JCAS in Afghanistan: fixing the Tower of Babel.

This article is a combination of two submitted by the authors itemizing joint close air support (JCAS) shortcomings in Operation Anaconda and recommending doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to fix the shortcomings. The authors' contend that JCAS procedures in Afghanistan were dangerous for our joint forces and imply that JCAS in Iraq, if we go to war in Iraq and use the same procedures, could result in fratricide--given the predictable increase in the size, tempo and intensity of combat operations.

This article deserves a serious read. The two original articles in their entirety, along with this article, are online in PDF format in our Go-to-War Primer, Category 1, "Desert and Related Articles," at sill-www.army.mil/famag.

Two of the authors are pilots who flew in Operation Anaconda. Two more are pilots who have flown combat missions over Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Parked in the North Arabian Sea, the USS John c. Stennis catapults a section of F/A-18 Hornets into the night. Lead and Wingman each are armed with one joint direct attack munition (JDAM), one air intercept missile(AIM)-9 and 500 20-mm rounds. They head north to provide on-call GAS in support of Operation Anaconda.

As they arrive over the shah-E-Kot Valley, Lead switches the auxiliary radios TO the tactical air direction (TAD) frequency given to him by the airborne warning and control system (AWACS). He maintains AWACS in the prime radios.

He has been given no mission brief up to this point. He has not been given a control point (GP) that designates his, GAS holding point. He knows what unit is on the air tasking order (ATO) and that that is where the action is, but he doesn't know where other friendly forces are or what the enemy situation is on the ground. He has a frequency and a terminal controller's call sign.

After establishing communications with the terminal controller, the controller has Lead advise when he is ready to copy the 9-line CAS briefing. "Ready," Lead responds.

The controller starts off: "Lines 1-3, N/A."

"Roger that..." says Lead as he and Wingman dodge the co-altitude EP-3 and pass over a Predator, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), flying a couple of thousand feet below them. They copy the abbreviated 9-line briefing and prepare for the attack.

All the controller wants is to give the pilots a precise coordinate, have them program the JDAMs and "Let em' rip." The target is a "mortar pit."

Lead asks for an attack axis, which the controller provides. The altitude is a round number: 9,800 feet. (Hmmm...)

Wingman takes the high-cover position as they go through the careful process of verbally cross-checking the accuracy of the precise coordinates.

"What's your target?" "Mortars."

Then another voice breaks in on the TAD frequency. It is another controller who immediately proceeds to provide a different 9-line brieting. The two controllers then engage in a free-text, plain English discussion of who gets the aerial fire support.

"So is mine."

"Well, are yours firing at you?!?!"

"Hey listen, have you cleared this through the brigade ALO [air liaison officer] or the FSC [fire support coordinator]?"

"No."

Gas for the jets starts to become an issue. The terminal controllers sort out the priority of fires and Lead delivers his JDAM. It misses the target by 200 feet. (JDAM?)

The controllers decide to switch to a different mortar pit and the pilots again go through the process of crosschecking the coordinates being entered into the weapons system. The altitude given is, again, a round number: 10,200 feet. (What are the odds of that?)

As Wingman (Dash 2) sets up his attack run, the AWACS controller comes on the common frequency to let them know a B-52 is "Cleared Hot" to drop leaflets. Dash 2 jumps on the auxiliary radio to assure Lead that he has not been fooled by the terminology and that he knows the clearancc given on prime radio was not his.

Dash 2's JDAM misses. It is off by 150 feet.

Lead asks for the bomb hit assessment. The controller reports that the JDAMs did not hit the targets but did hit close to the targets. After a couple of questions from Lead, that there were "No effects on target."

Off target, the outgoing F/A-18s dodge an inbound section of A- 10s as the Hornets head toward the fuel tanker.

This mission scenario was ineffective and inefficient. Piecemeal situational awareness, an absence of any agreed upon joint procedures, communications discipline that bordered on the dangerous and, ultimately, no effects on target characterized this mission.

This tale is not an embellishment or a composite picture from various missions. It is the summary of an actual mission flown in Afghanistan during Operation Anaconda. Unfortunately, in terms of procedures, communications discipline and situational awareness, this JCAS mission is representative of those flown during that operation.

