iraqi side misunderstands the issue," and "Japan has never examined export applications arbitrary," suggesting it was only a technical delay and hence different from the United States' intentional withholding of goods. In response to Iraq's accusation of Japan's quick support for the U.S./British attack in the end of 1998, a diplomat explained that i t was natural that the Japanese government should be the first to comment on such attack, as its working hours started earlier than any other governments' because of the time difference between Japan and other parts of the world. (33) The negative attitude of Japan toward Iraqi opposition groups also explains its unwillingness to be involved in power struggles within Iraq, where the United States and Britain are rather active.

Japan's lack of consciousness about being in "confrontation with Iraq" is partly explained by the fact that its direct purpose is not in sanctioning Iraq itself, and that for Japan Iraq is merely a factor subject to Japan's main concern. This can be clearly noticed in its tough policy in 1998. Japan's hard-line attitude toward Iraq in these periods coincided with its diplomatic efforts to show that it was qualified for permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council. Moreover, the U.S./British attack in the end of that year was more significant for Japan in the context of its relationship with North Korea. Japan used this chance to demonstrate that the defense system was solid enough if North Korea turned into another Iraq in East Asia. The chief policy-maker on security in Minshuto (the Democratic Party of Japan), the largest opposition party, mentioned that the action against Iraq had increased the possibility of U.S. air strikes against North Korea. (34) The then Foreign Minister, Masahiko Koumura also l inked support for military options to a warning toward North Korea, saying "we resolutely oppose the possession of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by any nation seen as a terrorist state by international society." (35)

Iraq's perception of Japan

If Japan prefers to operate in a purely economic framework, Iraq wants Japan to move further ahead politically, but not in support of the United States policy framework. In 1995, Fadhil Abadi, General secretary of Iraqi National Energy Committee, expressed Iraq's hope "to play a role in supplying [Asia's] energy needs", and said that he was "looking for and urging consortiums from

Japan, South Korea and other Asian countries to come to Iraq now and not wait until after the embargo is lifted." (36) It was clear that Iraq was targeting the Asian countries -- especially Japan -- as a means to break out of the economic sanctions. This policy coincided with Iraq's strategy of using the Oil-for-Food Program to reward countries that called for ending economic sanctions against Iraq and punish those who opposed lifting them. In expressing its appreciation and expectation toward Asian countries, Iraq was trying to induce Japan to join in the anti-sanctions campaign along with Russia, China and France. The reasons why Iraq believes that Japan will benefit from the lifting of sanctions are as follows; (1) Japan wants its debt to be paid; (2) Iraq believes Japan needs Iraqi oil because of its quality; and (3) it believes Japan needs its market for Japanese exports.

With regard to the first reason, Iraq believes that Japan, France, Russia and Italy can be categorized in a group of countries to which Iraq owes large debts. Iraq's debt to Russia is reported to be U.S.$16 billion, and that to France U.S.$10 billion. Iraq understands that these countries are naturally impatient to normalize their commercial transactions with Iraq so that they can recover their debts as soon as possible. In the Oil-for-Food scheme, Iraq selected these countries for privileges in oil exports and future economic development projects, such as production-sharing deals for the development of the West Qurna oil fields, which it offered to Luk Oil of Russia in 1997. Iraq's debt to Japan is reported to be approximately 750 billion yen, (37) a sum which is a little less than the Iraqi debt outstanding with France. It is probable that Iraq expects from Japan similar behavior to that of France and Russia.

Secondly, Iraq understands that Iraqi crude (Basra Light) is suitable for Japanese refineries. Some traders do admit that their evaluation of the quality of Iraqi crude is very high and that "some refineries would probably shift to using Basra Light from Iranian Light if Iraq made a full return to global markets." (38) As Iraqi crude is preferable in terms of price and quality, Japan began importing it through European or Chinese traders, and it amounted to around 2.5 percent of total Japanese imports of oil in 1999. (39) The share of Iraqi oil was as low as 4 percent of total Japanese oil imports until 1978, and it rose to 7 percent in 1979 only as an exceptional case, to compensate for the lack of Iranian oil; therefore, there is no urgent need for Japan to increase the share of Iraqi oil to more than the present level.

