International bounty hunters for war criminals: privatizing the enforcement of justice.
International law is often criticized for lacking any formal means of enforcement.  International criminal tribunals are not supported by an international police force. Many of the individuals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) remain at large,  and the Yugoslavian government has systematically refused to arrest indicted war criminals.  Even the October 2000 popular uprising that ousted Slobodan Milosevic from Yugoslavia's presidency has done little to improve Yugoslavia's level of cooperation with the ICTY. Mr. Vojislav Kostunica, Yugoslavia's newly elected president, has not permitted Serbs to be extradited to The Hague.  Mr. Kostunica has stated that a Yugoslavian national truth commission should address Yugoslav war crimes.  The departing president of the ICTY, Gabrielle McDonald, has criticized the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for "doing too little to help bring indicted people to justice." 
Without an international police force, who can the international community rely on to hunt war criminals and bring them to justice? In the United States, domestic bounty hunters have proven more effective at ensuring an alleged criminal's presence at trial than State law enforcement has.  Can international bounty hunters prove an efficient means to bring war criminals to justice? 
Shortly after Ms. Carla del Ponte, the Chief United Nations (UN) prosecutor at the ICTY, called for "creative ways" to arrest fugitive war criminals, on April 21, 2000, in Smederevo, Serbia, Mr. Dragan Nikolic, an indicted war criminal, was handed over to American Stabilization Force soldiers by bounty hunters.  The bounty hunters smuggled Mr. Nikolic out of Serbia and handed him over to NATO troops in Bosnia who transferred him to the ICTY in the Netherlands.  During an April 28, 2000 court appearance, Mr. Nikolic pleaded not guilty to eighty separate war crimes charges and requested that the ICTY dismiss his case on the grounds that his arrest was illegal.  On May 17, 2000, Serbian police arrested eight persons in Serbia who were allegedly involved in kidnapping Mr. Nikolic.  Serbian police claim that unspecified "foreign services" paid [pounds]31,000 (British pounds) for the kidnapping. 
This paper discusses the feasibility and practicality of utilizing international bounty hunters to deliver war criminals to justice. Part I of this paper provides a brief overview of some of the available sources of international law that establish war crimes. Part II discusses the international community's growing interest in prosecuting war criminals and the inadequacy of relying on extradition treaties, military forces, and UNSC enforcement sanctions to capture fugitive war criminals. Part III briefly considers the viability of utilizing an international police force to capture war criminals. Part IV analyzes the effectiveness of domestic bounty hunters. Part V discusses the available legal alternatives for establishing international bounty hunters. Part VI discusses whether a bounty hunter's forced abduction of an indicted war criminal violates the UN Charter. Part VII explores the practical applications of how an international bounty should function.
II. WAR CRIMES
International and domestic courts rely on treaties applicable to armed conflicts and customary international law  when defining war crimes. A war crime is defined as any violation of international law governing war.  However, only grave breaches of the law involving the mistreatment of protected individuals are typically prosecuted. 
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions  protect persons who are not taking an active part in an armed conflict. Protected persons include the sick and wounded, prisoners of war and civilians under the control of an occupying force. Murder, torture, inhuman treatment and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to a protected person in the course of an international armed conflict are grave breaches to the Geneva Conventions and constitute war crimes.  The Additional Protocols of 1977 extended these protections to all civilians.  Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions also provides basic fundamental protections to all persons during all armed conflicts, both international and internal. Common Article 3 prohibits murder, torture, the taking of hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, and the carrying out of executions without the judgment of a regularly constituted court. 
The Geneva Conventions focus upon the protection of persons during armed conflict, while the Hague Conventions  focus on the means and methods of warfare.  The 1907 Hague Convention concerning the laws and customs of land warfare prohibits parties to an international armed conflict from using poisoned weapons, employing arms that are calculated to cause great suffering, and improperly using a flag of truce.  The 1907 Hague Convention also requires combatants to protect, as far as possible, buildings of historical or cultural significance, and hospitals. 
On December 9, 1948, the United Nations general assembly approved a convention,  which established that genocide, whether committed in war or peace, is a crime under international law.  The convention defined genocide as acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. 
The four Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, and the Genocide Convention have all matured into customary international law.  Accordingly, all States are legally bound by these conventions regardless of whether or not a State is a party to any of the conventions. Individuals who violate any of these conventions during an armed conflict may be prosecuted as a war criminal.  Additionally, under customary international law, a commander may be held accountable for his subordinates' war crimes if he knew or should have known that his subordinates were involved in war crimes and he did not take reasonable measures to prevent the crimes.  Domestic criminal courts generally rely on the above sources of international law for the prosecution of a war crime.
The recent international war crimes tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were each provided with a statute drafted by the UNSC that codified the specific war crimes that each court could prosecute. 
The statute for the ICTY provides jurisdiction for grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the law or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity.  Under the ICTY statute, crimes against humanity include murder, enslavement, torture, rape, and the deportation and persecution of any civilian population on racial, political or religious grounds.  The statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) provides jurisdiction for breaches of common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, and crimes against humanity.  The list of crimes against humanity for the ICTR and the ICTY are identical.  However, the statute for the ICTY requires a nexus to the armed conflict before there can be a crime against humanity while the statute to the ICTR only requires a crime against humanity to be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population. 
On July 17, 1998, at a UN Diplomatic Conference in Rome, 120 States voted to establish a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC).  The ICC will come into force when 60 States or more have ratified or accepted the court's statute.  The ICC statute provides jurisdiction for the ICC to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. 
III. JUSTIFYING THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BOUNTY HUNTER
The international community's interest in the prosecution of war criminals has never been greater. For the first time since World War II, international prosecutions for war criminals are not just a theoretical possibility. The international criminal tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda demonstrate the UNSC's ability and willingness to create ad hoc tribunals for specific armed conflicts. Recent proposals have discussed the possibility of creating additional ad hoc tribunals to prosecute war crimes that were committed in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia.  The ICC is evidence of the growing support for a permanent standing international court to prosecute war crimes. States have also demonstrated a renewed interest in using their domestic courts to prosecute war criminals. 
Universal jurisdiction under customary international law gives States the right to use their domestic courts to prosecute war criminals.  Customary international law obligates States to search for, prosecute, or extradite war criminals.  The 1949 Geneva Conventions obligated States to enact domestic legislation to enable the State to fulfill its obligation to prosecute war criminals.  After the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the United States relied on Articles 18 and 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to fulfill its obligation under international law to have a domestic forum for the prosecution of war criminals. Article 18 of the UCMJ permits the United States military to try by general courts-martial its own military member or any prisoner of war for violations of the law of war.  Article 21 of the UCMJ permits the United States military to try any individual at a military commission for violations of the law of war.  Recently, in 1996, the United States enacted the War Crimes Act to expand federal court jurisdiction over war crimes to include the prosecution of violations of common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provided that a victim or the offender is a United States citizen. 
In 1999, Spain relied on universal jurisdiction to request the extradition of General Pinochet from the United Kingdom for alleged human rights violations committed in Chile.  Although Spain's extradition request was denied based upon Britain's determination that the 84-year-old Pinochet was mentally unfit to stand trial, this case emphasizes the continuing validity of universal jurisdiction.  The Pinochet case also established the precedent that there is no immunity for a sitting head of State who commits crimes against humanity. 
The continuing efforts of States to use their domestic courts to prosecute war criminals and the recent creation of international war crime tribunals will lead to increasing numbers of indicted war criminals. However, attempts by domestic or international courts to prosecute war criminals are often frustrated because there is not an effective means to obtain custody over alleged war criminals.
States are obligated under the 1949 Geneva Conventions to try individuals who commit or order grave breaches before their own criminal courts or to hand over such persons for trial in another State.  The duty to extradite also exists in Additional Protocol I and the Genocide Convention.  Additionally, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly asserted that a State's refusal to cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial, and punishment of persons accused of war crimes is contrary to the UN Charter.  Both the ICTY statute and the ICTR statute require States to cooperate with the international criminal tribunals by arresting and extraditing persons accused of war crimes. 
While States are obligated under international law to cooperate with any efforts to prosecute war criminals, the international community lacks effective enforcement measures for noncompliance.  The international community is overly dependent upon each State's willingness to comply with its obligations under international law. The use of extradition treaties, military forces, and enforcement sanctions by the United Nation Security Council have each proven to be an ineffective means of obtaining custody of an international fugitive. 
If a State is seeking custody of an individual present in another State, that State may seek extradition of that individual pursuant to an existing extradition treaty between those two States. However, not every State chooses to enter into extradition treaties. Even when there is an extradition treaty between two States, the treaty may only provide that extradition is discretionary.  For example, the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico does not require either State to extradite its citizens.  The United States does not consider its own extradition treaties as creating a per se obligation to extradite. The United States' view is that the State's right to protect its sovereignty and its right to grant asylum overrides a State's treaty obligation to extradite. 
Where no treaty exists, a State may seek extradition based upon the customary international law principles of reciprocity and comity. 
Reciprocity is an exchange of fugitives between States. Under the principle of reciprocity, a State extradites an individual to a government requesting extradition in exchange for that government's promise to extradite an individual from their territory.  The principle of comity is when a State chooses to extradite an individual as an act of courtesy or good will. 
Extradition requests, whether based upon treaties or customary international law, are often cumbersome and ineffective. Nations are often unable or unwilling to arrest and extradite indicted criminals. The existence of non-cooperative States effectively creates safe havens for international fugitives.  The best evidence of the failings of extradition requests is the frequent examples of State abductions and the tolerance of these abductions by domestic courts. The abduction of an individual by State agents within the jurisdiction of another State without its consent violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State.  Furthermore, a State-sponsored abduction violates the UN Charter, which prohibits a State from using force against another State except in self-defense.  Out of frustration, States have repeatedly resorted to abducting an alleged criminal in violation of international law as the only available means to obtain custody. 
On May 11, 1960, "Israeli agents abducted Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi war criminal infamous for his role in Hitler's 'final solution,'" from Argentina and flew him to Israel.  In February 1963, Argoud, a leader of a military revolt against President DeGaulle was kidnapped from Munich, West Germany.  In 1964, Egyptian agents attempted to kidnap Mordecai Luk, an alleged double agent for Egypt and Israel, by shipping him in a trunk to Egypt. 
"As a long-standing practice, U.S. law enforcement agents occasionally engaged in state-sponsored abductions in lieu of extradition as a more expedient means of arresting fugitive offenders in foreign jurisdictions."  On June 21, 1989, the United States Department of Justice expressed its opinion that the President has constitutional authority to direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to abduct a fugitive from a foreign State even if those actions violate international law.  In 1989, United States military forces abducted General Manuel Noriega from Panama to face United States drug-dealing charges.  United States DEA agents offered former Mexican police officers a $50,000 reward to abduct Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain who was wanted by United States law enforcement for helping drug lords torture a DEA agent.  On April 3, 1990, the former Mexican police officers abducted Dr. Machain and delivered him to the United States.  On July 15, 1993, in Nigeria, FBI agents abducted Omar Mohammed Ali Rezaq, a Palestinian who was wanted for killing one American and injuring another during the hijacking of an Egyptian airline. 
For the most part, domestic courts have tolerated State-sponsored abductions by holding that a State's illegal or irregular method in bringing a defendant to court does not divest the court of its jurisdiction over the defendant. The United States Supreme Court has held that a State-sponsored abduction in violation of international law did not deprive a federal court of criminal jurisdiction over the abducted individual.  The ICTY has not yet decided whether it will continue to maintain personal jurisdiction over an abducted individual.  Despite judicial tolerance of the practice, State sponsored abductions are not an acceptable solution for obtaining custody of war criminals. State sponsored abductions violate customary international law  and undermine world public order by encouraging the erosion of international law. 