In the sense that neither aircraft had effects on target, the scenario is not representative of overall operations in Anaconda. Extremely competent and highly trained professionals on the ground and in the air worked together to "make it happen" and delivered deadly fires to the enemy. Ground controllers identified targets and, more often than not, attack aircraft hit those targets.

However, there are enduring themes in this mission that bring into question our ability to effectively and efficiently provide aerial fires in support of the ground combat commander (GCC). Is this a problem? Yes. Will it repeat itself? Maybe.

Joint force performance in executing CAS missions is one of the defining expressions of joint operations at the tactical level of war. At the operational level of war, joint CAS effectiveness can be measured by how well command and control ([C.sup.2]) is executed--common operational pictures, ATO, rules of engagement (ROE), control measures, etc. Although some of the most important planning, coordinating and support procedures for JCAS are at the operational level, the net effectiveness and efficiency of JCAS is manifested at the tactical level where it is executed.

In Operation Anaconda, we did not execute GAS as an effective joint force. Poor CAS performance resulted from a lack of adherence to or even understanding of joint doctrine. Given the prospect for the continued application of joint operations in the Global War on Terror, we must examine this performance and commit to change...and fast. We must agree to build the operational architecture that's provided for in Joint Pub 3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support (online at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_09_3.pdf).

This article examines the shortcomings of JCAS performance in Afghanistan and provides specific operational-and tactical-level TTPs for improving JCAS on a future battlefield.

Observations from Afghanistan. The operational and tactical levels of JCAS did not adhere to agreed upon fundamental mechanics. The following section catalogues how the poor implementation of warfighting basics resulted in a level of performance that fell short of the mark.

These performance issues are not "news." The amount of self-induced friction experienced by all players during the Operation Anaconda was so significant that a JCAS Conference was convened at Al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait immediately after the operation in an attempt to identify and correct the problems.

* While there was some understanding by aircrews of the commander's intent and the ground scheme of maneuver at the outset of the operation, there was little understanding of how aerial fires supported the ground scheme of maneuver after the infantry took the field. There was even less awareness of where the forces were located and what their objectives were as the operation progressed.

* There was no dedicated, traditional airborne [C.sup.2]. The Air Force airborne battlespace command and control center (ABCCC) C-130 was not on the force list. The role was given to AWACS, but it did not have the workstations or the personnel with the right experience to fill the gap. Consequently, aircrews did not receive check-in briefings, updates or procedural control.

* The Army did not have a full-up air support operations center (ASOC) capable of translating the commander's intent into a priority of fires. This created confusion/friction as terminal controllers fought for aerial fire support assets on an ad hoc basis over a single TAD frequency.

* There was no traditional control point/initial point (CP/IP) matrix. What was used was a holdover from the initial armed reconnaissance phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, which was nothing more than a simple grid system based on latitude/longitude coordinates that subtended 30 by 30-nautical mile blocks.

This system was adequate for positioning attack/support aircraft for presence missions, holding tracks and refueling tracks, but it was not adequate to enable controllers to construct effective attack missions. This was because no IPs were established for which optimal geometry could be created for the aerial attack runs.

The absence of a satisfactory CP/IP structure and standard procedural control resulted in heavy bombers making attack runs over the top of tactical aircraft that were on attack runs in the same airspace with various helicopters in the same target area.

* A standard communications architecture was not adhered to. Rather than having a discrete TAD frequency assigned to individual terminal controllers or units, a single TAD was used. This was in part due to the requirement for the combined air operations center (CAOC) to monitor all release clearances through AWACS. This created confusion when multiple controllers attempted to control a single aircraft element.

* Standard commo brevity was not used and commo discipline was poor to the point of being dangerous. The following are three examples of joint forces using incorrect or misusing joint military terms, causing confusion.

First, AWACS transmitted "Cleared Hot" relay calls from the CAOC to aircraft on the strike common frequency. Other attack aircraft monitored that same frequency while working with terminal controllers over the TAD frequency in their other radio. Aircrews in GAS aircraft for whom the clearance was nor intended stood a chance of mistakenly delivering ordnance based on a "Cleared Hot" intended for other strike aircraft being controlled by the CAOC through AWACS.

Next, some terminal controllers shied away from the responsibility of clearing aircraft "Hot" by using the terms "Cleared to engage" or "Cleared to fire." Aircrews were not sure what these terms dictated or even implied.