Thirdly, Iraq believes that Japan needs Iraq as an export market for Japanese industrial products. As mentioned earlier, Japan was a main supplier of vital commodities such as industrial machinery, iron and steel, as well as automobiles to Iraq during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Iraq depended on Japan for 20-25 percent of its imports. Moreover, Iraq was a very attractive market because it tendered large-scale construction projects. It once held a leading position on the list of countries from which Japanese companies were awarded construction projects; it was at the top of the list in 1979 and 1980, and was second in 1977, 1978 and 1981. It dropped to tenth place in 1982, however, and then became a negligible market for Japanese construction firms with the devastation of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars on the Iraqi economy and infrastructure. (40)

For the above three reasons, Iraq insists that "Japan will need Iraq in the future much more than Iraq needs Japan now," (41) and consistently targets Japan as a possible lobbyist for Iraqi interests, together with France and Russia. Iraq learned from its experiences in the 1970s and 1980s that Japan might pursue an independent policy when it holds large-scale economic interests and is vulnerable to losing these interests. Japan is able to keep some distance from the United States, as it did after the first oil crisis and with its normal relationship with Iran after the Revolution. (42) In other words, Iraq sees Japan as the Achilles' heel of the pro-U.S. block. Thus, Iraq had criticized Japan's stand since 1990 as baffling (al-Jumhuriya), and said that "the Japanese giant has been reduced to a dwarf trampled by the United States (al-Iraq)." (43) After the U.S./British bombardment in 1998, Iraqi Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadhan denounced Japan as "the United States satellite country or less than that." (44)

Despite this Iraqi perception, however, figures show that Iraq was not a vital partner for Japan even during the peak period in the late 1970s. The Iraqi share of total exports from Japan never went beyond 1-2 percent, and imports only 1.6 percent (reached in 1979 when Iraq exported the largest amount of oil). It is true that major trading houses rushed into the Iraqi market, but there were no trading houses which concentrated on business in Iraq alone. This is different from the case of Mitsui in Iran, and Mitsubishi in Saudi Arabia, which cannot help from being deeply involved in the situation in the host countries. (45) It is not only with Iraq but also with the Middle East in general that the volume of Japanese trade has been decreasing since the early 1980s, as the share of the Middle East in total Japanese exports fell to 3 percent and that in its imports to 11 percent in 1989. (46)

In addition to the above-mentioned perspective, based on economic reasons, some of Iraq's perspective is based on memories of the political relations between Iraq and Japan in the 1940s, when the Iraqi government sympathized with the Axis. According to Shimizu, Japan set up a Japanese Legation in Baghdad in 1939, for political and strategic purposes, as part of its Islamic policy. (47) The fact that Japan once had the intention to establish a better relationship with the pro-Axis Iraqi nationalists in the pre-Second World War period has encouraged the government of Iraq to keep in touch with rightists and nationalists in contemporary Japan. Moreover, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as symbols of the victims of United States' nuclear attacks, are impressive in the eyes of the Arabs. Since Iraq overestimates the level of anti-U.S. feeling in Japan, it often tries to make use of any hostile mood against the United States when it arises. It seems probable that Iraq counted on the anti-U.S. feelings that rose in Okinawa i n 1995-6 to affect Japan's relation with the United States, and to be a chance to get Japan to shift towards Iraq.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN JAPAN AND IRAQ

Relations between Japan and Iraq underwent several changes at the end of the 1990s. In October 1999, the first high official of MOFA, holding the rank of director general of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, visited Iraq. Japan had to wait another year, however, to move forward, after the Arabian Oil Company failed to extend its oil exploration rights in Saudi Arabia. As the Arabian Oil Company had played a symbolic role in Japan's history of oil exploration in the Arabian Gulf, the government came under pressure to reconsider its oil policy as well as its relations with the oil-producing countries. It started to reassess the importance of its relationships with Iran and Iraq, expecting to find future sources of independent oil supply there. Production sharing contracts in Iraq, which had been previously offered to Russia and China, appeared attractive to Japanese business.

