Is your foundry prepared for the worst?

A drill at a university foundry center reinforces how preplanning with local agencies for a foundry explosion will save lives.

It's a few minutes before 11:00 a.m. on an average Friday at the Univ. of Northern Iowa (UNI) campus in Cedar Falls, Iowa.

In the UNI Metal Casting Center (MCC), located in the industrial technology building, 30 students and staff are participating in a ductile iron workshop. The participants are gathered around the melt deck, near the induction furnace that is holding 300 lb of ductile iron. Minutes before the pour, a student notices a leak detector alarm. A second later, someone yells that the coreless induction furnace's water-cooled passage may have ruptured.

An immediate evacuation begins, but before the people closest to the melt deck can exit the area, there is an explosion. The force from the blast blows out the south part of the wall and the electrical power is knocked out. The natural gas meter outside the building has been damaged but is not yet ignited.

Molten metal is splattered in every direction causing small fires around the area. The MCC is filled with thick, black smoke and dust that is blowing out of the breached wall and open door.

A Dangerous Situation

Foundry explosions are considered some of the most dangerous situations emergency personnel may have to respond to. In an actual steam explosion, metal heated at temperatures ranging from 1400-2500F (760-1371C) somehow comes in contact with water. The water turns from liquid to gas instantaneously, expanding to 1632 times its original quantity. This transformation creates an enormous amount of energy, resulting in an explosion.

A steam explosion can be deadly because three things may happen. The initial force of the explosion as the water expands slams objects into other objects and can hurl a person into equipment, ceilings or even through walls. Second, the explosion splatters dangerous materials, creating small fires surrounding the scene. And third, the splattered molten metal burns people in the area.

Following a steam explosion last summer at Dalton Foundries, Warsaw, Indiana, that killed three workers and injured 18 more, UNI set out to devise a plan to prepare its foundry, or any foundry, for such an event. The result was a full-fledged mock disaster held in the MCC.

The Drill

The preceding scenario detailed the preliminary circumstances for the April disaster drill, which simulated a foundry explosion and the accompanying emergency response measures. Several UNI departments and about six local agencies, including the Cedar Falls Fire Rescue Div., Sartori Hospital Ambulance and Blackhawk Emergency Response Management, participated in the drill.

With the help of these groups, the drill was to cover: incident management direction and control, victim rescue and care, and hazard assessment and control. In addition, it would test the agencies' equipment and response time, provide practice for foundry personnel and students, and increase the overall knowledge of foundry explosions.

"Dalton's disaster brought to the forefront the fact that steam, water and iron explosions are a possibility for all of us," said Dan Quick, director of UNI's Metal Casting Center, who said he's personally known nine individuals killed during his long career in the foundry industry. "The bottom line is that lives were lost. Dalton is a well-run facility - they were ready. It showed that such a disaster can happen anywhere - we all have to be prepared."

With this in mind, the major objectives of the drill included:

* preventing loss of life and loss of equipment in the foundry industry;

* developing personal knowledge in the foundry industry that will benefit individuals in the event of an emergency;

* improving the emergency response plan;

* providing emergency planning recommendations for all agencies involved.

After the Explosion

At 11:03, following a phone call to 911 reporting smoke and fire coming from the MCC, the Cedar Falls Fire Rescue arrived on the scene. Heavy, black smoke billowed out of the building and an array of pyrotechnic explosives could be heard from the outside.

Inside, the 5500 sq ft foundry was dark and filled with smoke via a fog machine. Occasional fireworks were set off to simulate secondary explosions that occur following the initial boom. The 30 volunteer students and staff participating in the drill lay "injured" or "dead," awaiting the rescue team. Complete with full makeup and costume by the UNI Theatre Dept., the volunteers' injuries ranged from severe burns to metal pieces impaled in their bodies.

Back outside, the rescue team examined their preplans, set up an incident command post and prepared the triage for the expected victims.

The incident command post is set up away from the action of the disaster. It is the stationary decision-making point. Here, all agencies and teams gather to deal with the incident. With the fire department in control, officials from all law enforcement, utilities and public safety are represented at the post. As decisions are made as to what to do next and who should do it, the representatives pass the information on to their crews. From the command post, all emergency personnel can be accounted for. Within minutes, the command post should be able to locate and report on the status of the crews.

The triage is set up to sort through and treat victims. It is located far enough away from the action to be safe, but not so far as to tire the emergency personnel.

At 11:15, following their preplan procedures, the crews. set up their fire and Hazmat (hazardous materials) apparatus at the predetermined locations. Small perimeter fires had burnt out or been extinguished and the smoke began to clear. At 11:23, the Cedar Falls Fire Rescue team "broke through" an overhead door near the blast area and began its search for victims.

