Is America a part of Europe?

WITH THE COLLAPSE of the Soviet Union, the traditional rationale for the U.S. role in Europe has been dealt a fatal blow. In 1971, the Mansfield amendment--which would have halved the U.S. military presence in Europe--was defeated by only one vote in the Senate. It is only a matter of time before a modern-day Mansfield amendment calling for a total withdrawal is introduced in Congress. Some on the American Left argue that our new emphasis should be on domestic issues and that victory in the cold war allows us to shake off old commitments. Others on the American Right argue that a Europe recovered from World War II should pay the bills for its own defense. Many Europeans, tired of NATO low-altitude training flights and exhausted by forty years of brinkmanship, simply want the Americans to pack up and go home.

All of these arguments are flawed. First, two world wars have proved that the United States ignores events in Europe at its own peril. Had we been engaged in Europe, rather than sulking in isolation after World War I, we could have tipped the balance of power against the aggressors, possibly deterring rather than fighting World War II. Despite the waning of the cold war, the United States has major political and economic interests in Europe. The U.S. role in NATO gives us significant indirect leverage in addressing such issues as the Persian Gulf crisis and trade disputes. Without a military presence, we would have no voice in Europe.

In a historical perspective, Europe has been an even less stable place than the Middle East. With the end of the cold war, Europe will not descend into fratricidal war, but the possibility for conflict and armed clashes will persist and even increase. Yugoslavia's civil war is a case in point. It is astonishing that the return of open warfare in Europe has not set off alarm bells in every European capital. The scores of ethnic groups and the myriad competing territorial claims throughout the continent create endless possibilities for conflict.

Some observers argue that a post-1992 superstate can unify the cacophony of European views and speak with one voice. But that vision has become a pipe dream. In the Persian Gulf crisis, our European allies scattered like a flock of quail. A few, particularly Britain and France, fought side by side with our troops in the Kuwaiti deserts. But most, especially Germany, stuck their heads in the sand. In Yugoslavia's internal crisis, mediators from the European Community responded like Keystone Kops. During the initial phases of the crisis, Europe split over whether to support the Communist Serbian and central government or the democratic secessionist republics of Slovenia and Croatia. The community sent teams to act as ceasefire observers but did not marshal its massive political and economic leverage to demand a nonviolent resolution based on democratic self-determination. In its first major post-cold-war play, Europe fumbled the ball.

No single locus of decision-making exists among our European allies. Aristotle was profoundly perceptive when he wrote that government by the many or government by the few cannot act as efficiently as government by one. In foreign policy, a single point of executive authority is indispensable for decisive action. The premise of those who foresaw the emergence of a European superstate was that Germany would become its natural leader. But the Germans, hamstrung by pacifist tendencies during the Gulf crisis and preoccupied with the costs of unification, forfeited the role. In the meantime, the rest of Europe no longer views German leadership as the answer. Britain and France--who performed decisively in the Gulf--do not wish to defer to Berlin. And the rise of a unified Germany has prompted fears that German leadership will mean German domination.

Keeping a U.S. Presence

THE QUESTION is not whether but how the United States should maintain its presence in Europe. A common transatlantic home should be built on five pillars:

1. NATO guarantees Eastern Europe. Soon after their liberation, Eastern European democrats began casting about for new security arrangements. Collective security through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is a nonstarter. It has 35 diverse members even before the newly independent republics of the Soviet Union are added to its ranks. Its rules requiring unanimity for action create insurmountable hurdles for collective defense. It would recreate the days of the League of Nations, when aggressors could veto collective actions designed to stop them. Moreover, the CSCE is just that: a conference, a diplomatic process. It cannot provide tangible security arrangements, such as the integrated military structure of NATO. Unless institutionalized and bolstered with well-trained and well-equipped forces, the CSCE can never contribute more than added confidence-building measures and a forum for discussion. In a major crisis, it will never be capable of doing more than adopting nonenforceable, wrist-slapping resolutions.

With the profound political instability and dire economic situation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the region could still become a geopolitical demolition derby. While current Russian leaders have combined their nationalism with democracy, we cannot exclude the possibility that others might later emerge who might vent its darker side. If concern still exists about Germany, which has had a democratic government for forty years, there will be even more reason for concern about Russia, which has had a democratic government for less than one year.

As Europe's only time-tested security structure, NATO should seek to find ways to fill the security vacuum in Eastern Europe, particularly over the next decade when the uncertainty centering on instability within the former Soviet Union will run the highest. This] does not mean that NATO members should immediately extend its full Article 5 commitment--"an armed attack on one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack on all of them"--to the new democracies. But it does mean that we should think in more subtle terms than an all-or-nothing guarantee.

The United States and its Western European allies should unambiguosly declare that NATO has a critical interest in the survival and security of these new democracies. By linking our commitment to democratic rule in Eastern European countries, it will give added incentive to these nations to avoid a reversion to authoritarianism.

In the longer term, NATO should develop formal security links with Eastern European democracies. Our goal should be their full integration into NATO. We will never build a common transatlantic home if NATO forces Eastern Europeans to live outside its protective walls.