This coincided with an increase in the volume of Iraq's trade, not only within the framework of the Oil-for-Food Program but also through full-fledged attempts to dismantle the economic sanctions. An increasing number of European and Asian companies started to export to Iraq, especially after exports of machinery, including spare parts, were partly allowed under the framework of the Oil-for-Food Program in 1999. The numbers of firms and countries that joined the Baghdad International Fair in November 2000 was the highest number following the imposition of U.N. sanctions in 1990. Japanese companies were no exception. Toyota Motor Corp. finalized a contract to sell 30,000 vehicles to Iraq in the same month. Iraqi exports jumped to U.S.$708 million in 1999 and U.S.$661 million in 2000, up from U.S.$117 million in 1997. Iraqi imports from Japan also reached U.S.$35.7 million in 1999 and U.S.$42.6 million in 2000, compared to U.S.$9.9 million in 1998 and U.S.$0.3 million in 1996. (48)

As the numbers of Japanese businessmen visiting Iraq increased, MOFA decided to reopen its embassy in Baghdad, which had been closed since the Gulf War, on an unofficial and limited basis, sending Jordan-based diplomats to Iraq on a rotating basis. This was encouraged by the visit to Iraq of Fumio Kyuma, member of the Diet and former chief of the Defense Agency, as well as that of the director general of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau in 2000. At the end of that year the cabinet decided to amend its resolution on the economic sanctions toward Iraq for the first time since their introduction during the Gulf crisis, lifting the ban on visa payments and other costs for traveling to Iraq as well as on the running costs of offices in Iraq for commercial activities related to humanitarian issues.

At this stage, Japan had come to frankly recognize that its companies had been "significantly disadvantaged when they did business in Iraq compared with the U.S. and European companies" because of the presence of the strict regulations on trade. The fear of Japan's being left behind from potential trade with Iraq has been evident since the middle of 1998; one diplomat admitted that "the government should do something for Iraqi affairs, especially in the situation where some firms are suffering from huge amounts of unpaid debts and others may be interested in the development of the Iraqi oil fields." (49) In 1999, another diplomat proceeded to say, "the MOFA would feel deep concern" if the economic sanctions were to be lifted now, because "there is a possibility that Japan will be left out of business with Iraq." (50) While insisting that Iraq's implementation of all of the U.N. resolutions is necessary before economic ties can be expanded a diplomat in the Second Middle Eastern Division noted the "maintenance of political dialogue between Japan and Iraq" was a second priority for its diplomatic policy toward Iraq, "in order to keep Iraq involved in international society, as Japan believes its commitment [to Iraq] would contribute to a change [for the better] in Iraqi attitudes." (51) Exhibiting this more balanced approach Japan was not the first country to support the United States military attack against Iraq in February 2001.

Even though Japan has shown some changes in its diplomatic policy, the Iraqi response has been cool; Iraqi newspapers complain that Japan has not made "essential modifications in its policies toward Iraq." (52) Said al-Sahhaf, the then Foreign Minister of Iraq, charged Japan with being "hostile to Iraq", and insisted that "Japan would remain blacklisted from Iraqi trade deals" because Iraqis could not "tolerate giving contracts to a country the government of which contributes to hostile stands toward Iraq." (53)

CONCLUSION

In concluding this essay, it is worth quoting some of Hideaki Sugita's work on Japanese perspectives toward the Middle East in the pre-War period. He concludes:

Of course there was a big gap between the Japanese perspective on the Middle East and the Middle Easterner's perspectives on Japan. The former had undergone a transformation from nationalistic sympathy for the Middle East to pragmatic realism after the Russo-Japanese War, and at the same time the image of the Middle East was simplified or reduced to that of "deserts" or "camels." In contrast, Japan continued to be idealized and symbolized as a model for modernization and nation-building in the eyes of people in the Middle East. ... The directions of idealization of each side were completely opposite, and it was quite rare that these vectors crossed, except in the case of the close relationship between the Pan-Islamic movements and the Japanese military regime in the late 1930s and the beginning of the I940s. (54)

We can see a kind of analogy between Sugita's remarks on the perception gap and the present situation surrounding Japan and Iraq.

