Interest groups in North Korean politics.

North Korea is often characterized as some form of highly centralized rule: totalitarian, posttotalitarian, corporatist, or personalistic. This article argues that much of the confusion around understanding North Korea's actions stems from misplaced models. Much of the current thinking on North Korea's politics does not account for the limited institutional plurality in the system. The article documents how the state's political institutions have changed since the country's founding and highlights the formal and informal roles of each major bureaucracy today. The Korean Workers Party and the role of Juche have declined, but the National Defense Commission and "military-first politics" have not taken their place as reigning supreme. Rather the interaction between the Korean Workers Party, military, and cabinet helps explain and moderate policy outcomes.

KEYWORDS: North Korea, DPRK, institutions, interest groups, pluralism, cabinet, NDC, KWP 

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This article seeks to provide a conceptual basis in which to evaluate North Korean domestic politics. Models of North Korean politics hold that the state can be understood as a type of totalitarian or authoritarian state. Kim Jong Il has "almost total power," (1) and the system is marked by a "hybrid of modern Stalinism and traditional Korean authoritarianism" that "lack[s] ... interest group participation." (2) It is "an eroding totalitarian regime [... where] an absolute dictator still rules," (3) and the "application of a 'bureaucratic model' to North Korea is premature." (4)

North Korea under Kim Il Sung approximated the totalitarian ideal type, but North Korea today is better understood as a centralized polity in which interest groups play an important role. Kim Jong Il's government is highly centralized, but it is less centralized than his father's. North Korean high politics comprise the interaction of the military, party, and cabinet with "oversight" by the security apparatus. The limited autonomy of these groups allows them to be defined as interest groups, and their interaction creates a role for discussing pluralist politics in North Korea. Kim Jong Il's focus on political survival and emergency management over ideology as a guiding force makes today's North Korean government more rational than in the past. Bureaucratic winners and losers are defined on an issue basis. In short, interest group politics--in conjunction with Kim Jong Il's central role--help explain political outcomes.

Models of North Korean Politics

Totalitarianism

Totalitarian states isolate individuals and replace previous private social networks with state organization. Totalitarian leaders are revolutionaries, intensely committed to destroying the old order and building a utopian political order based on an all-encompassing ideology. Monopolizing information sources and propagandizing provide purpose to the atomized masses for the radical changes. The state does not tolerate pluralism or opposition and regularly purges officials to pursue its revolutionary aims. The party and secret police utilize terror, or arbitrary coercion, to instill fear and anxiety in the population. (5) Antiregime organizing is not a matter of calculated risk as under authoritarian regimes; people are deterred from extrastate organization that has the potential to be viewed as antiregime. (6)

Totalitarian regimes are short-lived. Since the state's goals are utopian, they are never reached in practice. The revolutionary euphoria that helped singular leaders or parties come to power subsides; the elites that benefit from this dictatorial rule face a cognitive dilemma. They know the system does not promote its stated ideals, yet they have an incentive to maintain their privileged place in society and avoid punishment if the regime were to change. (7) Consequently, the state loses much of its utopian motivation, bureaucratizes, and makes routine the normal state functions.

Ideology may remain as a propaganda tool for the masses and shrinking group of true believers, but it is particularly hollow for many that employ it. Ideology becomes primarily a tool and a constraint on state actions, but it ceases to be a motivating force for the increasingly disenchanted and educated elite. Those in power are no longer a band of revolutionaries working against the system; they are the system, and they try to protect its interests. From this newfound conservative position, limited plurality emerges from the natural tendency to bureaucratize in the form of interest group participation. In the Soviet Union, this rise of limited pluralism followed the death of Stalin. (8) Likewise, I argue that North Korea has evolved from approximating the totalitarian ideal type to a more plural polity.

Personalism 

Personalistic rulers use coercion and fear like totalitarian regimes but govern not by tradition or ideology but by personal, arbitrary rule. Tradition and ideology constrain totalitarian leaders, while personalistic rulers do not have this constraint. They employ power for private ends, using national resources to extract private wealth, and use private wealth in turn to maintain power. This is increasingly difficult when mass organizations are prevalent as in many industrial states. Personalistic states are simple and unstable, since cutting off the head of the monster kills the beast. (9)

Although North Korea resembles this model in several ways, the model does not deal well with the remaining ideological constraints and power-wielding elites that continue to trumpet totalitarian rule. Personalism explains policy reversals and contradictions only as a function of the leader's changing motives or psychology. It has a difficult time explaining regular policy contradictions and cross-purposes in North Korea, which I describe in a later section. The model also predicts an unstable state, yet North Korea has weathered the collapse of its Soviet benefactor, a famine, nuclear crises, and a hereditary power transition.

State efforts to propagandize and promote ideology remain puzzling under this characterization of personalist rule. Efforts to modify the ideal type to include ideology or inner circles remove much of the model's explanatory power and produces expectations more in line with other ideal types. Further, Kim and his colleagues have enriched themselves at the expense of their populace, but private gains do not explain broad national goals like reunification, macroeconomic improvements, and broad anti-imperialism. Elite privilege is common to nondemocracies and a single man tops even totalitarian states, but the personalistic ideal type leaves puzzles that other analytical tools help bridge.

