JCAS and The Defense of Duffer's Wadi.

This article updates E.D. Swinton's book The Defense of Duffer's Drift written about combat in the Boer War and printed in the US in 1905. Like its predecessor, the article outlines a series of dreams of a main character in combat--in this case, a captain in command of a Stryker company who is tasked with the defense of a key piece of terrain, Duffer's Wadi. A "wadi" is a valley, gully or riverbed that remains dry except during the rainy season.

Reminiscent of Duffer's Drift, the main character makes mistakes in the first dream that result in disaster for him and his unit. In his subsequent dreams, he learns from his previous mistakes until he finally is successful in accomplishing his mission. Unlike Duffer's Drift, this article focuses on a single mission area: the ground commander's use or misuse of fires, specifically, joint close air support (JCAS).

The lessons the captain learns in these dreams are actual lessons gleaned from Air Warrior I and II after-action reports (AARs). Air Warrior I is the USAF exercise flown in support of brigade combat team (BCT) rotations at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. Air Warrior II is the USAF exercise flown in support of BCT rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana.

In the article's scenario, the enemy is referred to as the "Feyadeen." The battle could have taken place last year or will take place five years from now somewhere in the Middle East or Afghanistan. The Feyadeen consists of both regular forces with conventional weapons, such as tanks, BMPs, mortars, surface-to-air missiles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and irregular forces with non-conventional weapons, such as car/truck bombs, technical vehicles, suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Feyadeen are fanatics committed to driving all American and allied forces from their country despite the fact that their nation is in the process of building a fledgling democracy.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Prologue. The dust had just cleared from the last C-17 leaving the airfield as my company XO [executive officer], and I walked up to the tent that served as the battalion command post [CP], known as the TOC [tactical operations center]. It was the last day of October, and my company was one of two that had been airlifted to an abandoned airfield in the middle of nowhere as part of Operation Vigilant Foresight. Portions of a Ranger battalion had parachuted into this airfield that the Russians had built in the 1970s and secured it as our future SBCT [Stryker BCT] FOB [forward operating base].

The rest of my brigade would begin arriving early tomorrow morning. For now, it was up to my company and one other company in my Stryker battalion and the Rangers to hold the FOB and airfield for the night. Fortunately, we had about six hours until the sun went down to figure out what was going on.

Inside the TOC, my battalion CO [commanding officer] was looking over a map with the S3 and the Air Force master sergeant who served as the EBALO [enlisted battalion air liaison officer]. The EBALO was in charge of the single TACP [tactical air control party] we were able to get on the C-17s today. The rest of the USAF team and equipment would arrive tomorrow with the brigade TOC. My CO looked at me and pointed to a wadi on the map 20 kilometers due west of the airfield.

"We don't expect any trouble from the Feyadeen tonight, but if they come, it most likely will be from here, Duffer's Wadi," he said as he pointed to the map. (See Figure 1 on Page 6.)

"Move your company to Duffer's Wadi, establish a hasty defensive position and hold until relieved." The CO also told me that only three of the unit's 155-mm M198 howitzers had arrived and ammo was very limited. He sent the other company several kilometers east to block the eastern approach to the airfield.

"The ASOC [air support operations center] said they will give us the CAS we need," the CO said, "so take your FIST [fire support team] and company mortars with you and make sure you check in with the signal officer before you leave.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

"I don't have a TACP to send with you out west; we will run any CAS you need out of the battalion TOC until tomorrow. As soon as you get out there, radio back any preplanned CAS requests. Unless you have any questions, you and your men can get going," he finished.

My mind was jumping ahead to the myriad of things I had to do--orders to give, develop a plan for how to defend the wadi--so I told the CO, "We got it!" and left the TOC.

As I walked to the commo tent, the EBALO caught up with me and asked if I wanted to take an Air Force JTAC [joint terminal air controller] assigned to the Ranger battalion with me. The JTAC's unit had not arrived yet. Apparently, he was a combat veteran, had lots of great gear and was willing to support my company for the next 24 to 36 hours.

My unit had trained hard together for months before this mission, and I did not want to baby-sit some new guy if things got Hot. I politely declined the EBALO's offer and went to see a man about commo.

In the commo tent, they handed me a list with our unit's nets, frequencies and crypto for the next week. The signal lieutenant asked, "Sir, because your unit is the first one 'out of the shoot,' I'm going to let you decide if you want to freeze crypto for the next 48 hours so you don't have to take two months' worth of data." I looked at my watch and realized it would be next month in 10 hours and that this lieutenant had just had a great idea.

I asked him if that would affect my ability to talk to the battalion TOC, and he told me, "No," that if he froze crypto for me, he would do it for everyone in the battalion until the brigade set up its TOC tomorrow or the next day.

I walked out of the commo tent with one month's commo data, satisfied I had simplified my hasty plan a great deal.

It took a little less than an hour to finish fueling our Strykers and start moving. I pushed the company hard to get to our position with enough light to reconnoiter the area before we set up our perimeter and vehicle positions. We traveled in a column with flank security parallel to a well used dirt road running through the center of the wadi.