Both Japan and Iraq have created their own images based on their experiences in the 1970s. A common myth regarding the Middle East among the Japanese is as follows. People in the Middle East (with the exception of Israelis) hate Europeans or Americans, as they suffered directly from their colonial domination and are discriminated against. They prefer Japan, as co-members of the Orient, to cooperate with. Japan can be a model for non-Western countries in industrial development, and its policy toward the Middle

East is purely economic. Middle Easterners appreciate Japan because of its apolitical stance and lack of the history of confrontation.

People in the Middle East, and especially Iraqis, .on the other hand, stick to their own images of Japan. As an economic superpower, they see it as capable of playing a leading political role in international society, not along with the West but with the Asian and Middle Eastern countries. They see it as maintaining strong hostile feelings against the United States as it is the only country which was ever attacked by nuclear bombs. Moreover, they see it as a potential rival to the United States and other Western countries.

According to this understanding, Iraq expects Japan's "political involvement to come as a result of its economic interest"; that is, to deepen its political commitment to Iraq. What Iraq wanted to accomplish by intensifying tensions in 1997-1998 was to remind Japan of its economic interests there. Japan, however, rejected Iraq's message, as its policy had changed after the Gulf War. In the post-Gulf War period, Japan tried to pursue "political involvement at the expense of economic interests" in Iraq.

What is more confusing is, however, that Japan still pretends to maintain an apolitical, economy-oriented stance in its bilateral relationship with Iraq, while pursuing greater political involvement in contributing to the building of international security with the international community. In the context of Japanese policy toward international society, Iraq is obviously regarded as a "violator of the international order." Nonetheless Japan is not ready to confront this "violator" in the context of its economic policy.

Keiko Sakai is an Associate Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies (Azia Keizai Kenkyusho), Chiba, Japan.

ENDNOTES

(1.) Yasumasa Kuroda, "An Economic Superpower in Search of Its Proper Political Role in the Post-Cold War Era," in Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds). The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East. (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 1994), p.134.

(2.) Akifumi Ikeda, "Japan's Relations with Israel," in Kaoru Sugihara and J.A. Allan (eds). Japan in the Contemporary Middle East. (London: Routledge, 1993). p.156.

(3.) Hiroshi Shimizu, "The Japanese Trade Contact with the Middle East: Lessons from the Pre-oil Period," in Kaoru Sugihara and J. A. Allan (eds). op.cit., pp.33-42.

(4.) Shumei Okawa was one of the most influential Japanese nationalists of the pre-War era, and was interested in the situation in the Muslim world. In the 1930s many institutions and associations for understanding Islam and Muslim society were established in accordance with Japan's policy at that time.

(5.) Michael M. Yoshitsu, Caught in the Middle East: Japan's diplomacy in Transition. (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1984), pp.1-2.

(6.) Susumu Nikaido was the then Chief Cabinet Secretary.

(7.) Japan had, however, already voted for the U.N. resolution 2628 which emphasized the respect for the rights of the Palestinians in 1970. Also the Japanese government had mentioned the lawful rights of the Palestinian people, in front of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in 1971 when the King visited Japan, but it was only the King that witnessed this Japanese support for Palestine and it did not become a common recognition among the Arab states. See Joint Communique between Japan and Saudi Arabia in 1971, quoted by Takaya Sudo, "Paresuchinajin no Kenri to Nihon no Taiou (Palestinians' Rights and Japan's Stance Toward It)," Chuto Kenkyo, No.399, (1995 February), pp.8-9.

(8.) Tetsuo Hamauzu, "The Changing Structure of Oil Connections," in Kaoru Sugihara and J.A. Allan (eds). op.cit., p75.

