Internal armed conflicts: improving JGF organization.

The ongoing counter terrorist operation in the Northern Caucasus and the shortfalls in the employment of mixed interagency armed formations, as well as the possibility of internal armed conflicts breaking out in other parts of Russia necessitate further improvement in the organizational structure of the Joint Group of Forces (Troops) (JGF). In implementing military reform, it is necessary to bring JGF organization in line with the tasks of neutralizing and countering possible military threats within the state; the nature of warfare and combat operations to resolve internal armed conflicts, and the forms and methods of JGF employment. Principal efforts here should be focused on creating the main elements of the JGF structural composition, specifically bringing the JGF structure, composition, and numerical strength in line with the existing internal threats, taking into account the possible composition and tactics of illegal armed formations, as well as the state's financial, material and technical capabilities; improving the JGF command and control system, in accordance with the specific missions assigned to the JGF and its configuration; creating a manpower acquisition and staffing system in accordance with the prevailing conditions in an internal armed conflict; enhancing the level of operational, combat, professional and tactical training; and providing the JGF with modern, advanced arms and military equipment, enabling it to conduct effective combat operations under the specific conditions of an internal armed conflict.

All of the aforementioned tasks, which at first glance might appear disconnected, are in fact closely interconnected and essential to improving the JGF's structural organization. The fulfillment of any one of them in separation from others will not produce the required result: What is needed here is a comprehensive, integrated approach.

The principal theoretical and practical tasks of JGF organization and development include the creation of a rationally substantiated force structure with an optimal composition in accordance with operational (combat) needs and the economic and resource capabilities of both the state as a whole and the specific elements of its military organization. Importantly, whereas the JGF's general composition and its numerical strength should correspond to the scope of tasks that are assigned, and the combat (operational) requirements in the zone of an internal armed conflict, and are to a very large extent contingent on the composition of tactical and other groups deployed in the zone of an armed conflict (sectors, lines, zones, districts, military commandants' offices, etc.), its structure is designed to ensure the high combat and operational readiness of troops (forces, military agencies) and the maximum possible realization of their combat (operational) capabilities in fulfilling the set tasks in the prevailing situation, taking into account the changes that have occurred throughout the period of peace enforcement and peace-making operations.

Although the concept "joint group of forces" is widely accepted, there are many problems related to its creation and operation. The name itself implies the use of the joint principle of the formation and operation of mixed arms group of forces coming from different government agencies and placed under the control of the JGF commander. This principle, however, is rather difficult to apply today due to the constant striving by the leadership of a particular ministry (government agency) to interfere in the actions of its troops (forces) with narrow departmental views in mind, to address tasks that are oftentimes at odds with the principal objective--i.e., resolving an internal armed conflict. There is in fact no unity of command for all of the state's so called power structures, as a result of which the JGF is not in a position to eliminate the dual subordination of its component forces (troops).

It appears expedient that in the interest of achieving the principal objective, the JGF should be created and operated not as a joint [obyedinennaya] group of forces (troops), but as single [yedinaya] group--i.e., on the principle of direct subordination. Only this approach can help create a group of forces in which all of its elements will have a standard basic structure, capable of flexibly adapting to the prevailing situation, and at the same time directly subordinated to unified command.

In elaborating the JGF structure, it is essential to take the following into account:

-- an optimal and clear distribution of tasks (functions) between JGF components (eliminating duplication and overlapping) and ensuring their effective interoperability and interaction;

-- a rational correlation of assault, strike, command and control, combat service support, and support assets (forces) and agencies;

-- the principle of single responsibility for the conduct of combat, operational, and law enforcement actions and ensuring the integrated and well coordinated employment of mixed arms, heterogeneous troops (forces) and agencies from different government departments, fulfilling their specific tasks in the same areas;

-- the unity and harmonization of the structural organization of troops (forces) and elements of the state's military organization (in peacetime) that will comprise the future JGF, created to resolve an internal armed conflict;

-- should an internal armed conflict escalate into an international conflict or a local war, the JGF structure should not require substantial reorganization as it is transformed into a group of forces designed to act against an external aggressor;

-- combat (operational) stability, firmness, survivability and the ability to promptly restore (recover) its battleworthiness, as well as the mobility of JGF components;

-- a simple and flexible organizational structure ensuring development, staffing, controllability, and continuous material and technical support, as well as the JGF's prompt and effective transformation, adjustment, and employment as need be at different stages of an internal armed conflict;

-- a combination of the economical, cost effective maintenance and the maximum possible realization of the combat and operational capabilities of the weapons systems, military and special equipment that are designed, if necessary, to ensure the use of force to resolve an internal armed conflict both in peacetime and in wartime.