The position we were to defend was the mouth of Duffer's Wadi where it opened up to the west into a large valley. Our battle position was the narrowest part of the wadi, and the terrain closed into a three-kilometer-wide chokepoint. The ground rose gradually to the north and sharply up on the south with mountains on either side of the wadi.

My company consisted of 14 Stryker vehicles plus the one FSV [fire support vehicle] and totaled 150 personnel. We had two 120-mm mortars, nine Javelin missile systems, seven .50 cal machine guns and seven MK-19 automatic grenade launchers mounted on the Strykers. My three platoons consisted of 12 dismounted squads, each with a SAW [squad automatic weapon].

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

My company FIST had a brand new second lieutenant FSO [fire support officer], a staff sergeant FSNCO [fire support NCO] and two Soldiers, while each platoon had an FO [forward observer] party with one sergeant and Soldier each. My three MGSes [mobile gun systems] had been bumped from the air manifest to make room for the three 155-mm howitzers because intel had reported the enemy did not have a large armored force. The Javelins could handle anything the Feyadeen had.

The First Dream. This was my first chance to prove myself as a company commander. I was confident that my unit had the tools, the training and the firepower to hold the wadi against a much larger force.

After a quick recon, I decided to set my company CP up on the high ground just north of the middle of the wadi and arrange my Stryker platoons in a reverse horseshoe in the valley floor. (See Figure 2.) I placed the company FIST in the center of my defenses with the mortars located on the far southern flank behind a large rock outcropping. We were approximately four kilometers back from the entrance to the wadi, and any enemy force that entered it would come under the direct fire of the entire company--plus all the indirect fire I could call in.

The radio in my Stryker crackled, and it was my CO on the line. He wanted to know if we were in position. He also relayed the message that the EBALO was standing by for my CAS request.

I told him we were in position and had not encountered any opposition. I said I had no CAS request at that time but would get back with him if I needed CAS. My CO informed me that our sector would begin receiving JSTARs [joint surveillance and target attack radar system] coverage around midnight and that the TOC would forward that information to us digitally as soon as it came in. He told me to provide updates every two hours throughout the night unless I became engaged and then as necessary.

I put down the radio's handset just as the sun started to set. My men were eating MREs [meals ready to eat] in their defensive positions and had an air of confidence about them.

We were in the perfect position. As I looked west, the entrance of the wadi sloped up hill and crested at the optimum range of both my mortars and Javelins. I told my platoon leaders to have the Javelins focus on any tanks or APCs [armored personnel carriers] that came into the fight while the .50 cals and grenade launchers were to concentrate on any light-skinned vehicles. I had my FSO prepare a fire-for-effect, "At My Command" fire mission for the chokepoint at the mouth of the wadi.

The night was clear and cool. There was a full moon--we almost did not need our NVGs [night-vision goggles] and thermal sights. I was certain we were prepared for whatever the Feyadeen could throw at us--any enemy who poked his nose over that crest was going to be in for one helluva surprise.

A few minutes after midnight, the CO called and advised me that JSTARS picked up a force of approximately 60 vehicles 18 kilometers northwest of our position and moving toward us. At the present rate of speed, the enemy would be at my position in approximately 40 minutes. I alerted the platoon leaders and gave them the intel and orders to go to full alert.

Eventually, a single enemy tank flanked by two pickup trucks came over the crest and stopped. I could not take the chance that this tank had picked up on one of my Strykers, so I ordered the Javelins to engage them. The first Javelin was a direct hit, and the tank went up like a roman candle, lighting the entire wadi.

Just then, another tank and several more trucks came over the crest, and I called for both the mortars and howitzers to fire. Within seconds, the mouth of the wadi was engulfed in flames and explosions. Three of the trucks were hit; the tank retreated.

My CO informed me that JSTARs reported the enemy force was dispersing four to five kilometers to my west. My defensive plan in the wadi was exactly what I wanted: anything coming toward me faced certain death. Now all I had to do was wait for the Feyadeen to gather their courage and attack again.

It was another hour before we saw any movement from the enemy. Unfortunately when we picked up their troops moving on foot, they were already in the hills to our north and south. We immediately began engaging these troops with mortar and machine gun fire. Those who were not hit continued to move toward our flanks. Eventually, we started taking sporadic small arms and RPG fire from the ridge to the south of the wadi.

I told my FSO to work up a fire mission against the ridgeline just as my CO came on the radio and informed me that JSTARs said several of the vehicles were beginning to mass just beyond my line-of-sight at the mouth of the wadi. I informed the CO that I would need a significant artillery barrage if they attacked, and he told me that his tubes only had enough ammo for one more fire-for-effect mission.

