Islamist perspectives of regime political response: the cases of Lebanon and Palestine.

This essay argues that though breakthrough steps have been made at the formal level between some Arab officials or regimes and Israel, and while similar steps with Syria and Lebanon are expected, major obstacles remain and are likely to intensify and threaten the peace process and the final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although formal peace is commended, it is still insufficient for regional cooperation in the long run. What is needed immediately after or during the completion of the peace process is to take into consideration the deeper issues whose resolution would bring genuine peace and with it cooperation. The normalization of relations between Israel and Arab regimes only is not conducive in the long run for the region's stability and the well-being of its peoples. Violence is expected to intensify against both Israel and the Arab regimes, spearheaded, on the Arab side, by radical Islamist movements like Hamas and Hizbullah and, on the Israeli side, by Jewish fundamentalists.

While the regimes are capable of destroying the military infrastructure of such rejectionist movements, they cannot liquidate Islamist bases and dismiss their grievances, which happen to be the grievances of the broader popular Islamic movements, nationalist movements and, above all, of the people themselves. The strength of Islamic movements is on the rise and is likely to intensify after different peace agreements are signed. The concerned parties must, on the one hand, give priority to resolving the roots of cultural animosity and develop viable economies, on the other. That there is terrorism and violence is a matter of fact, but not every act of opposition or sign of unrest by the Islamists is a terrorist act. Put differently, the ultimate solution to the grievances of the people of the area cannot be of a security nature; it should address and resolve the underlying causes.

This article is divided into three parts: 1) an introduction that contextualizes the need for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict; 2) the main body of the article develops the discourses of many Islamic fundamentalist movements, especially Hamas, al-Jihad al-Islami and Hizbullah, on the current peace negotiations and agreements. The main body of the essay also shows the historical importance the Islamic fundamentalists place on Palestine, especially Jerusalem, and what they consider necessary ingredients for any peace agreement. The essay also presents their views of the regimes that have already made peace with Israel; 3) the concluding part contains certain short-term and long-term suggestions for enhancing the solidification of peace between not only the Arab and Israeli states but, more importantly, the peoples of the area.

INTRODUCTION

For American strategists and policy-makers the importance of resolving Middle Eastern conflicts in general and especially the Arab-Israeli one has come about basically from the realization of the explosive nature of these conflicts that negatively affects the interests of the United States. The USA has a vested interest in safeguarding the "New World Order" whose aim is to reactivate world commerce. The U.S. attempt to establish a new regional order in the area cannot succeed without first eliminating the basic obstacle in the Middle East, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The settlement of this conflict requires that Arabs and Israelis enter into a dialogue that will eventually lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict as well as subsequent normalization of relations - which as a matter of fact, has already begun. In this process, Islamism is portrayed as the new enemy of peace, along with the radical regimes of Iran, Libya, Iraq and the Sudan. These regimes are presented as capable of 'developing' mass destruction weapons, not to mention having individual regional ambitions. Therefore, the U.S. has made Israel an advanced post for both logistical support and arms storage in order to be closer to the Gulf. In this way, the U.S. will prevent its 'enemies' from developing a nuclear capability, and limit ballistic and conventional armaments.

The main opposition to the on-going peace process is portrayed as being basically orchestrated by Iran, the Sudan and other Arab Islamic movements. Israel and some Arab countries like Egypt propagate that the Islamic movements and the Islamic states of Iran and the Sudan are the front-line of a collaborative scheme capable of toppling the regimes that are theoretically capable of reaching peace agreements with Israel and consequently of forming a different regional order.(1)

Thus, the "Islamic threat" is being portrayed as the new enemy of U.S. interests in the Middle East, as well as of Israel and of 'moderate' Arab states.(2) Israel has transformed its fights with Islamists in Palestine and southern Lebanon into a war with the Islamic movements in the world. It has projected an image of itself as a state, just like any other in the area, that is confronting the Islamist threat, and therefore, its fights with Hamas are portrayed not as being with a disenfranchised people, but rather directed at weakening the internal Islamist Palestinian organizations and at preventing the establishment of a radical Palestinian state.