The UNSC could use its enforcement powers to lawfully authorize a military invasion of a State to forcibly remove an indicted war criminal.  However, authorizing a large-scale military invasion to pursue one person seems counter-productive to the UNSC's mission of maintaining international peace and security since the use of a large military force to capture a protected fugitive would most likely lead to an armed conflict. In any event, even if the UNSC authorized a large-scale military invasion to hunt for a fugitive war criminal, it is doubtful that such a mission would succeed.  The use of a large-scale military invasion force is not an efficient enforcement mechanism to capture war criminals. Military forces are not trained to hunt for individual fugitives. A single individual is easy to hide, and a large-scale military invasion might only prompt the fugitive to relocate to another State.
The UNSC could limit its authorization to the use of small-scale military forces to capture an indicted war criminal. A small, clandestine military strike force might be able to successfully capture a suspected war criminal without provoking an armed conflict since a small military force could enter a State by stealth as opposed to brute force. However, it would be extremely difficult for the UNSC to craft resolutions on an ad hoc basis that authorize States to use military forces to pursue a suspected war criminal but also restrict this grant of authority to use of only a small-scale strike force.  Furthermore, any UNSC resolution that called upon all States to undertake a small-scale military operation to abduct an indicted war criminal would also provide an advance warning of such an operation to the fugitive. Accordingly, ad hoc resolutions for small-scale military operations would undermine the element of surprise that would be essential for the operation's success. If the UNSC had its own standing m ilitary force, it could avoid this problem, but at present the UNSC is ill-equipped to authorize small-scale military operations to abduct indicted war criminals.
Even when a State's military force is already present in a foreign State by invitation or pursuant to a UN' mission, military commanders would still be reluctant to take on the responsibility of hunting war criminals since the search and apprehension of suspected war criminals would usually be counter productive to the commander's peacekeeping or peace-enforcement mission. Neutrality is the key to effective peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. It is hard to be perceived as neutral when military forces are actively engaged in the pursuit of alleged war criminals. 
Both the United States and NATO were reluctant to use military forces in Bosnia to hunt for indicted war criminals in Bosnia.  NATO policy was to arrest indicted war criminals only if they were encountered in the course of normal operations.  The Pentagon insisted that the arrest of suspected war criminals was the responsibility of local law enforcement or political authorities.  The real reason for the military's reluctance was that any aggressive effort on their part to hunt indicted war criminals would jeopardize the negotiated peace. 
The UNSC could employ other enforcement sanctions besides authorizing a military invasion to compel the extradition of an indicted war criminal. However, the use of economic and political enforcement sanctions have proven ineffective at compelling a non-cooperative State to render custody of an international fugitive. In November 1999, the UNSC imposed economic sanctions against Afghanistan for harboring Bin Laden after he was indicted on United States criminal charges for masterminding the United States 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  The UNSC ordered all States to freeze Afghanistan government assets and banned all flights to Afghanistan.  However, to date, the UNSC enforcement sanctions have not convinced Afghanistan to hand over Bin Laden. 
As the interest in prosecuting war criminals grows so to will the need for international bounty hunters. Although States are obligated under international law to cooperate with the prosecution of war criminals, far too frequently States are unable or unwilling to fulfill their obligation. The use of extradition treaties, military forces, and sanctions by the UNSC have, often proved to be ineffective tools for obtaining custody of suspected war criminals. If the international community is truly interested in prosecuting war crimes, then it needs to find effective legal alternatives for obtaining custody over fugitives. Establishing an international police force or authorizing international bounty hunters could provide the international community with an effective means to bring war criminals to justice.
IV. INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO BOUNTY HUNTERS
The UNSC could consider creating a permanent international police force as opposed to relying on private international bounty hunters. Although the UN does not have a permanent standing international police force, the UN frequently creates ad hoc international police forces to assist with particular peace operations. In 1998, approximately 3,000 civilian police officers were engaged in peace promoting missions throughout the world.  The capabilities of United Nation civilian police officers do not go much beyond traditional monitoring, training, or advisory tasks, however.  United Nation civilian police officers can not substitute as law enforcement for a failed State.  In a host nation with a functioning government, UN police officers can not operate without the cooperation of the host nation's government and law enforcement officers. The UN sends civilian police officers to rebuild and reform a host State's police force, not to perform law enforcement. The ad hoc United Nation civilian police fo rces that have been used in the past are incapable of capturing indicted war criminals in an uncooperative State. If the UN wanted an international police force to apprehend indicted war criminals, it would need to create a permanent standing police force. Such a force would need to be heavily armed and be prepared to enter a foreign State with armed force. A permanent international police force capable of arresting fugitive war criminals from rogue States might more closely resemble a military force than a civilian police force.
The creation and management of a permanent international police force for apprehending war criminals would involve substantially more effort than the creation of a legal framework to permit the operation of international bounty hunters. The UN Charter envisioned that the UN would possess its own standing military force but this has never occurred.  If, after approximately fifty years, the UN has been unable to implement its original intent of possessing a standing military force; it is difficult to envision the creation of a standing international police force. The cost of maintaining an international police force would be enormous.  Even if the UN could convince its member States to fund and man an international police force, it is questionable whether the UN could effectively manage such a force. Who would control the day-to-day operations of an international police force? How many locations throughout the, world would an international police force need to be effective? These issues are beyond the scope of this article. Even if there were an international police force, the possibility of having a system of international bounty hunters would still be viable. Just as domestic bounty hunters thrive in the United States alongside state law enforcement, they could contribute to the apprehension of war criminals in the presence of an international police force.
V. WHAT MAKES A BOUNTY HUNTER EFFECTIVE?
Each year in the United States, approximately seven thousand bounty hunters arrest between 25,000 to 30,000 fugitives.  Bounty hunters have proven themselves more efficient than law enforcement at ensuring a defendant's presence at trial.  How do domestic bounty hunters work?
In the United States, in order to be released after arrest, most defendants hire a bail bondsman to post a bond with the court.  The State then delivers custody of the defendant to the bail bondsman who must return the defendant to the court to receive a refund of his bond.  When the State transfers custody of the defendant to the bail bondsman, it also transfers powers to search for and arrest the defendant.  To guarantee a defendant's presence in court, bail bondsmen hire bounty hunters who are fully vested with the bail bondsmen's broad powers over the defendant. 
In 1872, the United States Supreme Court held that bounty hunters possess the same rights of search and arrest as a sheriff over an escaping prisoner.  Bounty hunters are legally entitled to break into a suspect's home and use whatever force is necessary, including deadly force, to arrest a fugitive.  Despite these sweeping powers, domestic bounty hunters are largely unlicensed and unregulated because they are viewed as private parties to whom constitutional restrictions do not apply.  Recently, several States have enacted or are considering enacting laws to regulate domestic bounty hunters. 
A domestic bounty hunter is paid only if he presents the fugitive or his death certificate to the court.  But financial incentives alone do not provide bounty hunters the necessary tools to hunt fugitives. Domestic bounty hunters could not exist without the legal immunity for the forceful acts necessary to arrest a fugitive. Without this immunity, domestic bounty hunters would face criminal and civil liability for their forceful acts in apprehending fugitives. 
Likewise, an efficient system of international bounty hunters could not exist absent a legal immunity from State domestic laws for the forceful acts necessary to apprehend an indicted war criminal. A bounty might encourage someone to provide information concerning the whereabouts of a war criminal, but in most cases it would not encourage someone to pursue a war criminal's apprehension. No matter how large the reward, a private party would be foolish to attempt to arrest a war crimes fugitive when faced with the risk of criminal convictions for kidnapping and other offenses under domestic law. The Serbian bounty hunters who kidnapped Mr. Nikolic were convicted by a Serbian court and sentenced to serve two-to-six years of imprisonment.  The nine men who captured Mr. Stevan Todorovic for a bounty were also convicted by a Serbian court in the town of Uzice and received from one and a half years to eight and a half years of imprisonment.  An efficient system of international bounty hunters can not be e stablished without legal immunity for the forceful acts necessary to apprehend and deliver a war criminal to trial.
VI. ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL BOUNTY HUNTERS
Generally, sovereign States are free to criminalize conduct that occurs on their territory. However, in certain specific circumstances, the international community has chosen to pierce the veil of State sovereignty in order to immunize an individual from the possibility of domestic criminal prosecution. For example, representatives to the principal and subsidiary organs of the UN while exercising their functions and while traveling to their place of meeting are immune from arrest, detention, and all kinds of legal process.  Another example of immunity from domestic law is combatant immunity. During international armed conflicts, military members are directed to kill, destroy property, or commit other such acts that would normally be considered criminal acts. However, if a military member acted in accordance with the law of war, customary international law provides him with a blanket of immunity for his pre-capture warlike acts.  How could worldwide immunity from domestic laws be created for interna tional bounty hunters?
The United States or any other individual State could not by itself create worldwide immunity from every State's domestic laws for international bounty hunters. A group of States could ratify a treaty that provides international bounty hunters with immunity from domestic criminal prosecutions. However, while using a treaty to create immunity for international bounty hunters is theoretically possible, it is practically nonviable. First, it would be extremely difficult to achieve a consensus among States on such a novel idea. Second, even if a consensus could be obtained, any treaty would only bind the signatories to the treaty. Nonparty States would create safe havens for fugitives and completely frustrate the efforts of international bounty hunters. Third, the treaty process takes too long.
In 1994, the UN chose the treaty process as a means to provide protection to military members to military forces performing a UN peacekeeping mission that was authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.  States that have ratified the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel are obligated to criminalize the murder, kidnapping, or attack upon the person or liberty of any UN or associated personnel.  After approximately six years, only thirty-three States, have ratified this treaty.  The inability to achieve a broad international consensus on protecting peacekeepers most likely contributed to the UNSC's decision to bypass the normal treaty route when it created the ICTY. The UNSC did not pursue a treaty to create the ICTY because the treaty process would have taken years, if not decades, and could have been defeated by opposition from a number of States.  The best alternative for providing immunity from domestic laws for international bounty hunters would be an enforcement action by the UNSC.
Worldwide immunity for international bounty hunters could be created by a resolution by the UNSC.  Under the UN Charter, the UNSC has substantial powers to maintain international peace and security. If the UNSC determines that a threat to international peace exists then it may use its enforcement authority to eliminate that threat,  even going so far as to displace domestic law. Article 42 of the UN Charter authorizes the UNSC to call upon multinational military forces to restore international peace. Article 41 of the UN Charter permits the UNSC to impose measures not involving the use of armed force to maintain international peace. Article 41 further permits the UNSC to enact arms, air travel, oil embargoes, economic, and financial sanctions.  The UNSC has also used its Article 41 enforcement authority to attempt to coerce a non-cooperative State to turn over custody of an international fugitive. In November 1999, the UNSC imposed economic sanctions against Afghanistan for harboring Bin Laden who was charged with complicity in the United States 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  In this instance, the UNSC determined that a sole criminal fugitive remaining at large constituted a threat to international peace. Furthermore, the UNSC has also used its broad enforcement authority under Article 41 to create the ICTY and ICTR.