As I worked the fire mission up with my FSO, the southernmost Stryker took a direct hit from an RPG. The burning Stryker illuminated our entire position, and the enemy's small arms and RPG fires immediately became more accurate. The reports of killed and wounded started coming in on the company net when two tanks and 20 vehicles came over the hill moving fast.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Again I yelled on the net for my platoon leaders to focus the Javelins on the tanks. Fingers of fire reached out, and within a half-minute, the tanks were dead--but not before one got off a shot and hit a Stryker on my left flank illuminated by the fire still burning from the first one.

The 155-mm fire mission started hitting the wadi floor when the trucks were about half way between the crest and my position. We poured everything we had onto them, and within a minute, half of the vehicles were dead or on fire.

Suddenly one of the burning trucks exploded in a huge fireball. It was then that I realized that the remaining trucks had no troops in them--that each appeared to be heading for a different Stryker. They were suicide bombers who knew the exact positions of the other Strykers. As this was happening, the ridge to the north erupted with RPG fire, hitting another two Strykers. My command was now down four Strykers in less than five minutes.

Only four of the original trucks were still moving, but I watched in horror as they weaved back and forth at full speed coming toward us. I was standing 50 meters from my command Stryker when the truck hit and my world went black.

Sometime later, I thought I heard a voice speaking a language I did not understand as vehicles drove past my position heading east. My head was throbbing, partly from the explosion of the suicide bomber and partly from the knowledge that I had failed in my mission and gotten most of my company wiped out.

I quickly pondered my situation and grasped the following lessons:

1. Twice I had been offered more fires in the form of CAS, and twice I had turned CAS down. We were defeated because we did not have enough fires to kill the enemy before they got to us. Next time I would include CAS in my fires request.

2. My main position was good; however, I allowed the enemy to hide from me until he was ready to attack--we could not kill the enemy as fast as he could present targets. I needed to move my FISTers to terrain where they could see the enemy sooner, so we could engage the enemy farther from our position.

Second Dream. Suddenly, I was walking out of the battalion TOC with my XO en route to the commo tent. It took me a moment to realize that I was in the same place with the same orders on the same day that I had started before--had the other been a dream? This time, I was much wiser and armed with two major lessons I had learned in the first fight.

Just then, the EBALO walked up and, again, offered me a Ranger JTAC; like before, I turned him down. This time, I told the EBALO that I would put in a CAS request as soon as I saw the terrain and would expect his help in executing CAS if we needed it. He promised to stand by for the request.

We went to see the commo lieutenant. I immediately asked the lieutenant to freeze crypto to simplify commo. Again, he agreed. I walked out with one month's data looking forward to the fight ahead.

Again I pushed my guys hard to get to the wadi with as much daylight as possible left to set up our defenses. I used the same reverse horseshoe defense and kept my mortars in the same place. This time, I told my FISTers to move as high as they could into the terrain on my right flank and far enough forward to see beyond the crest at the mouth of the wadi. (See Figure 3.) I wanted them to be able to see into the open valley beyond to get artillery on the bad guys before they could see us.

I told the company FSO that the plan was to hit the enemy with CAS after the main artillery barrage and that I would save enough artillery rounds for a last ditch defense of our position. Again, I had my FSO prepare a fire-for-effect, "At My Command" mission for the chokepoint at the mouth of the wadi. If things got Hot in the valley, I would pull him back to our right flank and then execute the fire mission.

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

As the FIST's Stryker moved off to the north, I got battalion on the radio to put in my CAS request. I told the EBALO I wanted CAS available from dark until 1200 tomorrow, for starters. He informed me that I could expect two F-16s equipped with LANTIRN [low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night] pods to be over our area starting at midnight at the same time that JSTARS came on station. The LANTIRN pod gives the pilot the ability to accurately locate targets at night. With the intel that JSTARS could provide, these fighters should provide devastating effects on the enemy.

The EBALO also told me that A-10s would be on station in flights of two starting around 0400 to cover us until the sun came up. He asked if I wanted to build any ACAs [airspace coordination areas] to deconflict the CAS from the artillery. Because my FISTers were the experts on this and they had just left, I told the master sergeant, "No, we will separate by time, sequentially using artillery and then CAS." I figured that, at this range, the 155-mm tubes' max altitude would be very high, and I did not want to mix up the jets with incoming rounds.

I still thought the defensive position and direct fire plan from the first attack was the right way to proceed, so I told my platoon leaders to have the Javelins focus on any tanks or APCs that came into the fight while the .50 cals and grenade launchers were to concentrate on any light-skinned vehicles. But this time, I told the platoon leaders to expect suicide attacks in the form of truck bombers, and if any trucks were headed directly at us at high speed, the Javelins should take them out first.

The sun was just setting in front of us as we made the last of our preparations while my FISTers checked in on the radio. Using my binoculars, I could barely make out the FIST Stryker about three kilometers west of us on my right and 700 to 800 feet above the valley floor. They were hidden from view from the west and should have a great view of the open valley below.

I made the first of my reports to my CO and told my driver to start some coffee; it was going to be a long night. I settled down to wait and went over the first battle in my head. Were there really only two lessons to be learned? Had I adequately prepared this time? I convinced myself I had and decided to walk the defenses before it got too dark.