Corporatism 

Corporatism is an elastic concept, criticized for failing to explain political outcomes in a specific manner. (10) North Korea's specific variety, "neosocialist corporatism" in Bruce Cumings's characterization, sees the body politic as a noncompetitive, united entity in which disharmony is harmful. The state regularizes policy relations between different interests in this top-down, hierarchal model. Mixing metaphors, the state is a family whose father directs affairs out of his paternal wisdom--an element shared by the personalist model. The personality cult emphasizes that through wisdom, Kim promotes virtue, love, and benevolence and expects loyalty in return. Policy radiates from the nerve center. Innovation does not come from below. (11) Fundamentally, one would not expect to find open policy disagreement as in a liberal state. The more conflict rather than regularized bureaucratic interaction shapes policy decisions and implementation, the more one must conclude that pluralism is at work.

Institutional Pluralism

The core difference between neosocialist corporatism and this formulation of institutional pluralism is the role of institutional bargaining as a form of policy moderation. (12) The unified corporatist state is unobstructed domestically, because the state controls interest groups. The institutional pluralist state makes the most extreme policy choices more difficult. While ultimate authority remains in the hands of one man, power is more diffuse. Information inputs and policy outputs more fully capture the interests advocated by differing segments of the state's policy experts.

When ideologues dominate politics, administrative competence declines. Absent policy inputs from outside the state, politics stagnate if specialists from below do not push new concrete ideas up to the entrenched generalists. In a participatory bureaucracy, ideas flow up and down. Experts provide original ideas, which are moderated by bargaining. Without a permanent purge, specialists can develop expertise and send new ideas up to the leadership. Likewise, an expert bureaucracy can modify--wittingly or not--orders of superiors according to developed professional standards. (13)

The institutional pluralist model sees the state's dynamism as promoting continuity and stability. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's similar "posttotalitarian" model, by contrast, predicts instability and collapse. The decay of ideology creates space for democratic opposition. Technocratic employment becomes an alternative to party careers. Citizens withdraw into private life, and the state increasingly tolerates private activity. The loss of ideological purpose combines with these developments to create room for rational policy, requiring differing views. In the early phase, the leadership is divided, coercion is used less, and contact with the outside world is less restricted. Terror is no longer arbitrary; rather the state learns to deal with dissent outside of the state structure for the first time. Crackdowns on dissent freeze the posttotalitarian system into a purposeless, unmoving state susceptible to collapse. (14)

The difference between the institutional pluralist and posttotalitarian model is critical in judging whether one sees the North Korean state as stable or nearing collapse. I retain the institutional pluralist label, because evidence of policy disagreement presented here remains within the state. State institutions maintain a monopoly on permitted dissent. No significant, organized civil society within the country challenges the existing regime.

Consequently, the most apt characterization of North Korea's political evolution is one from nearing the totalitarian ideal to a state characterized by institutional pluralism. (15) Following the famine, Kim Jong Il eventually pursued a subtle but importantly distinct modus operandi. Bureaucratism continues on the rise as the first-generation revolutionaries die off of old age. The party is less important, and policy goals have been gradually rationalized.

The remainder of this article traces the evolution of North Korea's institutions empirically and shows how they affect policy outcomes. Kim Il Sung maintained a highly centralized state with a dominant party. Its institutional structure fostered Juche-oriented policy goals. As the state's goals shifted in the late 1990s, Kim Jong Il raised the status and power of the military and the cabinet. The interaction of these three institutions with conflicting goals and tactical approaches produces the jostling of bureaucratic politics that increasingly appear to shape national policy in North Korea.

Kim Il Sung and Totalitarianism

Kim Il Sung maintained the longest ideologically driven political system of the communist experiment. Kim Il Sung consolidated his power in the 1950s, making Soviet support less salient. In December 1955, Kim introduced the country to Juche. Juche is an inherently flexible, nationalistic philosophy that would reign supreme over distinctively Kimilsungist/Stalinist political institutions for the next two decades. Kim would interpret ideology instead of leaving this role to the party as Marxist-Leninist doctrine would support. While the party began as an important institution, it came to occupy a decidedly second-place role. The party would sit atop and constrain the bureaucracy but follow the orders of a single man. North Korea approached the totalitarian ideal type in the 1950s and 1960s. (16)

This rise of personal power was codified in the 1972 constitution. The constitution created the position of president for Kim Il Sung, instituting an unprecedented concentration of presidential power unseen even in Stalin's Soviet Union or Mao's China. Kim Il Sung drew advisers from his revolutionary brethren and put them in high positions in the party. They were rewarded for general (ideological) knowledge. Specialists and those with technical knowledge were tolerated in the party starting in the 1960s, but they had no opportunity for senior leadership. (17) The 1972 constitution formally downgraded the main legislative body, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), and the main executive body, the Administrative Council. The party was now positioned over the military and the government, creating a three-tiered political structure (see Figure 1). Kim codified personal power but maintained ideology as a guide and constraint on political action.

