JAG[C.sup.2]: a concept for future battlefield air-ground integration.

As a result of lessons learned during combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (2001 to 2006), the imperative to build joint integrated command and control structures has highlighted doctrinal and technical air-ground integration issues. This is demonstrated by the many ad hoc organizations created to deal with the challenges of the modern battlefield.

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The key is to enhance joint collaborative efforts to integrate joint assets rather than just deconflict them. An example of this collaboration is represented by the joint air-ground control cell (JAG[C.sup.2]), a concept not yet established in joint doctrine but supported by combat operations.

Established within the corps or division, JAG[C.sup.2] provides the commander the ability to plan, coordinate, deconflict and control all third dimensional operations in the airspace overlying the division or corps area of operations (AO) in real time or near real time (battlefield airspace control (1)). With airspace control combined with the joint integration of intelligence, targeting and fires, the commander can employ his intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets effectively (unmanned aircraft, or UAs, and fixed- and rotary-wing). He also can leverage joint ISR capabilities to find, track and target the enemy and more rapidly decide, target, deconflict and precisely engage emerging high-value, time-sensitive targets within his AO using a combination of organic and joint assets (called dynamic attack (2)).

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Background. The Air Force theater air control system/Army air-ground system (TACS/AAGS) is the combined command and control system that provides the interface between Army and Air Force tactical air support agencies in planning, coordinating and controlling air support operations. Evolving from the lessons of World War II, Korea and Vietnam, this system is the basis for requesting and controlling close air support (CAS) since it was formalized in a "Concept for Improved Joint Air-Ground Coordination" signed by the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff in 1965.

Within the TACS/AAGS, the Air Force is responsible for communications to request and deliver CAS, providing advisors and forward air controllers (FACs) in the form of tactical air control parties (TACPs) and establishing regional coordinating centers (now called air support operations centers, or ASOCs) that plug into Army maneuver headquarters. The Army commander, through his G2 and G3 air personnel and the fire support cell (FSC), specify the targets to be attacked, determine the priorities and coordinate tactical air integration with the fires and maneuver of the ground forces.

The TACS/AAGS is a "stovepipe" system that is satisfactory for rapid management, planning and deconfliction. However, it was not designed for real-time (or near-real-time) coordination, deconfliction and control of all tactical air operations and fires or to quickly execute complex processes that require joint integration of airspace control, intelligence, targeting and fires.

The Growing Airspace Congestion Problem. It's widely acknowledged that airspace control within the ground commander's AO is becoming more complex and difficult. In a 2005 Air Force Magazine article, author Rebecca Grant notes there are some 775 UAs--from miniature UAs to the high-altitude Global Hawk--now in operation over Iraq and Afghanistan. (3) Michael Heinz, who heads Boeing's Unmanned Systems unit, "sees an annual market of at least $10 billion by the decade's end with growth continuing at double-digit rates for a decade or more." (4)

The airspace environment also is becoming more complex. Altitudes and ranges of new weapons systems are increasing. For example, the Army loiter attack munition (LAM) that will be organic to the brigade combat team (BCT) is being designed to cruise at medium altitude out to 100 kilometers with a 45-minute loiter time. (5) To meet the need for real-time ISR in the division, the Army recently decided to buy up to 132 extended-range, multipurpose UAs to operate up to 25,000 feet and out to 250 kilometers.

In a mature theater of operations, the ground commander not only must contend with his own airspace users, but also with commercial flights, contract aircraft and other government agency aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Roy Lembke, 4th Infantry Division G3 Aviation Chief, points out that political and economic objectives require the commander to facilitate all types of military and civilian air traffic while simultaneously conducting combat operations. (6)

Joint Intelligence, Targeting and Fires Integration. Charles E. Kirkpatrick wrote the paper "Joint Fires as They Were Meant to Be: V Corps and the 4th Air Support Operations Group During Operation Iraqi Freedom" that was published in The Land Warfare Papers in October 2004. In the paper, he relates how V Corps and its Air Force component, the 4th Expeditionary Air Support Operations Group (4th EASOG), collaborated by integrating Army and Air Force intelligence and targeting to focus and execute joint fires more rapidly. Achieving this level of integration required "organization and equipment the 4th EASOG did not have and a fundamental change in operating philosophy." (7) At the most basic level, it required an ad hoc integration of ASOC, TACP and corps command post (CP) cells and elements, an integration that had not been previously attempted.