The third example is that some terms used looked and sounded like traditional, doctrinal fire support coordinating measures (FSCM) but were not and sometimes proved dangerous. Free-fire areas (FFAs) were not FFAs as defined by joint doctrine or the Department of Defense Dictionary.

In this example, FFAs were plotted on maps in the Navy's carrier intelligence center as promulgated through the ATO special instructions (SPINS) and the intelligence network. When aircrews sought clarification on this control measure, they were told these FFAs were not really FFAs that allowed all firepower sources free engagements in that area, but were some type of control measure intended for ground forces only. Such misuse of common terms caused great confusion and bore the potential for disaster.

* Terminal controllers seldom used JCAS 9-line briefs--and when they did, they listed lines I through 3 as "N/A." (More on this later.)

* Times-on-target (TOTs) were not used. The use of a TOT is not always required and sometimes is inappropriate. This is especially true when permissive GAS procedures are being used, the volume of fires is not an issue and (or) targets are relatively static.

However, in Operation Anaconda, the absence of TOTs as a control measure created a very open-ended enterprise that increased individual aircraft time over the target area. This had the net effect of reducing the aggregate number of aircraft that delivered fires in that target area.

* Aircrews were very rarely provided a "mark." Like the TOT, a mark is not a requirement for GAS. Marks may not be appropriate when employing joint-weapons (J-weapons) and positive visual identification of the target by the aircrew is not required.

But J-weapons are not the only weapons in the inventory. For example, MK-82s with variable-time fuzes were used as a weapon/target match against personnel in the Shah-e-Kot Valley and positive identification often was required. And while a mark may not be a requirement for GAS, it is listed in JP 309.3 as being one of the nine determining conditions for effective GAS.

Historically, artillery or mortars fire marking rounds, such as white phosphorous. When a mark was used in Operation Anaconda, it was generally a laser mark that worked extremely well for aircraft with laser trackers. But not all controllers had suitable lasers, and not all aircraft had laser trackers.

The absence of a visual mark increased the time required for the aircraft to acquire the target, which increased time-to-kill and decreased the overall number of aircraft available to the ground combat commander.

* The quality of visual "talk-ons" by terminal controllers to a target was poor and took a long time. Often an aircrew had to terminate a talk-on to go to a fuel tanker to extend its time-on-station. Sometimes aircraft were sent home.

Once again, this decreased the overall number of aircraft available to the ground combat commander.

* Target elevations were sometimes only very roughly estimated, which detracted from the effectiveness of global-positioning system- (GPS)-guided munitions, such as JDAM.

* Procedures and requirements for using airborne forward air controllers (FAG(A)) were confused with procedures and requirements for working with a ground FAG or enlisted terminal controller (ETAC).

* Predators used the term "Cleared Hot" when cueing attack aircraft onto targets that were patently interdiction targets. "Cleared Hot" is a term used exclusively by terminal controllers engaged in a GAS mission.

While UAVs may have utility in a GAS environment, they also have limitations that may preclude commanders from using them. It is safe to say, however, that UAV controllers who are not executing a GAS mission should not use GAS terms.

In spite of these violations or aberrations of joint doctrine, we succeeded in Operation Anaconda because we had professional warriors on the ground and in the air making it successful. But even in the face of mounting evidence that our joint forces in Operation Anaconda were dysfunctional, there was an inexplicable reluctance to impose operational and tactical discipline in the form of previously agreed upon joint TTPs.

Special OperationsForces (SOF) GAS and Conventional GAS. Operation Anaconda was a small operation that took place within the larger context of Operation Enduring Freedom. Operations prior to Anaconda relied primarily on SOF who employed precision munitions delivered by coalition aircraft to break the back of Taliban and al Qaeda forces.

Operation Anaconda on the other hand, used conventional forces and somewhat more conventional tactics in an attempt to target remaining pockets of al Qaeda fighters. However, the procedures and tactics used during Anaconda were largely the same as those used during the SOF phase of combat.

During the Post-Anaconda CAS Conference in Kuwait, all agreed that poor performance in Anaconda was due to unsatisfactory procedures and execution. This led to an examination of procedures and tactics used with SOF teams and a discussion of whether or not the delivery of aerial fires in support of SOF is CAS. Many argued that it is not.