When the historic "Gaza and Jericho" first agreement was signed in September 1993 at the White House in Washington, D. C., in the presence of PLO Chairman Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and President Clinton, uproar and discontent were exhibited by all radical groups, Israeli and Palestinian. The main objections that were raised were religiously articulated, i.e., the giving up of greater Israel or the promised land or Palestine, the eternally and religiously endowed land. Of course, the first Islamic groups to object were the Islamist movements such as Hamas and al-Jihad al-Islami.

The Islamicity of East Jerusalem serves as the ideological focus of the current and future opposition; for the status of occupying East Jerusalem goes beyond the status of an ordinary occupied territory to the status of religious aggression. It is a holy land for Muslims - and of course for Jews and Christians. Prime Minister Rabin's repeated refrain that a united Jerusalem was the eternal capital of Israel seems offensive and insensitive to the feelings of Muslims and even Christians. Although he is catering to Jewish fundamentalists, yet at the same time, he underlines the religiosity of the conflict over Jerusalem.

PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

In the on-going Arab-Israeli negotiations, Palestinian diplomats have come under heavy criticism from Palestinian Islamists as well as from Arab Islamists in general. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat has accused the Jordanian Muslim Brethren of interfering in Palestinian internal affairs when they called for boycotting peace negotiations.(3) Arafat has also attacked Palestinian Islamic movements and accused Israel of strengthening them with the aim of having them compete with the PLO.(4)

Hamas, the most prominent Palestinian Islamist movement, has described the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement as a surrender, both in terms of form and content. It believes that the agreement serves Israeli interests and not the Arabs'. For the agreement, Hamas argues, has not dealt with the status of four million Palestinian refugees and apparently permits Israel to lease Arab land. Furthermore, the agreement disregards the issue of the Judaization of Jerusalem's main features, and marginalizes Muslim claims to Jerusalem as an issue of supervision over the Islamic holy places. Like previous agreements, the Israeli-Jordanian one is a surrender, but will nevertheless not be able to weaken the will of the Arab-Islamic nation.(5)

Hamas's escalation of violence in both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem has surprised both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority, especially after a period of relative calm that followed the institution of Palestinian self-rule. The earlier assumption that Hamas would be weakened, its military power dismantled, or even that it would become an ordinary political party seems unwarranted. The military operations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv indicate the failure of internal Palestinian attempts at integration or unification. The grievances that Hamas has exploited are basic Palestinian concerns that neither the Palestinian Authority nor the Israeli government can ignore. At the top of these concerns is the on-going occupation of Palestinian lands, the issue of Palestinian detainees in Israel, and the impossibility of building peace on agreements that do not take into consideration the interests of the people.

In the opinion of Hamas, the Palestinian Liberation Organization does not represent the majority of Palestinians, especially after the Oslo meeting that has organically linked the Palestinian Authority to Israel. The Palestinian Authority is now serving Israeli interests. Violent acts like the bus explosions in Israel force all parties concerned into re-evaluating their positions vis-a-vis Hamas. What makes the language of Hamas more appealing to most Palestinians is that so far they have not benefited either economically or politically from the peace agreement. The Palestinian Authority seems to be more of a security buffer between Israel and the Palestinians, and the extension of Hamas' activities into Israel proper weakens this Authority.(6)

Furthermore, the political language of Hamas has been religiously developed. In an interview, Bassam Jarrar, a leading thinker of Hamas, clearly states that although Hamas rejects the Declaration of Principles it will not use force to abort it. Hamas, he adds, is ready to take part in municipal and associational elections but not in elections relating to the Palestinian Authority. Also, Hamas does not plan on participating in self-rule because this legitimizes the peace process and the terms of the Oslo agreement. However, what is more interesting is that Hamas is ready to have a cease-fire with Israel if the latter withdraws to the pre-1967 borders, though the legitimacy of these borders is still questioned.(7)

The Islamists have for long considered the PLO as enemy number one and the Arab regimes that oppose Islamic movements as enemy number two. As for Israel, Hamas would re-prioritize the level of enmity in terms of the battle's outcome between the Arab regimes and the Islamic movements.(8)

