Is technology mature enough for the Future Combat System? (Analysis).

Less than a year away from a major milestone decision for the Arm/s Future Combat System, there are concerns that I critical FCS technologies will nor have advanced enough to meet the ambitious deadlines. Some believe that a decision at that time would be, at best, a guess.

In April 2003, the ECS is scheduled to move ahead with the so-called Milestone B, a decision that will determine whether the Army will proceed with a demonstration program. The uncertain maturity of some technologies does not mean, however, that the program is not technically feasible. Rather, innovative management of technical risk is required.

There are six basic technologies that will need to mature in order for the Army to field the FCS as currently planned: sensors, networking, robotics, armor, munitions and hybrid power.

Relatively speaking, the most mature technologies are munitions, armor, and hybrid power, which are products of the Industrial Revolution. Although advances in these areas will occur, their capabilities will increase at relatively slow and linear rate.

Sensors and robotics are growing out of the development of electronics in the late industrial period and early computer age. Their capabilities will grow exponentially. The least mature technology is networks. Predicting when the sensor, robotics and network technology will advance sufficiently to meet ECS requirements is at best an educated guess and the primary difficulty in managing the risk inherent in a high technology program.

Based on open literature sources, it is reasonable to say that demonstrations needed to support a milestone B decision in 2003 for the six critical technologies could occur as early as 2004 or as late as 2010. Estimates for when the technologies could be ready for ECS low rate production varied from 2006 to 2015.

The FCS is designed to equip the Arm/s Objective Force, which would dose the gap between light and heavy forces by replacing them with medium-weight units, designed both to deploy quickly, to fight a major conflict and to perform peace-enforcing missions.

This vision, however, is not easy to implement and relies heavily upon technology. Thus, how technology is used and managed is critical to its success.

To satisfy the requirements of the Objective Force, the ECS should be lightweight, deployable, and maneuverable. To achieve this, the FCS is intended not to be platform-centric hut network-centric. The FCS is a modular construct with its separate functions fur fires, transport and sensing distributed across platforms that are individually smaller and lighter than either the 70-ton M1A1 Abrams or 35-ton M2A3 Bradley.

The FCS consists of both manned and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in a network-centric system of systems. In addition, the FCS must be able to survive a first-round engagement, it must be affordable and maximize commonality as well as joint and international interoperability, and it should include embedded training and human factors considerations in its design.

A team of Boeing and SAIC was selected in March as lead systems integrator, responsible for overseeing the integration and demonstration of an FCS prototype.

Next April, the decision will be made to proceed toward system development and demonstration (SDD). The SDD phase of the program will extend until September 2006. The timetable calls for a decision on low-rate initial production in fiscal year 2007 and full-rate production in 2008 or 2009. Finally, a demonstration of initial operating capabilities is expected in 2010 with subsequent iterative, or block upgrades to full operational capability thereafter.

Following is a summary of the current stare of the six critical technologies in FCS.

Sensors

Electronic information is used both as an additional weapon in the ECS arsenal and as an additional layer of protection. On the surface are tactical sensors (chemical, acoustic, electro-optic, infrared, electromagnetic, and magnetic). National assets alone are insufficient to meet the intelligence, surveillance and targeting requirements.

High altitude electro-optic and electromagnetic sensors are relatively mature and available to division-level commanders and above. However, typical update rates are on the order of hours to a day and are therefore most useful only for intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

To enable FCS capabilities with fast update rates, sensors and sensor platforms need to be assets of brigade-level and lower commanders. Commanders are currently able to detect and track targets using unattended acoustic ground sensors and moving target indicator radars, but reliable target identification requires imaging sensors mounted on UAVs and UGVs. Simply mounting a visible or infrared camera on a platform, however, does not solve the target identification problem. Bandwidth constraints of the network do not allow for streaming video from these sensors, nor would the flood of data help a commander assess his or her threat situation.

Miniaturization of electronic technology and its integration with photonic technology will be necessary to provide UAVs and UGVs with on-board processing for data compression or information extraction. In this way, the sensor provides a commander only what is required under the low-power, low-bandwidth constraints of the network. A demonstration of such technology under the Army's Sensor Optoelectronic Processing Scientific and Technology Objective (STO) is expected in 2004, but its insertion into a systems demonstration is unlikely before 2006.