Because the fire department and other emergency agencies participated in a preplanning program with the MCC, the crew was familiar with the layout. By 11:35, the emergency personnel located three dead victims near the power unit, who were left in place until the coroner arrived. Nine critical victims were pulled out to the triage with injuries including severe burns, head trauma and impalements; eight more suffering serious injuries, including concussions, burns and broken bones were carried out; and nine with minor injuries, including bruises, burns and confusion, were led to safety. Finally, the last victim, a student strewn across a jolt-squeezer (and passed several times by firefighters who could not see her in the "smoky" foundry), was brought out to the triage around 11:45 a.m.

From the triage, victims were sent to area hospitals by one of several ambulances, who had also been consulted in the preplanning. The hospitals then dealt with the patients all the way up to the operating room doors, which is where the drill ended.

One glitch in this drill was that one victim was so severe that he needed to be airlifted to an area hospital. Unfortunately, a helicopter was unavailable due to another call. A lack of communication sent the victim by ambulance to the wrong hospital. He could not be saved, bringing the drill's death total to four.

Lessons Learned

"This was the most realistic drill we've ever been part of," said Mike Whitson, Cedar Falls Fire Rescue. "With the pyrotechnics, smoke, flares and explosions going off in your ear, it adds to the adrenaline factor. People make mistakes under pressure, and this is a good way to gauge these things."

Whitson said the number one result of the drill was that it reinforced the importance of preplanning among the foundry, fire department, hospitals, etc. "The drill ran similar to our procedures - give or take a few things - because we had devised a preplan for a disaster. That should be the number one task for any foundry. A foundry fire can throw a lot of different things at you, so all parties must be prepared for the unexpected. Without a preplan, there's little or no hope of having an acceptable outcome."

The major problem uncovered by the drill was in communications, which pose critical problems for response coordination between agencies. The scanning features weren't properly programmed, and rescuers couldn't hear instructions from incident command, nor talk to each other. Thus, they were relegated to using runners back and forth. A need for a state fire frequency to correspond with neighboring agencies arriving at the scene was also identified, and five more channels will be added to the communication tower to avoid overload.

"The 911 communications went into chaos," said Quick. "On the following Monday, the system was being rebuilt."

Another problem that was revealed was that one of the area hospitals had never been notified that an explosion had occurred; they heard through a phone call from another hospital. So that's another procedure that needs to be solidified.

Other discoveries made by the agencies in post-mortem reports included: personnel were working independently when they should have been working in pairs or in fours; incident command was not getting proper counts of victims from triage; EMS needed a written record of events; and EMS Command needed more accountability in terms of number of patients, where they were transported and how.

Jay Willsher, Sartori Paramedic Service, said he realized that all the agencies manage disaster scenes in different ways, and plans are now underway to standardize operations. He reiterated how the interagency communication problem opened their eyes.

"We've been told by the National Safety Council that what we learned in this exercise will save lives this year," Quick said.

Because a preplan was in place, Whitson said procedures were followed extremely well, except for one instance, where the ladder was driven past the preplan location and into the hazard area, which could have ignited leaking gas.

In reality, Whitson said this type of explosion would have likely produced a lot of secondary fires, small chemical spills and a structural collapse.

"Anytime there's a mass casualty incident, we immediately try to remove as many victims as possible," he said. "With multiple hazards, sometimes you can't rescue victims until the hazard is fought and firefighters can get in safely. Multiple secondary fires, which weren't modeled, would be a severe problem."

Preplanning

Whitson said a walk-through inspection is the first step in preplanning. Different from all other department inspections, it consists of 10-12 firefighters combing the facility, analyzing all hazards. They examine the facility and obtain blueprints, examine its structural construction, note landmarks such as the gas utility, steam, electricity and gather other specific information on how to fight a fire, ventilate the building, rescue victims, etc.

In addition to UNI, Whitson has conducted preplan measures with Viking Pump, a foundry in Cedar Falls. Once the preplan is completed, the department shows it to the foundry, asks for input, and gives them a copy. "Fire departments don't charge for this activity, since it benefits them," he said.

Whitson also noted that it's important for systems to be established to determine the number and location of personnel within the building, and at what time of the day the population is highest. "When the fire department arrives, a clear answer is needed on the number inside. If you're unsure, the aggressiveness of the incident changes." Without good information, he said, there's a reluctance to start the process.

"If you preplan ahead of time, you're miles ahead of where you would be when you pull up for real," Whitson said. He also noted that the first 15 min sets the stage for the next 3-4 hr, so it's critical for the first firefighter on the scene to be able to refer to a site-specific plan.