One major element of the JGF structural composition is the command and control system whose organization should be based on the general requirements, such as the need to ensure the prompt, efficient, continuous, stable and covert command and control of troops (forces) at all stage of an internal armed conflict under any conditions. This objective is achieved by meeting a number of specific requirements that can be conveniently divided into several groups.

* Group 1 comprises requirements ensuring that the JGF command and control system conform to the composition, structure and numerical strength of troops (forces) and agencies, as well as the nature of their tasks. The composition, functions, and structure of the command and control system itself should be well balanced.

* Group 2 includes specific criteria related to the JGF command and control system's support functions, namely: ensuring the readiness for transition to alert status; putting military command and control agencies on an emergency basis without substantial restructuring (primarily by somewhat increasing the numerical strength of personnel and clarifying their functions in compliance with emergency situation requirement); prompt and effective control of elements of the state's military organization designed for the JGF, in daily activities in peacetime and their reorganization and transfer under JGF command with the introduction of an emergency situation to resolve an internal armed conflict; systematic preparations for resolving an internal armed conflict and effective use of the available capability in combat operations and the performance of the entire spectrum of functions and tasks with minimum strength levels; inter-branch, inter-arms, and inter-agency interaction, coordination of command and control agencies, eliminating duplication and overlapping of functions, and ensuring the high efficiency of command officials.

* Group 3 comprises requirements designed to ensure that the command and control system provides effective command and control of troops (forces) in resolving an internal armed conflict. This provides for its integration into the general state and military command and control system using a single information and telecommunication field and other troops and forces in the country as a whole; effective command and control of troops (forces), agencies and weapons in real time; realistic assessment and forecasting of the situation on the ground, and the accumulation and effective use of available information; preserving the structure and basic functional capabilities under external impacts; adaptation to the environment and set objectives, and effective operation under uncertain conditions.

* Other specific requirements include the following: formation of an integrated organizational-technical structure for all command and control agencies on the vertical and horizontal level, using the same algorithm but with limited access to information resources for other systems in a given unit; introduction of modern, user friendly information technology in the command and control process; the use of modern automated systems ensuring the high quality and effective operation of command and control agencies and well substantiated decision making, based on higher volumes and speed of information processing, formalization of routine processes, optimization of information flows, intellectual support for the decision making process and reducing officials' workload to enable them to better address creative tasks.

These requirements for the JGF command and control system are not invariable. They constantly change depending on the conditions of the situation, above all in the interest of improving the promptness, efficiency, continuity, and covertness of command and control of troops (forces). In this context, in peacetime, the command and control system on the countrywide and regional level (regional commands, military districts, regional directorates) must be able to quickly reorganize and adapt for the conduct of operations involving the use of force in the course of an internal armed conflict. It is the view of the present author that general supervision over the settlement of internal armed conflicts on a countrywide basis should be entrusted to the president of the Russian Federation, while in the conflict zone, it should be entrusted to the president's plenipotentiary representative who should have control over all state and military authorities and respective structures and agencies based in the conflict zone. The presidential representative's command and control agency should be regional headquarters.

Military formations as part of the JGF should be manned on a mixed basis (conscripts and contract servicemen), combining the territorial and the exterritorial principle of selecting military servicemen for operations in the zone of an internal armed conflict. Domestic and foreign experience in the use of military force in resolving armed conflicts, including internal armed conflicts, shows that it is impossible to create a contract-servicemen-only group. Even if this is done at the JGF formation stage, subsequently, in the course of conflict resolution, as a result of personnel rotation and inevitable personnel losses, it would be hardly possible to complete the principal mission without using enlisted personnel. Nonetheless, due to the difficult social and demographic situation in the country, JGF manning with conscript servicemen should, to the maximum degree possible, be based on the voluntary principle and with the provision of adequate professional and psychological training. Exception can only be made for the final stage of the resolution of an internal armed conflict--peace building, when, due to a reduction in the JGF's numerical strength, the military formations remaining in the conflict zone can be manned with conscripts, which is in fact what is now happening in the Chechen Republic. Thus, while the mixed manpower acquisition principle is essential, it should be combined with a clear identification and separation of missions to be performed by professional (contract) servicemen and enlisted men.