The two defining components of CAS are proximity of friendly combat forces to enemy forces and a requirement for detailed integration between the ground forces and air forces. The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia says, "CAS can be conducted at any place and time friendly combat forces are in close proximity to enemy forces. The word 'close' does not imply a specific distance; rather, it is situational. The requirement for detailed integration because of proximity, fires or movement is the determining factor. CAS provides firepower in offensive and defensive operations to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix or delay enemy forces."

That is a tenuous and dangerous position.

Given this definition, the most compelling of the two requirements is "detailed integration." The most common mistake is to assume that "integration" is the coordination required to deliver fires short of the fire support coordination line (FSCL).

This argument says that fires beyond the FSCL are permissive and there is little need for integration. It says there is no need for CAS TTPs when supporting SOF operating very deep-that chances for fratricide are small because of the SOF team's small footprint and the absence of a defined forward-line-of-own-troops (PLOT) beyond the FSCL. It argues that tactical procedures are inappropriate for forces that may be executing a strategic mission.

This argument is flawed. There may be less of a chance of CAS fratricide due to the small footprint of a SOF team, but the level of detailed integration required between a section of aircraft with live ordnance and an SOF team on the ground is no less important. SOF teams deploy early in an operation and have little opportunity for planning and coordination. This creates a requirement for shared language and standardized procedures. In SOP CAS, there is still a potential for fratricide and unacceptable collateral damage by misidentifying a target or implementing a poor attack plan.

SOF still require an aerial attack that brings the appropriate effects on target and minimizes risks to the SOP team. SOF still require high-tempo fires be available to the teams--that an attack is efficient so aircraft can get in and out to make way for the next attack element. And there is still a danger of mid-air collisions between attack and support aircraft if appropriate control measures are not used.

No TTPs exist outside of CAS TTPs to satisfy these requirements. By definition and by practicality, aerial fire delivered in support of Special Forces is CAS.

While it is understandable that the unique characteristics of SOP CAS produce doctrinal discussions, it is disconcerting that a argument should have to be made to support JCAS TTPs' use to execute a conventional fight. Current JCAS doctrine is time-tested and relevant.

Born out of the requirement to orchestrate a high volume of aircraft originating from many different locations and operated by four different services supporting multiple ground units in contact with the enemy, JCAS TIPs match a perishable air support asset with a need efficiently and effectively.

Due to the fluid and relatively large (sometimes massive) footprint of conventional forces on the ground, the opportunity for fratricide is extremely high. The gun-target lines of indirect fires and their trajectories must be accounted for. The volume of aircraft probably will be much higher than in a deep SOP team scenario, and the requirement for efficiency that provides tempo will be commensurately higher. There likely will be a much greater potential for attack aircraft to be exposed to the threat as commanders assume more risks to support and defend the ground combat element.

Both SOP and conventional CAS factors point to a compelling need for the disciplined employment of JCAS doctrine.

Need for Joint Doctrine. US armed forces do not like to adhere to doctrine. American fighting forces are known for this characteristic. There are a number of reasons why we don't like to adhere to doctrine.

In general, we accord great respect to military leaders who are tactically and operationally agile in combat. In this light, doctrine is seen as prescriptive and stifling.

Also, doctrine is authoritative, not directive. While it provides structure through a common operational architecture as well as standardized tactical procedures, joint forces are not necessarily required to adhere to the architecture or procedures as long as the commander approves the deviations.

In addition, adhering to doctrine approaches heresy in an age of rapid change-an age of "Transformation" and "Revolutions in Military Affairs." These are powerful impediments to the use of doctrine.

Properly implemented doctrine is a force multiplier, not a detractor. The joint forces' application of doctrinal fundamentals facilitates an operational and tactical environment that reduces self-induced friction and fosters inventiveness and creativity. Joint doctrine frees combat leaders from having to negotiate basic ground rules every time joint forces are assembled for combat. When all participants adhere to agreed upon fundamentals, the result is a cohesive fighting force.

Operational-Level Recommendations. The success or failure of JCAS control measures, commo architecture and operational-level [C.sup.2] functions are affected most by commanders and their operational-level planners who design the operation prior to its execution. Based on the discussion of shortcomings of JCAS in Operation Anaconda and the need for all forces to know joint doctrine, we make the following operational-level recommendations to improve JCAS on future battlefields.