Kim's speeches and writings explicitly and consistently identified the government bureaucracy as an enemy to the good. Like other communist states, party members maintained key posts in the government bureaucracy to ensure proper policy implementation. The foreign minister, for example, was a member of the Politburo. Certain ministries--foreign affairs, armed forces, trade, external economic relations--and the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Academy of Sciences all had formal roles in foreign policy, but in practice the party was sufficiently staffed and empowered to control these bureaucratic elements under Kim Il Sung's watchful eye. (18)

Kim Il Sung controlled the bureaucracy through the party. In foreign affairs, for example, foreign policy decisionmaking centered on the party secretariat's Department of International Affairs, not the separate Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its decisions would be sent to the rubber stamp parliament and then implemented through the Politburo. The party was the most important organ advising policy decisions, making policy decisions, and executing policy. Remaining institutions existed to carry out and support the party's orders. This decisionmaking and implementation process operated under the supervision of the Central Committee of the party--and the president. (19) Ideology informed macro-political decisionmaking, which was reflected in the state's institutional formation.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Kim Jong Il and North Korea's Evolving Institutions

After he came to power, Kim Jong Il emasculated or abolished much of his father's Juche-guided institutions. His shift toward a more pragmatic decisionmaking mode required a modified institutional structure. The two Kims required distinct types of policy-relevant knowledge. Kim Jong Il's modified institutions were necessary to provide detailed information to make pragmatic policy choices possible.

The 1990s were a tumultuous decade for the former Soviet bloc, including North Korea. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two Koreas pursued a limited rapprochement. In 1992, the two Koreas signed the Basic Agreement, whereby both committed to peaceful reunification, denuclearization, and cultural and economic projects such as family reunions and joint ventures. Lacking its Soviet backer, North Korea revised its constitution again in 1992 to reflect the de facto rule of Juche instead of Marxism-Leninism as the guiding philosophy of the state. The first nuclear crisis ensued in 1993-1994, and North Korea's founder, president, and national hero died in 1994. Kim Il Sung had publicly groomed his son as his successor for over two decades. Following years of failed food and agricultural policies under both Kims--including actions that induced soil erosion, decreased production incentives, and inefficient food rationing and distribution networks--widespread floods triggered famine. (20) Kim Jong Il did not make any public appearances in the three years following his father's death. Many outside observers argued that the regime's days were numbered. (21)

The younger Kim emerged in 1997 from three years of mourning, traditionally reserved for the death of Korean kings, and began personalizing his bureaucracy. While the younger Kim's power fundamentally stems from his lineage, he was and is no democrat or capitalist. Nevertheless, he eventually came to change some of the inefficient modes of rule. Kim would constantly have to keep an eye on his father's comrades, the powerful gerontocracy. Kim came to replace his father's focus on reunification and Juche with emergency management. After a slow start in a time when hundreds of thousands of North Koreans died in the famine, the state's goal shifted. The state sought to avoid collapse and only later would develop more far-reaching goals.

North Korea again revised its constitution. In 1998, the "Kim Il Sung Constitution" was unveiled with a dedication in the preamble to the country's founder: "The DPRK Social Constitution is the Kim Il Sung Constitution; it legally embodies Comrade Kim Il Sung's Juche state construction ideology and achievements." This preface was necessary, because the new constitution proved anything but supporting the political institutions and roles of Kim Il Sung. The younger Kim sought to bolster his legitimacy and hold onto power through referencing the revered leader. This appeal would be particularly useful for the aging revolutionaries in key positions, particularly in the army. These first-generation revolutionaries may have felt compelled to respect the dying wish of Kim Il Sung. Kim Jong Il's Confucian show of filial piety bolstered his appeal to these old men and his own legitimacy.

The new constitution removed previous roles of the party, and a new ideology eventually reinforced the institutional changes by enhancing the status of the military. "Military-first politics" replaced Juche. While Juche is still often utilized rhetorically in propaganda, references to military-first politics now dominate. The military-first ideology would now constrain state actions.

The military had long enjoyed prioritized resource allocation, but the younger Kim raised the military's political and social status as well. The military was credited with safeguarding and building the revolution. The twin goals of building a "powerful and prosperous nation" required focused attention on ideology, politics, the military, and the economy. (22) This effort to maximize material and ideological gains demanded an institutional structure that could produce these goals more effectively. Since the 1998 constitutional revision, that bureaucratic structure has been substantially simplified (see Figure 2). The military did not replace the party as the key organ. Rather they were rebalanced as peer organizations. The Korean Workers Party, National Defense Commission, and the cabinet jointly dominate national politics under Kim Jong Il. (23)

The Korean Workers Party

The role of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) declined under Kim Jong Il. Kim has publicly chastised the party, emphasized other competing institutions, and gradually rationalized policy against the party's Juche bulwark. In 1992, Kim Jong Il remarked publicly that he reads the army's daily newspaper every morning before the party's daily newspaper. The symbolism was not lost on North Korea's populace. (24) At the December 1996 graduation ceremonies at Kimilsung University, Kim Jong Il praised the army while noting the party's dwindling abilities. He blamed the party for policy failures during the famine at this important event. The following year, Kim imprisoned or executed several leading party officials but left the military untouched. (25)