Concurrently, the Sensors fur the Objective Force STO, which addresses the integration of sensors into a network, has been proposed as an advanced technology demonstration. A demonstration of capabilities would happen no sooner than 2005.

The utility of sensor data depends upon the speed with which it can be relayed to and processed by other components in the FCS. In one engagement in Desert Storm, sensor-to-shooter time was 80 minutes after an SA-2 surface-to-air missile site was detected as a potential threat. Although in the recent military operations in Afghanistan, sensor-to-shooter times were reduced to 20 minutes, nominal times remained on the order of hours. Perhaps the greatest challenge facing FCS is the development of a network to provide high-speed command, control and communications.

Networking

FCS network capabilities go beyond those envisaged for the Army's current Battle Command System. The network must be capable of integrating numerous remote ground and aerial sensors, maneuvering robotic systems, and controlling and directing both direct fire and beyond-line-of-sight weapon systems in a mobile environment. In addition, bandwidth management and seamless internetworking of both horizontal and vertical communications are required. The architecture and protocols for such a system are presently undeveloped and are only just being addressed.

Anyone who has used a wireless modem or cell phone to connect to the Internet is already aware of the problems facing the FCS. Consider that Single Channel Ground and Air Radio System (SINCGARS), which has a bandwidth of only 9.6 kilobits per second (Kbps), would take 23 minutes to transmit a single 1001(1650 pixel 8-bit JPEG image. The Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), which transmits at 14.4 Kbps, would still take more than 15 minutes.

Only a broadcast system, such as the Global Broadcast Service, which transmits at 23 megabits per second (Mbps), is capable of sending this image in under one second. The FCS is required to transmit images and data from multiple sensors, which only exacerbates the bandwidth problem. Although image compression and partial information updates can reduce the bandwidth load, to maintain situation awareness on the order of tens of minutes dictates a constant large stream of imagery and data.

Further, the network must be insensitive to nodes dropping on and off unexpectedly, which places an additional burden on network protocols. In addition, the network must have a low probability of detection and intercept and must provide assured communication that is linked horizontally and vertically.

The Army Multifunctional On-the-Move Secure Adaptive Integrated Communications (MOSAIC) program addresses some of these hurdles. By 2004, it is expected to demonstrate a self-organized wireless duster consisting of 15 to 20 nodes. The network is expected to have a 2-minute installation time and 5-minute recovery. Data transmission is between 56 Kbps and 15 Mbps, dependent upon the range between nodes, which at the extremes are from 100 kilometers (kin) to 100 meters (in). However, a wireless network with the capacity for 100 Mbps transmission will not be ready until at least 2010.

Robotics

As part of the FCS concept, robotic vehicles serve several functions, including as sensor platform, weapon platform, and network node. UAVs are mature enough to serve as semi-autonomous sensors and weapons platforms. Because of the complexity of ground navigation, UGVs are not as far along.

Although the operational concept for FCS requires UGVs to sense the battlefield and react on their own with minimal human interaction, current technology can best be described as remote controlled or tele-operated. Semiautonomous operation, suitable for sensing and indirect fire functions, will nor be available until 2010, and fully autonomous systems (necessary for direct fire, battle damage assessment, and reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and acquisitions) will not be available until 2015 or later.

The Army's Robotic Follower technology demonstration aims to create a robotic replacement of the Army mule. In off-road conditions, the robotic follower chases 500 m behind a lead vehicle at 15 kph. By 2005, separation is expected to increase to 750 m and speed to 65 kph.

Armor

Survivability in the conventional sense requires technologies in both passive and active protection, as well as stealth. With regard to passive protection, improvements in armor technology have led to the development of ceramic- and composite-based lightweight armors capable of surviving a first-round hit from a medium-caliber weapon (smaller than 30 mm, as compared to a 125-mm round for the (M1A1). The technology to manufacture these armors for application to FCS should be available by 2006.

In contrast to passive armor, which is designed to withstand a hit from a round, active protection systems are designed to sense the round and deflect or destroy it prior to penetration (using, for example, ejecting armor plates to alter trajectory) or defeat it in some manner after penetration. Deflection of shaped-charge weapons and rocket-propelled grenades should be possible beyond 2006, but the deflection of larger munitions or kinetic-energy rounds is not expected until beyond 2010 and perhaps not before 2015.