(9.) Nevertheless, to its great disappointment, Japan did not find its name on the list of appreciations for supporters of the liberation of Kuwait, which the Embassy of Kuwait in Washington issued just after the War. See Chuto Chosakai, "Zadankai: Sengo no Wagakuni Chuto Gaikou no Sokuseki (Round Table Talk: Trail of the Japanese Diplomacy Toward the Middle East Since the Second World War)," Chuto Kenkyu, (June, 1998), p.31.

(10.) Ikeda mentions that this apparent shift was because of the pressure from the United States, and that it was a Japanese policy toward the Jews in the United States rather than toward Israel itself. Ikeda, "Japan's Relations ...." op.cit., p.155.

(11.) Asia Times, (Bangkok, Thailand) 17 April 1997.

(12.) Kuroda, op.cit., p.136

(13.) Makoto Mizutani, "Japan's Aid Program and the Middle East," in Kaoru Sugihara and J.A. Allan (eds). op.cit., p.113.

(14.) Miki became Prime Minister in 1974.

(15.) See Keiko Sakai, "Oil for Food as a Political Tool for Iraq," Faleh A. Jabbar et.al. (eds). From Storm to Thunder: Unfinished Showdown Between Iraq and U.S. (Tokyo: IDE, 1998), p.66; originally data obtained from Kaigai Kensetsu Kyoukai (Overseas Construction Association of Japan).

(16.) Iraq has rather long history of trade with Japan compared with the other Arab oil-producing countries. Direct trade between them began as early as the 1930s; see: Hiroshi Iwanaga, Iraku: sono Kokudo to Shijyo (Iraq: its land and market). (Tokyo: Kagaku Shinbunsha, 1979), pp.292-294.

(17.) Japan delayed freezing Iraqi assets in Japan until one day after the United States did so, but was swift in setting sanctions toward Iraq before it was formally decided in the U.N. Security Council.

(18.) See the following memoirs of the diplomats who were in their assignments in Iraq during the Gulf Crisis; Masaki Kunieda, Wangan Kiki: Gaikoukan no Genba Houkoku (The Gulf Crisis: A real report of a diplomat). (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1993). pp.108-109; and Kunio Katakura, Hitojichi to Tomoni Ikite: Iraku taishi no wangan kiki taiken ki (Living With the Hostages: Memoir of the Japanese Ambassador in Iraq During the Gulf Crisis). (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbun Sha, 1994), p.41.

(19.) According to "Statistical Appendix", Japan's Official Development Assistance Annual Report 1999, as found at the MOFA homepage, www.mofa.go.jp.

(20.) If the disbursement to the Northern Area in Iraq (i.e. Kurdistan) is included, the annual amount from the United States rises to U.S.$ 120 million on average for 1995-96.

(21.) Words of the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Walter Mondale. Jiji Press, (Tokyo) 5 September 1996.

(22.) Reuters, (London) II September 1997

(23.) This kind of notion is evident in the recent writing of Japanese diplomats such as Masahiko Hone, "Waga Kuni no Keizai Kyouryoku (ODA) no Kihon Shisei to Chuto Chiiki Enjo no Jittai (Our Basic Stance for ODA and Actual Situation of Aid for the Middle East Region)," Chuto Kenkyu. (Tokyo: July, 1997), p.5; Ryohei Murata, "Keynote Address," in Edward J. Lincoln (ed). Japan and the Middle East. (Washington D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1990), p.8; and Masamitsu Oki, "Japanese Middle East Policy: Past, Present, and Future," in Edward J. Lincoln (ed). op.cit., p.61.

(24.) Yoshitsu also quotes a high-ranking Japanese official as follows; "the Arab countries were largely unaware of [Japan's] recognition of the legitimate right of Palestinian self-determination." See: Yoshitsu, op.cit., p.1.

(25.) Chuto Chosakai, "Zadankai: Sengo no Wagakuni Chuto Gaikou....", op.cit., p. 19.

(26.) Katakura, Hitojichi ... ..., op.cit., pp. 107-109.

(27.) Chuto Chosakai, "Zadankai: Sengo no Wagakuni Chuto Gaikou....", op.cit., p. 9.