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

These statements and actions set the ground for shrinking the party's role. Kim had no need to abolish the party. Rather, he would simply demote it and raise the military to prominence. Kim would leave institutions in place and keep his father's loyalists as the head of ministries and other organizations. He would simply not empower many of these positions any longer. Ministers are now largely nominal positions. These positions are filled by Kim Il Sung's compatriots still, but their deputies have the power. Just as Kim Jong Il was North Korea's number two leader for twenty years, his number two counterparts in each ministry now rule. The 1998 constitution made Kim Il Sung North Korea's "eternal president." Kim Jong Il would take a primarily military--not party--title from which to rule the country. Some important, trusted officials with strong family backgrounds retain their party titles. The party is not irrelevant, but it does not dominate the system as it once did under Kim Il Sung. Yi Chol, North Korea's ambassador to Switzerland; Kang Sang Chun, head of Kim's personal office; and Won Yong Rok, head of North Korea's unofficial diplomatic representation in Germany all continue to sign external correspondence with their titles of vice-director of the party's Organizational Guidance Department. These figures are long-standing important figures in North Korea, but they derive their power from their inner circle status. They do not control large bureaucracies; they gain power by their access to the Dear Leader. Kang's access to Kim is self-apparent as he heads Kim's personal office. Chol and Won head important overseas missions where Kim's family members live or have lived. (26) Kim's sons were educated in Switzerland; Yi Chol was responsible for them. When Kim's second son and possible heir, Kim Jong Chul, was videotaped touring at four Eric Clapton concerts in Germany, (27) Won was responsible for him. These men are important but do not demonstrate the importance of the party despite retaining their party titles.

Kim Il Sung created the party's Central People's Committee specifically to control the bureaucracy; (28) the younger Kim abolished the guidance organ outright in the 1998 constitution. Kim Jong Il would not utilize the party as an intermediary between himself and the military or government. The party can still make policy proposals, but it has lost its critically important function of coordinating policy across the otherwise stovepiped bureaucracy. One estimate claims that the 1998 constitutional revision reduced North Korea's official personnel by 30 percent over five years in order to save scarce resources. (29) This is one explanation for the bold move; the other requires a closer look at the military.

National Defense Commission

Kim Jong Il raised the National Defense Commission (NDC) to the pinnacle of institutional power in 1998. When Kim retired the position of president with his father, he took the ruling title of chairman of the NDC. He introduced the concept of the military's bureaucratic primacy in an August 22, 1998, Rodong Shinmun editorial. On August 31, North Korea flight-tested the Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile/space launch vehicle over Japan, prompting substantial international concern. The following week, on September 5, the Supreme People's Assembly officially retired the position of president and elected Kim as chairman of the NDC only four days before the important anniversary of the founding of the state. Kim uses drama and important anniversaries to highlight important political events. This succession of events suggests he wanted the country--and the world--to take notice.

The core question is whether this shift toward the military is a real shift of power or merely show. Kim lacks genuine military experience, so heralding the military's critical role may be an attempt to keep a lid on its power rather than raising its actual authority. It is also possible that evaluating these changes at face value is the correct view. Kim may see the party as ineffective and the military's bureaucracy as disciplined. Kim may have decided to rule through the military bureaucracy because it distorts his policy prerogatives less.

This section evaluates these competing perspectives and concludes that the conventional wisdom that a shift to military-first politics has catapulted the military into bureaucratic primacy is less likely to be correct. The party is in decline, but Kim uses the government, military, and the party in tandem to check one another and carry out policy collectively. New benefits granted to the NDC and the military establishment have been largely nominal. Kim has honored the military and raised its prestige. Rhetoric and prestige matter, particularly for the egos of those being honored and those being excluded. However, as far as honors placate the military establishment, Kim can reduce dissatisfaction enough to pursue interests in conflict with the military's actual policy preferences.

Much has been written on the gradual rise of the military in North Korean politics. In 1991, Kim took the rank and title of vice-marshal of the Korean People's Army (KPA). In 1995, after his father's death, he had himself promoted to the supreme commander of the military. The seating order at important state events like Kim Jong Il's birthday celebrations and Kim Il Sung's funeral changed; it listed members of the NDC before Politburo members. These lists historically had provided a pecking order of officials. (30) In 1996, Kim expanded the number of national holidays from five to seven. The two new holidays were both named after the military: Foundation Day of the Korean People's Army and the Victory Day of the National Liberation War. Kim had the Supreme People's Assembly elect the vice-marshal and director of the KPA General Political Department (the military's top official after Kim Jong Il), Jo Myong Rok, to the second-highest office in the land: first vice-chairman of the NDC. Jo also gave the keynote address at the fifth anniversary of Kim Il Sung's death and visited the White House in 2000 to meet with President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and Secretary of Defense William Cohen. (31)

With the notable exception of raising the formal authority of the NDC, each of these actions is merely honorific. These actions were not without purpose. Prestige can be a cheap and effective motivating force. Honoring the military allowed Kim to both dampen mistrust and provide an excuse for dismantling much of the party's functions. Kim would pit the three main bureaucratic actors against one another and foster limited debate over some of the core problems facing the country, such as economic reform, trade, and foreign investment, and their risks to security. Kim Il Sung's goals of security, prestige, and prosperity remained in an emergency management government where the two tangible goals were discussed publicly.

