Iraqi Element In Afghan Insurgency.

As spring approaches in Afghanistan, a new Taliban/ Qaede-led offensive is awaited. But, unlike in previous offensives in the five years since the Taliban movement was pushed out of power in Kabul, it now seems to be better organised. A key to its revival is the link it has forged with the Neo-Salafi insurgency in Iraq, which has provided hundreds of Taliban with hands-on training in that country, as well as logistical and tactical support. One device is a CD released by Jaysh ul-Islam al-Iraq (Islamic Army of Iraq), a Neo-Salafi group affiliated to al-Qaeda, which shows how urban guerrilla warfare is being conducted in Iraq and how this can be adapted to the insurgency in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world.

The CD is widely circulated among Neo-Salafi militants in South Asia, including the rank and file of the Taliban. The Jaysh ul-Islam al-Iraq is an indigenous group commanded by former Iraqi generals and independent Neo-Salafis, and the CD shows the very refined quality of their attacks. The group co-ordinates its activities with other organisations, such as Jaysh Ansar ul-Sunna, another of the Qaeda affiliates.

The CD contains 10 separate clips, each one showing a significant aspect of Jaysh ul-Islam strategy. These include: The structure of the group's intelligence, infiltration of enemy forces, exhaustive knowledge of the target, precise identification of material used against specific targets, and the importance of dedicated jihadis. One clip shows fighters taking up positions near a spot used by a US helicopter carrying soldiers. As it takes off, it is hit by a missile and crashes. Several soldiers are seen burned in the wreckage; one who survives is seen pleading in English for his life. He gets a hail of bullets which kill him.

Other footage shows an attack on the US base of Tal A'far. One clip shows two trucks seconds before one of them, full of explosives, rams into a US armoured vehicle; the other, having monitored the target's movements, swiftly reverses from the scene. The Neo-Salafi insurgents, with help from collaborators within Iraqi government forces, has planted explosives in the camp which can be seen going off. In one picture, US soldiers watch the first explosion. In the next second, their building is blown up. Qur'anic verses and religious songs in Arabic form the background to the scenes.

ATO on March 15 reported that as many as 500 fighters who trained in Iraq were now in Afghanistan or Pakistan, "while many others are expected to return soon". The Taliban's connection with Iraq began before the US-led attack there in 2003 when Taliban leader Mullah Omar sent some of his men to stay with Jaysh Ansar ul-Islam, a partly Kurdish and partly Turkoman Neo-Salafi group in northern Iraq, to train and fight alongside Kurdish guerrillas against Saddam's forces. After the US invasion, many of these men together with Iraqi Arab recruits went to other parts of Iraq to fight alongside various groups opposed to the US occupation.

ATO noted that, in 2003, one of the Taliban commanders who had been sent to Iraq, "Mullah Mehmood Allah Haq Yar, returned to Afghanistan, where he rejected the traditional style of guerrilla warfare in operation since the anti-Soviet resistance of the 1980s - heavy reliance on AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades". The first thing he taught the Taliban was "the formation of groups that could fight independently" and which would be task-orientated to specific missions. ATO said many of these small groups were "sent regularly to Iraq between 2004 and 2005", where they spent months with the Jaysh ul-Islam al-Iraq, Jaysh Ansar ul-Sunna and other Neo-Salafi affiliates.

In return, these men passed on their new-found expertise to comrades in North and South Waziristan, with ATO noting: "the former being a veritable Taliban stronghold, the latter heading that way. And significantly, a la Iraq, they have organized scores of suicide squads, a relatively new phenomenon in Afghanistan".

"In the first phase of their spring offensive", ATO said, "the Taliban aim to contain the Pakistani army by engaging it throughout the tribal belt. This will allow the Taliban freely to cross the leaky border with Afghanistan, or better, strike a deal with the army to leave the Taliban alone. According to contacts who spoke to Asia Times Online, a blueprint for such attacks in the tribal areas has already been approved by the Taliban's command council.

"Within Afghanistan, heavyweights Kashmir Khan of the Hizb-i-Islami Afghanistan, Mullah Dadullah, Mullah Akhtar Usmani and Sirajul Haq Haqqani, son of former Taliban minister and commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, are already in the field to influence local tribes to support the Taliban movement. Shabname, or 'night messages', contained in pamphlets are being distributed asking people to revolt against foreign forces, which, the pamphlets say, are made up of people from countries where caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed have been published and his personality ridiculed. Independent analysts believe that the Taliban, even with training, will be unlikely to achieve anything like the level of warfare being waged by the Iraqi resistance, which has a strong element of hardened professional soldiers. Nevertheless, the Afghan resistance will be sufficiently competent and equipped and big enough to remain a serious threat to US and allied troops, and even force a rethink on their part".