At midnight I called the EBALO and asked him for a JSTARS report. He told me he would get right back to me. He called 10 minutes later with the CO on the line and told me JSTARS had picked up a force of approximately 60 vehicles 18 kilometers northwest of our position moving toward me. If they did not slow down, they would be at my position in approximately 40 minutes.

I asked the CO for an initial location on the Feyadeen convoy, and he passed the convoy's coordinates to me. I contacted my platoon leaders, gave them the intel and put them on full alert.

Finally, I called my FIST and gave them the information on the enemy. I reiterated my guidance: artillery first, then CAS and told them to contact the EBALO and start coordination for the CAS mission. (I realized at this point that I did not have a radio I could hear the pilots on; the CAS mission info all would have to be radio relayed through the EBALO who was still back at the airfield. But I was confident we would be able to work any request we needed.)

Less than 30 minutes later, my FIST lieutenant informed me the enemy convoy was in sight and within range of the artillery. I told him to start engaging it with artillery and monitored his request for fires on the net. His request was by-the-book; 90 seconds later, the rounds screamed overhead. As I heard them impact beyond the rise, I asked the FIST to give me a report. They said the rounds impacted at the beginning of the convoy, and the enemy was scattering to the north and south of the wide valley at high speed. The lieutenant adjusted fire for two more volleys when the battalion FSO came on the net and told me we had fired all the rounds available if I wanted to save some for last-ditch final-protective-fires [FPF].

The FIST lieutenant was yelling on the radio that six vehicles were burning and one of them had blown up in high order, like an ammo carrier. In his next report, the lieutenant said the enemy was still dispersed but had resumed moving toward the mouth of the wadi at high speed. He told me he was talking to the EBALO, and the F-16 pilots had visually identified the enemy and our friendly positions.

The EBALO came over the net and said the first fighter would attack in 30 seconds. Just then, a tank came over the rise at the mouth of the valley three kilometers away. I called on the net to ensure the Javelins had acquired it when the tank exploded in a huge fireball. I thought to myself, these Air Force guys are okay.

Within seconds, another fireball erupted several miles to the west, but I could not tell what had been hit. I could faintly hear the jets pass overhead to the west and then another two explosions. The FIST lieutenant came back on the net and reported that about half of the trucks had stopped on each side of the mouth of the wadi and dismounted infantrymen were running into the hills. The rest of the trucks and tanks were racing toward the wadi, trying not to get hit by the CAS aircraft.

I told the lieutenant to focus the jets on the mouth of the wadi just as two more bombs blew up in the distance. My plan was working--we were really hitting the Feyadeen hard.

As I picked up the radio handset to report to battalion, five vehicles appeared at the mouth of the wadi driving fast and weaving back and forth. I radioed the platoons and told them to focus all fires on those trucks. Javelins and .50 cals reached out into the night, and almost immediately, three of the vehicles were burning.

Suddenly we were blinded as two of the trucks heading our way exploded in a flash of light. It took several seconds for our NVGs to readjust, seconds in which I waited tensely to see if any of the vehicles had not been destroyed. I could hear my FIST lieutenant directing mortar rounds into the wadi directly in front of us. Two more Javelins fired on my right, and I began hearing the thump of the mortars and the hammer of the .50 cals.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

There was another large explosion, this time a kilometer to our front, and a second of blackout for the NVGs. I heard one of my platoon leaders yelling orders on the net to a Javelin gunner, and a flash was followed by a large explosion barely 300 meters to our front. I shuddered to think that all five of the enemy trucks must have been suicide bombers.

We had done well; however, we now were all bathed in the bright light of five burning vehicles in the wadi--our NVGs were virtually useless. I called my FIST lieutenant and asked him where the enemy was and if he could put more CAS on them. He told me the fighters were out of bombs but could strafe with their guns. He also told me the EBALO had moved the F-16s just out of the fight because we wanted to fire an artillery barrage and needed the aircraft out of the area to fire.

I asked when there would be more fighters with more bombs on station, and the EBALO broke in to say he could get more aircraft in 20 minutes. As I hung up the mike and tried to see to the west, I caught a flash of light on the ridge to my right and saw an RPG impact roughly where the FIST was. In a couple of minutes, sporadic RPG fire began erupting from the ridges north and south of our position. The FISTers said they were okay, but I decided to pull them back and prepare for a last ditch until the next CAS aircraft arrived.

I called my platoon leaders and asked for a Javelin inventory. We had shot half of our Javelins in the last attack, and I had no idea how many enemy vehicles were still out there. Suddenly, somewhere west of the burning hulks I saw a flash and a puff of smoke and then an earsplitting explosion 200 meters to my left ended with one of my Strykers erupting in a volcano of white fire. A tank!

I could not make out the tank with or without my NVGs due to the bright light of the burning trucks. Our positions were lit up. I queried my platoon leaders to see if anyone could find the tank and kill it with a Javelin. Another tank joined the first, both firing as fast as they could, and within seconds, five more of my Strykers were hit.

