Iraq in four steps.

SUPPORT for a limited air strike against Iraq is beginning to fade both in Congress and among the American people. Questions have arisen over what the U.S. would hope to accomplish and whether the limited air power now deployed in the Persian Gulf region is capable of effecting any positive resolution.

NR senior editor Peter Rodman offers a better course of action in the following pages. Whether the current crisis is resolved diplomatically or through the use of force, these principles should underpin thinking on this matter.

Treat the Problem, Not the Symptoms: The problem is Saddam Hussein's regime, not weapons that can be produced by any country capable of making pesticides. Hussein's driving political imperative is his own survival. Unless you threaten that, you merely kick the can down the road as we have done for the past seven years.

Think like TR: The Clinton Administration has turned Teddy Roosevelt's motto on its head -- talking a strong line while offering a series of may-work half-measures as military options. We even sent home one of three American aircraft carriers last week, a particularly bad move considering the refusal of Saudi Arabia to allow us to send bombers from their large bases. Strident threats backed up by a weak military presence is an Arab game, not ours.

Not through the Air Alone Shall We Succeed: Eliot Cohen's five-volume examination of air power in the Gulf War led him to the conclusion that like modern American courtship, "air power offers instant gratification without commitment." Military options using ground troops, however difficult, should be explored. Unless Saddam senses that there is at least an American willingness and capability to use ground forces, he will merely ride out air strikes, hope for a few POWs (especially female fliers), and parade his dead before the world.

Give It Straight to the American People: The President is avoiding answering the real question: "Are Saddam and his possession of weapons of mass destruction such a clear and present danger that we should be willing to go to war?" Until that question is confronted, the Administration is left trying to convince the public of something not to be believed: that Saddam is an intolerable presence who can be dealt with on the cheap.