The Islamization of the conflict with Israel transforms it into a two-sided religious duty: first, the elimination of the state of Israel and, secondly, the establishment of an Islamic state. For today's Islamist ideologies present themselves as the alternative to nationalist and secular ideologies. Since the late Eighties, Hamas, the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, has come to portray the Arab-Israeli conflict as a struggle between the forces of Judaism and those of Islam, with the former being regarded as the source of evil and the symbol of Western civilization? The Islamic movement has entered into an open struggle with the PLO resulting in many bloody confrontations. Hamas and al-Jihad al-Islami have also launched military operations against the Israeli army, the most famous of which led to the deportation of more than four hundred people affiliated with the Islamic movements. Moreover, Hamas has declined to join the Palestinian National Council and declared in its Covenant (al-Mithaq) of 1988 its rejection of UN resolution 242 and the recognition of Israel. It has also developed its security apparatuses significantly and refused to join the unified leadership of the intifadah. At times, it even fought the PLO, especially after the Gulf War, because of Hamas's opposition to peace negotiations. The PLO's attempts to contain Hamas have failed, and the latter have put forward difficult conditions for joining the National Council.(10)

It seems that Hamas is going to be a force to reckon with, whether in Palestinian internal politics or Israel. For Hamas is, first of all, the main Sunni Islamist movement in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. It is deeply rooted in the famous Muslim Brotherhood, which is known as an international umbrella for many sorts of Islamist movements that call for the reinstitution of Islam as a universal ideology and for the application of Islamic divine law. Hamas has become the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood since the inception of the intifadah.(11)

The ideology of Hamas is therefore based on religious principles that transform the Arab-Israeli conflict into a religious war between Islam and Judaism.(12) Al-Jihad al-Islami in Palestine represents as well a challenge to both Israel and the PLO. From one aspect, al-Jihad, as declared by one of its leaders As'ad al-Tamimi in his book, The Liquidation of Israel: A Qur'anic Duty (1990), does not recognize the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine since the struggle between the Islamic movement and Israel is ever-lasting and has a religious background. Consequently, there is no possible compromise that can settle the conflict in a way that makes the two parties satisfied. The Jews must therefore go back to wherever they came from. Furthermore, and as a challenge to the PLO, al-Jihad has rejected the National Council resolutions and compromises and demanded withdrawal from the peace process.(13)

In an interview, Fathi al-Shiqaqi, one of the founders of al-Jihad al-Islami who was assassinated in 1995 in Malta, rejected the principle of confrontation with the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, he argued that al-Jihad's work must focus on social and political mobilization that develops a national, popular Islamic opposition to Zionist trends within the Palestinian Authority. More importantly, relations with the Palestinian Authority depend on how it is going to conduct its affairs with the Israeli occupation and opposition forces. He added that al-Jihad's work covered all of Palestine and not just the Territories. Further, al-Jihad may only stop its military operations against Israel after the latter's withdrawal from the Territories. Further, he added that al-Jihad is not ready and does not want to participate in the Palestinian Authority because al-Jihad's ideological orientation opposes the legitimacy of both the Palestinian Authority and Israel. As to its relation with Hamas, al-Jihad coordinates with it, and the theoretical and practical gaps between the two, like the need for immediate jihad, is narrowing.(14)

It is obvious that the two Palestinian Islamist movements constitute a potentially strong adversary for the PLO and consequently for the peace process. Hamas, specifically, is capable of blocking the maneuvering power of the Palestinian Authority and the nature of peace itself, especially if negotiations are perceived as surrendering fundamental rights.

HIZBULLAH AND OTHER ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

Hamas has strong ties to and offices in Damascus, Amman, Tehran, and Khartoum. More importantly, it is alleged that Hamas has received $30 million from Iran after signing an agreement at Qum in Iran to de-legitimize the PLO and to coordinate Hamas's military activities with those of Hizbullah in southern Lebanon.(15)

The Iranian involvement in the Arab World is of course not recent. In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, Iran developed a network of Islamist organizations throughout the Middle East and has worked against most of the Arab regimes as well as Israel. Following the same line, these Iranian- supported organizations have rejected compromise and called for the liquidation of Israel and those Arab governments that do not view Palestine as a religious endowment.(16)

It is clear that the on-going peace negotiations are taking place in a strategically changing environment; for Iran has been exerting extensive efforts in order to get recognition as a great regional power in the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular. It has been financing, directly or through the Sudan, many Islamist movements such as Hamas in Palestine, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, al-Nahdah in Tunisia and, most importantly, Hizbullah in Lebanon in order to place itself on the Arab agenda and to preempt setting up a new regional order opposed to its interests in the area. Iran sees its relations with Islamist movements and states as the strategic bedrock for future resistance to negotiations and accords. These relations also are a reminder that Iran cannot be isolated from any regional plan and is capable of using its Islamist groups by proxy.