I grabbed the radio, "Lieutenant, fire all remaining artillery and mortars on those tanks, now!" I screamed. That would have to do until the CAS got here.

My own mortars thumped over and over, and I could see the explosions close to where the first tank fired. Overhead, our artillery screamed and began hitting the opening of the wadi two to three kilometers in front of us. The flames from the trucks were dying down enough that I could use my NVGs again. Two of my Javelin gunners must have figured this out at the same time, and I saw both Javelins strike a tank on the north side of the wadi. There were two more tanks moving toward us along with several trucks. The artillery and mortars hit a couple of trucks and forced the remaining vehicles to take evasive action.

I called the FIST lieutenant and asked him what we had left for fires, and when we were going to get more CAS. He told me we were out of 155-mm ammo and had about 20 rounds of mortar HE [high-explosive rounds] left. A shot from a tank on the south and another Stryker down--that was seven. I could not take losses like this for much longer.

"Have the fighters strafe the tanks if that is all they have left," I ordered the FIST.

I yelled to the platoon leaders, "Why isn't someone shooting the tanks with the Javelins?" Just then I realized the tanks had been focusing on the Strykers nearest where the Javelin shots had come from. When my platoon leaders reported we were out of Javelins, I was not surprised.

A jet passed low overhead, and its 20-mm cannon lit up the sky as the pilot fired at one of the two tanks in sight. Cannon shells exploded all over the tank, shearing off a tread and leaving it smoking but still in one piece. A shoulder-fired missile chased after the jet from the south wall of the wadi; it flared and disappeared into the night sky. The missile must have missed the jet. The remaining tank took a shot at us, missed and pulled back out of the light.

Now effectively down to 50 percent of my company and low on ammo, we were in a bind. We had destroyed a large number of the enemy, but we could not stand another attack like the last one.

As we began consolidating the wounded near the intact Strykers, small arms fire and RPGs started raining down on our position from the high ground on both sides of the wadi. We returned fire into the hills and the enemy fire slowed but did not stop. My FIST lieutenant reported the team had moved to a safe position and two new F-16s were on station. I told him I wanted to know how many of the enemy vehicles he could identify, particularly the tanks. I wished out loud that the FIST was still in a position to see beyond the rise at the mouth of the wadi. By now, the fires to our front had died down completely, but the moon was full and overhead.

The F-16 flight lead reported to the EBALO that it looked like there were approximately 20 vehicles and two or three tanks still out there and most were starting to move our way slowly. I got on the radio and directed the fighters to "Hit the tanks now!"

The fighters complained they were not picking up our positions on their systems and would have difficulty sorting us out if the enemy vehicles got much closer. When I asked the EBALO why, he explained the fighters have encrypted systems on board to pick up our EPLRS [enhanced position locating reporting system] receivers. The fighters use the data for their SADL [situational awareness data link] to tell where we were positioned and keep from hitting us. The jets stay current with all the other systems throughout the theater.

It dawned on me that I had frozen crypto, which gave us yesterday's crypto data while the fighters had today's data. Ouch!

The fighters made two passes and scored two direct hits on the tanks. When the first bombs hit, the enemy charged our position. Whether the charge was to escape the CAS or to die in a last-ditch attack I will never know.

Of the original force of 60, the Feyadeen only had 15 or 20 vehicles left. One of the trucks was hit by a fighter attack and blew up 300 meters to our front; fragments from the bomb rained on our position.

The FIST lieutenant told me the EBALO needed the ground commander's initials for any attacks closer than that last pass. We were not dug in, so I told the EBALO to limit the fighters to "cannon only" attacks to reduce risks and gave him my initials.

As I watched the fighters strafe two more trucks 200 meters in front of us, I called my CO and told him there was a good chance we were going to be over-run. The valley went bright as one of the trucks, a would-be suicide bomber, went off and illuminated our positions.

Now the enemy was just meters away. The last thing I remember before a truck bomb hit my Stryker was calling off CAS and telling the EBALO to have CAS aircraft stay with the enemy if the enemy made it past our position.

Hours later, I was awaken by someone saying my unit had taken 80 percent casualties. Despite the A-10s showing up and chasing the enemy after the enemy past our position, one of the truck bombs had made it to our base and blown up the Ranger headquarters, causing heavy casualties.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

As my mind cleared from the fog, I tried to decide why I had failed again. It became clear that there were several other lessons I should have learned:

3. CAS, indirect fires and my company's direct fires had significantly hurt the enemy. But to hold my position against a significantly larger force, I needed to slow the fight down and kill more of the enemy before he got into the wadi.

4. The turning point in this battle occurred when the tanks took out seven of my vehicles and the rest of my Javelins. While I had requested CAS this time, I had no CAS plan. Using my FIST and the EBALO, I had directed the fighters to attack the enemy column when I really needed to be more specific on what my targeting priority was: tanks. Too late in the fight, I realized the fighter jets would hit exactly what I needed them to, but I had to communicate my plan to them. I now understood that what I killed was as important as where I killed it. I needed to build a good CAS plan and communicate it effectively.