More advanced protection technologies, such as stealth, are also not expected to mature until 2010. The development of smart armor, which attempts to deflect a round once it has penetrated the first layer of armor, and electromagnetic armor, which reshapes a penetrated round, are also research areas that will require a decade or more to bring to fruition.

Munitions

To enhance survivability, FCS fires will be distributed and robotic and will rely heavily upon non-line-of-sight systems. Lethality overmatch will be guaranteed through an integrated system of both ground-based line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight systems, as well as precision and loitering attack missiles.

A demonstration of ground-based systems is addressed in the Multi-role Armament and Ammunition advanced technology demonstration. The ATD focuses on developing an improved kinetic energy (KE) round by 2006. In contrast to conventional munitions that rely upon explosives, a KE round destroys a target through energy transfer. The intent is to transfer sufficient energy to destroy a target by blasting a penetrator rod traveling at hypervelocity speed (5,000 feet per second) through heavy multi-plate or reactive armor.

The effectiveness of KB weapons has already been demonstrated by the line-of-sight antitank (LOSAT) missile. LOSAT consists of two 2-pack launch pods mounted on a Humvee and uses a second-generation infrared imager for target acquisition. By the end of fiscal year 2003, an operational company of 144 missiles will be delivered to the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Improvements in KB missile technology are covered under the Direct Fire Lethality ATD, which addresses the loss in accuracy due to lateral acceleration and diminished performance against explosive reactive armor. The gaal is to increase a KB round's probability-of-hit and probability-of-kill at 3 km to better than 70 percent of the current Abrams rates.

The primary hurdles to improved performance are not technologies, but engineering and manufacturing. Technologies being pursued include an advanced propellant, a radial thruster, a novel penetrator and an electro-thermal-chemical igniter.

The improved KB missile will transition to the Armament and Ammunition ATD in 2002. This ATD addresses issues related to the overall firing systems. For example, current gun weight is 6,700 pounds (lbs), which should be reduced to 2,900 lbs by 2006. Weight reduction to 3,500 lbs is acceptable. Further, the lightweight FCS platforms need to withstand the recoil force of the weapons system, which currently is 160,000 lbs. The goal of the ATD is to reduce this to 85,000 lbs, with 100,000 lbs as an acceptable minimum.

Beyond-line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight weapon systems are currently not as mature as line-of-sight systems. For that reason, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency initiated the Netfires program, which seeks to develop a multi-missile package capable of engaging targets between 25 and 50 km away, as well as a soft-launched loitering attack missile capable of hitting targets between 40 and 100 km away. The loitering attack missile can remain above a designated area for up to one hour before engagement collecting data to improve situation awareness. These technologies will not mature before 2006.

Hybrid Power

A hybrid system combines an energy storage system (for example, flywheels or batteries), a power unit like a fuel cell, and a vehicle propulsion system. Propulsion can come either entirely from an electric motor alone, referred to as a series configuration, or in combination with the engine in a parallel configuration. One attractive feature of using hydrogen fuel cells for power generation is the production of water as a by-product. Thus, in addition to reducing fuel consumption, fuel cells reduce water requirements as well.

Hybrid-electric counterparts of both the Bradley and Humvee are already under development. With regard to the FCS, the Advanced Hybrid Electric Drive (AHED) program seeks to demonstrate a 13-ton, 8-wheeled vehicle using an 8-wheel drive. The independent wheel drive, which uses a 150-horsepower (hp) permanent magnet motor, allows a vehicle to turn in place like a tank by having one or more wheels turn in different directions. The primary power source for the AHED is a 500-hp diesel engine and a 114-kilowatt (kw) battery pack It has a 114-kw battery pack for supplemental power. Top speed is expected to be 65 mph.

Many of the technologies associated with hybrid power remain research topics. For example, hybrid propulsion of FCS ground vehicles requires efficient electronic switching at high voltages and temperatures. Increased efficiencies to the levels desired for the FCS require a better understanding of surface interface and material defects in wide band gap semiconductor materials, a fundamental research issue that may not be resolved before the decade's end.

Key Decisions Ahead

Given the state of the various technologies needed for FCS, the Army should consider developing initial versions of FCS for low-intensity conflicts and, as technologies mature, new versions for higher-intensity combat.