Hizbullah is functioning in accordance with local, regional and international formulas. Like Hamas, it sees in aggravating the Arab-Israeli conflict an opportunity to hinder the negotiations. As is well-known, Hizbullah represents the Iranian dimension that can be used to remind the negotiators that Iran is around and must not be neglected. Lebanon presents then to Iran one of the few spaces in the Arab World where it can be of influence. Thus Hizbullah, for instance, in a speech by its deputy general secretary, Sheik Na'im Qasim, criticized Yasir Arafat for granting Israel concessions and claimed that the armed resistance of the confrontational forces was what had prevented the realization of the Israeli scheme. He described the peace negotiations as a necessity for affirming Arafat's leadership over the Palestinians, and for the Americans and "its Arabs" as well as Israel. Also, they served well as a vehicle to end the Palestinian cause by a formula that would provide self-rule for some Palestinians on a small part of their land. He accused Arafat of preparing the ground for an internal Palestinian civil war that would erupt in that part of the land recently given to Palestinians. From this angle, Qasim believed that the deportation of some Islamist leaders to Lebanon and the promise to take back some of the PLO members to Israel went along the same line. He therefore suggested the following points as an alternative scheme for the peace process:

A. The intensification of armed struggle and resistance, especially in the occupied lands.

B. Complete support for the Palestinian intifadah.(17)

Also, the general secretary of Hizbullah reaffirmed, at the end of Hizbullah's third annual conference in 1993, the continuation of party policies concerning the support and development of the Islamic resistance in southern Lebanon and the Biqa' Valley. Armed resistance was the chosen alternative to negotiations that did not lead to the restoration of Islamic and Arab rights. He concluded that the rejection of the negotiations and peace accords as well as the non-recognition of Israel are incontestable principles. He further linked the foreign policy orientations of the party with Iran's authority, especially the Supreme Guide. The relation with Iran for the party is strategic, and the Palestinian resistance is seen as a concomitant to the Islamic resistance in Lebanon.(18)

The Islamic resistance in Lebanon has viewed the peace talks as futile and has thus increased its armed activities. Furthermore, Hizbullah has been organizing marches against the Lebanese-Israeli peace talks, such as that commemorating the abortion of the 17 May 1983 Peace Accord which gave Israel a free hand in Lebanon and subordinated Lebanon politically and militarily to Israel.(19) Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of Hizbullah has already decried the peace talks and described them as illegal since they give peace and legitimacy to Israel and to its use of force in the occupied land. He added that "the issue [i.e., of peace and recognition of Israel] is not related to the decision of individuals or of governments but it is the decision of the Muslim nation. And anyone who misuses its decision, the nation will sooner or later make its decision about him."(20) In the same vein, and after its third general annual conference, Hizbullah reasserted its position on the need for armed resistance as the only alternative to any kind of negotiation, or else Arab and Islamic rights would not be regained. It also affirmed the need to cooperate and develop relations with all Islamic liberation movements, especially with the intifadah.(21)

On the substantive level, Hizbullah considers that Israel is a foreign and occupying entity in the area and of the holy places. It therefore views fighting Israel as a religious duty. As a result, it has conducted numerous military operations against the Israeli army and the army of Southern Lebanon.(22)

The general feeling of the Islamists toward the peace process might be appropriately summarized by the paper submitted by four leading Islamist theoreticians to the Islamic-nationalist conference held in Beirut (10-12 October 1994). The final declaration of the conferees reflects the general mood of the area and, especially, among the Islamists and old-guard nationalists. Though the Islamist paper, "A Reading on the Status of the Nation," does not in principle reject peace and peaceful relations with Jews, it however stipulates the following points. First, the Islamic movement stands against international domination and does not surrender but mobilizes people to fulfill their duty of resistance. Second, it aims at fighting official governmental surrender and at finding out ways and means that may lead to the restoration of free Arab sovereignty and decision.