5. I had turned down a JTAC willing to come with me who had both the training and equipment to help me specifically target what I wanted in real time. A CAS expert could help me build and execute a solid CAS plan.

6. Twice before, the enemy had dismounted into the high terrain on either side of my position. The second time he had caused less damage than the first, but he had forced me to pull my FIST back. I could not afford to let the enemy dismount into the hills if I intended to hold my position. My CAS and fires plan would have to prevent the enemy from dismounting into the hills.

7. Finally, my "frozen crypto" was a problem with the CAS jets. I needed to ensure my unit was on the same communications plan as the joint assets that support us.

Third Dream. I awoke just outside the battalion TOC and was not surprised to see my XO pointing toward the commo tent. Same place, same orders, same day--but now I had learned seven lessons.

On cue, the EBALO walked up and offered me a Ranger JTAC for the mission. The EBALO seemed surprised when I slapped him on the back and told him I would love to take the JTAC with me. I told the JTAC where my vehicle was and asked if he would like to ride with me.

I then told the EBALO that I would give him a detailed CAS request with a CAS plan as soon as the JTAC and I saw the terrain we were going to defend. I also told the EBALO to meet with my FIST lieutenant and the JTAC before we left and come up with a concept of how we could synchronize all our fires.

I walked into the commo tent and walked out with two months of crypto data.

As we drove to the wadi, the JTAC and I studied the map together. I told him I needed a fire plan that allowed me to delay the enemy to slow the fight down and enable me to kill the enemy through the depth of the sector rather than try to kill him all at one time. I especially needed help destroying the enemy tanks and preventing the enemy infantrymen from dismounting into the hills on either side of us. I told the JTAC I intended to move my FIST forward (again), and put the JTAC with them so they could target as far forward of the company position as possible.

We got to the wadi with daylight left, and I used the same reverse horseshoe defense and kept my mortars in the same place. Before the FIST and JTAC took off, we had a quick meeting. I told them to focus the CAS on any tanks that the enemy might have as early as possible and hold the artillery until the enemy reached the mouth of the wadi. The JTAC told me that jets equipped with the targeting pod should be able to break the tanks out of any formation and pick them off if they were not moving too fast. I told him to work closely with the CAS fighters as they picked off the tanks.

I also sent four of the Javelin teams with the FIST lieutenant and told the teams not to let any tank enter the wadi. (See Figure 4.) If there were no tank targets, the Javelins second priority would be to hit the fast-moving trucks. I also told the JTAC that, as the enemy got closer, I wanted him to use CAS and prevent the Feyadeen from dismounting into the hills on our flanks.

Like before, I had the FIST lieutenant prepare a fire-for-effect, "At My Command" fire mission for the chokepoint at the mouth of the wadi; I also told the team to recon alternate positions and egress routes instead of moving them and the Javelins back, if things got too dangerous.

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

The JTAC told me the maximum range of his laser designator was roughly 10 kilometers and showed me on the map where he could expect to designate targets. I told the JTAC to work with the EBALO and get us as much CAS as possible from now until noon tomorrow, for starters, and that we would update the request in the morning for the next day. He said he would report to me once the request went in and if there were any changes.

Unlike before, I told my FIST lieutenant I did not want him using artillery unless the Feyadeen entered the wadi, and then I wanted it to be in conjunction with the Javelins and CAS, if at all possible. I directed he and the JTAC to build ACAs with the EBALO and let me review them when they were done. The JTAC asked if I wanted ACAs where air and artillery could fire at the same time, and I told him that was the only kind I wanted for this engagement. I was impressed with this young Air Force NCO and how quickly he fit in with my unit, even though we had not trained together.

As my FIST, JTAC and four Javelin teams moved into the hills on our right flank, I decided to walk our positions one more time while I still had light.

Around 2200, the JTAC and FIST lieutenant reviewed their plans with me by radio. (See Figure 5 on Page 12.) If the fight got into our wadi, the max ordinate of the artillery would be 16,000 feet AGL [above ground level]; the fighters with targeting pods simultaneously could drop their laser-guided bombs from above this altitude without fear of being hit by friendly artillery. If they had to come lower to use their guns or freefall bombs, we would have to shut off the artillery for the pass only.

I called my CO and briefed him that we were ready and went to my Stryker for a cup of coffee before things heated up.

By 2345, I could feel my adrenaline start pumping in anticipation of the battle I knew was ahead of us. Were we ready this time? Had I gleaned all of the lessons learned from the first two dreams? I remembered the last time I went to the NTC my brigade commander said, "The enemy always gets a 'vote.'" Tonight, if I had my way, the Fedayeen would not make it to the polls.

The radio crackled and brought me back to the mission at hand. Right on time, I heard the EBALO announce that JSTARS picked up an enemy force of approximately 60 vehicles 18 kilometers northwest of our position and had sent two F-16s their way. This force was heading directly toward Duffer's Wadi and would reach us in 40 minutes if we did not slow it down.