In the Tadic case, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY rejected the defense's argument that the UNSC lacked the authority to create an international criminal tribunal.  The Tadic defense argued that Article 41 only permits the UNSC to impose economic and political measures.  The Appeals Chamber held that the examples of economic and political sanctions expressly contained in Article 41 do not exclude other types of enforcement measures.  Article 41 grants broad discretion to the UNSC to take any measures not involving the use of armed force in order to maintain international peace and security.  Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber declined to review the UNSC's determination that an international criminal tribunal could effectively meet its objective of restoring the peace.  In conclusion, the UNSC has very broad discretion in crafting enforcement mechanisms under Article 41 to promote international peace and security.
Although an international bounty hunter might forcibly abduct an indicted war criminal with a weapon, the use of an international bounty hunter should not be considered the use of an "armed force". The "armed force" contemplated by Article 42 of the UN Charter is the employment of military forces. The use of international bounty hunters would not constitute "armed force" under Article 42 because they are not in the military and they are not State actors. If a State provided substantial logistical and intelligence assistance to a private bounty hunter, one could argue that the bounty hunter should be considered the equivalent of a State actor and the bounty hunter's actions should constitute the use of an "armed force" under Article 42. Whether the use of an international bounty hunter would constitute the use of "armed force" as defined by Article 42 is purely an academic argument. The UNSC can authorize an enforcement action under either Article 41 or Article 42. The important issue for this paper is whethe r the powers of the UNSC are broad enough to establish international bounty hunters and not whether the UNSC should cite to Article 41 or Article 42 of the UN Charter when it establishes such a system.
If the UNSC determined that arresting indicted war criminals would promote or maintain international peace then the UNSC could implement enforcement measures to compel their arrest. Prosecuting war criminals promotes international peace by deterring future war crimes. Punishing the perpetrators of war crimes also helps eliminate the need for victims to commit war crimes in revenge. By creating the ICTY and the ICTR, the UNSC recognized the importance of the prosecution of war criminals for restoring international peace.  The UNSC could just as easily determine that the apprehension of indicted war criminals is also necessary to promote peace since an international criminal tribunal can not fulfill its intended role in restoring international peace if it is unable to obtain custody of its indicted war criminals. Accordingly, the UNSC could use its broad enforcement authority to pass a resolution that provides international bounty hunters with legal immunity from State domestic law for the forceful acts n ecessary to arrest indicted war criminals. All UNSC resolutions are immediately binding on all members to the UN; therefore, the UNSC could effectively create a worldwide immunity from domestic laws for international bounty hunters. 
VII. WOULD THE FORCEFUL ACTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL BOUNTY HUNTER VIOLATE THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER?
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits a State from using force or threatening to use force against another State's territory or political independence. Included in this prohibition is a State's unilateral decision to kidnap an individual from a foreign State. However, the abduction of an individual from a foreign State by an international bounty hunter would not violate Article 2(4) because the international bounty hunter is a private party. Article 2(4) regulates the conduct of States not individuals. In any event, even if bounty hunters were considered to be acting as State agents, the forceful acts committed by international bounty hunters would still not violate Article 2(4) if international bounty hunters were acting pursuant to a UNSC resolution. The UNSC has the authority to authorize uses of force that would otherwise violate Article 2(4). Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter permit the UNSC to trump the prohibitions of Article 2(4) in the interests of maintaining international peace. Accordingly, a UNSC resolution that establishes a legal immunity for international bounty hunters from domestic laws for the forceful acts necessary to arrest a war criminal would not violate the U.N. Charter.
VIII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL BOUNTY HUNTERS
The UNSC could establish worldwide legal immunity for international bounty hunters for the forceful acts necessary to arrest indicted war criminals. However, whose indictments could an international bounty hunter seek to enforce? Who would be responsible for funding the reward? Should international bounty hunters be given the absolute right to cross international borders? Should international bounty hunters be required to notify local law enforcement before attempting an arrest? Who should adjudicate criminal and civil claims against bounty hunters for use of excessive force? Should international bounty hunters be licensed, and if so, who should be the licensing authority? Where should the international bounty hunter be required to deliver custody of the captured fugitive? When should an international bounty hunter be paid? Can the UNSC realistically expect private parties to capture indicted war criminals? Each of these issues must be carefully considered by the UNSC before privatizing the enforcement of ju stice.
A. Whose Indictments Could an International Bounty Hunter Seek to Enforce?
The UNSC must carefully decide which war crime indictments international bounty hunters could act upon. One legal scholar, Ms. Beverly Izes, has proposed that the UN formally legitimize State-sponsored abductions of war criminals by defining an explicit set of circumstances that prescribe when a State may perpetrate a kidnapping.  Ms. Izes proposed that the UN create a list of crimes that would justify a State-sponsored abduction.  Furthermore, before a State attempted an abduction of a suspected war criminal, there must be a refusal by the refuge State to extradite the suspect, a refusal to bring the suspect to trial, or a clear case of where the local trial of a war criminal was a sham.  This type of proposal would give each State the authority to issue an indictment that an international bounty hunter could seek to enforce. However, creating an expansive system that permitted international bounty hunters to enforce the war crime indictment of any State or entity would be a grave mistake.
Domestic courts or self-appointed commissions of rogue States could issue spurious indictments against world leaders for political purposes.  An expansive authority to issue war crime indictments could easily lead to the wrongful abductions of heads of State and other governmental leaders. For these reasons, the authority to issue war crimes indictments that can be acted upon by international bounty hunters must be limited to impartial institutions whose sole interest is the pursuit of justice.
The UNSC could limit the authority to issue an indictment that international bounty hunters may act upon to the UNSC itself. Because it would be too burdensome for the UNSC to act upon every potential indictment, the UNSC should delegate the responsibility to international criminal tribunals. Probable cause determinations necessary for indictments are better suited for a judicial body. Initially, it would be prudent for the UNSC to limit the authority to issue such indictments to a single international criminal tribunal. The ICTY is an excellent candidate for such authority.
The ICTY has had difficulty in obtaining indicted individuals, and it could benefit from the efforts of international bounty hunters. Furthermore, the ICTY already has a judicial procedure in place for issuing international arrest warrants. Before issuing an international arrest warrant, an indicted individual is given the opportunity to voluntarily come before the court. It is only after an indicted individual is not arrested that the ICTY issues and transmits an international arrest warrants to all States.  Accordingly, an indicted war criminal and States would be provided with a fair opportunity to transfer custody of the indicted war criminal to the ICTY before the authority of international bounty hunters were unleashed. If the use of international bounty hunters with the ICTY proved successful, the UNSC could expand the authority to use international bounty hunters, giving it to other international criminal tribunals such as the ICTR or the ICC.
B. Who Would be Responsible for Funding the Bounty Hunter's Reward?
Locating funding for rewards should not be difficult. The UNSC could simply call upon member States to fund reward money for indicted war criminals. In 1987, West Germany offered nearly a half-million dollar reward for the arrest of Josef Schwammberger who was wanted for war crimes he committed as a Nazi SS captain in charge of two Jewish ghettos and a. work camp.  Germany is offering a reward of 500,000 Deutsche Marks for information that leading to the arrest of Alois Brunner, another Nazi war criminal.  The United States Department of State is offering rewards of up to five million dollars for information that leads to the capture of any of the fugitive war criminals indicted by the ICTY.  If the United States is willing to offer money just for information that leads to the capture of a war criminal then it should also be willing to offer money for the actual arrest of a war criminal. States whose citizens were victims of a war crime should also be willing to fund rewards for capture of the individuals responsible for those crimes. The UNSC could also solicit funds from private groups interested in promoting human rights.  Organizations such as Amnesty International may be willing to spearhead private collection efforts to raise bounties for war criminals. The more egregious the crimes, the easier it should be to raise a substantial reward for that criminal's capture.
C. Should International Bounty Hunters be Given the Absolute Right to Cross International Borders?
International bounty hunters could not be effective without the freedom to travel between States. However, the UNSC should not extend an absolute right to enter foreign States to international bounty hunters since such a right could be easily abused. Illegal aliens, drug traffickers, and other international criminals could falsely claim that they were acting as international bounty hunters when caught entering a State illegally. International bounty hunters should be expected to enter States through their own legal and independent means.
After an international bounty hunter has obtained custody of a fugitive war criminal, the UNSC should provide the international bounty hunter with the absolute right to cross international borders while en route to delivering custody of his prisoner. If an international bounty hunter presents a copy of the indictment and he has custody of the indicted individual, State officials should be required to let the international bounty hunter and his prisoner continue to their destination.
D. Should International Bounty Hunters be Required to Notify Local Law Enforcement Before Attempting an Arrest?
Unlike domestic bounty hunters, international bounty hunters should not be required to notify local law enforcement. In the United States, requiring domestic bounty hunters to notify local law enforcement before attempting an arrest is a reasonable requirement. Local law enforcement should always be willing and able to assist bounty hunters in bringing a fugitive to justice. In the international forum, a State might actually be protecting a war criminal. An indicted war criminal might actually be running the State and in control of the State's law enforcement. Accordingly, international bounty hunters should not be required to notify local enforcement before attempting to arrest a suspected war criminal.
E. Who Should Adjudicate Criminal and Civil Claims Against Bounty Hunters for the Use of Excessive Force?
International bounty hunters will be pursuing individuals who desperately want to avoid a lengthy prison sentence. Indicted war criminals who were prominent government officials or senior military commanders could even be protected by armed bodyguards. Accordingly, International bounty hunters will often need to use force or threaten the use of force in order to successfully apprehend an indicted war criminal.
An international bounty hunter should have the legal right to forcibly enter an indicted war criminal's home and to use a reasonable amount of force to arrest that individual. Furthermore, an international bounty hunter should also be entitled to forcibly enter the home of a third party when he reasonably believes that an indicted war criminal is present. International bounty hunters should also be permitted to use reasonable force against any third parties who attempt to obstruct the bounty hunter's efforts to apprehend an indicted war criminal. An international bounty hunter should only be permitted to use deadly force against an indicted war criminal or a third party in self-defense. Accordingly, an international bounty hunter could only use deadly force if he reasonably believed that he was threatened with grievous bodily harm.
Of course, a prudent bounty hunter will look for any way possible to capture an indicted war criminal with a minimal amount of force. After all, a violent confrontation not only threatens the welfare of a fugitive, it also threatens the welfare of the bounty hunter. International bounty hunters would also have a financial incentive to limit their use of force against an indicted war criminal if they could not collect their reward if the indicted war criminal died during an attempted arrest. However, the strongest incentive for international bounty hunters to limit their use of force against both indicted war criminals and third parties would be the possibility of a criminal or civil complaint against the bounty hunter for excessive use of force.
Like domestic police officers, the conduct of international bounty hunters must be reviewable by some judicial body. An international bounty hunter should have complete criminal and civil immunity from State domestic law for his use of force during an actual or attempted arrest of an indicted war criminal since a State that has been harboring an indicted war criminal can not be trusted to impartially and fairly adjudicate a criminal or civil complaint against an international bounty hunter. However, an international bounty hunter's conduct during an attempted arrest should be reviewed by the same international court who issued the indictment that the bounty hunter was trying to enforce. This international court should have sole jurisdiction to adjudicate both criminal and civil claims against international bounty hunters for use of excessive force. Furthermore, this international court should use all or any portion of a bounty hunter's reward to satisfy a criminal fine or a civil judgment against a bounty hu nter.