As to the West, the paper accepts the particularities of the West and Western life, but it is against its total support of Israel and opposition to the rights of the Arabs and attempts to destroy Arab unity. The paper also focuses on the ill-distribution of economic wealth by current regimes and calls for the redistribution of wealth on local and regional levels between the rich and the poor. Also, violence and terrorism in all their forms and manifestations are condemned. But, on the other hand, there is a legitimate and obligatory kind of violence which focuses on resisting the aggressor and the unjust. This is best manifested in the intifadah and its confrontation with the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and Jericho. Al-jihad is then a duty imposed on all Muslims; and therefore the Islamists especially support the Palestinian resistance.(23)

CONCLUSION

Iran and numerous Islamist movements have already been using the religious nature of Palestine for mobilizing people. Thus any popularly supported resolution of the status of East Jerusalem would have to take away the religiosity of the conflict and open the possibility of real normalization between Arabs and Israelis. Otherwise, Egypt will serve as the example for Arab regimes: accused of giving up the holy land.

Egypt's mounting internal problems with the Islamists because of its unsuccessful normalization of relations with Israel serves as the future model. But this is an unstable situation for all the parties concerned, especially given the possibility of an Islamist takeover in one of the states in the Arab World. While a satisfactory and real resolution of the ambiguity of the status of East Jerusalem, not through putting it under Israeli political rule and Jordanian religious supervision, disarms the opposition in the first place, it is a must for the longevity and genuineness of peace among the peoples of the area. Those strategists, especially the Americans and Israelis, who think that the Muslims and Arabs would accept the Muslim and Christian Holy Places as tourist attractions are making a serious political and cultural error. Put differently, the religious values of the peoples, and not only one people, of the area should be taken into consideration, or else there are going to be built-in dangers ahead for the area.

Now that the PLO and Israel have mutually recognized each other's right to exist as two peoples with basic human and political rights, the future of the Arab-Israeli conflict seems to shift the focus of the conflict from the traditional lines of conflict between Arabs and Israelis to another level of conflict. Although this level has long existed, such as the conflict between Hamas and the PLO and between the Israeli Labor and Likud parties, nonetheless, the near and foreseeable future is going to be plagued with radical Islamists and Jewish fundamentalists struggling against recognizing each other.

In this way, the Palestinians and the Israelis will become part of this troubled area, the Middle East, where they are likely to suffer like other states in the area such as Egypt or Algeria, whose legitimacy is being questioned by radically and religiously oriented individuals and movements. Claims and counter claims will be postulated, leading to internalize what has largely been thus far an external problem of legitimacy that helped the cohesion of both the Israeli and Palestinian societies. Civil strife against the Palestinian and Israeli establishments cannot be discounted. It seems then that all countries of the area are going to share, at least, some concerns, i.e., religious radicalism - in addition to the economic problems as well as the normal political and developmental issues.

The other important issue that must be dealt with seriously is the status of the economies of the concerned parties, namely Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. These states are plagued, in one way or another, with poverty, inflation, underemployment, and exploitation. Many Palestinians or Egyptians, for instance, may turn to Islamism because of the corruption of their political elites, exploitation of the nouveau riche, nepotism, favoritism and the like.

The Islamist movements have been raising the issue of social justice; and social justice as a popular demand is likely to accelerate, given the dire needs of the people. Thus, the economic pressures that Israel puts on the Palestinian Authority, by cutting off the Territories from Israel and not allowing seventy-five thousand Palestinian workers to enter Israel and work, as a response to violent acts, works in the interest of the Islamists and not the other way around. Having a real stake in the economy reduces the membership of the Islamists and makes people more likely to cooperate and preserve the system. Liberalism and pluralistic democracy should be also encouraged and implemented along with the two issues mentioned above. Jordan might serve as an example of a successful liberalization process. The opposition in the Arab World thus far has nothing to lose, either economically or politically. Indeed, this makes the opposition more clandestine and outspoken and without a need to tune its views to the realities of the world. But an institutionalized opposition becomes indeed more responsible and more realistic. For it has to deal with the real issues of economy and politics - imagine how much better or worse an Islamist minister of economy would run the economy of Egypt than a secular minister!