I grabbed the mike and asked the JTAC if the jets saw any tanks in the enemy convoy. After a couple of minutes the EBALO came up on the net and reported that the fighters counted 15-plus tanks. Before I could call the JTAC again, he came over the net and told me he was proceeding as planned. Within minutes I heard the faraway sound of jet noises and then saw flashes followed seconds later by the rumbling of bombs going off.

I waited five minutes and called the JTAC for an update. He told me the fighters caught the convoy 15 kilometers north and were "tank plinking." The convoy had executed a "bomb burst" maneuver to the four corners of the compass and was totally disorganized. He said he called the EBALO for another set of fighters as the two on station were in a feeding frenzy but only had enough bombs to kill eight tanks if they ran a perfect score.

[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]

The EBALO said we could expect a two-ship of fighters about every 45 minutes and two more were inbound. After a few moments of thought, I asked the JTAC how many bombs and how much time on station the fighters had left. He came back with three bombs and 30 minutes. I told him to call the fighters off and have them hold while we talked.

I pulled out my map, found a grid line 10 kilometers north of us and told the JTAC to have the fighters hold and only re-attack if a tank or organized column passed the grid within the next 20 minutes. After 20 minutes, the fighters were cleared to re-attack the remnants of the convoy, focusing on the tanks. The JTAC understood I was trying to slow the battle down and attrit the enemy at range.

I hacked my watch and called my platoon leaders and let them know what was going on just a few kilometers north. After 20 minutes, I checked the JTAC who said the fighters reported the enemy was regrouping. I told him to send the fighters back in and check the status of the next two-ship of fighters. Soon after, I saw more flashes and, eventually, heard three more explosions. The JTAC told me the fighters had scored six tank kills with another probable and were passing the coordinates to the next flight.

For the next hour, we continued to put two more two-ships of CAS on the convoy. When the bombs went off, the vehicles in the convoy would scatter, zigzag or drive in circles. Still, the fighters were killing their fair share.

The enemy had started shooting back with shoulder-fired missiles. The JTAC reported the fighters had to climb to stay out of range of the missiles and were having trouble distinguishing tanks from APCs and trucks based on all the thermal energy near the convoy caused by the burning hulks. We were just getting used to seeing a flash followed by a dull thump when a huge flash and a much larger explosion occurred. The JTAC told me that the fighters thought they hit a truck or APC filled with explosives. My guess was they hit a truck bomb.

I called my platoon leaders again and told them to expect suicide bombers and stick with the plan if the enemy ever came south. When I asked the JTAC for BDA [battle damage assessment], he told me the fighters had killed at least 18, maybe 20, of the vehicles and that the convoy was still disorganized but beginning to move south. It appeared that the enemy was tired of getting beaten up in the open and was racing toward the high ground north and south of the mouth of the wadi.

A few minutes later, the JTAC told me the last two fighters were almost out of bombs, and it would be 20 minutes before more were on station. I did not want to let up on the enemy, but I also did not want to give away the positions of my Javelin teams just yet.

The enemy now was becoming visible to the FIST, so I asked the JTAC if he could use his laser to mark targets the fighters could kill with their cannons. He said he would try. The EBALO called and said the fighters had a 10,000-foot deck unless troops were in contact. I told him I needed the deck cancelled to use their guns to either kill or stop the trucks before they hit the high ground or we were going to be troops in contact. He called the ASOC, which got permission to cancel the deck from its higher headquarters, the AOC, in a couple of minutes.

Five or six times I watched the sky erupt as flames came off the nose of an F-16; I heard the sound of a sheet ripping followed by a high growl. Although the aircraft only hit two of the movers, the convoy reversed back to the north. On one pass, a missile streaked up at the sky but the aircraft flared and turned away unharmed.

The F-16s were out of gas, and two more were ten minutes away. After this next flight of F-16s, we were going to get two two-ships of A-10s.

It was almost 0300, and we still had not seen any Feyadeen. But based on my previous experience, I did not want to get too comfortable. If the enemy rushed us, it would be time for the FIST to go into action. By my best count, the enemy still had between 30 and 40 enemy vehicles left, and they were now less than four kilometers from the mouth of the wadi. If any of the enemy got through the fighters, I would make our next move with the Javelins on the north ridge.

I conveyed this plan to the FIST lieutenant and platoon leaders and told the JTAC to have the next set of fighters focus their attacks on any tanks within five kilometers of the wadi. The fighters acknowledged and confirmed their systems were showing our positions.

The lieutenant yelled for us to get ready for a group of about eight vehicles rushing us at high speed. I held off on the artillery and let the Javelin gunners with the FIST have the first shot. I told the platoons in the wadi to hold fire unless a threat got within 500 meters. Just then four trucks and an APC crested the wadi entrance followed by what might have been a tank. I never got a good look at it because four fingers of fire shot off of the ridge and blanked my NVGs. The four explosions were almost simultaneous and half of the vehicles blew up. A 500-pound bomb hit next, and the whole wadi lit up like day.