F. Should International Bounty Hunters be Licensed? By What Licensing Authority?
Who should be eligible to hunt for war criminals? The UNSC could limit its grant of legal immunity from domestic law for the forceful acts necessary to capture a fugitive war criminal to licensed individuals. Although most jurisdictions within the United States do not require licenses, the modern trend is to license bounty hunters.  Requiring a license could insure that all bounty hunters receive some minimal training. Requiring a license also provides the means to exclude certain individuals from serving as an international bounty hunter. For example, ex-convicts could be excluded from acting as international bounty hunters. The UNSC could ask the UN General Assembly or an international criminal tribunal to develop the needed criteria to qualify for an international bounty hunter license and to issue any licenses. Even so, international bounty hunters should not be licensed.
Requiring all international bounty hunters to obtain a license assumes that all individuals want to work as a bounty hunter on a recurring basis. In fact, many individuals who decide to forcefully capture an indicted war criminal may do so only as the result of a one-time opportunity rather than a decision to pursue a career as an international bounty hunter. The best person to apprehend a particular war criminal might not be the full-time professional bounty hunter but an acquaintance, friend, business partner, political rival, or estranged spouse of the war criminal. If licenses were not required, individuals who have no interest in a career as a professional bounty hunter would be free to capture fugitive war criminals.
Requiring international bounty hunters to obtain a license before attempting to apprehend a war criminal would greatly reduce the number of persons engaged in the hunt. The UNSC or the international community should not be concerned about the character of the individual who delivers the custody of a fugitive war criminal. as long as custody is delivered. The UNSC should be concerned about the possibility of wrongful arrests of individuals who are unreasonably mistaken for fugitive war criminals. However, requiring international bounty hunters to hold licenses does not preclude the possibility of wrongful arrests. Even highly trained police offices occasionally arrest the wrong individual. If a bounty hunter wrongfully arrests an individual who is mistaken for an indicted war criminal then that bounty hunter would be subject to domestic civil and criminal liability. The possibility of liability under domestic law should be sufficient by itself to deter wrongful arrests. Requiring bounty hunters to be licensed would substantially reduce the number of individuals who could arrest war criminals while doing little to reduce the risk of wrongful arrests.
Requiring international bounty hunters to obtain licenses might substantially impede a bounty hunter's efforts to apprehend fugitive war criminals. It could make it reasonably easy for States to learn the identities of bounty hunters. A State that opposes the use of international bounty hunters or one that intentionally harbors a war criminal could use this information to obstruct a bounty hunter's efforts. A State could explicitly or surreptitiously deny a bounty hunter entrance or could keep a fugitive war criminal informed of the bounty hunter's whereabouts. Of course, a State could not actively obstruct a particular bounty hunter if the bounty hunter's identity were unknown.
The potential detriments of requiring licenses for international bounty hunters outweigh any of the potential benefits. A licensing requirement for international bounty hunters would greatly reduce the number of bounty hunters, impose an unnecessary administrative burden, and potentially offer rogue States a means to obstruct the efforts of bounty hunters. While a licensing requirement would be an effective means to ensure that bounty hunters receive some training, it is doubtful that training would provide any significant benefit by preventing wrongful arrests since these arrests are already punishable by civil and criminal domestic law. The best way for the UNSC to avoid wrongful arrests is to ensure that indictments for war criminals contain sufficient information to identify a fugitive. Indictments should contain as much identifying information as possible, such as recent photographs, an accurate physical description, and a list of any identifying scars or tattoos. 
G. Where Should the International Bounty Hunter be Required to Deliver Custody of the Captured Fugitive?
Ideally, the international bounty hunter should deliver the indicted war criminal to the court that issued the indictment. In many circumstances this would involve travel over great distances and through many different States. It would be more practical if the court could identify suitable destinations for delivery of the fugitive that were reasonably close to the anticipated point of capture. What constitutes a suitable destination for the bounty hunter to transfer custody depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Possible delivery locations could include the embassy of any State that posted reward money for that war criminal or any location where the military forces of such State were located. If a State contributed to the reward for the capture of an indicted war criminal, it would be reasonable to trust that State with the responsibility of completing delivery of a captured fugitive to the court. Accordingly, indictments should identify not only the court that issued the indictment as an acc eptable destination for the delivery of the fugitive but it should also include other reasonable locations as acceptable destinations.
H. When Should an International Bounty Hunter be Paid?
In the United States, domestic bounty hunters are paid upon returning the defendant or the defendant's death certificate to the court. Likewise, international bounty hunters should only be paid for the delivery of an indicted war criminal. Reward money could be released to the bounty hunter after the court that issued the indictment confirms the identity of the delivered individual as the person named in the indictment. International bounty hunters should not be rewarded for causing an indicted individual's death. Payment of reward money for causing an indicted individual's death could transform international bounty hunters into international assassins. It would be far easier to kill an indicted war criminal than to transport that individual through a State that has been intentionally harboring him.  Furthermore, paying international bounty hunters only upon delivery of an indicted war criminal will help minimize the amount of force that an international bounty hunter uses to arrest a fugitive since the bounty hunter would collect nothing if the fugitive dies.
I. Can the UNSC Realistically Expect Private parties to Capture Indicted War Criminals?
Pursuing a career as an international bounty hunter would require far more expertise than pursuing one as a domestic bounty hunter. Even with legal immunity for the forceful acts necessary to arrest a war criminal, an international bounty hunter would require some knowledge of domestic law. The professional international bounty hunter might need to become familiar with a State's privacy laws if he sought government or private commercial records to help trace a fugitive's whereabouts. A bounty hunter might need to possess a weapon to coerce the cooperation of an indicted war criminal. Accordingly, the professional bounty hunter would also need to be aware of any domestic laws that prohibit or regulate the possession of firearms or other weapons.
The professional international bounty hunter must also consider the possibility that a foreign State might use its power to protect an indicted war criminal. For over twenty-five years, the Syrian government has openly protected a Nazi war criminal, Alois Brunner, who as the chief deputy to Adolf Eichmann was responsible for the deaths of more than 100,000 Jews and some 60,000 others.  In 1987, a privately sponsored effort to kidnap Brunner from Syria was called off because Brunner was too closely guarded by Syrian police. 
An indicted war criminal could even be the head of a foreign State. When an indicted war criminal is controlling a State, the State will probably disregard the legal immunity granted by the UNSC and criminally prosecute the bounty hunter for any attempts to arrest the indicted war criminal. On May 24, 1999, the ICTY indicted the head of Yugoslavia, President Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes.  Could an international bounty hunter realistically be expected to abduct a head of State?
Although varying domestic laws between States make international bounty hunting a complex business, the substantial rewards offered for indicted war criminals could reasonably attract a corporate interest. A corporation with a legal staff and employees with previous military or police experience could handle the complex issues involved with international bounty hunting and earn a generous profit.  However, even a corporation would not pursue all indicted war criminals. A corporation would realistically assess its chances at success before expending its resources to pursue any specific war criminal. A corporation engaged in international bounty hunting might deem it too high of a risk to pursue a war criminal who was a State leader.
Even if professional bounty hunters shied away from pursuing certain indicted war criminals, this does not foreclose the possibility of arrest by an individual who has no interest in pursuing a career as an international bounty hunter. Arresting an indicted war criminal may not be a complex matter if the indicted criminal happens to be a neighbor, relative, spouse, or business partner. Many individuals, out of mere circumstance, may be in an excellent position to abduct an indicted war criminal, and might chose to do so if it was lawful and financially profitable. For example, while a corporate bounty hunter might be unable to locate and arrest Slobodan Milosevic, a political rival might have the access and government allies necessary to deliver Milosevic to the ICTY.
During the summer of 2000, after reading an article about the United States' five million-dollar bounty for indicted war criminals, five journalists on vacation in Bosnia spontaneously decided to search for Radovan Karadzic.  After only a few days of inquiries, they met with a high-ranking member of the Serb secret police.  The Serb policeman mistook the journalists for a CIA hit team and offered to provide them with information on Karadzic's security detail and when and where Karadzic traveled in exchange for twenty percent of the bounty for Karadzic's capture and American passports for himself and his family.  The Serb policeman explained that he had been profiting from cigarette and liquor smuggling across the Bosnia border but that he was now "being squeezed" by Karadzic's lieutenants.  He needed to get Karadzic before Karadzic's men came to get him.  The five journalists provided all of this information to an American Lieutenant Colonel at the NATO base in Sarajevo. Although it is unknown when and if NATO will attempt to act on this prospect for capturing Karadzic,  this episode illustrates that private bounty hunters can realistically enlist the help of individuals closely associated with fugitives.
International bounty hunters could also circumvent the power and authority of an obstructive State by tricking the indicted war criminal into leaving the State where he or she is protected. If an indicted war criminal could be lured to a State that would not use its powers to protect him or her then an arrest could be more easily accomplished. An indicted war criminal could be lured to a different State by many different techniques. A Caribbean cruise sweepstakes award or an invitation to a fictitious job interview could persuade someone to travel abroad. An international bounty hunter posing as an Internet love interest could entice an indicted war criminal to a foreign rendezvous. The possible avenues to entice a fugitive out of a protective State are only limited by the boundaries of a bounty hunter's imagination.
The abilities of private parties to hunt indicted war criminals should not be underestimated. The efforts of private citizens at hunting Nazi war criminals have out-performed the efforts of the world's governments.  Simon Wiesenthal has been personally responsible for ferreting out thousands of Nazi war criminals.  Neal Sher, a director of the Department of Justice's Office of Special Investigations, the government organization responsible for locating Nazi war criminals in the United States, has admitted that Simon Wiesenthal had a better track record at hunting Nazi war criminals than most governments. 
International bounty hunters would also benefit from the vast expanse of information available on the Internet. A website devoted to the most recent sightings of individuals who are indicted by the ICTY already exists.  Private bounty hunters are already responsible for capturing two of the war criminals indicted by the ICTY.  Additionally, States would not be precluded from helping private international bounty hunters. A State could assist an international bounty hunter by providing intelligence, equipment, training, and transportation.
While international bounty hunters may not be able to arrest every indicted war criminal, the UNSC can reasonably expect international bounty hunters to capture indicted war criminals given the examples of domestic bounty hunters, the successful efforts of private parties at locating Nazi war criminals, and the possibility of State assistance. Whether motivated by justice, financial gain, or other self-serving goals, private parties are in an excellent position to contribute effectively to the apprehension of indicted war criminals if given the opportunity.
Increasing the number of available forums to prosecute war criminals will not serve the interests of justice if the international community lacks the ability to locate and arrest indicted war criminals. There is no international police force to hunt and apprehend war criminals. Extradition treaties, the use of military forces, and UNSC economic sanctions are often ineffective means for obtaining custody of war criminals. If the UNSC wishes the ICTY and ICTR to fulfill its intended role of promoting international peace then the UNSC must find ways to forcefully bring indicted war criminals to trial.
The UNSC could lawfully authorize a multinational military force to use all necessary means to apprehend an indicted war criminal. However, the use of military forces could trigger a widespread-armed conflict. Furthermore, using military forces, which are engaged in peace-keeping, to hunt for war criminals would compromise their neutrality and potentially destabilize a negotiated peace. In many cases, the use of international bounty hunters to apprehend an indicted war criminal would be a more effective alternative than the use of military forces.