Arguments citing the rise of the military generally note Kim's reliance on that organization. One prominent scholar concluded that "it was the military that carried Kim Jong Il through the most difficult times from 1994 to 2000," and therefore Kim emphasized the role of the military over the party. (32) Yet Kim has had an uneasy relationship with the military. He purged 600 officers after an alleged coup attempt in 1992 and completely dissolved the VI Corps in 1995 and replaced it with personnel from the XI Corps due to massive corruption. (33) Further, both Kims have employed an extensive security apparatus. The cabinet, party, and military each have their own security service that checks on the military, the bureaucracy, and one another. Like most dictators, Kim is suspicious of the military and has sought to keep them close so as not to lose control of their extensive coercive potential.

The Cabinet

The 1998 constitution changed the State Administration Council into the cabinet and enhanced its management authority. The cabinet's primary responsibility is to implement policy promulgated by the rubber stamp parliament. It is the bureaucracy responsible for executing policy. With the abolition of the Central People's Committee and vacant position of president, the cabinet has become a formally independent actor, albeit in practice responsible to Kim. The constitution granted the cabinet broad responsibilities in this area. The cabinet could modify its own structures for implementing policy, change rules of administration, modify strategic-level national management practices, and create, inspect, and abolish key administrative organs.

The new constitution also raised the cabinet's status to the second most important bureaucratic element after the National Defense Commission. Nominally, the Supreme People's Assembly remained above all other elements, but the constitution even removed its formal authority to check the military and government. Despite this heightened authority and real power, the cabinet and its government ministries did not get the praise the military enjoyed. On the contrary, the government ministries continued to be blamed publicly for distorting policy directions when policy outcomes did not meet expectations. Furthermore, Kim's new titles do not reference the SPA or the cabinet, rather he is (in order) the general secretary of the Korean Workers Party, chairman of the National Defense Commission, and supreme commanding general of the People's Armed Forces (who has never appeared in military uniform). (34)

The cabinet is low on prestige but not on power. The cabinet's roles expanded in 1998, especially in the area of the economy, which rose to center stage in 2001. The cabinet became the dominant force in economic policy, and Premier Pak was considered the most influential proponent of economic reform against other institutional interests in the security sphere until his dismissal. Economic reform is at the center of many debates on the strategic direction of the state--in and out of North Korea--which cannot be adequately reproduced here. Despite widespread disagreement about the nature and extent of economic reform, (35) Pyongyang has certainly delegated some power in the economic sphere. Technocrats and specialists have a greater role in governments guided by policy goals rather than the Juche ideology.

The bureaucracy has always housed specialists, even in the political sphere where technical or specialized knowledge seemingly has less utility than in the physical sciences or economics. However, even Kim Il Sung's rule recognized that international politics required expertise. Foreign ministers held posts longer than other ministers, and their tenures only grew longer (see Table 1). While these men were also party members, they were granted longer tenures since an effective foreign policy was critical to the state's existence, and an effective foreign policy required specialized knowledge.

This same role for specialized negotiators and advisers extended within the ministry. Unlike US diplomats, who are trained to become generalists, North Korean diplomats specialize in one area and develop effective tactics to make diplomatic gains disproportionate to the state's power. A string of US negotiators have sat across the table from Kim Kye Kwan for many years. The North Korean leadership finds even international politics an appropriate area for specialized knowledge.

These specialists report the results of negotiations to Kim. If he did not value this specialized knowledge, he could easily change the Foreign Ministry's operation.

The Security Apparatus

Especially in a state where the military is recognized as a key institutional actor in politics, one could reasonably suspect that the security apparatus may serve as a fourth institutional actor. Alternatively, the intelligence and police organizations could support one of the other three collective political actors, giving it a specific advantage in policy debates. If the security apparatus were a coherent body, this may be true. It is important to note that the North Korean security apparatus is divided in three parts and, while powerful in other ways, lacks a discernible influence on a wide range of political decisions. Each of the three major institutional actors has formal control over one of these organizations. In practice, elites in the party, government, and military--and security practitioners themselves--fear different elements of the security apparatus and cannot employ it to systematically influence policy.

First, the party controls the smallest and most elite security services. The Central Committee secretary in charge of South Korean affairs (CCSCSKA) has approximately 15,000 personnel. The party's CCSCSKA controls the important Operations Department (OD) as well as three other bureaus (Office 35, Unification Front Department, and the Foreign Liaison Department). The OD is credited with carrying out intelligence operations overseas, including high-level assassination attempts, kidnappings, and hard currency--raising illicit activities. This type of organization naturally attracts more risk-accepting individuals with lethal skills. The organization is small but requires close high-level scrutiny to keep it in check.

