Iran's Regional Ambitions.

The big question for the Bush administration now is the link between Iran's nuclear programme and Tehran's geo-political ambitions, i.e, its regional policies. If the theory that Iran's Islamic revolution cannot survive unless it expanded regionally is in fact the prime motive of its regional policies, then this is bound to clash with the regional policies of its neighbours - which is where the strategy of the US in the Middle East will be at stake. If, at the same time, Iran's nuclear ambitions are dependent on its regional ones, then there could be a clash - even military confrontation.

Bush strategists are saying, however, that if Iran proves to the US that its nuclear programme is peaceful and that its Islamic revolution is both national and defensive, then there would be an agreement ultimately between Washington and Tehran. From the standpoint of the Bush administration, which now is struggling against a strong anti-Iraq-war offensive from the Democrats, the success of its Iraq project will be at stake in the period between now and the November 2008 US presidential elections.

The big question for the Shi'ite theocracy of Iran is whether or not the Bush strategy in Middle East - centring on US success in Iraq - really matters. The same goes for the Syrian government and all others who now are part of the Iran-led axis of influences. Strategists in Tehran argue that US success in Iraq may not have to be measured by the calculations of the American Republican Party in the period between now and November 2008. But there are also strategists in Tehran who think the calculations of a Democratic administration in the US after late 2008 may not be in line with the interests of Iran's supremacists - i.e., those hardliners who now have the upper hand in the Ja'fari theocracy.

Hossein Mousavian, a former security official who played a leading role in Iran's negotiations with the EU over its nuclear programme, has been arrested. The FT on May 3 quoted Mohammad Atrianfar, a prominent journalist close to Mousavian, as confirming he had been taken into custody on April 30 from his Tehran home. The semi-official Fars news agency, affiliated to the IRGC and the supremacists, on May 2 quoted an official as saying Mousavian was charged with espionage for "communicating with foreign agents and exchanging information with them" on the nuclear programme. The official rejected any early release for Mousavian.

President Ahmadi-Nejad and fellow supremacists in Tehran have shown nervousness about prominent Iranians spending time abroad and Mousavian has travelled regularly since losing his post as chair of the foreign policy committee of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) in 2005. Atrianfar, like Mousavian close to the influential former President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, said: "The move exerts pressure because Mousavian was a link with some lobbies outside Iran. This is to create a police atmosphere which is worrying". Rafsanjani is most prominent among conservative pragmatists who want the theocracy to limit its ambitions to Iran, whereas his supremacist rivals want to spread regionally and internationally as a super-power.

Mousavian is deputy head of the Centre for Strategic Research, a Rafsanjani-led think tank which briefs Iran's leaders. He played a central role in negotiations with the EU between 2003 and 2005, before he was removed as part of the team of Hassan Rowhani, who was replaced as secretary of the SNSC by Larijani after the election in June 2005 of President Ahmadi-Nejad. Since then, Mousavian has been a prominent critic of Iran's diplomacy in the international stand-off over the atomic programme - although he has offered support to Larijani in talks with Solana.

In January, Mousavian briefed Iranian journalists urging Iran to bargain over its "rights" to a nuclear fuel cycle and implied the country had no choice but to accept the Dec. 23 UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution, which imposed sanctions and demanded Iran suspend almost all nuclear activities. Further sanctions on Iran were imposed in a more recent UNSC resolution. Now there is talk of yet another UNSC resolution.

Tehran's Supremacists & Their Iraqi Allies: Where Washington is concerned, whether the US is under a Republican or a Democratic administration, the supremacists of Tehran have no allied states and resources in the Middle East on which the Americans and their Western partners can depend. Members of the Iran-led axis in the Middle East other than Tehran now are Syria and non-state movements which are not capable of acting independently for a sustainable period of time - such as Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, plus Hizbullah-like groups inside Ja'fari communities around the world. The supremacists of Tehran include the co-ruling IRGC on which Ahmadi-Nejad depends. But their allies in Iraq are not strong enough to sustain a military confrontation with US forces for the period between now and November 2008.

Those Ja'fari Shi'ite movements which are allied to Iran's supremacists at present are only groups headed by opportunists depending more on short-term conveniences than on long-term strategic or ideological considerations. They include the Sadrist movement, headed by a young cleric whose ideological background is Arab nationalism. The cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, has limited experience in geo-politics and the military capabilities of his militia - Jaysh al-Mahdi - are limited to hit-and-run tactics far less effective than those of its Neo-Salafi enemies. This militia now is split into several factions and only two of them are under IRGC control; but these two are bitter rivals and Sadr is said to have been behind the recent murder of some of their leaders. Iraqi experts say the IRGC-backed factions of Jaysh al-Mahdi stand no chance of surviving a confrontation with the US forces.

Sadr's ideological base is the same as the one of most anti-Sadrists among Ja'fari Shi'ite militia groups. These include al-Da'wa al-Islamiya which now consists of several factions. Iraqi PM Maliki, who until recently depended heavily on the support of Sadr, belongs only to one of these Da'wa factions which is more Arab in terms of nationalism than being Shi'ite; only one of the others is loyal to the IRGC and this is at odds with Maliki's faction over several Iraqi/Arab issues.

There is now a "Higher Shi'ite Council" in Gaza, the product of Hamas' close alliance with Iran's Shi'ite theocracy. Al-Tashayo' - a Sunni Arab term for the process of Sunnis being lured to convert into Ja'fari Shi'ism - is a new trend in the parts of the Muslim World where there are Shi'ite communities. There is now a Hizbullah branch or an equivalent group under a different name in each of Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and other countries. Even in Yemen, the Zaidi Shi'ite extremists of the al-Houthi family are allies of Iran and are receiving help from Iran's Shi'ite theocracy.

This is the main reason for King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to lead a new approach among Sunni Arab regimes, including his rapprochement with Tehran which aims at reducing Sunni-Shi'ite tensions in the Muslim world (see news19-IraqShi'itesNeedUSmay7-07).