Private international bounty hunters will obviously not be concerned about the political ramifications of their actions. Nonetheless, an international bounty hunter is more likely to capture an indicted war criminal peacefully than is a military force. An international bounty hunter can not capture an indicted war criminal by waging a war against a State's military or police force, but must apprehend an indicted war criminal by stealth and surprise and with a minimal amount of force. Further, an international bounty hunter will carefully limit his use of force against an indicted war criminal because the former will not be paid if the latter dies. And, an international bounty hunter will cautiously avoid the use of force against third parties because of potential civil and criminal liability. The ideal grant of immunity from State domestic law for international bounty hunters for the forceful acts necessary to apprehend an indicted war criminal would not be limitless. A bounty hunter, like a civilian police officer, could still be held accountable for an excessive or unnecessary use of force.
Authorizing private parties to apprehend indicted war criminals could provide excellent opportunities for individuals who are personally acquainted with the war criminal. The best person to capture an indicted war criminal might be that individual's neighbor, coworker, estranged spouse, or political rival. These individuals could be capable of capturing an indicted war criminal with very little force if given a financial incentive and a lawful authority to act.
The UNSC should pass a resolution that provides international bounty hunters with immunity from domestic laws for the forceful acts necessary to arrest an indicted war criminal. The international bounty hunter should have the same authority to use force as a civilian police officer pursuing an escaping felon. The UNSC should call upon both States and private organizations to fund the rewards offered for fugitive war criminals. To test the effectiveness of international bounty hunters, the UNSC should permit the ICTY to issue international arrest warrants that bounty hunters could seek to enforce. These international arrest warrants should only be issued after States are given a fair opportunity to surrender custody of the indicted individual to the ICTY. The international arrest warrants should contain sufficient information to enable the accurate identification of the indicted individual and specify all acceptable locations for delivery of the fugitive. International bounty hunter should have the right to c ross international borders when traveling with the indicted war criminal to a location designated in the indictment for delivery of the fugitive. Given the examples of domestic bounty hunters, the successful efforts of private parties at locating Nazi war criminals, and the possibility of State assistance, the UNSC can reasonably expect international bounty hunters to capture indicted war criminals. Even if the establishment of international bounty hunters does not result in the arrest of every indicted war criminal, it would still be a significant step in the right direction.
(*.) Major Supernor (B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, J.D., Florida State University School of Law, LL.M. The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army) is a country program manager for the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, Newport Naval Station, Rhode Island.
(1.) "The weakest link in all of international law is the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms." Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 408 (Summer 1998). International criminal law is weakened by a lack of enforceability. FARHAD MALEKIAN, THE MONOPOLIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 56 (1995). International criminal law provides only a mirage of justice since international tribunals lack any coercive power to bring an accused before the court. Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 364-65 (2000). International criminal law has failed and it will continue to fail without a means of enforcement. Id. at 393.
(2.) The ICTY indicted 98 individuals. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Key Figures, available at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm (last modified Mar. 1, 2001) (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review). Nine of the indicted individuals have died and charges have been dropped against 18 others. Id. Proceedings are ongoing for 38 of the indicted individuals. Id. Twenty-seven of the indicted individuals remain at large. The three principal architects of the Bosnian genocide, ex-Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, and General Ratko Mladic, are among the most notable fugitives in Yugoslavia. Radovan Karadzic, an indictee of the ICTY who is charged with responsibility for killing up to 6,000 Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995, lives in a closely guarded stronghold outside Pale in the Serb Republic. Brian James, Out of Sight, But Not Out of Mind; Night & Day, MAIL ON SUNDAY (London), Aug. 10, 1997, at 10. Mr. Richard Holbrooke, the United States Ambassado r to the United Nations, explained that "NATO troops have been reluctant to arrest Karadzic, who travels with 20 to 80 bodyguards." David J. Lynch, Bosnian Serb Leader Faces Capture as his Power Fades, USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 2000, at 22 A. For several years, the residence of another indictee, General Ratko Mladic, the former commander of the Bosnian Serbs, "the Butcher of the Balkans", was also a matter of public knowledge. James, supra, at 10. On Mar. 25, 2000, Mladic attended a soccer match in Belgrade with an escort of bodyguards, the Yugoslavian foreign minister, army chief of staff, and the Serbian Prime Minister. War Criminal Watch, COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, http://www.wcw.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2001) (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review). Only recently has General Mladic gone into hiding. After Years in Open, War-Crimes Suspect Drops out of Sight, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 22, 2001, News, at 20.
(3.) Kosovo War Criminals May Go Free, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press/l999/feb/kos0209.htm (Feb. 9, 1999) (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review); YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 201 (1999); Brown, supra note 1, at 414. ("Most of the indictees still at large are apparently living free in the areas where the local authorities have failed to comply with their legal obligation to arrest those indicted.").
(4.) David Buchan, Downfall of Milosevic, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 7,2000, World News, at 6. Western governments continue to pressure Yugoslavia's new government to fully cooperate with the ICTY. On Oct. 25, 2000, the United States Congress approved a $100 million aid package to Serbia but conditioned the aid on the new Yugoslav government's cooperation on arresting and transferring those indicted by the ICTY for war crimes. Steven A. Holmes, $100 Million Voted for Serbia, But with War-Crimes Strings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2000, at A13. Recently, Yugoslavia stated its intent to try Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia for abuse of power and theft of national property rather than turn Milosevic to the ICTY to face war crime charges. Alan Sipress, Yugoslavia Vows Milosevic's Arrest This Month, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2001, at 24.
(5.) See Diane F. Orentlicher, A Look at ... War Crimes and Punishment, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2000, Outlook, at B3.
(6.) Terence Neilan, World Briefing: United Nations: Council Criticized on War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at A6. Although States are bound to follow orders from the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has held that the ICTY is not vested with any authority to issue sanctions against a recalcitrant State. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, No. IT-95-14-AR 108 bis, para. 33 (I.C.T.Y. Oct. 29, 1997) (judgment on request for review of trial decision of July 18, 1997), available at www.un.org/icty. The UNSC is the only international organ that can enforce the authority of an international tribunal. However, the UNSC has not taken any affirmative action in response to Yugoslavia's and the Bosnian-Serb Republika Srpska's refusal to render its citizens to the ICTY. Brown, supra note 1, at 410.
(7.) See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
(8.) This paper focuses on the feasibility of using international bounty hunters to apprehend war criminals. International bounty hunters could also be used to pursue individuals whose crimes did not occur in the context of an armed conflict. International bounty hunters could also be tasked with the responsibility to pursue individuals wanted for piracy, terrorism, drug trafficking, or violations of human rights. For example, international bounty hunters might prove useful to capture Osama Bin Laden. See Infra note 121 and accompanying text. However, before advocating such an expansive role for international bounty hunters, one must recognize that the use of international bounty hunters is an erosion of state sovereignty by the international community. Nations jealously guard their rights as a sovereign. The author believes that any curtailment of sovereign rights to permit the use of international bounty hunters must be approached cautiously and in a narrowly defused context. The effectiveness of internatio nal bounty hunters should first be verified before establishing an expansive use of international bounty hunters. To test the effectiveness of international bounty hunters, the UNSC should permit the ICTY to issue international arrest warrants that bounty hunters could seek to enforce. See Infra pp. 35-37. Only if the use of international bounty hunters proves itself in this narrowly defused context should a more expansive use of international bounty hunters be explored.
(9.) Zeljko Cvijanovic & Vesna Peric Zimonjic, Belgrade Crackdown: "Bounty Hunters Strike Inside Serbia to Seize War Crimes Suspects," THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), May 18, 2000, at 14.
(10.) Id. Two men posing as police officers forced Mr. Nikolic into the trunk of a car where he was driven to the border of Bosnia. Id. After crossing the Drina river by boat, Mr. Nikolic was handed over to American soldiers. Id.
(11.) Id. Mr. Stevan Todorovic, another indicted war criminal who was captured by bounty hunters has also asked the court to dismiss his case because of the illegality of his arrest. See Maggie O'Kane, Tougher Rules for Arrest of Suspects, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Oct. 20, 2000, Foreign Pages, at 18. On Oct. 20, 2000, judges at the ICTY ordered NATO to reveal details of Mr. Todorovic's apprehension. Id. On Nov. 20, 2000, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, NATO, Norway, United Kingdom, and the United States appealed the decision of the trial chamber. ICTY-Status of Cases as of 11 April 2001, http://www.un.org/itcy/glance/casestatus.htm (Todorovic Case) (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review). However, before this appeal was decided, Todorovic negotiated a plea agreement whereby he would plead guilty to count one of his 27 count indictment and he would withdraw all pending motions related to the circumstances of his arrest. Id. The prosecution withdraw the remaining 26 counts and will recommend to the court that Todorovic be sentenced to not less than five years of imprisonment and not more than 12 years of imprisonment. Id. Count one of Todorovic's indictment accuses him of committing a crime against humanity by persecuting individuals on political, racial, and religious grounds. Id. NATO and its member states may have pressured the prosecution to obtain a plea agreement with Todorovic to avoid having to disclose the details of Todorovic's capture by bounty hunters.
(12.) Cvijanovic & Zimonjic, supra note 9. On Nov. 24, 2000, a Serbian court in Smederevo sentenced seven of these persons to serve between two-to-six years of imprisonment for abducting Nikolic. Seven Charged with Abducting War Crimes Go on Trial, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 5, 2000, at International News.
(13.) Cvijanovic & Zimonjic, supra note 9. Thirty-one thousand British pounds is about forty-five thousand U.S. dollars.
(14.) Customary international law results when States observe a constant practice out of a sense of legal obligation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, [sections] 102 (1987). Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines customary international law as the general practice of States accepted as law. STAT. OF THE INT'L CT. OF J., June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).
(15.) "Every violation of the law of war is a war crime." U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956) para. 499 [hereinafter AR 27-10]. However, some international law scholars contend that technical violations of the law of war do not constitute war crimes. See Yoram Dinstein, The Universality Principle and War Crimes, in 71 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM, 17, 21 (Michael Schmitt & Leslie Green, eds., 1998). Professor Dinstein believes that only serious violations of the law of war such as the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions constitute war crimes. Id.
(16.) Harold Wayne Elliott, The Trial and Punishment of War Criminals: Neglected Tools in "New World Order?" 82 (1998) (unpublished Doctor of Juridical Science dissertation) (on file with the University of Virginia Law Library).
(17.) There were four Geneva Conventions of 1949: The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GWS]; The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GWS at Sea]; The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.S.T. 135 [hereinafter GPW]; The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.S.T. 287 [hereinafter GC].
(18.) See GWS, supra note 17, art. 49, 50; GWS at Sea, supra note 17, art. 50, 51; GPW, supra note 17, art. 129-30; GC, supra note 17, art. 146.
(19.) Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Victims of International Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 11 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Victims of Non-International Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 11 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1442.
(20.) See GWS, supra note 17, art. 3; GWS at Sea, supra note 17, art. 3; GPW, supra note 17, art. 3; GC, supra note 17, art. 3.
(21.) Of the thirteen 1907 Hague Conventions, the most important for land operations is the forth. Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention No. IV].
(22.) See e.g., BEIGBEDER, supra note 3, at 9.
(23.) Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 21, at art. 23.
(24.) Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 21, at art. 27.
(25.) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
(26.) BEIGBEDER, supra note 3, at 12-13; Major Marsha Mills, War Crimes in the 21st Century, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 47, 60-61 (1999).
(27.) Genocide Convention, supra note 25, art. II.
(28.) See, e.g., Mills, supra note 26, at 50.
(29.) The sources of international law briefly discussed in this article are not the only available sources that establish war crimes. Other international treaties could also establish individual criminal responsibility for wrongful acts committed during an armed conflict. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13,. 1993, S. TREATY DOG. No. 21, 103d Cong. (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993) (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997). The Nuremberg Charter established criminal liability for waging a war of aggression (crimes against peace), for violations of the laws and customs of war, and for major inhumane acts committed against a civilian population before or during an armed conflict (crimes against humanity). Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Annex containing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat 154, 82 U.N. T.S. 279. This article provides the most commonly relied upon international law source that establishes war crimes.