In conclusion, while the three steps mentioned above seem of great magnitude and require a lot of work, they are necessary for the well-being of the area, the United States and, indeed, the world. The need for all parties to skillfully tackle the status of Jerusalem and the economies and politics of the region's states must be the future concern of all, especially politicians, policymakers and political scientists.

NOTES

1. Al-Hayat, 13 March 1993.

2. Ahmad Moussalli, "The United States and Islamic Fundamentalism," Al-Safir, 29 March 1993.

3. Al-Safir, 6 May 1993; Al-Safir, 5 May 1993.

4. Al-Hayat, 5 August 1993. For a brief review on the development of the relations between the Palestinian Islamic movements and other Islamic movements, see Patrice Caude's report in Guardian Weekly, 9 May 1993, p. 16.

5. Al-Hayat, 28 October 1994.

6. Al-Hayat, 28 October 1994.

7. Graham Usher, "The Islamist Movement and the Palestinian Authority, an interview with Bassam Jarrar," Middle East Report, July-August, 1994, pp. 28-29.

8. Al-Hayat, 29 April, 1993; Beirut al-Masa', 13 and 14 May 1993; Al-Safir, 22 April 1993; and al-Wasat, no. 61, 29 March 1993, p. 27.

9. For information on the establishment of Hamas, see Ziad Abu Umar, "Hamas: A Historical and Political Background," Journal of Palestine Studies, no. 13, Winter 1993, pp. 84-85; and Al-Hayat, 29 March 1993.

10. Al-Hayat, 29 March. On the attempts to reconcile the PLO and the Hamas movement, see Journal of Palestine Studies, no. 13, Winter 1993, pp. 115-126. On the Sudanese leader Hasan al-Turabi's attempts to reconcile the two, see the notes taken at the meeting in Khartoum, Journal of Palestine Studies, pp. 128 and 142-143; and on the attempts made by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, see the internal memo that was distributed by the PLO, Al-Safir, 6 July 1993, where the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was accused of preventing the reconciliation.

11. Shu'un al-'Awsat, No. 16, February 1993, p. 63; on the relations of Hamas and the Brotherhood, see Journal of Palestine Studies, no. 13, Winter 1993, pp. 70-85; and on the popularity of fundamentalist movements in the Territories, see the article by one of the fundamentalists, Mahmoud al-Zahhar, "The Islamic Movement . . . Facts and Numbers, between Reality and Imagination," Journal of Palestine Studies, no. 13, Winter 1993, pp. 99-110 and see also the article on elections in Palestinian institutions, pp. 110-114.

12. See Journal of Palestine Studies, pp. 146-150; and see also on the same topic, Shu'un al-'Awsat, no. 16, February, pp. 62-63.

13. Shu'un al-'Awsat, no. 16, February 1993, pp. 59-60 and 65-67.

14. Al-Safir, 22 August 1994, p. 11.

15. See "Hamas", Journal of Palestine Studies, p. 90; and Al-Hayat, 29 March 1993.

16. Shu'un al-'Awsat, no. 16, February 1993, p. 59. On al-Jihad al-Islami and Hamas as well as Hizbullah being close to Iran, see pp. 61-62.

17. Al-Safir, 29 April 1993.

18. Al-Hayat, 5 May 1993. On the general attitudes of Hizbullah, see Martin Kramer, "Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad," Bulletin: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, vol. XLVII, May 1994, no. 8. See also "An Open Letter, The Hizballah Program," The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 48, Fall 1988.

19. Al-Bilad, no. 132, 22 April 1993, and al-Hayat, 8 May 1993.

20. Al-Safir, 10 May 1993.

21. Al-Hayat, 5 May 1993.

22. Shu'un al-'Awsat, no. 16, February 16 1993, p. 62.

23. Fahmi al-Huwaidi, Muhammad Salim al-'Awwa, Muhammad 'Amara, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 'Qira'at li Hal al-'Umma, Al-Mu'tamar al-Islami al-'Arabi, Beirut, 10-12 October 1994, pp. 2-3 and 8-15.

Ahmad S. Moussalli is an associate professor in the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut. The research for this article was funded with a grant from the Earhart Foundation.