"The critical ingredient in successful focusing of joint fires," as corps commander Lieutenant General William S. Wallace later commented, "lay in the organization of the main command post to place the ACE [all-source collection element], FECC [fire and effects coordination cell] and the ASOC in close proximity for current operations." (8) This required collocating the ASOC and corps TACP so the intelligence and targeting elements were fully integrated with the corps G2, the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) and the rest of the FECC. (9) See Figure 1.

Although it was an ad hoc arrangement, Kirkpatrick concluded that it points the way toward further and "even more fruitful collaboration among warriors of all armed services." (10)

JAG[C.sup.2]. The imperatives to break down stovepipes and build joint integrated command and control structures that preclude the need for ad hoc arrangements form the basis of the JAG[C.sup.2], conceptually represented in Figure 2. With many of the attributes of an integrating cell, the JAG[C.sup.2] is composed of various staff sections (functional cells or elements) and command and control facilities, such as the ASOC and TACP. While some integration takes place in a functional cell or command and control facility, the focus is generally on maximizing the effects of a single warfighting function.

Integrating cells, such as the JAG[C.sup.2], focus the efforts of multiple functional cells and command and control facilities on planning and preparing for or executing the overall operation within a time horizon. Integrating cells are not new. Current operations, future operations and plans are all integrating cells.

The "sweet spot" for joint integration is the division or corps CP where tactical control (TACON) of brigades and operations is exercised. This is where the ASOC and division or corps TACP normally are collocated. (11) It is also where the senior FSC directs and monitors fires and the senior Army airspace command and control ([A.sup.2][C.sup.2]) element and tactical air defense element are located. The precise determination of the JAG[C.sup.2]'s organization and technological requirements will depend on the processes it will integrate.

BrigadierGeneral Richard P. Formica's Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Joint Fires and Effects Cell (JFEC) during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II provides insight into who might lead this cell. In his organization, the corps air liaison officer (ALO), essentially, served as the deputy effects coordinator (DECOORD). (12) Because the ALO already commands the ASOC and TACP, he is a logical choice. His designation as the corps or division DECOORD or deputy fire support coordinator (DFSCOORD) emphasizes the joint collaborative aspects of the JAG[C.sup.2] concept.

Battlefield Airspace Control. The ability to plan and coordinate, deconflict and control all third dimensional operations rapidly in the airspace overlying the division or corps AO in real time or near real time is critical. Normally designated the airspace control authority, the joint force air component commander (JFACC) is responsible for theater-wide airspace control. However, current JFACC doctrine and equipment were not designed to provide real-time or near-real-time control of this increasingly complex and crowded airspace.

Requesting or changing a formal airspace coordination measure (ACM) outside of the normal airspace control order (ACO) cycle is time-consuming and unresponsive, taking up to 20 minutes to process a single request. Captain Rudy Cancino, Chief of Combat Airspace at the Combined Air and Space Operations Center Nellis (CAOC-N) at Nellis AFB, Nevada, notes that six to 10 additional real-time or near-real-time requests an hour, along with the other ACM requests, would pretty much overwhelm the airspace control cell (ACC) in an air operations center (AOC). (13) This limitation is not conducive to the tactical flexibility required by the ground commander.

The solution is to delegate airspace control authority. The airspace control authority can delegate execution of airspace control to a component in the airspace control plan or ACO, using an airspace control sector for a large area or a high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ) for a small area.

With their organic air assets, the Marine Corps and Navy routinely decentralize the execution of airspace control. However the Army and the Air Force normally do not allocate resources for decentralized control over the Army AO.

By integrating Air Force and Army controllers, the Army and Air Force can build an airspace organization that can control an airspace sector over the division or corps AO. This implements existing doctrine that in the past the Army or Air Force have not resourced.

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As part of the Air Force's ASOC transformation effort, an air battle manager function and manpower positions already have been added to the ASOC to monitor airspace control and deconfliction and provide command and control expertise for planning and employing air and space power. The air battle manager also is the link to the controlling and reporting centers and the airborne warning and control system (AWACS).

The revised single CP division design contains an ACE with Army airspace managers and en route controllers. Together, they provide the nucleus for an Army-Air Force ACE. The addition of USAF controllers provides the expertise to work with JFACC aircraft.

The ASOC, ACE, air and missile defense (AMD) element and FSC typically are collocated at the division or corps level, providing the linkage between air space control, fires and air defense. The ASOC has a robust communications capability for controlling assigned aircraft and is linked through the theater battle management core system (TBMCS) to the AOC.