(30.) AR 27-10, supra note 15, para. 501; Major Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond; Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MILL. REV. 155 (June 2000); Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 573 (July 1999); William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL L. REV. 1 (1973); Matthew Lippman, Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 71-79 (Fall 1996) (discussing the command responsibility doctrine utilized in the trial of General Yamashita); Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita (U.S. Milit. Comm'n, Manila, Oct. 8-Dec. 7, 1945), IV LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1, 4 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n 1948). Protocol I imposes criminal liability upon a superior when he knew or should have known that his subordinates were committing war crimes and he failed to take all feasible measures within his power to prevent it. Protocol I, supra note 19, art 86.
(31.) Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted at New York, May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted at New York, Nov. 8, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
(32.) BEIGBEDER, supra note 3, at 152.
(34.) Id. at 175. The differences between the statutes for the ICTY and ICTR can be accounted for by the differences between the armed conflict in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The conflict in Yugoslavia had both an internal and international aspect but the conflict in Rwanda was strictly internal. Id. at 174-75.
(35.) Id. at 175.
(36.) See id.
(37.) U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/189/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
(38.) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Ratification Status, http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm (last modified Feb. 12, 2001). One hundred and twenty-nine nations have signed and twenty-five nations have ratified the court's statute. Id. On June 9, 2000, France, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, ratified the court's statute. Id.
(39.) ICC Statue, supra note 37. Although, the ICC will not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until a provision defining this crime is adopted. Under articles 5, 12, and 123, this provision could not be adopted until seven years after the ICC statue has taken effect. Id.
(40.) Carlotta Gall, UN. Mission in Kosovo proposes to Set Up a War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2000, at A3. United Nations Press Release, SC/69 10, Council Asks Secretary-General, Sierra Leone to Negotiate Agreement for Creation of Independent Special Court, Aug. 14, 2000, available at www.un.org (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review); United Nations Press Release, SG/SM/7481, United Nations Legal Counsel Completes Formal Discussions with Cambodian Government on Establishment of Tribunal to Try Former Khmer Rouge Leaders, Jul. 6, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000706.sgsm7481.doc.html, (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review).
(41.) See Infra notes 47 and 48 and accompanying text.
(42.)M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 356-60 (3d ed. 1996). Universal jurisdiction under customary international law permits States to enact legislation that grants its domestic criminal courts jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals. BEIGBEDER, supra note 3, at 133. Universal jurisdiction permits a State to prosecute a war criminal irrespective of the war criminal's nationality or place of the commission of the offense, or of any link between the prosecuting State and the war criminal. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 511-13 (1992). The rationale for universal jurisdiction is that there are certain offenses, which by their very nature, affect the interests of all States. Id. at 512-13.
United States federal courts have recognized universal jurisdiction over war crimes. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). The American Law Institute's Restatement also states that war crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, [sections] 404 (1987). In 1996, a Spanish judge ruled that crimes against humanity enjoy universal jurisdiction and started a criminal investigation into the torture and murder of Spanish citizens in Argentina. BEIGBEDER, supra note 3, at 133. In 1997, a German court utilized the doctrine of universal jurisdiction to convict a Bosnian Serb for taking part in a massacre of 14 Muslims in Bosnia. Id. at 134. However, French courts have declined to accept universal jurisdiction in a number of cases. Id.
(43.) Mills, supra note 26, at 48 & n.6.
(44.) See GWS, supra note 17, art. 49; GWS at Sea, supra note 17, art. 50; GPW, supra note 17, art. 129; GC, supra note 17, art. 146; BEIGBEDER, supra note 3, at 8.
(45.) UCMJ art. 18.
(46.) UCMJ art. 21.
(47.) War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. [sections] 2441(a) (1996).
(48.) The Case of General Pinochet: Universal Jurisdiction and the Absence of Immunity for Crimes Against Humanity, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ON-LINE, http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/EUR450211998 (visited Mar. 9, 2001) (Amnesty International's Spanish language 1998 third party position paper on General Pinochet's extradition case before the English House of Lords).
(49.) See Charles Trueheart, Rights Activists Cheer Pinochet Precedent, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2000, at A22.
(51.) See GWS, supra note 17, art. 49; GWS at Sea, supra note 17, art. 50; GPW, supra note 17, art. 129; GC, supra note 17, art. 146; BEIGBEDER, supra note 3, at 8.
(52.) Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 88; Genocide Convention, supra note 25, art. VII. Professor Bassiouni has compiled an extensive list of international criminal law conventions that establish a duty to extradite. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 788-800 (1992).
(53.) Principles of International Co-operation in the Detention, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI) 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29), at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 95(1), 1 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 2) at 188, U.N. Doc. A164/Add. 1 (1947); Extradition and punishment of War Criminals, G.A. Res. 3, 1 U.N. G.AOR at 9-10, U.N. Doc. A/OR/1-1/R (1946).
(54.) ICTY Statute, supra note 31, art. 29; ICTR Statute, supra note 31, art. 28.
(55.) The efforts of the ICTY have been severely stagnated by its inability to coerce individual states to secure the arrest and detention of high-profile defendants. Penrose, supra note 1, at 353.
(56.) See infra notes 64 through 67 and accompanying text.
(57.) During the time that there were 185 member States to the United Nations, the United States had only entered into approximately 100 separate extradition treaties. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 16-17 (3d ed. 1996).
(58.) Most extradition treaties permit one or both States discretion to refuse extradition. Brigette Belton Homrig, Abduction as an Alternative to Extradition: A Dangerous Method to Obtain Jurisdiction over Criminal Defendants, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 676 (1993).
(59.) Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the Mexican States, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
(60.) BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 108. The United States Secretary of State may exercise executive discretion to override a duty to extradite under treaty obligations. Id.
(61.) Id. at 5-7; Argiro Kosmetatos, U.S.-Mexican Extradition Policy: Were the Predictions Right About Alvarez?, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1064, 1068 (March 1999). Suspected war criminals have been extradited despite the absence of an extradition treaty. On Dec. 11, 1974, the Supreme Court of Bolivia denied France's request to extradite, Klaus Barbie, a Nazi war criminal known as the "The Lyons butcher," on the basis that there was no extradition treaty between France and Bolivia. Jean-Olivier Viout, The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes Against Humanity, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 155, 156-57 (1999). However, as a result of a change in the Bolivian government, on Feb. 6, 1986, Barbie was summarily expelled from Bolivia and flown to the French territory of Guyana where he was arrested by French authorities. Id. at 161-62. The French courts disregarded Barbie's contention that he should be released because his custody was obtained by an illegal extradition. Id.
In March 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright authorized the extradition of Pastor Ntakirutima, a Rwandan genocide suspect, to the ICTR despite the absence of an extradition treaty with Rwanda. See Betsy Pisik, Rwanda Tribunal Victory, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2000, at A12. Although the United States does not have an extradition treaty with Rwanda, in 1995, President Clinton entered into an executive agreement with the ICTR, which promised that the United States would agree to surrender persons in its territory that were charged or convicted by the tribunal. Agreement on Surrender of Persons Between the Government of the United States and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Jan. 24, 1995, U.S.ICTR, 1996 WL 165484; Ntakirutima v. Reno, 184 F. 3d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 5. Ct. 977 (2000). To implement this executive agreement, in 1996, Congress enacted legislation that provided that federal extradition statutes apply to the surrender of persons to the ICTR. National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. 104-106, [sections] 1342, 110 Stat. 486 (1996). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Ntakirutima's arguments that the Constitution of the United States requires that an extradition must occur pursuant to a treaty. Ntakirutima's, 184 F.3d at 424-27. A majority of the Court held that either a federal statute or a treaty may confer the power to extradite. Id.
(62.) Kosmetatos, supra note 61, at 1069 n.26.
(63.) Id. at 1069 n.27.
(64.) According to estimates of Nazi hunters from the Anti-Defamation League and the World Jewish Congress, between as many as 40,000 and 50,000 Nazis sought refuge in Latin America after World War II. CHARLES ASHMAN & ROBERT J. WAGMAN, THE NAZI HUNTERS 303 (1988).
(65.) BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 219. State abduction violates the domestic law where the abduction occurs and international law. I. A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (1971).
(66.) U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. The United Nations Security Council ordered Isreal to make reparations to Argentia for abducting a Nazi war criminal, Eichmann, from Buenos Aires. U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960).
(67.) Despite the widespread existence of extradition treaties, international abduction has "occurred fairly consistently worldwide throughout the last 160 years." Jonathan A. Gluck, The Customary International Law of State-Sponsored International Abduction and United States Courts, 44 DUKE L.J. 612, 613 (Dec. 1994).
(68.) Homrig, supra note 58, at 698. Israel also allegedly considered kidnapping Alois Brunner, another Nazi war criminal, from Syria but ruled against it because political matters in that part of the world made it impractical to risk the negative reaction of another Eichmann-type of raid. ASHMAN & WAGMAN, supra note 64, at 27.
(69.) BASSIOUNI, supra note 59, at 220 n.9.
(70.) Id. at 221 n. 11.
(71.) Kosmetatos, supra note 61, at 1064. In recent years, United States authorities have engaged in dozens of kidnappings of foreign suspects wanted for drug-related offenses. Stephen J. Hedges, et al., Kidnapping Drug Lords, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 14, 1990, at 28 ("Kidnapping is an attractive law-enforcement tool because it avoids lengthy extraditions and official corruption that can shield and even free suspects.").
(72.) Gluck, supra note 67, at 652 n.218 (citing an internal memorandum from the U.S. Department of Justice); Jeanne M. Woods, Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial Arrests, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1996) (criticizing the Department of Justice opinion).
(73.) Homrig, supra note 58, at 677-78; United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (1990) (describing the circumstances surrounding Noriega's abduction).
(74.) Homrig, supra note 58, at 685.
(75.) Homrig, supra note 58, at 685.
(76.) Kristin Berdan Weissman, Extraterritorial Abduction: The Endangerment of Future Peace, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 460 (Winter 1994).
(77.) United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 228 (United States courts traditionally uphold personal jurisdiction over a criminal defendant that was secured by illegal methods, including abduction by government agents.).
(78.) See supra note 11, and accompanying text.
(79.) The United States Supreme Court has determined that customary international law is binding on the United States when there is no controlling treaty, executive or legislative act, or judicial decision. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 577 (1900).
(80.) BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 219.
(81.) U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
(82.) Between June 1993 and 1994, in Somali, United States military forces and other UN military forces were unable despite their best efforts to capture General Mohammed Farah Aideed, a Somali warlord. Moyiga Nduru, Aideed's supporters vow to fight on: Death of Somali Warlord Could Trigger War, 715 ETHNIC NEWS WATCH 12 (1996). The United States, with other UN peacekeeping forces, went into Somalia in December 1992 for humanitarian reasons. General Aideed Obituary, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 1996, Arts, Books and Sport, at 69. In June 1993, General Aideed's men killed 24 Pakistanis peacekeepers that were trying to close down a Somali radio station. Id. This incident prompted the US-led peacekeepers to focus their energies on capturing General Aideed. Id. In October 1993, three US helicopter gunships were brought down as they stormed a building in a failed attempt to capture General Aideed. Id. General Aideed's men were seen on television dragging a dead American pilot through the streets of Mogadishu. Id. The US withdrew its troops from Somalia in 1994, and the rest of the UN peacekeepers left in March 1995. Nduru, supra. In August 1996, General Aideed died of a heart attack that was related to an injury sustained following a July 24, 1996 assassination attempt by a rival Somali faction. Id.