Second, the National Defense Commission controls the Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF) through the Korean People's Army; the NDC independently controls the State Security Department (SSD). Kim Jong Il's personal protection force, the Guard Command, is responsible to the MPAE Guard Command personnel have a reputation for arrogance and heavy-handed tactics. For example, when Kim visits units, Guard Command personnel keep the rank-and-file soldiers far from Kim. Stories abound about the Guard Command requiring the soldiers to stand in the dirt off of military runways, while Kim briefly waves from afar. Guard Command personnel hit the soldiers with rifle butts and generally show disdain for the average soldier.

The Security Command has a similar function to the Guard Command. It is responsible for investigating and eliminating individuals or groups disloyal to Kim. The Security Command is also technically subordinate to the KPA and MPAF; however, shortly after the younger Kim came to power, he gave control of the Security Command to the SSD, which is the core intelligence organization in North Korea. It is not under the control of the KPA leadership and thus serves as an important check on the military.

The SSD has had a long history of tense relations with the military. In this regard, it is no different from most communist states. (36) After Kim Il Sung consolidated his power, he still purged military officers in 1976-1977 after Kim Jong Il was designated successor. Those who voiced displeasure with this move were purged. Another purge of military officers for unknown reason occurred in 1987-1988. When the SSD exposed an alleged coup attempt in 1992, 600 officers were purged. Likewise, the SSD uncovered massive corruptions in the VI Corps in 1995, prompting the corps' reorganization. Finally, in 1998, top intelligence leaders were purged following the introduction of military-first politics. Kim Yong Ryong, deputy head of the SSD, was executed on made-up charges following his voicing opposition to the military-first doctrine. Kwon Hui Gyong, North Korea's former ambassador to the Soviet Union and director of the party's Central Committee on External Information Collection Department, was exiled. Other opponents simply disappeared. (37)

Third, the cabinet controls the Ministry of People's Security (MPS). The MPS is the lower-level intelligence agency that serves as the national police force. It numbers approximately 130,000 people and competes with the SSD. Like the SSD, it was reorganized in the 1990s several times amid concerns about corruption, increasing illegal border crossings into China, and its inability to contain low-level disorder after the floods and famine. The MPS lost its function over border control in 1995 and part of its authority to control travel in and out of Pyongyang in 1997; the MPAF took up this role, marking a partial militarization of border control and travel restrictions. (38)

The three security apparatuses in North Korea check one another. They do not represent a coherent whole. While it is possible that the security establishment's influence on national policy is real and hidden, these divisions suggest that the lack of observed political behavior by the security apparatuses can be taken plausibly at face value. The security apparatus is not an institutional player on a wide range of policy decisions.

Interest Group Interaction

Under this model, the three bureaucracies debate policy in the formation and execution stages. This hypothesis requires both elite similarities and differences. Elites must be sufficiently similar that they interact. They do not operate in a vacuum or on a different plane than elites in other institutions. They also must be different in the sense that they pursue different goals on either policy decisionmaking or policy implementation.

Elite Similarities

There is a great deal of homogeneity within groups in North Korea and stark contrasts between them. Of the state's 100 top-ranking officials, twenty-five graduated from the Mankyongdae Revolutionary School, thirty-four attended Kimilsung University, and forty-seven graduated from universities overseas. (39) Like local ties, school ties are particularly strong and long-lasting in Korea. Officials with strong informal networks occupy each of the major bureaucracies in three groups.

The first-generation revolutionaries that fought the Japanese started as a cohesive group. They shared an important formative experience and reference point. Naturally, some would change their viewpoints; however, there has not been any indication that since Kim Il Sung consolidated his power in the 1960s any challengers from this group have emerged without being purged. These men are now in their eighties and nineties; as far as generalizations about groups of individuals go, one can confidently remark that this group is cohesive. They know each other well and likely communicate with one another. They lack specific skills, so they gravitate toward general management positions in the bureaucracy and positions in the party.

Second-generation revolutionaries who did not actually fight the Japanese but came of age after the Korean War are also a cohesive group. They attended the Mankyongdae Revolutionary School. These men were selected for similar reasons and came to power through the same path. They hold high-level positions in various bureaucracies, including the party, military, and government. One can infer from their informal networks that they, too, likely communicate with one another to some extent.

Finally, the technocrats are somewhat more diverse. They gained their positions because of their specialized or technical skills. Unlike their predecessors, they were university educated in the sciences, economics, or other areas, in addition to receiving ideological training. They graduated from Kimilsung University or universities overseas. Unlike the revolutionaries, they did not come to power from bold and risky moves to oust the Japanese. Their actions reflect a more risk-averse view of politics. Their training also suggests that they value specialization and place less emphasis on ideologically based actions. Threatened professionally--and potentially physically--by the two revolutionary generations, this group has become even more unified, and although it is found in all sectors of the party, military, and government, it is particularly attracted to the government.

Concrete data indicating the age makeup of each institution are not readily available except for the SPA. The SPA is the only major bureaucracy left unevaluated, since its role is mainly symbolic. Nevertheless, it serves as a rough estimator of elite composition over time. North Korea's elites are getting older (see Table 2), but the first generation (indicated by low levels of education in Figure 3 and self-description as farmers or laborers in Figure 4) is dying off as the younger generation comes to the fore. This further suggests that specialists provide more policy input than previously.