The tactical air integration system (TAIS) that the Army is fielding can provide a near-real-time air picture that includes link-16 and blue force tracker (BFT). Army battle command systems (ABCS) complement the organization by both digitally integrating the air and ground operational picture with airspace and fire control measures (FCMs) and disseminating the data to all units throughout the operational area.

From an Army perspective, using an airspace control sector moves decision making down to the lowest practical level, leading to more rapid decisions at the tactical level. For the Air Force, an airspace control sector supports the tenets of centralized planning (by the AOC) and decentralized execution (by the corps or division joint airspace control cell). Further, this joint teaming would "sew up the seam" between the airspace control authority and ground commander's operations.

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In the Battle of Fallujah II, a HIDACZ was established around Fallujah with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) delegated as the airspace control authority. Within the HIDACZ, a 30-nautical-mile diameter airspace cylinder extending to 30,000 feet was established over the town, as shown in Figure 3.

The 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing Direct Air Support Center (DASC) collocated with 1st Marine Division controlled all air activity (fixed- and rotary-wing plus UA assets) within the HIDACZ and within the cylinder from 25,000 to 30,000 feet. (14) Control below 25,000 feet was exercised by joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) in coordination with the division air officer. This required a level of integration between the DASC, division air officer, UA operators and fire support elements (FSEs) never attempted before. (15)

Fallujah II was an ad hoc command and control system that handled the airspace demands of a hard-fought urban battle within a sizeable airspace control zone delegated to the ground forces by the airspace control authority. Delegation of airspace control provided the ground commander the tactical flexibility to clear airspace rapidly, allocate resources and coordinate and integrate UAs, fires, and rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft.

Dynamic Attack. In the V Corps OIF I 2003 example, the ASOC placed a team in the ACE, opening the way to exploiting many sources of information: corps long-range surveillance detachments (LRSDs), the Army's [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] element that directed helicopter missions, Hunter and Predator UAs, joint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft and other external sources. The ACE (rear), a fixed facility at Al Jaber Air Base, Kuwait, focused on generating targets using national and theater feeds that were passed to the ACE. (16)

According to Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. McGee, 4th EASOG Deputy Commander, targets generated by the ACE rear were passed to the main CP and then funneled to the FECC. The FECC decided to whom to give the targets for prosecution--artillery, rotary wing or ASOC (fixed wing). In OIF I, most went to the ASOC. If the targets were in the division AO, the ASOC passed them to the division to prosecute. If the targets were in the corps AO, the ASOC either executed the prosecution or passed them to the combined air operations center (CAOC) through both the CAS cell and the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) if the target was beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL); that didn't happen often because the ACE was focused inside the FSCL. (17)

The ASOC placement allowed it to clear prospective targets easily and quickly via Central Command's (CENTCOM's) collateral damage estimate (CDE) process through which prescribed attacks or weapons effects on targets, such as mosques, hospitals or schools, were to be avoided. Armed with up-to-the-minute target data, the ASOC then directed sorties to targets, not just in direct support of divisions, but throughout the corps AO.

The June 2006 Air Force Virtual Flag exercise was conducted in conjunction with joint fire control measures (JFCMs) joint test and evaluation at the Distributed Mission Operations Center, Kirtland, AFB, New Mexico, and provided a venue to experiment with the JAG[C.sup.2]. An Air Force intelligence officer was collocated with the corps ACE, and one of the corps TACP ALOs was assigned to the ASOC as an air interdiction (AI) coordinator.

The FSE and intelligence element developed targets and established joint fires areas (JFAs), also known as kill boxes. The AI coordinator managed air-delivered fires into the JFAs inside the FSCL and coordinated with the AOC for attack of targets beyond the FSCL. Besides helping develop targets for the JFAs, the Air Force intelligence officer was valuable in keeping updates of maneuver units in or near the JFA and coordinating ISR assets with the AOC to obtain better intelligence resolution.

Under the JAG[C.sup.2] concept, the cell integrates the functions of existing cells, elements, centers, parties and equipment. In doing so, it breaks down the stovepipes and builds joint integrated command and control structures that preclude the need for ad hoc arrangements. Through decentralization of airspace control and the integration of critical and complex joint intelligence and fires processes, command and control requirements for execution are minimized. In other words, the JAG[C.sup.2] will place the most firepower accurately on target with less command and control than required by today's centralized structures.