(83.) If the UNSC could craft such a resolution, it would effectively create the equivalent of state-supervised bounty hunters. Like bounty hunters, these small-scale military forces would rely on stealth and surprise to capture fugitive war criminals. Alternatively, the UNSC could adopt this article's recommendation of passing a resolution that provides private actors with immunity from domestic law for the forceful acts necessary to act as international bounty hunters. See infra notes 128 through 133 and accompanying text. It would be much easier for the UNSC to pass a single resolution that established a system of private international bounty hunters than it would be to craft ad hoc resolutions for small-scale military operations for each fugitive war criminal. Furthermore, if the UNSC established a system of private international bounty hunters, this would not preclude States from choosing to assist private bounty hunters by providing them with training, equipment, intelligence, and transportation.
(84.) On July 10, 1997, after British troops arrested one suspected war criminal and killed another who resisted arrest in the Bosnian town of Prijedor, a spate of retaliatory hand-grenade attacks, stabbings, and bombings was directed against NATO units. Chris Hedges, Dutch Troops Seize Two War Crimes Suspects, Wounding One, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1997, at A20.
(85.) Jamie McIntyre, Who Will Catch Bosnia War Criminals?, CNN INTERACTIVE WORLD NEWS, http://cnn.com/world/9612/19/pentagon.bosnia (Dec. 19, 1996) (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review).
(86.) BEIGBEDER, supra note 3, at 162.
(87.) Eileen O'Connor, Pentagon denies current framing for Bosnian 'snatch missions' CNN INTERACTIVE WORLD NEWS, http://www9.cnn.com/WORLD/9708/13/bosnian.war.crimina1s/ (Aug. 13, 1997) (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review). Despite the Pentagon's rejection of any legal responsibility to arrest war criminals indicted by the ICTY, NATO troops have arrested a few of the indicted war criminals. NATO's strict stance against actively pursuing indicted war criminals may have softened after General Wesley Clark replaced General George Joulwan as the overall NATO commander. Steven Erlanger, NATO Action Reflects Shift in Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1997, at A5. On July 10, 1997, a British military operation led to the arrest of one indicted war criminal and the killing of another. Id. On Dec. 18, 1997, Dutch troops arrested two war crimes suspects. Hedges, supra note 84, at A20. On Jan. 22, 1998, United States troops arrested war crimes suspect, Goran Jelisic. Mike O'Connor, G.I.'s in Bosnia Make Their First Arrest of a War-Crimes Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at A7. NATO troops have arrested nineteen of the individuals currently in custody before the ICTY. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Key Figures, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm (last modified Mar. 29, 2001) (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review). Thirteen individuals voluntarily surrendered themselves to the ICTY and six others were arrested by domestic law enforcement. Id. Despite these arrests, NATO troops do not actively hunt war criminals, and they are unwilling to make any attempt to capture a well guarded or politically connected war criminal such as Slobodan Milosevic or Ratko Mladic.
(88.) See BEIGBEDER, supra note 3, at 162-163.
(89.) Barbara Crossette, New Sanctions Incite Attacks by Afghans at U.N. Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at A6.
(90.) Brian Blomquist, Afghans Defy Deadline to Hand over Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999, at Metro 5.
(91.) Afghanistan's Taliban regime has stated that Afghan hospitality makes it impossible to turn a house guest over to his enemies, but it has assured the United States that Bin Laden is under virtual house arrest because of international concerns. Holger Jensen Scripps, Taliban Snubs Hijackers But Won't Hand Over Bin Laden, DESSERT NEWS (Salt Lake City), Jan. 2, 2000, Viewpoint, at AA04.
(92.) Nilas Gunnar Billinger, Report of the Special Swedish Commission on International Police Activities, in POLICING THE NEW WORLD DISORDER: PEACE OPERATIONS AND PUBLIC SECURITY 459, 479 (Robert B. Oakley, et al., eds., 1998). This book is a collection of essays that discuss in detail the role of United Nations civilian police in recent peace operations such as Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia and Haiti.
(93.) Id. at 39.
(95.) Under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, each member State was required to complete a "special agreement" with the Security Council that governed the type and number of military forces that the nation was obligating itself to provide to the Security Council for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. U.N. CHARTER art. 43. However, the Security Council has never signed an Article 43 special agreement and does not have its own military forces. Andrew S. Miller, Universal Soldiers: U.N. Standing Armies and the Legal Alternatives, 81 GEO. L.J. 773, 782 (March 1993) (questioning the feasibility of creating a standing U.N. military force and recommending that the UN avoid being drawn into a major debate over this issue). The UN has never had a permanent, standby, or on-call military force acting under UN authority and prospects for one in the near future remain grim. David J. Scheffer, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, & Peacebuilding: The Role of the United Nations in Global Conflict: Pe rmanent Peacekeeping: The Theoretical & Practical Feasibility of a United Nations Force: United Nations Peace Operations and Prospects for a Standby Force, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 649 (Spring 1995).
(96.) In 2000, it cost over ninety-five million dollars just to run the ICTY for one year. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Key Figures, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm (last modified Mar. 29, 2001) (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review).
(97.) Jonathan Drimmer, When Man Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of Bounty Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 731, 732-33 (Fall 1996).
(98.) Bounty hunters return 99.2% of all individuals in the custody of bondsman while law enforcement returns 92% of individuals under public bail. Id. at 738 n.31. Mr. Bob Burton, president of the National Institute of Bail Enforcement Agents, claims that of the approximately 22,000 annual arrests by bounty hunters only about 15 of those arrests involve "errors." Kirk D. Richards and Matthew Marx, Proposed Law Would Limit Who Can Be Bounty Hunter, COLUMBUS DISP., Oct. 3, 2000, at 1C.
(99.) Drimmer supra note 97, at 735. With the exception of the Philippines, commercial bailsbondman do not exist outside of the United States. F. E. DEVINE, COMMERCIAL BAIL BONDING: A COMPARISON OF COMMON LAW ALTERNATIVES 15 (1991). Other common law countries have chosen to use methods of recognizance, criminal penalties, nonfinancial control of conduct, or noncommercial financial security deposit to insure an accused's presence at trial. Id. at 201. The most common type of bail system utilized by common law countries is the recognizance system. Id. Under the recognizance system, the accused or a noncommercial surety pledges to pay money to the State if the accused fails to appear at court. Id. Typically, no money is deposited with the court and a debt to the State is only incurred if the accused fails to appear at trial. Id.
(100.) Drimmer, supra note 97, at 735.
(101.) Drimmer, supra note 97, at 736.
(102.) Drimmer, supra note 97, at 736.
(103.) Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1872) (recognizing the bounty hunter's comprehensive common law right of recapture over a bailed defendant).
(104.) Drimmer, supra note 97, at 750-53. According, to Thomas Nixon, the chief instructor for the National Institute of Bail Enforcement Agents, although bounty hunters can legally break into a fugitive's home, most gain access simply by knocking at the door. Janet Caggiano, Skip Tracers; For Bounty Hunters, the Work Is 97 Percent Boredom and 3 Percent Fear, RICH. TIMES DISP., Sep. 5, 1999, at Gl. Nixon, a practicing bounty hunter, usually gains entry by posing as a salesman or courier; or he just waits until the fugitive leaves. Id.
(105.) Jonathan Drixmner, When Man Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of Bounty Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System, 33 HOUS. L. REv. 731, 736 (Fall 1996). The author criticizes the lack of regulation of bounty hunters for causing unnecessary violence, the destruction of property, and the arrest of innocent victims. Id. at 737. These concerns, and an infamous 1997 Arizona case, prompted several States to enact or consider legislation to regulate bounty hunters. The 1997 Arizona case concerns five men who broke into a private residence and engaged in a gun battle with one of the home's occupants. Adam Cohen, Murders at Dawn--Bounty Hunters Storm the Wrong House in Phoenix, Killing Two and Spurring the Cry for Safeguards, 150:11, TIME, Sep. 15, 1997, at 91. Two of the five intruders were shot before the intruders killed two of the home's occupants. After the fight, the five intruders told police that they were bounty hunters who mistakenly hit the wrong house while looking for a California fugitive. Id. The leader of the raid was recently convicted of first degree murder and nine other criminal charges. Sentencing for Bounty Hunter Stalled, Hearing on New Trial Set, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Jan. 30, 1999, Valley and State, at B2. State prosecutors maintained that the five intruders broke into the home under the mistaken belief that they would find a large amount of drugs and money and that their claims of being bounty hunters was merely a cover story. Id. Regardless of whether the intruders were truly acting as bounty hunters or not, their criminal acts spurred legislation nationwide that attempted to prevent bounty hunter misconduct.
(106.) A Nevada law, effective Oct. 1, 1997, requires bounty hunters to obtain a license. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. [sections] 697.173(1) (LEXIS 2000). To qualify for a bounty hunter license in Nevada, a individual must be 21 years of age or older, be a United States citizen, have graduated high school, submit a negative drug test, undertake a psychological examination, complete required training, and pass a written examination. Furthermore, Nevada excludes anyone convicted of a felony, a crime of moral turpitude, or a crime involving the unlawful use, sale, or possession of a controlled substance from holding a bounty hunter's license. Id. at [sections] 697.173(2).
Other representative state statutes also deal with bounty hunters: IND. CODE ANN. [sections] 27-10-3-5 (LEXIS 2000) (to obtain a permit bounty hunters must be at least 18 years old, a U.S. citizen, a resident of Indiana for six months and have no recent criminal convictions); GA. CODE ANN. [sections] 17-6-57 (LEXIS 2000) (must have a firearms license, be a U.S. citizen, 25 years old, and notify local sheriff and police chief before engaging in surveillance, apprehension, or capture); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. [sections] 597:7-b (LEXIS 2000) (requires bounty hunters to be trained and certified by the Professional Bail Agents of the United States, to register with the secretary of state, and to notify local law enforcement before searching for a fugitive); UTAH CODE ANN. [sections] 53-11-108 (LEXIS 2000) (applicant for license must be at least 21 years of age, a citizen or legal resident of the U.S., not be convicted of a felony or a crime involving violence, fraud, or moral turpitude, have completed a training pro gram of not less than 16 hours, have at least 1,000 hours of experience as a bail recovery agent or law enforcement officer); TENN. CODE ANN. [sections] 40-11-318 (LEXIS 2000) (prohibits individuals with felony convictions from serving as bounty hunters and requires bounty hunters to notify local law enforcement before attempting to take any person into custody); ARK. STAT. ANN. [sections] 16-84-114 (LEXIS 2000) (requires bounty hunters to notify local law enforcement before attempting to apprehend a fugitive).