2. U.S. activism in Eastern Europe. The countries of Eastern Europe, struggling against enormous economic odds, have a great interest in fostering U.S. ties, especially to help them emerge from the shadow of Western European economic domination. Also, as the European Community grants associate-member status to the Eastern Europeans, a close economic relationship could give the U.S. a potential back door into an increasingly protectionist post-1992 Europe.

Above all, we should open Western markets to Eastern European exports. Trade represents the major hope for rapid economic development. With Moscow demanding hard-currency payment for its exports, Eastern European energy costs soared by $20 billion in 1991. Foreign debts limit their credit. Because of the current uncompetitive quality of Eastern European goods, the 30 per cent of Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian exports that went to the Soviet Unio or East Germany--markets now closed or vanished--has few buyers. It is imperative that European Community grant them associate status as soon as possible and that the United States immediately liberalize trade by increasing the list of imports given duty-free entry. Since sustained economic growth depends not on aid but on trade, the West must lift these counterproductive obstacles.

In order to prevent potential ethnic conflicts, we should work with the continent's leaders to channel the new Eastern European nationalism in constructive directions. Those who look with dismay at nationalism's re-emerge should remember that only their sense of distinct identity enabled these peoples to resist and triumph over 45 years of Soviet indoctrination and repression. Yet national borders do not neatly divide separate nations. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania all have significant national minorities, while Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia actually are not nation-states but multinational states.

Tragically, on the eve of the current armed hostilities, officials from the United States and the European Community made ill-advised statements in support of Yugoslavia's central government, thereby appearing to give a green light to the use of force by the Communists. It makes no sense to try to maintain the artificial unity of Yugoslavia. The United States and Western Europe should have backed up their demands for an end to Serbian aggression against Croatia with a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for the immediate dispatch of peacekeeping forces to Yugoslavia.

National Rights

IN THE LONGER TERM, we should encourage Europe's leaders--from West and East--to develop a formal charter of national minority rights. The international community has articulate individual human rights in the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and other documents. But apart from the Genocide Convention of 1948, it has not stipulated the legitimate rights of national minorities. While the issue arises also outside of Europe--the Kurds and the Tibetans, for example--Europe's democratic consensus might enable its leaders to address the question forthrightly. A new European charter could set guidelines for guaranteeing legitimate national rightsin such areas as language use in education and respect for religious freedom, thereby helping to reduce the danger of civil strife or even war resulting from Eastern Europe's and the former Soviet Union's national mosaic.

All the steps are needed to integrate the new Eastern European democracies into the common transatlantic home. None is a question of charity. Our interests, as well as theirs, will be advanced by making Eastern Europe the focal point of the U.S. political and economic presence in the region.

3. Close U.S-German partnership. Not only in Europe but also around the world, enduring memories of World War II still limit Germanys's ability to play a role commensurate with its economic power and geopolitical importance. In the Persian Gulf crisis, both internal and external anxieties about greater German activism produced a confused and ineffective policy, with Bonn's ultimate military contribution amounting to a paltry 720 troops deployed in the inactive Turkish theater. To allay suspicions about a wider global role for Germany, its leaders must work with the other Western powers, particularly the United States. In view of our mutual interests, we should develop a common agenda, with the United States providing the needed "political cover" for a more active German foreign policy.

At the same time, the United States needs a European partner dedicated to expanding opportunities for world trade. Since Germany's exports account for 35 per cent of its GNP--one of the highest totals in the West--Berlin has a profound interest in keeping markets open. We should therefore work in tandem to avoid a post-1992 Fortress Europe, because higher tariffs will lead to a cycle of retaliation. In addition, we must resolve the outstanding disputes in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) talks. While the Western Europeans bicker about retaining $81.6 billion in trade-distorting agricultural subsidies, we risk losing an estimated $5 trillion of additional global economic growth over the next decade that a Uruguay Round agreement would bring. A U.S.-German partnership could not only overcome the pleadings of Europe's and America's special interests, but it could quiet catcalls from pundits on both sides of the Atlantic who suppot the "go it alone" approach.

Indeed, in coordinating fiscal and monetary policies among the major industrial democracies, the United States should at times follow Germany's lead. U.S. Presidents have repeatedly tried to "jawbone" the Germans to lower interest rates to stimulate the world economy. But we need to conced the wisdom of Germany's approach. Our looser monetary policies have produced an inflation rate of 6 per cent, while Germany's stands at 3 per cent. As a result, U.S. interest rates on long-term loans--which are critical for capital development--run significantly higher than those in Germany. We should therefore think twice before pressing the Germans to ease up on the money supply after every momentary blip in the index of leading economic indicators. While their approach might limit growth in the short term, it recognizes the need to eliminate inflationary expectations for the sake of long-term growth.

Curbing Arms Sales

ANOTHER ISSUE on our mutual agenda should be controlling the transfer of key technologies to the developing world. The activities of German firms in Libya and Iraq have given Berlin a black eye. Germany does not need a reputation for moral indifference or irresponsibility as it tries to re-emerge on the world stage. Unless Germany reins in its freewheeling arms exporters and unless the West clamps down on technology exports to rogue states such as Iraq and Syria, we will someday confront a new Saddam Hussein armed not with Scuds but ICBMs. To create the impression that Germany is a geopolitical chamelon would not only undermine U.S.-German relations but also would reinforce historical anxieties about a wider German role.