* Commanders: Ensure all operators involved in an operation get an overview of the commander's intent, ground scheme of maneuver and priorities of fire. Ensure these are updated regularly. This information should be pushed to major subordinate commands--not merely posted on a secure Internet protocol router (SIPR) website.

* Operational-Level Planners: Design airspace control measures (ACM), especially CPs and IPs, as a team effort between the GCC and the air component commander (ACC).

* [C.sup.2]: Provide a check-in briefing for aircrews that maximizes their situational awareness.

* GCC: Ensure the Air Force ASOC or Marine direct air support center (DASC) coordinates with the FSC to establish and assign priorities of fire.

* ATO Planners: Declare the [C.sup.2] language that will be used and stick to it. For example, if the USAF tactical air command system (TACS)/USA Army air-ground system (AAGS) is being used, ensure that US Navy tactical air control system (NTACS)/USMC Marine air command and control system (MACCS) terminology is not used in the SPINS or in the area of responsibility (AOR).

* Operational-Level Planners: Ensure the communications architecture is constructed with the tactical end state in mind. The use of a common frequency (such as an air defense net or a positive control AWACS frequency) is acceptable as long as only correct, disciplined communications are used. Ensure terminal controllers are assigned discrete frequencies to the maximum extent possible.

* All: Know Joint Pub 3-09.3 cold. When arriving in theater, be prepared to comply with JP 3-09.3 procedures. Also be prepared to adapt or create tactics, based on the mission, commander's intent, threat and ROE. You first must know doctrine before you can implement it or decide how to deviate from it.

* All: Communicate. Understand where and how the commander is deviating from joint doctrine. Provide appropriate feedback during combat operations either in real-time or through the chain of command.

* All: Formally update doctrine immediately upon cessation of hostilities. Ensure that after-action items/reports get submitted to the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULL).

JCAS at the Tactical Level: Challenges and Solutions. Tactics are the thoughtful outcome of planning by trigger-pullers who look to achieve mission objectives in consonance with the commander's intent with respect to a given threat and in accordance with the ROE.

Therefore, tactics can never be prescribed. Still, there must be a common understanding and appreciation of the various JCAS tactical and technical foundations employed during training in peace to ensure tactical interoperability during combat operations in war.

Given JCAS performance in Operation Anaconda, it is wise to reevaluate JCAS fundamentals, including the following selected CAS TTP that were underused in Afghanistan during that operation.

Who needs a check-in brief? "Get your gas. Check in with AWACS. Go hold where you're told. You'll get your information from the FAC or ETAC soon enough."

This is not the correct way to operate under any circumstances. Aircrews lose valuable time they could use to prepare for their missions.

Aircrews have questions that can be answered while in CAS holding. Where is the fight? Do I have the right chart out? What is the lay of the land? What is the current threat? How will the threat affect my desired/required weapons delivery parameters? Where is the artillery? What batteries are Hot? Is there a prepared 9-line brief waiting for me that can be passed through the controlling agency? Is the controller using a hasty IP that was not in the SPINS?

Providing a check-in briefing gets the aircrew "out in front" in an enterprise that requires a clear mind for sound judgment and split-second timing to bring effects on target. It is critical the [C.sup.2] agency provide the interface and connectivity between the ground combat element and the attack aircraft.

[C.sup.2] platforms come in many shapes and sizes: USAF ABCCC in a C-130 or AWACS; Marine DASC or DASC-Airborne; and USN E-2C Hawkeye.

What is the importance of the ASOC or DASC? A primary task of the ASOC or the DASC is to translate the ground commander's intent for the many types of aircrews and tell them the priority of fires, as directed by the ground commander's FSC. This must be done in a very short time.

The ASOC or DASC is collocated with the FSC and provides the FSC updates on aircraft, ordnance and time-on-station available. The FSC tells the ASOC or DASC the focus of effort and priority of fires, helping it to decide which aircraft to assign to which units/ controllers.

The ASOC or DASC also routes the aircraft to deconflict air and ground fires and its flight path with other aircraft. This is transparent to the aircrews but critical. Aircrews normally are based hundreds of miles from the ground elements and not privy to the latest developments of the ground battle. They may or may not talk directly to the ASOC or the DASC, depending on the [C.sup.2] architecture in place.