The Chechen Connection Spreading In Russia: There is a link between the Neo-Salafi emirate of North Waziristan, the Neo-Salafi insurgency in Iraq, and the Neo-Salafi militants in Chechnya. Apart from their co-ordination, all want to spread their global reach and have a common objective: establishing the global caliphate in the final phase of their trans-national struggle. Whereas the emirate in North Waziristan will concentrate on the south-eastern periphery of the Middle East including Pakistan and Central Asia, the Chechen militants will seek to spread within the Caucasus and Russia and through Europe.

The Chechen Internet site Kavkaz (www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/) - a sort of semi-official organ of the Chechen insurgency which has engaged in a nearly 15-year war with the Russian state - recently carried long articles from two prominent figures, Ahmed Zakaev and Movladi Udugov. Both pieces dealt with the outline of Chechens' future.

Udugov's views on the Chechens' future are far more extreme than those of Zakaev. Udugov advocates a philosophy popular among trans-national jihadi groups of the Sunni sect, such as al-Qaeda which has discarded any ideas of carving out a Chechen state in the current world order. What Zakaev sees as the civilised Western world, Udugov argues is the same brutish, corrupt system which one can see in Russia, except that the Western predators are more polished.

Udugov argues that any state in today's global community is an institution of oppression and corruption; and the Chechen state, if it were to be established, would inevitably fall into the same pit. What Chechens should have is not a regular state but an enclave separate from the rest of the world; one like the new North Waziristan emirate which could be used for the launching of the global jihad which, in the final phase, would lead to the establishment of the global khilafah (caliphate) and transcend present-day history.

Al-Qaeda's model is not just wishful thinking but the group sees it as a reality, as can be seen in North Waziristan, where the Taliban and al-Qaeda have created an emirate designed exclusively for jihadi purposes. This reminds one of the Soviet enclave in the first few years of its existence; it was in conflict with the entire "capitalist" world - and the Bolsheviks regarded it as a springboard for a global revolution.

Udugov is different from Zakaev not only in his vision of future states but in what he considers the very nature of the forces that will fight the anti-Islamic world. In sharp contrast with Zakaev, though, Udugov discards Chechen nationalism, not only because narrow nationalism makes it harder for Chechens to forge alliances with other ethnic groups, but also because jihad requires a different type of people. These people should be united not by blood but by common spiritual bonds of dedicated Muslims. Elaborating on this point, Udugov says this is why he feels an attachment to other Chechens, even though he disguises himself as a collaborator with the Russians.

At the same time, Idugov feels himself attached to the story of the Russian boy who forsook alcohol, fornication and other sins and became a dedicated Muslim of the Neo-Salafi order. This stress on embracing people of all ethnic backgrounds who are ready to embrace al-Qaeda's Islam and similar-minded Chechens is not unique.

The Taliban and al-Qaeda follow the same principle. The story of the "American Taliban" - John Walker Lindh, the American Catholic who on conversion to Neo-Salafism joined the Taliban and was captured by US troops - is well known. More interesting is the story of another American convert.

A few years ago a videotape, allegedly circulated by the Taliban or al-Qaeda, showed a man speaking with an American accent promising the US a new and even more devastating repetition of 9/11. It was revealed that the man on the tape was an American Jew - if one could judge from his name - who apparently became a convert and joined the jihadis.

Russian President Vladimir Putin understands well that Neo-Salafi Islamists, who have wanted their philosophy and practice to replace the Communist movement, are an implacable mortal enemy of his regime. The Neo-Salafi call for Islamic unity, similar to Karl Marx's call for workers of all countries to unite, could unite the Muslim people of the Caucasus and spread to Muslim enclaves in the Russian heartland. The movement would include ethnic Russians.

Putin understands that Russian jihadis are a part of the "worldwide revolution" of Sunni radicalism, and that the US is in as much peril as Russia. While similar to Bush in his approach to confronting jihadism, Putin believes himself to be wiser than the US president. This is not because of Putin's personal faculties, but the result of leading a collapsing super-power which has tasted the bitter fruits of protracted war and defeat in Afghanistan and now Chechnya.

Al-Qaeda follows the same principle, seeing what it believes Bush cannot see: that military preponderance is useless in the US war on terror, which could be too long to endure both for Russia and the West. This is one of the major reasons that Putin appeals to those he regards as moderate, at least in comparison with the jihadis. Izvestia, a leading Russian publication, recently published a positive account of Zakaev. It is one of the major reasons Putin has been dealing with Sunni Hamas (a Gaza offshore of the Muslim Brotherhood) and Shi'ite Iran. Yet it is not likely that Putin will succeed in his endeavours, and the long war on terror will continue.

Zakaev, a moderate, argues that the present war in Chechnya should be driven by the pre-modern forces of Chechen nationalism and lead to the creation of an independent Chechen state. This should be incorporated into the concert of modern powers, and with a gravitation to the West.

In fact, Zakaev, who is based in England where he has the status of a political refugee, has admitted that the US, with all its administrative hesitation, understands Chechens' legal rights. Consequently Chechens, Zakayev says, should in general follow international law.