In manning the JGF, it is also very important to know whether servicemen are natives in a given area (zone of an internal armed conflict) or have arrived from another region. There is no unequivocal answer to the question of which manpower acquisition principle should be used for the JGF--territorial or ex-territorial. In each specific case, the following factors will need to be taken into account: national mentality; the level of support that separatists have from the local population; servicemen's morale, clan affiliation, the attitude to their military and civic duty, their educational level, etc. Only once these factors have been evaluated can a decision be made as to whether servicemen (especially contract servicemen) living in a given area can participate in operations to resolve an internal armed conflict.

The territorial principle of manpower acquisition, without a doubt, has a number of strengths--specifically, the servicemen's knowledge of the locale, natural climatic conditions and biorhythms, and ethnic psychological stereotypes. Under certain conditions, these servicemen should benefit from favorable impacts on the part of the civilian population. At the same time, such servicemen may be subject to strong psychological pressure and affected by the wrong understanding of their obligations to their relatives and fellow countrymen fighting on the side of illegal armed formations. All of this can have some highly negative consequences, including betrayal.

The principle of rotational participation in combat operations in a conflict area should be strictly observed. This principle enables military servicemen to get some rest after the performance of combat missions, both psychologically and physically, and also to have some time for the analysis and evaluation of combat experience, and the preparation and rehearsing of new methods of action.

The system of operational, combat, and professional training and preparation for action in the JGF in an internal armed conflict is divided into general and immediate. General preparation should be conducted as part of military training programs at respective military higher educational establishments whose curricula include military action (the use of military force) to resolve internal armed conflicts. The development of teaching and training aids on these subjects should factor in the experience in the use of troops (forces) to resolve analogous conflicts. It is also expedient to make appropriate changes in military-professional training standards for graduates of military schools and academies.

Immediate preparation for action in the zone of an internal armed conflict consists in training military servicemen in the conduct of military (combat) actions in a specific conflict area. Personnel should receive initial training in their respective military districts and then get additional training at training centers located near the conflict area with similar physical- geographic (terrain) conditions. Training should also be based on special programs, taking into account the specifics of forthcoming operations. At the end of an immediate preparation program, servicemen take a test, their test scores being used as a basis for participation in combat actions. Responsibility for the preparation and training of military servicemen should be borne by officials at the respective training centers. The test scores in final examinations are an important legal document that these centers must store in their archives. The preparation and training of military servicemen should not end at this stage but should continue also when they perform their official duties in a conflict area, as part of operational, combat, and professional on-the-job training programs.

Technical equipment and supply of the JGF is ensured in compliance with the arms modernization program for the Armed Forces and other branches of service, providing for the replacement of obsolete weapon systems with new, advanced weapons, military and special equipment designed for combat employment both in large scale (local) wars and in armed conflicts, including internal armed conflicts. The principal requirement is to achieve technical (technological) superiority over the adversary.

The main lines of developing arms, military and special equipment are as follows:

-- for aviation: enhancing the combat effectiveness of air-to-surface precision guided missiles; the development of new types of air-based weapon systems, including modular type weapons with gliding and free-fall bombs; protection of communication channels and radio command and control lines against jamming and monitoring by the adversary; creation of position fixing navigation systems in the conflict area, etc.

-- for armor: comprehensive enhancement of firepower, protection, mobility and automation of command and control based on standardized technical solutions, helping bring their specifications up to the most advanced foreign models;

-- for missiles and artillery: enhancing combat (operational) characteristics (specifications), e.g., the rate of fire, survivability, interoperability with new-generation intelligence and fire control systems.

In conducting operations inside the country, especially in population centers, it is very important to use non-lethal (less than lethal) weapons and ammunition, designed to temporarily disable, disorient or distract a person, disrupt communications, etc. This will help to increase the capability of troops (forces) operating in population centers and to reduce (prevent) civilian casualties.

Providing the JGF with advanced, modern weapon systems is not an end in itself. It helps to use new forms and methods of action that are unknown to the adversary. Implementation of the proposed lines of improving weapons, military and special equipment of the Armed Forces will help to substantially increase the battleworthiness and operational effectiveness of combat actions. Russia's economic constraints, however, limit and hinder the deployment of large scale efforts to create new-generation weapon systems or elements thereof, forcing more resources to be spent on extending the life cycle of the existing systems and on their upgrading and modernization. This situation is typical of practically all of the aforementioned types of weapons, military and special equipment.

The present article has addressed only some basic lines of the structural development of the JGF designed to resolve internal armed conflicts. But there is an urgent need to now. Otherwise we will inevitably be confronted with the problems that were left unresolved during the first and partly also the second stage of the counter terrorist operation in the Northern Caucasus.

Col. Gen. V.I. MOLTENSKOY

Deputy commander in chief of the Russian Ground Forces 

Candidate of Military Sciences