All an aircrew knows is that it has been assigned a TAD frequency and a controller--plus the information in its check-in brief that most likely will need to be updated due to the fluidity of the ground battle. The aircrew switches frequencies and executes. It's that simple and that critical.

Why are lines 1 through 3 of the 9-line briefing applicable? Of all the concepts, procedures and tactics that require an explanation, the need to explain the utility of the JCAS 9-line brief is the most troubling. (See Figure 1.)

Some operators in the Afghan operation argued that there is little requirement for a 9-line briefing. These operators contend that a derivation of precise target coordinates make it possible to employ accurate weapons, such as JDAM, and obviate the need to plan attack geometry or coordinate timing and flow. Others see the utility in the standard briefing format, but do not appreciate the benefits of the first three lines.

Granted, there are times when a 9-line brief is not required, but they are rare. In a permissive, low-tempo environment with a relatively low number of targets, good weather conditions and attack aircraft with a healthy amount of time-on-station, a terminal controller is justified in bringing a section of aircraft or two over the target area and talking their eyes on to the target. Under the same conditions with a FAC(A) controlling, the FAC(A) probably is going to arrange for a rendezvous with the attack aircraft and lead it to the target area where he will provide a mark or a talk-on. However, in most other circumstances, a 9-line should be used.

The obvious circumstances that dictate the use of a 9-line is when the threat is moderate or high and restrictive GAS procedures are used. The standard attack format is used along with a TOT to reduce the exposure of attack aircraft to the threat. Not much argument here.

The argument arises when the threat level is medium to low. In this case, there are times when a more developed attack can be planned and transmitted via the 9-line brief. The entire brief can be used when aircraft time-on-station is low due to aircraft type, ship/airfield location, availability of tankers, etc. The increased level of 9-line planning and the coordination of a mark pay great dividends in significantly reduced time for the aircraft to acquire and kill a target, maximizing the productivity of the aircraft's time-on-station.

The more restrictive measures of a 9-line brief impose geometry that improve the flow of aircraft and, if a mark is used, reduces the aircrew's time to acquire the targets. The net effect is a greater number of aircraft in the target area over a given amount of time, which increases the potential to kill targets.

The same can be said for the scenario with a low threat, good weather, good time-on-station but a relatively high number of targets. This scenario requires a greater number of aircraft over the target area to kill as many targets as possible before they either mass for an attack or flee.

Finally, the 9-line should be used when the controller wants to control the geometry of the attack because there is a remote chance of fratricide or unacceptable collateral damage.

Many operators accept the utility of the 9-line standard attack format but believe lines 1 through 3 are unnecessary--that the remaining lines provide the required information, such as target elevation and description. Or they transmit the 9-line because the joint task force commander requires them to but opt out by transmitting "Lines 1-3, N/A." They do not understand how critical lines 1 through 3 are in developing an effective, efficient attack.

Lines 1 through 3 are applicable. The first three lines provide the IP heading (as well as offset direction) and distance to the target in one burst transmission. Using lines 1 though 3 increases the odds of a successful attack to a degree that far outweighs the time it takes for a controller to generate the geometry and aircrew to copy the information down.

Precise attack geometry reduces the odds of fratricide by dictating the bomb fall line. (Offset direction is critical here.) Precise attack geometry ensures greater effects on target by taking into account the terrain in terms of target acquisition, uninterrupted laser energy and the impact angle of the ordnance (especially in mountainous terrain). It increases the odds of first-pass target acquisition by the aircrew. Pre-planned attack geometry also increases the odds of the controller's first-pass acquisition of the attack aircraft so he can provide the aircraft a "Cleared Hot."

Using lines 1 through 3 increases effectiveness throughout the AOR by optimizing aircraft flow and providing deconfliction. Because pre-planned CAS missions are vetted through the ATO planning process and the assignment of CPs are an essential part of that process, flow into and out of the target area can be optimized and the potential of mid-air collision reduced.

