Israel In A Nuclear/WMD-Free Greater Middle East, Is It Possible.

*** Bush's Team Is Actively Seeking An Alternative To Bashar Assad, Perhaps A Man From The Ba'th Military Wing Willing To Let The Syrians Democratise At The Iraqi Pace, With Lebanon Setting The Pluralist Trend

*** Iran Theocracy Is Denounced As An Outlaw Ally Of Neo-Salafi Insurgents In Iraq; Larijani Says The West Is Treating Tehran Worse Than N. Korea, But He Sees Room For Talks

*** EU3 Look To Russia & China To Influence The Iranians

*** US President In Jan. 2003 Told Blair He Was After WMD In Saudi And Pakistan To Follow The Iraq Operation

NICOSIA - The UN atomic watchdog has unanimously called for a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in a liberalised Middle East but has rejected an Arab call to identify Israel as a nuclear threat. The Arabs are pursuing this matter in a context of Israel and Iran as well as others being included in a NWFZ for an area US President George W. Bush has defined as the Greater Middle East. The chances of the Arab states succeeding should, eventually, be strong for the following reasons:

Israel is believed to have some 200 atomic bombs. They are more than 30 years old and the installations at the plant in Dimona have been said to be leaking for more than a year. This is worrying not only the Arab world but the majority of the Israelis as well.

Iran is accused of developing nuclear bombs in many installations scattered throughout the vast country, with most of them believed to be deep underground. A major part of Iran is unstable in terms of seismic activity. At least the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, on the Persian Gulf coast, is close to Kuwait, eastern Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar.

Some of Iran's other nuclear plants lie in the south-west of the country, close to the UAE and Oman - the other two member-states of the Arab Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). For the nation to be able to maintain its own nuclear safety, Iran must have a per capita GDP comparable at least to that of Russia, which is close to completing the Bushehr reactor. But such a GDP level is not expected before another generation, perhaps, judging by the qualifications of Iran's newly-elected President, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad (see below).

A leak from Bushehr or other installations in western Iran would threaten most of the GCC. This is why the Arab Gulf bloc is pushing for the NWFZ as well as a zone free of all other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for the whole of the GME.

If the Arab states - still mostly run by undemocratic regimes - get President Bush to be convinced that they will work more seriously in line with his GME democratisation process and for peace with Israel, they can expect him to push for a WMD-free GME. If Bush gets Israel to get rid of its WMD, there will be no more reason for Iran and others to possess such weapons but a stronger case of the US enforcing a WMD-free project in the GME.

A general conference in Vienna of the UN's 139-nation International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Sept. 30 unanimously passed a resolution welcoming North Korea's agreement to abandon nuclear weapons and called on Pyongyang to let IAEA inspectors back into the country.

The IAEA conference rejected discussion of "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat", as proposed in a resolution by Oman, despite a strong push for this by 15 Arab states plus Palestine. Israel welcomed the idea of such a zone but said it advocated "achieving regional peace and security, not arms control per se", in comments by Israeli atomic energy chief Gideon Frank.

Egyptian Ambassador Ramzy Ezzeldein Ramzy told the IAEA conference the resolution on a NWFZ invited Israel "to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to accept that its various facilities be subject to the IAEA safeguards system". Israel has not signed the NPT and neither confirms nor denies reports that it has atomic bombs.

Frank said that, while Israel felt a NWFZ "could eventually serve as a complement to overall efforts to peace and security in the region", the Jewish state wanted a general peace agreement in the Middle East first. Frank said Israeli actions, such as its withdrawal from Gaza, had created a "window of opportunity to advancing peace and security in the region". He said confidence-building, as in creating a NWFZ, "is a long and enduring process".

Notwithstanding their opposition to Tehran's nuclear programme, Arab states resent the fact that the IAEA is cracking down on Iran for what the US charges is a covert atomic weapons project, while Israel avoids such scrutiny. The agenda item was put off until next year as part of a compromise taking annually since 1998 in which Arab states drop this agenda request in order to win Israeli participation in a consensus on the call for a NWFZ.

Emotions were high, however, this time after the IAEA's 35-nation board of governors last month found Iran guilty of violating the NPT and threatened to take Tehran to the UN Security Council, which could impose trade sanctions. Iran has threatened to use its energy weapon against states backing such a move and impose an oil embargo in the event of UN sanctions by the Security Council (see news15cIranNukeOct10-05).

Iran is willing to resume talks with France, Germany and the UK (the EU3) about its nuclear programme but insists again on its right to enrich uranium for peaceful uses. This first official request to resume negotiations by the ultra-conservative government of Ahmadi-Nejad, which had adopted a tougher line on the nuclear issue after it took office in August, was made on Oct. 12 by its Foreign Ministry. It said Iran "was ready to resume unconditional negotiations with all member states of the IAEA", including the EU3, "to strengthen co-operation and assure Iran's right to nuclear development". This came as a delegation of senior IAEA officials led by Olli Heinonen, who has long been an expert in both the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programmes, arrived in Tehran for a week-long visit. Their visit is crucial because they are measuring Iran's willingness to co-operate in future inspections.