As the FIST Javelins reloaded, two vehicles came through the burning hulks toward us. I cleared my platoons to fire and three Javelins hit the two trucks. Even though they were 800 to 900 meters in front of us, the shock waves off of these trucks were incredible. They had to have been truck bombs loaded with thousands of pounds of explosives.

West of the wadi's mouth I saw a flash and then heard an explosion in the vicinity of my FIST. The lieutenant's excited voice came over the radio, and he told me a tank was shooting at him from just outside of the Javelin's range. The tank was stopped and shooting inaccurately but would home in on any future Javelin shots.

The JTAC immediately lased the tank for the F-16s to take out. The JTAC told me there were three more tanks coming fast, and he did not know if the fighters could get all three before they got to us. He also said the remaining 25 to 30 vehicles were behind them and speeding up.

I told everyone to focus the fighters and Javelins on the tanks and told the FIST lieutenant to call in the artillery and mortars when the vehicles entered the wadi. I had to get fires on the enemy and keep the enemy infantry from dismounting and shooting back.

The valley was still lit up from burning vehicles, and our positions in the center of the wadi were visible.

The fighters got another tank before two entered the wadi. The FIST gunners killed one, and two missiles missed the other. The enemy tankers were shooting their main gun and machine guns on the move at a Stryker on my right.

The JTAC yelled that one of the F-16s had the tank locked, but the pilot's system showed us inside the bomb frag area and asked if I wanted to give my initials for this close of an attack. Thankfully, I never had to answer. A Javelin came from 200 meters to the left of me and scored a direct hit on the tank. The tank's main gun missed the Stryker it was aiming at, but a Stryker was damaged by the machine gun and caused my first casualties.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

I could hear our artillery screaming overhead at the same time my own mortars started thumping. The lieutenant had timed it perfectly; 20 vehicles came into view and disappeared in smoke and flashes caused by 155-mm rounds, 500-pound bombs and mortars rounds. A few of the Javelin gunners could still make out targets and were shooting.

Two trucks made it through on the left flank and every .50 cal on the southern Stryker platoon poured lead on them. The trucks came to a stop, started burning and then both went up in huge fireballs. More truck bombs!

The FIST lieutenant said the enemy was pulling back, and asked if he could Check Fire the 155s and mortars. I gave him permission and told the JTAC to keep the fighters on the enemy. Sadly, the JTAC informed me the fighters were out of bombs but that it looked like we were going to get a breather from the enemy assault.

The FIST lieutenant told me we had fired all the artillery and mortars we could if we wanted to save ammo for a last ditch defense. The lieutenant said there were only 10 to 15 vehicles left. I was asking the JTAC if the F-16s could harass the remaining vehicles with their cannon when he told me that a two-ship of A-10s just checked in. The A-10s set up an orbit over the remaining vehicles and, within 10 minutes, the Warthogs destroyed the remaining enemy vehicles.

It was 0430 when the EBALO called and said that JSTARS no longer had any movers on its radar to my west. The sun was just starting to lighten the eastern sky. Our losses were three wounded, two on the wadi floor and one of the FISTers on the ridge. One of the Strykers would have to be towed back to the airfield for repair. I called my CO and reported in; he told me to expect relief in six hours. The C-17s with the rest of the BCT already were landing at the airfield. I posted guards and told the rest to grab a few hours of sleep.

No sooner had I laid down than I felt a hand on my shoulder shaking me awake. My first sergeant was telling me we had two hours to load on the C-17s and deploy forward for Operation Vigilant Foresight.

Had this all been a dream? Only time would tell.

By Colonel D. Matthew Neuenswander, USAF, and Lieutenant Colonel D. Wayne Andrews 

Colonel D. Matthew Neuenswander (El Cid), USAF, until recently, was the Commander of the Air-Ground Operations School (AGOS) at Nellis AFB, Nevada. In that capacity, he was responsible for the Joint Firepower Course, the USAF's primary close air support (CAS) training as well as executing more than 20 Joint Air Warrior I and II exercises in conjunction with the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. Currently, he is Chief of Counterland Doctrine in the Air Force Doctrine Center at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He has flown both the F-16 and A-10 during Operation Anaconda; he commanded the A-10 detachments in Afghanistan and was the first Group Commander at Baghram Air Base.

Lieutenant Colonel D. Wayne Andrews is the Senior Instructor on the Army Joint Support Team at Nellis AFB. He has served as an S3 and Battalion Executive Officer for the 2d Battalion, 5th Field Artillery (2-5 FA), 212th Field Artillery Brigade, and a Small Group Instructor for the FA Officer Advanced Course at the FA School, both at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He also was a Field Artillery Battalion Observer/Controller and Chief of the Leader Training Program at the NTC. He commanded C Battery, 1-4 FA, 2d Infantry Division, in Korea and, in the 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, he commanded B/26th FA (Target Acquisition Battery) and then served as a Fire Support Officer for 1-5 Cav.