These benefits also occur in immediate-request CAS because it is a joint tactical air strike request (JTAR) routed through CAS request channels. If a JTAR is approved by the senior fire support control agency, the mission is transmitted back to the requesting unit with data that includes a CP. The optimal CP is chosen if the ASOC or DASC knows what IP the controller wants to use. The ASOC or DASC transmits the mission data directly to the aircraft or to other [C.sup.2] agencies that relay the information and the assigned CP.

Aircraft deconfliction takes place when a [C.sup.2] agency uses positive or procedural control to route aircraft to and from CPs throughout the AOR. This routing also provides deconfliction from other fires, to include mortars, artillery and naval gunfire.

Creating attack geometry for the pilot and transmitting it in a standard 9-line format optimizes the attack effects and provides efficient aircraft flow and deconfliction.

Who creates IPs? Somehow we no longer understand the importance and determining characteristics of the IP. Terminal controllers must have well-thought-out IP options from which to execute final attack planning. Terrain, location of friendlies, scheme of maneuver, threat axis and location, locations of indirect fire assets and aircraft flow into and Out of the target area must be accounted for.

More importantly, we don't understand who creates IPs and gets them inserted into the ATO. Before ground combat forces take the field, the FSC and his ALO or air officer need to coordinate with the air operations center (AOC)--through the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), if necessary--to plan the operation. Central to this planning is creation of IPs that will facilitate the ground scheme of maneuver.

But in Afghanistan, the CAOC developed all ACM. It was a simple grid system laid out in 30-by-30 nautical mile boxes. The corners of these boxes were labeled CPs/IPs. Grid points laid out in such a simple system are neither geometrically or geographically suitable for use as IPs. There was an effort to create useable IPs for Operation Anaconda, but this happened well into the operation and the terminal controllers never used them.

What happened to the effective talk-on? The general consensus of aviators in Afghanistan was that American ground forces' ability to provide a talk-on to a target has deteriorated. Ground forces tended to think talk-ons simply took too long--some took 40 minutes.

Talk-ons are not hard to do. For example, talk-ons given by UN Protection Forces FACs in Bosnia were referred to as "Grey Line Tours." Those FACs took aircrews over the river and through the woods to a mortar position in a tree line very quickly. They used simple rules for a good talk-on, as follows.

* Start by looking at a map. This will help you create and expand a mental picture of the target area beyond line-of-sight and visualize what the aircrew may see.

* Use reference points, but stay away from those that are significant only in their vertical development. Aircrews at 10, 15 or 20 thousand feet above the ground can't pick out the "big ridgeline" if their world is nothing but ridgelines. They can't pick out the "big castle" in the middle of a city when nothing on the ground looks much like a castle from the air.

Look on the chart for the most significant man-made or natural feature within five nautical miles of your target. Use that as your starting point. Instead of a big castle, for example, the unique circular street in the middle of the city from which all streets emanate is a better anchor point. The aircrew will be able to see this unique reference from the air.

Color or significant changes in color, such as in the differences between types of sand, soil or fields, sometimes make excellent reference points. Be sure the color changes are unique and will stand out.

* Use a signal mirror to show the aircrew your position (which reduces the potential for your being fratricide). Your position also makes an excellent anchor point, especially if you have eyes on the target. (The light from the mirror is directional as you look through the sight on the mirror and will not give away your position, if you are careful.)

* Find a unit of measure on the ground that you can use to "walk" the aircrew to the target. Typical units of measure include airfields or distances between two significant man-made features, such as bridges.

* Use the principle of "big to small" to lead the aircrew to the target.

There is no substitute for training. We need to ensure we are training to a common operational picture that comes as close to how we intend to fight as possible. (See Figure 2 for a list of execution tips for terminal controllers and attack aircraft.)

While we cannot predict what circumstances of mission, intent, threat and ROE might require our ingenious tactical inventiveness, we do know we must all show up at the fight with the same tactical foundation, regardless of service. From there we can adjust for new technology, new joint organizations, etc. If we don't understand the theory behind our science, there will be no way to achieve combat success with any modicum of efficiency.

At the Post-Operation Anaconda GAS Conference in Kuwait, an F-i 15E pilot stood up to say his piece. In his right hand, he clutched a document of some sort.

"We 'Strike Eagle' guys don't do GAS. It is not a primary mission for us. We do not train to CAS. For this operation, we figured out we needed to learn how to do it pretty quick. So we did some research, found some pubs and prepared ourselves. We thought we were ready.