JAG[C.sup.2]--The Way Ahead. JAG[C.sup.2] was first introduced in the ASOC Enabling Concept signed by the Air Force Chief of Staff on 1 June 2006. It is being introduced into Air Force doctrine as a vignette in Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.3 Counterland.

Work is ongoing with the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Program Integration Office-Battle Command, Army Airspace Command and Control and the Army Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, all at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Army's Center of Excellence for Joint Fires at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to introduce the concept and gain consensus. The Air Force Air Combat Command (ACC), headquartered at Langley AFB, Virginia, is exploring future opportunities to experiment with and exercise the concept, such as in Urban Resolve-Future sponsored by the Joint Forces Command to be run out of Suffolk, Virginia, in April 2008.

After gaining consensus for the concept, future joint efforts will define the joint integrated organization, its responsibilities and processes, and its chain of command, the latter either through Army or Air Force channels. The goal is to move and share joint information, make informed decisions and execute air-ground integrated operations more efficiently and effectively.

Colonel (Retired) Curtis V. Neal, USAF, is the Lead for Theater Air-Ground System Transformation in the Joint Air Ground Division, a division of the Air Combat Command (ACC), at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada. He commanded the 449th Air Expeditionary Group at Camp Doha, Kuwait, during Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Other assignments include serving as Deputy Commandant of the Air-Ground Operations School, Nellis AFB; Commander of the 10th Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS), Fort Riley, Kansas; and senior Air Force Observer/Controller for the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a 1989 graduate of the Army's Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth and a 1983 graduate of the Air Force Fighter Weapons School at Nellis AFB. He is an Air Force Master Navigator with 1,500 hours in the F-4.

Endnotes:

1. For the purpose of this article, the focus is confined to airspace control within the division or corps commanders area of operations and within the fire support coordination line (FSCL).

2. The term "dynamic attack" implies three characteristics: speed, mass and precision. Where speed is always a desired attribute, mass and precision may be unique characteristics or used in combination. For example, speed and mass; speed and precision; or speed, mass and precision may be employed in combination.

3. Rebecca Grant, "The Clash of the UAV Tribes," Air Force Magazine, September 2005 (Arlington, VA: Air Force Association).

4. Russ Mitchell, "The Pilot, Gone. The Market Huge." The New York Times, 31 March 2002 (New York, NY: The New York Times Company).

5. Colonels Gary S. Kinne, John A. Tanzi and Jeffrey W. Yaeger, "FA PGMS: Revolutionizing Fires for the Ground Force Commander," Field Artillery, May-June 2006 (Fort Sill, OK: US Army Field Artillery School).

6. Comments on JAG[C.sup.2] Concept paper by LTC Roy Lembke, 4th Infantry Division G3 Aviation Chief to the author, email, dated 18 July 2006.

7. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, "Joint Fires as They Were Meant to Be: V Corps and the 4th Air Support Operations Group During Operation Iraqi Freedom, "The Land Warfare Papers, No 48, (Washington, DC: Association of the US Army), October 2004, 2.

8. Ibid, 4.

9. Ibid, 3.

10. Ibid, v.

11. Corps and division headquarters habitually have aligned tactical air control parties (TACPs). On the other hand, the air support operations center (ASOC) is a command and control center that normally is collocated with the senior tactical fire support cell (FSC).

12. Interview with Brigadier General Richard P. Formica, former Commander of the Force FA Headquarters and Joint Fires and Effects Coordinator for the MultiNational Corps Iraq (MNC-I), "Part 1: Joint Effects for the MNC-I in OIF II" by Patrecia Slayden Hollis, Field Artillery, May-June 2005 (Fort Sill, OK: US Army Field Artillery School).

13. Meeting with Captain Rudy Cancino, Chief of Combat Airspace at the Combined Air and Space Operations Center, Nellis (CAOC-N), Nellis AFB, NV, 12 July 2006.

14. LtCol Keil R. Gentry, USMC, "RCT-1 Fires in the Battle of Fallujah," Field Artillery, November-December 2005 (Fort Sill, OK: US Army Field Artillery School).

15. Interview with Major Dawn Ellis, Direct Air Support Center (DASC) Officer, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Department of Aviation, Command and Control Branch, Office of Transition Task Force, 8 September 2006.

16. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, 4.

17. LtCol Michael B. McGee, Deputy Commander of 4th Air Support Operations Group (ASOG) that worked with V Corps during OIF I; email to the author, 6 June 2006.

By Colonel (Retired) Curtis V. Neal, USAF