In 1999, West Virginia unsuccessfully attempted to pass legislation that would require bounty hunters to be licensed and will likely try to pass similar legislation again next year. Bounty Hunters' Charges Could Spur Law, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 7, 1999, at 3A. Pennsylvania is considering legislation that would require bounty hunters to be 21 years of age or older, to be a citizen of the United States, to pass a background check for mental stability, to undergo 80 hours of training, and to not have a conviction for a felony, first or second degree misdemeanor, or any crime involving violence or fraud. S. Res. 1 931, 183rd Gen. Assem., 1999-00 Sess. (Pa. 1999). On Jan.. 19, 2000, a bill was introduced in Virginia that would regulate bounty hunters. S. Res. 582, Va. 2000 Sess. (Va. 2000). In 2000, Ohio is considering legislation that would require bounty hunters to be licensed and to notify local law enforcement before attempting to make an arrest. Kirk D. Richards and Matthew Marx, Proposed Law Would Limit W ho Can Be Bounty Hunter, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 2000, at 1G. Representative William A. Hutchinson, an Arkansas Republican, has proposed federal legislation in the United States House of Representatives that would require all bounty hunters in the United States to notify local law enforcement before attempting to obtain custody of a fugitive. Citizen Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 3168, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
In 1999, Alaska strictly prohibited all bounty hunters from operating within their State by passing a law that prohibits private persons from making any arrest for a crime not committed or attempted in their presence. ALASKA STAT. [sections] 12.25.025 (LEXIS 2000). Kentucky, Wisconsin, and Illinois passed laws that prohibit companies from posting bonds for profit. Wanted: Get Out of Jail Free--Are Bounty Hunters Needed?, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 21, 1999, Editorial, at A14; DEVINE, supra note 99, 52-53. Furthermore, Kentucky law requires bounty hunters working for an out-of-state bondsmen to obtain a warrant from a Kentucky judge before arresting a fugitive in Kentucky. Id.
(107.) Drimmer, supra note 97, at 743. Bounty hunters typically earn ten percent of the bond, plus expenses. Caggiano, supra note 104, at Gl.
(108.) Despite legal immunity, bounty hunters still face criminal liability for mistakenly entering the wrong property or for using force against the wrong person. In a 1999 incident in DeKalb County, Georgia, two bounty hunters kicked in a door at a wrong address and terrified a 14 year-old girl who was there alone. Bill Torpy, Playing with a Different Set of Rules; Modernizing Bounty Hunting, ATLANTA JOURNAL, Feb. 28, 1999, Local News, at lE. Both bounty hunters were charged with criminal damage to property and one was also charged with misdemeanor battery. Id.
Bounty hunters may also face civil liability for mistakenly entering the wrong property or for using force against the wrong person. In a 1994 incident, bounty hunters wrongfully arrested a woman who was mistaken for a fugitive and transported her from Manhattan, New York to Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Cohen, supra note 105, at 91. A federal jury in New York awarded the wrongfully arrested woman $1.2 million. Id.
A Georgia law holds bounty hunters strictly liable for all damages when a bounty hunter enters the wrong property and causes property damage or injury. GA. CODE ANN. [sections] 176-58(c) (LEXIS 2000). Effective July 1, 2000, New Hampshire will require bounty hunters to carry liability coverage in the amount of $300,000. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. [sections] 597:7-b (LEXIS 2000).
(109.) supra note 12 and accompanying text.
(110.) Nine Convicted in Kidnap of War-Crimes Suspect, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 2000, at A15.
(111.) Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 3, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, art. IV.
(112.) Major Geoffrey Corn & Major Michael L. Smidt, "To Be or Not To Be, That is the Question" Contemporary Military Operations and the Status of Captured Personnel, June 1999 ARMY LAW. 1, 14. The GPW does not explicitly mention combatant immunity but it is inferred from the cumulative effect of the protections within the GPW. Id. at n. 124.
(113.) For example, the Genocide Convention opened for signature on Dec. 11, 1948 but was not ratified by the United States until 40 years later on Nov. 25, 1988. Genocide Convention, supra note 25.
(114.) Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, G.A. Res. 49/59, 49 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 49) at 299, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994) (hereinafter CSUNAP); see also Lieutenant Colonel Steven J. Lepper, The Legal Status of Military Personnel in United Nations Peace Operations: One Delegate's Analysis, 18 Hous. J. INT'L LAW 359 (Winter 1996), for an in-depth discussion of the drafting process and meaning of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.
(115.) See CSUNAP, supra note 114, art. 9.
(116.) Judith Kumin, Foreign Aid Workers Need Protection Too, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sep. 21, 2000, at A21.
(117.) BEIGBEDER, supra note 3, at 150.
(118.) State members to the United Nations must accept and carry out decisions by the Security Council. U.N. Charter art. 25. Security Council decisions must have affirmative votes from nine of the fifteen members of the Council and not be subject to the veto of any of the permanent members. Id. art. 27. The permanent members to the Security Council are the United States, China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and France. Security Council, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/Organs/sc.html#MEMBERS (last visited Apr. 17, 2001) (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review).
(119.) "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 
(120.) See BEIGBEDER, supra note 3, at 150-51.
(121.) Crossette, supra note 89. The United Nations Security Council ordered all countries to freeze Afghanistan government assets and to ban all flights to Afghanistan. Blomquist, supra note 90. On Dec. 19, 2000, the Security Council voted to broaden its sanctions against Afghanistan. UN Council Applies More Pressure on Taliban, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 20, 2000, News, at 4. However, Afghanistan's leaders still refuse to hand over Osama Bin Laden. Id.
(122.) Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-l-AR72, paras. 31-37 (I.C.T.Y. Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35 ILM 32 (1996), available at www.un.org/icty (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review).
(123.) Id. para. 34.
(124.) Id. para. 35.
(125.) Id. paras. 31-37.
(126.) Id. para. 39.
(127.) Mills, supra note 26, n.6; ICTY Statute, supra note 31.
(128.) U.N. CHARTER arts. 25 & 48, Currently, 189 States are members of the United Nations. List of Member States, at http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2001) (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review).
(129.) Beverly Izes, Drawing Lines in the Sand: When State-Sanctioned Abductions of War Criminals Should be Permitted, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 10 (Fall 1997). Ms. Izes also stated that abducted individuals should be permitted to bring human rights actions to an international tribunal for any abduction that failed to follow the United Nation's procedural guidelines on State-sponsored abductions. Id. at 14.
(130.) Id. at 2.
(131.) Id. at 14.
(132.) On February 29, 1992, after ten months of hearings and approximately 3,000 witnesses, a self-appointed commission found President George Bush, Vice-President J. Danforth Quayle, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and General Norman Schwarzkopf guilty of nineteen war crimes committed during the course of the Gulf War. BEIGBEDER, supra note 3, at 137-38. These crimes included crimes against peace, indiscriminate bombing, use of prohibited weapons of mass destruction, and crimes against humanity. Id. Lacking any enforcement authority, the commission did not pass any sentence but condemned these individuals in the strongest possible terms. Id. The commission ignored Iraq's unlawful act of aggression against Kuwait and that the UNSC had acted within its rights under the UN Charter in authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. Id. at 138. It also ignored Iraq's own war crimes. Id. The commission's real objective was to influence public opinion against the war. Id.
(133.) Indictments for the ICTY are prepared by a prosecutor and confirmed by a judge of the Trial Chamber if a prima facie case has been presented. If an indicted individual is not arrested, a public hearing is held before the full Trial Chamber. If the full Trial Chamber is satisfied that the indictment was issued upon probable cause then the full Trial Chamber will issue and transmit an international arrest warrant. Id. at 153. See also Rule 61, Procedure in Case of Failure to Execute a Warrant, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 9, ICTFY, July 5, 1996. The ICTY has issued international arrest warrants against twelve of the indicted individuals. Fact Sheet: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-e.htm (last modified Mar. 29, 2001) (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review). International arrest warrants have not resulted in the apprehension of any fugitive war criminals. Id.
(134.) ASHMAN & WAGMAN, supra note 64, at 30-32 (Schwammberger was known as the "mass murderer of Poland"). On November 17, 1987, people interested in collecting the reward led Argentine police to a small village where Schwammberger was hiding. Id. at 32.
(135.) Arrest Order Filed for Nazi Brunner, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Sep. 11 1997, Editorial, at 14A.
(136.) Diplomatic Security Service: US. Department of State, http://www.dssrewards.net/english/warcrimes/torture.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2001).
(137.) The authors of The Nazi Hunters state that two wealthy American businessmen offered them a "blank check" for anyone who could abduct Alois Brunner, a Nazi war criminal hiding in Syria. ASHMAN & WAGMAN, supra note 64, at 28.
(138.) See supra notes 105-106.
(139.) For example, Janko Janjic, a fugitive war criminal indicted by the ICTY, is extensively tattooed. War Criminal Watch, COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, http://www.wcw.org (see "sightings" section for the ICTY on this web site) (last visited Apr. 17, 2001). One tattoo on his forehead reads "I was dead before I was born." Id.
(140.) After Syria denied extradition requests for Alois Brunner, a Nazi war criminal, State agents unsuccessfully attempted to execute Brunner with mail bombs. See ASHMAN & WAGMAN, supra note 64, at 18. One bomb cost Brunner two of his fingers and the second bomb cost him one of his eyes. Id.
(141.) CHARLES ASHMAN & ROBERT J. WAGMAN, THE NAZI HUNTERS 17(1988). In 1954, France tried Brunner in absentia and sentenced him to death. Id. at 26. Brunner worked in Damascus, Syria as an assistant manager for a trading company that represented West German firms under the alias, Dr. George Fischer. Id. In 1960, Syrian police arrested Dr. Fischer for drug smuggling but after Syrian officials learned his true identity, he was welcomed to the country and became a security advisor to the Syrian government. Id. at 26-27. Brunner helped train Syrian police in effective interrogation methods and he is believed to be responsible for plotting several anti-Israelis incidents throughout the world, including the 1961 attempted bombing of the World Jewish Congress in Vienna. Id. at 27. Syria repeatedly denied West Germany's extradition requests for Brunner and even provided Brunner with armed, uniformed bodyguards. Id. at 27-28. The French, Greek, Czech, Austrian, and Israeli authorities all want custody of Brunner. Jam es, supra note 2, at 10. Poland is also considering demanding Brunner's extradition but then Syrian President Hafez Assad stated that to his knowledge Brunner was not in his country. Plea Over War Criminal, BIRMINGHAM POST, Jan. 19, 2000, News, at 9. But President Hafez Assad's recent death has provided new hope that Brunner will finally face extradition. Syria's new President, Assad's son, Bashar-al-Assad, is considering extraditing Brunner to Germany in exchange for closer diplomatic ties with Western countries. Allan Hall and Gabriel Milland, Last Major War Criminal to Go Back to Germany, EXPRESS, Oct. 31, 2000.
(142.) ASHMAN & WAGMAN, supra note 64, at 30.
(143.) Outstanding Public Indictments, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/indictlist-e.htm (last modified Mar. 29, 2001) (copy on file with the Air Force Law Review).
(144.) A former British military commander is already attempting to establish Justice Action, the world's first non-governmental war crimes investigation unit. James Clark, Colonel Bob to Lead Hunt for War Criminals, LONDON SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 28, 2001, Home News. The group will be staffed by former police officers and military investigators. Id. Justice Action is seeking funding from private individuals and charitable organizations. id. The group will not act as an international police force but will attempt to put pressure on governments to apprehend and prosecute war criminals. Id.
(145.) Scott Anderson, What I Did on My Summer Vacation, ESQUIRE, No. 4, Vol. 134, 104.
(151.) CHARLES ASHMAN & ROBERT J. WAGMAN, THE NAZI HUNTERS 280-97.
(152.) Id. at 287.
(153.) Id. at 290.
(154.) War Criminal Watch, COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, http://www.wce.org (visited Apr. 17, 2001).
(155.) See supra notes 11 and 110, and accompanying text.
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|Author:||Supernor, Christopher M.|
|Publication:||Air Force Law Review|
|Date:||Jan 1, 2001|
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