Recently Iran threatened to "discontinue confidence-building measures", including inspections, if pressure on Iran built. IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei  has been urging the US and EU3 not to seek a confrontation with Iran, saying patient diplomacy and continuing inspections are the only ways to assure that it does not produce weapons fuel. The US argues that Iran already has a hidden weapons project. The Bush administration is continuing to press Russia, which is selling Tehran nuclear fuel and technology under conditions that it insists will prevent Iran from diverting fuel to any weapons programme. Talks between Iran and the EU3 broke down in August after Iran rejected a demand that Iran permanently end its enrichment activities.

A Moderate Tehran Stance? Ex-President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's unelected Expediency Council has got sweeping new oversight powers, in an apparent bid by Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to rein in Ahmadi-Nejad's government and other conservative hardliners in Iran. In recent meetings with foreign diplomats, Rafsanjani has explicitly stated that the Supreme Leader and the Expediency Council together - with no reference to Ahmadi-Nejad's government - will "determine everything in the country". And during Friday prayers in Tehran on Sept. 30, Rafsanjani carefully calibrated his words, describing the need for "diplomacy and not slogans", an indirect swipe at Ahmadi-Nejad's tough speech at the UN just days earlier. But a European diplomat was on Oct. 12 quoted as saying: "Maybe we have over-estimated the capacity of Rafsanjani to make a deal. Nobody thought it would be easy, because there is consensus in this regime [on pursuing nuclear technology]. The difference between them is tactics".

Diplomats note that Rafsanjani used "all his weight", just before the June presidential election which he lost, to convince Ayatollah Khamenei not to allow resumption of enrichment activities until after the vote, as hardliners demanded. Iran has since warned it could reverse voluntary acceptance of the NPT Additional Protocol, which enables snap inspections. Or Iran could withdraw from the NPT altogether, heightening concern of a secret bomb programme and risking a US or Israeli military response.

Amir Mohebian, political editor of the conservative Resalat newspaper, says: "It's not rational to tell Iran not to enrich uranium - it's our right". He says Iran can prove its peaceful intention through greater transparency, if the IAEA guarantees a supply of nuclear fuel for five years, while talks continue. He adds: "We have spent huge money, $4 billion for enrichment, so we can't stop it".

A resurgent military role, however, has set off alarm bells. US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack recently warned: "I think it stands to reason that the one logical conclusion of the military involvement in a nuclear program is that they are trying to build a nuclear weapon".

The EU3 position has hardened since spring, when diplomats in Tehran spoke of a face-saving acceptance of Iran's right to nuclear technology by allowing a very limited, experimental enrichment project. One document circulated between embassies in Tehran, with a section labelled "Compromise Solution" which allowed a pilot project of a few hundred centrifuges. Iran wanted 5,000 centrifuges - central to a key method of uranium enrichment - for the project. But European diplomats say no such offer was ever put to the Iranians, and that "no enrichment at all" has been their constant message.

Iranians often point out the inconsistencies in their own neighbourhood. Israel, Pakistan, and India are all nuclear weapons states - did not sign the NPT - and have been little punished for secretly building the bomb. The US in July, in fact, agreed to a deal for extensive civilian nuclear co-operation with India. But, says one of the Western diplomats, "a regime that threatens to destroy Israel with the Shahab-3 [missile] can't have nuclear weapons. [W]e can't deal with Iran like we deal with India, which has proven to be a responsible nuclear weapons power".

ElBaradei recently described the Nobel Peace Prize he shared with the IAEA as a "timely shot in the arm", one which can influence the agency's Iran policy. The timing might be perfect for ElBaradei as the Iran policy is currently the subject of heated debate among IAEA member-states. In view of Iran's refusal of the IAEA governing board's September request to freeze all its uranium enrichment-related activities, an IAEA meeting in November may influence the broader issue of the agency's macro-role in non-proliferation and the strength of the NPT.

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, an Iranian expert writing for Asia Times Online, on Oct. 13 said: "The Nobel award to ElBaradei is likely to increase his margin of independence and maneuverability - particularly with respect to the pressure applied by the US and to a lesser extent by the European Union - to commit the IAEA to take the next logical step and refer Iran to the UN Security Council". So far, ElBaradei has resisted this idea, arguing that there is still a window of opportunity to resolve the matter within the IAEA and through the Iran-EU talks. Hence, recalling how the Bush administration reluctantly consented to the extension of ElBaradei's tenure in view of his knack for independence, the 2005 Nobel Peace recipient is now better positioned to dictate his map of action on the Iranian nuclear issue. In part this depends on Iran's willingness to show more flexibility.