While not involved in the UNI exercise, Jack Schuldt, Safety Specialties, Inc., agreed that more foundries need to preplan with fire department officials. In addition to gathering information to help them combat fires, Schuldt said they'll identify ways to prevent disasters. He too advised bringing in the county's emergency response team, but only after the hazard analysis and safety committee's advisement so the foundry is aware of what could happen.

While UNI went to great lengths to actually simulate a disaster, Willsher stressed that a simple "paper drill" can be conducted by a foundry and its emergency agencies at virtually no cost nor production interruptions. Basically, it consists of bringing all the parties together in a conference room, and simulating the emergency phone call for a specific explosion. Then, the parties walk through the response process, identifying inconsistencies and problems along the way.

In fact, the MCC, through its paper drill, discovered that its maintenance staff didn't know how to shut down a gas line, that procedures weren't established for contacting the public utility, and responsibilities for evacuation or dealing with the media hadn't been properly assigned. On a larger scope, it was learned early on that area hospitals would not have enough burn treatment materials should a foundry disaster occur.

Quick, who previously worked for General Motors foundries, recalled several times lives were likely saved because officials were prepared for the worst. However, he feels that because foundries aren't expected to treat, transport or decide where to send victims, some foundries feel preplanning is the responsibility of emergency agencies, not the foundry.

"If foundries don't tell their rescue teams what to expect, then they haven't executed their responsibility." The foundry, he said, is the only one who can predict the worst case scenario, and must inform fire departments and hospitals, etc., so they can plan for it.

Prevention First

While the benefit of emergency procedures and preplanning is obvious, they should be an outreach of what the company and its workers can control: a safe, minimal-hazard foundry.

Taking a step backward from preplanning, Schuldt said the first thing a foundry should do is set up a hazard analysis of the melt department, and then form a molten metal safety committee. By going through every job for every hazard, you can determine what can be accomplished through engineering controls, personal protective equipment (PPE) and establishing-job safety procedures.

Once the hazards have been identified, the molten metal safety committee's job is to ask "what if" on every potential hazard in the place, to cover every possible anomaly that could occur. "You must do it every step of the way through production, pouring, melting, the entire gamut," he said. "You can then create procedures for potential problems like a plugged taphole on the cupola, foreign material in the charge, blown water hose on an inductor, power shutdowns, runouts, etc.

"For instance, if you ask, 'what if the ladle on the monorail falls?' you can determine what action needs to be taken to avoid that situation. Therefore, solutions might include checking bolts and connections once a month. What you've done is proactively reduced the likelihood of those things happening."

Schuldt advised foundries to examine the 14-point Appendix C of OSHA CFR 1910-119 (Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals). Although it doesn't directly apply to metal explosions, he said the word "chemicals" can be replaced with "molten metal" and should be used as the discipline to ask the "what-ifs?"

Unfortunately, said Schuldt, most foundries haven't made the proper hazard analysis and elimination steps, likely due to dollars and manpower shortages. "The process could very well take two hours a week for two years. And once you determine a hazard that can be engineered away, there's some real equipment and preventive maintenance costs. But it shouldn't take a fatality or hard hits from OSHA to initiate such action."

When asked if most foundries know what to do in the case of disaster, Schuldt replied, "Probably not. You need procedures for who will contact the fire department and rescue teams, and who is in charge. Someone needs to know how the firefighters should proceed - some may want to throw water on every fire."

He said OSHA CFR 1910-38 (Employee emergency plans and fire prevention plans) should be followed, and married with the molten metal committee's hazard analysis. "If you do that, you'll have an excellent safety preparedness procedure," he said. "Then, take one step back and do all the things to prevent that disaster from ever occurring."

While there is inherent danger in the metalcasting process, it can certainly be minimized. "Hazards can be managed," Schuldt said, "through proactive safety approaches by people who understand machine, environmental and personal hazards within the foundry. The key is to determine how to remove those hazards through engineering, and using PPE and job safety procedures. A foundry can melt up to 80 tph and never have a problem, as long as it follows proper procedures."

The UNI Metal Casting Center (319/273-6894) will publish a full report of the drill this fall.

RELATED ARTICLE: Fighting the Foundry Fire

Whitson said that most firefighters don't understand the foundry's unique hazards. "Most aren't prepared, unless there's a great number of foundries in your immediate vicinity, which kind of forces you to realize the hazards. I'll tell you, when we respond to a foundry call, the tension level goes up. There's a multitude of hazards that can confront you."

Their greatest fear, he said, are secondary steam explosions. Chemical and structural matters are much easier, but many firefighters have little experience dealing with molten metal steam explosions.

As opposed to a standard structural fire, in which water is applied in the first minute on the scene, firefighters arriving focus on information gathering. Whitson said no firefighters will proceed until it is known for sure what they'll face inside, which places further responsibility in the hands of the foundry.