(28.) Hafiz Ibrahim, an Egyptian poet (1872-1932), recited nationalistic poems for anti-colonialism, taking subjects from Japan. In his poems he idealized Japan saying, "Japan had climbed up to the top of glory, and Egypt will soon follow her." There were many other Arab poets, such as Ma'ruf al-Rusafi of Iraq and Ya'qub Sarruf of Lebanon, who composed similar poems on Japan. See: Hideaki Sugita, Nihon jin no Chuto Hakken (The Japanese Discovery of the Middle East). (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1995), pp.197-212.

(29.) See for example Kunio Katakura and Motoko Katakura, Japan and the Middle East. (Tokyo: The Middle East Institute of Japan, 1991).

(30.) Various articles and editorials of al-Thawra and al-Jumhuriya; October 1988 to April 1989.

(31.) Kyodo News, (Tokyo) 2 November 2000.

(32.) MOFA, Press Conference by the Press Secretary, 14 November 1997.

(33.) Hiroyuki Kobayashi, "Wangan Shokoku Jousei to Wagakuni no Seisaku (Present Situation of the Gulf States and Japan's Policy Toward Them)." Chuto Kenkyu. (September, 1999), pp.32-33.

(34.) Asahi Shimbun, (Tokyo) 19 December 1998.

(35.) Nikkei Shimbun, (Tokyo) 21 December 1998.

(36.)Reuters, (London) 13 October 1995.

(37.) According to a banker's estimate. There are several estimations about the total amount of the debts to Iraq. Another source says that Iraq owes to 200 billion yen to Japan's nine major trading firms. JiJi Press, (Tokyo) 3 September 1996.

(38.) Reuters, (London) 19 December 1996.

(39.) Data from Enerugii Sogo Suishin Iinkai (The Committee for Energy Policy Promotion).

(40.) It is worth mentioning that the United States climbed up to the top position after 1984 instead of Iraq or other Middle Eastern and Asian countries; see: Sakai, op.cit., p.66.

(41.) al-Thawra, 12 January 2001.

(42.) Ryohei Murata, former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, admitted that "there are two primary points of divergence in Japanese and U.S. positions concerning the Middle East which may bring about occasional differences of approach to a given situation. These are relations with the PLO ... and relations with post revolutionary Iran." Murata, op.cit., p.7; see also Kazuo Takahashi, U.S.-Japan Relationship over the Persian Gulf (Islamic Area Studies Working Paper Series No.8) (Tokyo: Islamic Area Studies Project, 1998).

(43.) Quoted by MENA, (Middle East News Agency, Cairo) 27 January 1999.

(44.) Kyodo, (Tokyo) 20 December 1998.

(45.) The only exception was Marubeni, who's share of value of projects which awarded in Iraq was 41 percent of those awarded in the Middle East total; see the Middle East Economic Institute, Chuto Keizai, special issue, 1989, No.121, quoted in Sakai, op.cit., p.67.

(46.) Douglas R. Ostrom, "Trends in Japanese Trade with the Middle East," in Edward J. Lincoln (ed). op.cit., p.19.

(47.) Hiroshi Shimizu, Introduction to Japan's Economic and Political Relations with the Middle East in the Inter-War Period: with an annotated bibliography of the Japanese Foreign Office Archives at the Diplomatic Record Office, Tokyo. (Singapore: Department of Japanese Studies at the National University of Singapore (Occasional paper series No.2), 1985), pp.20-21.

(48.) According to MOFA homepage.

(49.) Hitoshi Noda, "Wangan Shokoku Jousei to Wagakuni no Seisaku (The Present Situation of the Gulf States and Japan's Policy Toward Them)." Chuto Kenkyu, (July, 1998), p.16.

(50.) Kobayashi, "Wangan Shokoku Jousei .....", 1999, p.33.

(51.) Hiroyuki Kobayashi, "Wagakuni no Tai Iraku Seisaku (Our Policy Toward Iraq)," Kokusai Shigen. No.309 (September, 2000), pp.3-4.

(52.) al-Thawra, 12 January 2001.

(53.) Kyodo News, (Tokyo) 20 January 2001.

(54.) Sugita, op.cit., p.255.

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