In the absence of an Iranian flexibility, on the other hand, ElBaradei can conceivably utilise his enhanced stature to exert more pressure on Iran and, perhaps, "even resort to the stick of Security Council action". But Afrasiabi added: "This does not bode well for Iran, which has been very critical of the IAEA, and now has to contend with a much-strengthened body showered with global accolades through the Nobel prize. No matter what, in the current ongoing IAEA-Iran negotiations, the Nobel Prize has tipped the balance in favor of the former and somewhat weakened the Iranian hand".

In a clue to the complexity of the issues, unconfirmed reports say the legal department of the IAEA has concluded that the legal basis for sending Iran's case to the Security Council is lacking. Afrasiabi noted that, under IAEA's own standards in Item 12 (C), "the only explicit provision for such cases is reserved for when there is suspicion of diversion of nuclear activities toward weapon proliferation". Yet, in IAEA's own findings, reflected in the various ElBaradei reports on Iran, "all nuclear material has been accounted for and no such diversion has occurred in Iran". Afrasiabi said: "This and the rather impressive record of Iran-IAEA cooperation the past two years...have raised the concern that the IAEA would be potentially undermining itself, pretty much as a pawn of the US, if it opts at the next meeting to send Iran's case to the Security Council".

The recent changes in the composition of the IAEA governing board, raising the number of non-aligned movement (NAM) states to 16 from 14, has been interpreted by Iran as a welcome development. This is in the view of opposition of most NAM nations to the US-EU drive towards the Security Council. That despite the decision of India, traditionally a leader in NAM politics, to cast a vote against Iran, leads observers to believe it would be premature to take NAM's role and weight in the upcoming battle for granted.

Another welcome sign, as far as Iran is concerned, is the initiative by South Africa to diffuse the crisis through its proposed swap of Iran's "yellowcake" (the concentrated oxide of uranium formed in the milling of uranium ore) for nuclear fuel. This proposal is viewed favourably by some of Iran's top nuclear decision-makers. These officials are hoping their quest to restart Iran's enrichment facilities in Natanz under full outside scrutiny and perhaps in collaboration with foreign companies - as stated by Ahmadi-Najad in his UN speech last month - may materialise without a major hitch.

The South African initiative is a major new development which can potentially avert a serious global crisis over Iran's nuclear issue, at least for now, even though the final answer to this crisis is likely to be determined over the question of when and if Iran decides to resume work at Natanz. It is said the question of Natanz's restart is at least half a year away.

Another question is EU3 resolve on this subject, given the German elections culminating in a new, conservative chancellor, Angela Merkel, keen on closer relations with the US. A more pro-US turn in German foreign relations will affect Iran at this critical juncture. It also spells more trouble for Iran-German and Iran-EU relations. During his 2000 trip to Germany, Iran's then president, Mohammad Khatami, met Merkel and a number of other German parliamentarians, and was lectured by Merkel on human rights and other issues. It would not be surprising if Merkel backs sending Iran's case to the Security Council in the near future, this as a gesture of closer German-US ties.

As the last IAEA meeting showed, however, the EU lacks a consensus on Iran, and several EU states sitting at the IAEA governing board are reluctant to force the Iran issue at the Security Council, as are most NAM nations as well as China and Russia. This explains why the initial EU draft on Iran at the last IAEA meeting, explicitly calling for Security Council action, was not even logged in, contrary to the normal protocol, and the second draft resolution proposed by the EU3 omitted this demand as well as any mention of deadlines set for Tehran to comply with IAEA's request for Iran's suspension of its uranium-conversion activities in Isfahan.

Afrasiabi wrote: "The answer is that in a certain sense the IAEA is caught between the Scylla of inaction threatening the agency's perceived viability and inner resolve and the Charybdis of strong action against Iran threatening its internal unity. The alternative middle way, that would somehow appease both the anti-Iran hardliners and the soft-neutral or pro-Iran member states, needs to be worked out, which in turn requires positive inputs from both Iran, the US and Europe". Concerning the US, so far there is little sign that the Bush administration is accommodating itself to anything short of Security Council action, and President Bush's recent press interview, lambasting Iran as a "terror-sponsoring" state, can hardly be interpreted as a positive sign as to how the US is implementing its Iran policy within the IAEA. The European trip of career US diplomat Nicholas Burns recently meeting European diplomats over Iran will be key in determining this question. Another player increasingly weighing in the picture is the EU's foreign policy chief Javier Solana, who pre-empted Burns by calling for the continuation of Iran-EU talks, quickly echoed by Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani.

Solana has a good opportunity now, given the political transition in Germany and the unsettling turmoil in Tehran-London relations clogging up their direct diplomacy, to play an unprecedented role. He along with ElBaradei can put the "genie" of Iran's nuclear crisis back in the bottle. Solana's ability to play this role effectively depends in part on White House willingness to give EU3 diplomacy more chance. That depends on the US calculation of the risk of losing the momentum in getting Security Council action against Iran if Washington lessens the pressure somewhat.

How the IAEA will tackle this problem in the near future will be interesting not only in the wake of the UN's atomic agency basking in the Nobel limelight, but also in the context to NAM, the EU and US diplomacy.