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

Elite Differences

The generational divide and institutional setting are important sources of differing opinions among elites. The national bureaucracies fight among themselves for the ear and favor of the Dear Leader. Kim's decisions are not made without reference to specialized and general advice.

Critics may reasonably charge that Kim instituted the Three Reports System early in his political career to bypass the bureaucracy. In this system, Kim used a small group of loyalists to secure his access to reliable information, because he openly distrusted the bureaucracy. But when Kim came to power after his father's death, he put effort into reorganizing the bureaucracy to fit his rule. The Three Reports System is small to allow Kim greater personal control over the group, yet its size prevents it from supplying the full range of information required for effective rule. It provides Kim with another check on information the bureaucracies provide him, but it cannot hope to duplicate all of its efforts. If it did, this organization would cease to be small and become a large bureaucracy itself.

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

Further, there is empirical evidence of bureaucratic infighting. This has been most significant, as Bob Carlin and Joel Wit demonstrate, in the economic sphere where conflicting opinions can be seen explicitly in the North Korean media. (40) Reformers argue, primarily in the quarterly economic journal Kyongje Yongu, that reform is necessary for popular domestic benefits and security. As the state continues to descend economically, resources available for the defense sector should shrink. The long-term security challenges intensify if North Korea cannot reverse this trend through greater emphasis on economic growth and the productive sectors of the economy. Economic reform requires eased internal control, so merchants can engage in trade. International business requires cross-border communications and travel.

Reform opponents, writing primarily in Nodong Sinmun, warn against stripping resources from national defense and undermining the state's ideological orientation. Extensive contact with the outside world undermines the ideological coherence of the North Korean state; the Soviet bloc's collapse demonstrates to this group the danger of eroding ideology. Dangerous ideas as well as state secrets can pass through business contacts.

While most of the guns versus butter debate centers on subtle characterizations of state priorities, there are also more concrete discussions found in the media. Subtle debate ensued over allowing cell phones and a national intranet, the British embassy's secure satellite communications, overflight by foreign air carriers, and regular access to the site of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) by South Korean ships. Differences of opinion can be gauged on the relative prioritization of heavy industry versus agriculture and light industry. (41) The role of wage and price reforms and foreign investors, (42) efforts to legalize markets, matters regarding tax policy, (43) and decisions to decentralize the food distribution system (44) and reintroduce the centralized Public Distribution System are all discussed in the official press.

In another instance, North Korean interlocutors used bureaucratic politics to explain their state's decision to a US negotiator. After a US military helicopter strayed over the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in 1994, North Korea shot it down. One pilot died; the other, Chief Warrant Officer Bobby Hall, was captured. The Clinton administration sent then Congressman Bill Richardson to Pyongyang to secure his release. North Korean Foreign Ministry officials told Richardson they wanted to see Hall's release, but hard-liners in the military opposed it.

Skeptics have reasonably noted that the officials were speaking to a foreign audience to give the impression of bureaucratic conflict without strong evidence of meaningful bureaucratic divisions actually existing. (45) Even if this were true, however, one would have to ask why the North Koreans would want to give the impression of a divided government. The government has never been short on excuses for provocative acts or strategic delays. It is reasonable to suspect that this explanation was genuine and in line with other disagreements exhibited among North Korean elites. Institutions have to fight to have their views heard and considered by the decisionmaker.

Conclusion

North Korea's political system has pluralized enough that the institutional pluralist model pays dividends as an explanatory strategy. The bureaucracies have sufficient autonomy and conflicting objectives to help explain North Korean policy outcomes through pluralist interaction. This is not to suggest that Kim Jong Il's rule is in doubt or fragile. It is to suggest that his power is not as thorough as the totalitarian and personalistic ideal types may suggest. The totalitarian and personalist models come closer to explaining an earlier period in North Korean politics. The younger Kim's government is still highly centralized but not as much as his father's. Understanding the bureaucratic positions of the main political institutions helps us peer inside North Korea's black box and explain why this state responds to international events the way it does.

For helpful comments, I would like to thank Mark Gasiorowski, Bill Clark, Wonik Kim, Andrew Scobell, John Merrill, Robert Rauchhaus, this journal's editor, and two anonymous reviewers.

The views expressed in the article are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Department of State or the US government.

Notes

(1.) Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 4.

(2.) Samuel S. Kim, "Introduction: A Systems Analysis," in Samuel Kim, ed., The North Korean System in the Post--Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 12, 22.

(3.) Andrew Scobell, Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), p. vi.

(4.) Hak Joon Kim, North and South Korea: Internal Politics and External Relations Since 1988 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), p. 150.

(5.) Sigmund Neumann, Permanent Revolution: The Total State in a World at War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942); Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950); Franz Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957).

(6.) Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

(7.) Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, pp. 39-40.

(8.) H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

(9.) Houchang Chehabi and Juan Linz, Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

(10.) Oscar Molina and Martin Rhodes, "Corporatism: The Past, Present, and Future of a Concept," Annual Review of Political Science 5 (June 2002): 305-331.