This partnership will take time to develop and will only work if Germany remains a responsible Western power rather than a country jockeying for position between East and West. At the same time, a special relationship with Germany does not imply the United States putting greater distance between itself and Britain, France, Italy and other NATO nations.

4. An open-door policy vis-a-vis the newly independent republics of the Soviet Union. Before the coup, most of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment, in the name of stability, decried nationalist movements that opposed Gorbachev. They were wrong. Stability at the cost of individual freedom and national independence is too high a price to pay. We should not condemn nationalism but only the excesses of extreme nationalists. We must find ways to integrate into the West those former Soviet republics that establish democratic institutions, adopt free-market reforms, and respect the rights of national minorities within their borders.

5. Restructing NATO for new missions. Many observers believe that NATO should become a political rather than a military alliance. But no alliance has ever survived for long after security ceased to be its core function. No political substitute exists for the bonds of collective defense. Moreover, in the hardheaded world of power politics, no diplomatic or political initiative can succeed unless backed by credible military capabilities. This does not mean that NATO cannot add new political missions. But it does mean that we must not confuse NATO's raison d'etre--forging a transatlantic security link--with other important but secondary goals.

What to Do?

IN THE FOG of public debate, two options have begun to emerge. The first--the NATO option--centers around a continuing U.S.commitment to a major force presence in Europe. While the numbers of U.S. troops in Europe would substantially decrease, the centrality of our role in the alliance and its integrated military command would remain unchanged. The second--the European Community option--seeks to develop a principally European security structure, though with continued U.S. participation. Ultimately, our allies will coalesce around the latter. While they understand the need for our nuclear guarantee--and accept the voice that it gives America in Europe's security decisions--they will object to a U.S. policy that supports European political unity but demands a security relationship in which Washington retains its dominant leadership role.

Our approach should welcome increased Western European self-reliance. When we brought our forces to a peak development of over 400,000 troops in the mid 1950s, I vividly recall a meeting of the National Security Council when President Eisenhower said that he intended this to be only a temporary measure needed until our allies in Europe recovered from World War II. If the Europeans develop the capability of speaking with one voice on political and security matters--which is possible but not inevitable--we should embrace the European Community option.

This does not mean that we should withdraw all of our ground forces from Europe. But it does mean that our function should involve a conventional and nuclear deployment much smaller than today but still large enough to create the essential link of mutual security and to preserve the military infrastructure for any U.S. intervention that might become necessary in a crisis.

As NATO finds its footing in the new Europe, it should also expand its mission. Today, as demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, challenges to Western interests can arise half a world away. If NATO adheres to artificial geographical restrictions. we will be shooting ourselves in the foot, compromising our interests to legalism. For example, an effort to cut the oil lifeline of Western Europe is as great a threat to the security of NATO as a military attack against a NATO member. While European defense must remain NATO's core mission, so-called out-of-era security cooperation must become its cutting edge. Unless we adopt such a policy, the American people--whose commitment to NATO had depended on the perception of a Soviet threat--will inevitably seek disengage from Europe as the alliance increasingly speaks of Moscow not as an adversary but as a "partner in security."

While we already cooperate in distant crises, our solutions tend to be ad hoc. To improve NATO's capabilities to cope with out-of-area conflicts, we need to move forward in three areas. First, the European members of NATO should develop a joint rapid deployment force that would function, depending on circumstances, independently or under an integrated command with similar U.S. forces. Second, the United States should welcome European activism in parts of the underdeveloped world where their historical experience exceeds our own. For too long, Americans have assumed that our superior military power gave us superior political wisdom. In addition, because the next crisis will likely take place in the underdeveloped world, the United States should open its overseas bases outside Europe to our NATO allies. Our current policty restricts foreign military powers from using our bases, but we should be more flexible in order to facilitate greater European activism in critical parts of the underdeveloped world. Third, NATO should develop better mechanisms for more coordinate crisis management. Working together, the members of the Atlantic alliance--which control over half of the world economy--wield power that no potential adversary can afford to ignore.

These five pillars provide a framework for a common transatlantic home. The critical issue for Europe is whether economic unity will produce a parochial or an open Europe. Critics wrongly scorned former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's position on European unification. Her warnings about a unified but inward-looking and protectionist Europe were misinterpreted as opposition to any unity at all. She understood that the rush to create the mechanisms of unity had clouded the need to craft the meaning of unity. In her vision, European economic unification should serve as the necessary precursor to Atlantic economic unification. On the eve of post-1992 Europe, its leaders must understand that unity will serve European interests only if it represents the first step toward moving out into the world and not toward retreating behind the cloistered walls of a Fortress Europe.

This article is excerpted from Seize the Moment, by Richard Nixon. Copyright [C] 1992 by East-West Research, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Simon & Schuster, Inc.