"When we got in country, the operations were nothing like what we expected. We concur with almost everything that has been said here this morning. But we have a question. Is there any reason why we can't just use this publication to fix the problems? Seems like most everything that folks have been talking about is covered in this pub."

He raised the document in his right hand. It was Joint Pub 3-09.3.

Figure 2: Summary of JCAS Execution Tips for the Terminal Controller and Attack Aircraft

Terminal Controllers

* It tempo, threat or the need for a volume of fires is high, use the 9-line briefing. Lines 1 through 3 are not only applicable, they are critical for an effective, efficient mission.

* Lines 1 through 3 allow the forward air controller (FAC) and pilot delivering the ordnance to account for the bomb fall line, given the terrain, laser target lines and impact angle. This is done to prevent fratricide and unacceptable collateral damage and ensure effects on target.

* Be as precise as possible when deriving target elevation, especially when constructing joint direct attack munition (JUAM) missions.

* Use a mark in a permissive environment if it is important to get the aircrew's eyes on the target quickly, especially if the target is fleeting in nature.

* Use times-on-target (TOTs) in permissive environments if you want to create hightempo fires by sequencing multiple sections of aircraft across the target area.

* When executing a talk-on, first construct the mission on a chart. Try to put yourself in the cockpit and visualize what the pilot is looking at.

* When appropriate, mark your own position with a signal mirror during the day or with an infrared (IR) strobe or pointer at night.

* Make sure your laser terminology and IR terminology are correct and that you do not confuse the two.

* Practice. Call your local USAF, USAF Reserve, Air National Guard, USN or USMC unit to support your training. Create airspace control measures (ACM). Develop 9-line briefs to reflect different types of threat scenarios and missions. Coordinate with your artillery and mortars to provide marks. If you do not have a local impact area, get a case of smoke grenades and use the smokes to simulate marks and bomb hits. Work talk-on missions. Debrief and analyze.

* Finally, as a terminal controller--control.

Attack Aircraft

* Provide a sanity check for the mission--understand the friendly and enemy situation and be alert for confusing terminology. Given the time, refine the mission with the FAC to produce timely effects.

* Don't automatically deliver on a "Cleared Hot" if you did not understand the brief or if the mission develops to the point of contusion. Given the significant friction on the battlefield, make sure you and the controller work as a team and you understand the nature of his mission.

* Execute the mission--hit the target.

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Jansen, US Marine Corps, is an F/A-18 pilot who served as the Executive Officer for Marine Flight Attack Squadron 314 flying combat missions off the USS John C. Stennis over Afghanistan in support of Operations Anaconda and Enduring Freedom. He attended the Post-Anaconda Close Air Support Conference (GAS) at Al Jaber Air Force Base in March 2002. He has flown combat missions in Operation Southern Watch over the No-FlyZonein Iraq and Operations DenyFlight/Provide Comfort over Bosnia.

Lieutenant Commander Nicholas Dienna, US Navy, served as the Operations Officer in a VF-211 flying combat missions off the USS John C. Stennis over Afghanistan during Operations Anaconda and Enduring Freedom. He is a former Top Gun Instructor and currently serves as the Navy Executive Fellow at the Rand Corporation.

Major Wm Todd Buf kin II, US Marine Corps, is an AH-1W pilot who most recently served as a Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Detachment Officer-in-Charge with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), MEU (SOC), flying missions over Camp Rhino in southern Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. He is a qualified Forward Air Controller (FAC) and FAC (Airborne). He deployed with tour Western Pacific MEUs, one as a Battalion Air Officer and three as an AH-1W pilot.

Major David I. Oclander, US Army, is a student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia. Next year he will attend the Marine Corps School for Advanced Warfare, also at Quantico. He commanded B Company, 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute in the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Major Thomas Di Tomasso is a US Army Infantry officer with experience in Somalia, Bosnia and Afghanistan as a Joint Task Force Operations Officer. Currently, he is a student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Major James B. Sisler, USAF, is an F-15E Instructor Pilot with 13 combat missions over Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom from October to December 2001. He is a qualified ground Terminal Attack Control Instructor and has been the mission commander as well as led combat missions in support of Operations Northern and Southern Watch over Iraq.