Although the revolutionary capabilities envisioned for the FCS demand some technologies that are still unproven, critical requirements in survivability and lethality depend on more conventional technologies. This bodes well for the demonstration of a prototype FCS between 2003 and 2006 with rudimentary capabilities in networked situation awareness but more substantial capabilities in survivability and, especially, line-of-sight fires.

A block I FCS entering low rate initial production in 2007 would be capable of peace enforcing and low-end small-scale conflicts.

Robotics is a keystone technology for the FCS. The dependence upon robotics is perhaps the key enabler to reducing overall FCS weight and size.

Although present capabilities in UGV technology fall short of FCS expectations (fur example, a 15-kph follower as opposed to a 60-kph fully autonomous vehicle), the development path is straightforward and will be aided by natural advances in software and computing technology. But the present deficiencies in UGV technology are offset by the maturity of UAV technology and the approach to Netfires.

While reducing vehicle weight is important, it may be possible to achieve the Army's goal of deploying an FCS brigade in 96 hours using a mix of robotic and manned vehicles that does not rely solely upon the C-130 aircraft. A wide range of other deployment enablers exist that can meet the strategic timelines. For example, the C-17 strategic airlifter is capable of moving combat vehicles up to 70 tons. Hence, even if technology cannot achieve the 20-ton objective, heavier variants can still be deployed.

The information requirements for detecting tracking, and identifying objects are immense. Sensor technology needs to be miniaturized and needs to be smart (that is, provide on-sensor preprocessing for detecting and tracking targets prior to transmission). Although the technology for achieving this no longer lies in the realm of research, this does not imply that solving the engineering problems is a simple task The infrastructure for developing and producing it needs to be supported.

The performance of the MOSAIC ATD network will be critical in assessing the level of situation awareness that is possible in the near term. It should not be surprising that the most revolutionary technology, network technology, has yet to be demonstrated. The challenges in designing a secure network with mobile infrastructure are unique to the military. However, commercial technology developed for networks with fixed or portable infrastructure can be leveraged for military needs, especially with regard to integrating applications that are presently stove-piped.

Meanwhile, there are critics who claim that the FCS will lack an adequate level of survivability, The FCS denies an opponent the opportunity to fire by seeing first and shooting first. Also, the likelihood that an opponent might hit a manned vehicle is reduced using distributed, unmanned platforms on the battlefield. Critics contend that by relying upon a mobile, light, and distributed force structure, the Army is subjecting itself to far too many dangerous situations where large-scale heavy forces will be required.

Lethal technologies and precision weaponry, while effective, may still prove incapable of defending the lightweight platforms of the FCS against a determined adversary. However, the argument for FCS rests less on its individual combat power relative to a heavy enemy force and more on its place within the Arm/s contribution to a joint services operation.

Nonetheless, to address concerns about survivability, the Army has purposefully dedicated one modernized legacy corps, the III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, to retain a sufficient number of heavy combat systems, such as the M1A2 Abrams tank with system enhancement package, the Paladin self-propelled howitzer, the multiple-launched rocket system, the Apache Attack Aviation system, and the M2A3 Bradley fighting vehicle.

Even with one corps as an insurance policy, the question remains: How vulnerable is FCS? With the possibility of near-peer competitors, such as China, able to deploy several corps' worth of combat power, how survivable will the Objective Force plus one U.S. corps be in terms of the future threat? Admittedly, additional study is required to address survivability.

Current technology in munitions provides an effective line-of-sight fire. FCS is dependent upon Netfires to ensure its capability for beyond-line-of-sight fire. Although this can also be provided using precision bombing, if a decision has been made to deploy ground troops, one needs to assess the total logistics cost of deploying Netfires as part of the FCS versus sending a manned bomber.

There are questions as to whether milestone decisions are being made too soon. Besides the technology risks, there are other factors to be considered. First, the chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, may need to rely upon his successor to implement many of the changes proposed, and there is concern that a successor may not stay the course of Army transformation. Second, there is a competition for dollars. The Army needs to upgrade its legacy equipment, so the FCS procurement dollars may nor be available in the out years. Third, the political environment may not support a change in Army force structure in 10 years.

Joseph N. Mait works at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense Universizy Jon O. Grossman is a senior researcher in military technology at Rand Corporation.

A version of this article was first puhlished in the Defense Horizons newsletter, of the National Defense University.

The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other US federal agency.