(11.) Bruce Cumings, "Corporatism in North Korea," Journal of Korean Studies 4 (1982/83): 269-294; Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).

(12.) Hough's original formulation of Soviet politics also connects elite differences with different interests of the masses. I exclude this here, since I do not see a parallel in North Korea.

(13.) Jerry Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).

(14.) Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Jeffrey Goldfarb, "Posttotalitarian Politics: Ideology Ends Again," Social Research 57, no. 3 (1990): 533-554; Mark Thompson, "To Shoot or Not to Shoot: Posttotalitarianism in China and Eastern Europe," Comparative Politics 34, no. 1 (2001): 63-83.

(15.) For a related argument that Stalinism died in North Korea with Kim Il Sung, noting increased information inflows, marketization, limited entrepreneurship, relaxation of law enforcement, and a changed social hierarchy, see Andrei Lankov, "The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism," Asia Policy 1 (January 2006): 95-121.

(16.) Charles Armstrong, "The Nature, Origins, and Development of the North Korean State," in Kim, The North Korean System, pp. 43-53.

(17.) Hak Joon Kim, North and South Korea, p. 68.

(18.) Adrian Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 16-52; Byung Chul Koh, "North Korea's Foreign Policymaking Process," in Jae Kyu Park, ed., The Foreign Relations of North Korea: New Perspectives (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 49-55.

(19.) Se Hee Yoo, "Change and Continuity in North Korea's Foreign Policy," in Dough Joong Kim, ed., Foreign Relations of North Korea During Kim Il Sung's Last Days (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1994).

(20.) Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

(21.) Byung-joon Ahn, "The Man Who Would Be Kim," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (November-December 1994): 94-108; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Jongryn Mo, North Korean Economic Reform and Political Stability (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1996); Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999).

(22.) Byung Chol Koh, "'Military-First Politics' and Building a 'Powerful and Prosperous Nation' in North Korea," Nautilus Policy Forum Online 05-32A, April 14, 2005.

(23.) Jinwook Choi, "Changing Relations Between Party, Military, and Government in North Korea and Their Impact on Policy Direction," APARC Working Paper (Stanford, CA: Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 1999).

(24.) Sung Chull Kim, North Korea Under Kim Jong Il: From Consolidation to Systemic Dissonance (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), pp. 95-98.

(25.) Hak Joon Kim, North and South Korea, pp. 108-109.

(26.) Yonhap News Agency, North Korea Handbook (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 98-104.

(27.) Bertil Lintner, "The North Korea Enigma: Sons and Heirs," Asia Times, August 18, 2006, www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HH18Dg01.html.

(28.) Tai Sung An, North Korea: A Political Handbook (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1983), p. 52.

(29.) Alexandre Mansourov, "Inside North Korea's Black Box: Reversing the Optics," in Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, eds., North Korean Policy Elites, IDA Paper P-3903 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2004), p. 45.

(30.) Chung In Moon and Yongho Kim, "The Future of the North Korean System," in Kim, The North Korean System, p. 236; Yonhap, North Korea Handbook, p. 189.

(31.) Hak Joon Kim, North and South Korea, pp. 90-112; Kim, The North Korean System, p. 16.

(32.) Dae-Sook Suh, "New Political Leadership," in Kim, The North Korean System, pp. 79-81.

(33.) Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, pp. 119-120.

(34.) Yonhap, North Korea Handbook, p. 93.

(35.) For debates surrounding North Korea's economic reform, see Choongyong Ahn, Nicholas Eberstadt, and Lee Young-sun, A New International Engagement Framework for North Korea? Contending Perspectives (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute, 2005); Ruediger Frank, "Economic Reforms in North Korea (1998-2004): Systemic Restrictions, Quantitative Analysis, Ideological Background," Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 10, no. 3 (2005): 278-311; Young Yoon Kim and Soo-young Choi, Understanding North Korea's Economic Reforms (Seoul: Center for the North Korean Economy, Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005); Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, 2007.

(36.) Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Security Police," in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

(37.) Mansourov, "Inside North Korea's Black Box," pp. 46-47.

(38.) Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001).

(39.) Hak Joon Kim, North and South Korea, p. 87.

(40.) Robert Carlin and Joel Wit, North Korean Reform, Adelphi Paper No. 382 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006).

(41.) Ibid.

(42.) Kim and Choi, Understanding North Korea's Economic Reforms.

(43.) Wonhyuk Lim, "North Korea's Economic Futures: Internal and External Dimensions," CNAPS Working Paper (Washington, DC: Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, 2005), www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/events/lim_20051102.pdf.

(44.) Scott Snyder, "Negotiating Regime Survival in the Face of System Crisis," in Kim, The North Korean System, p. 174.

(45.) Sung Chull Kim, North Korea Under Kim Jong Il, pp. 100-101.

Patrick McEachern is a foreign service officer and a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at Louisiana State University.

Table 1 North Korea's Foreign Ministers

                               Duration
Foreign Minister     Years     (years)        Subsequent Position

Pak Hon Yong       1948-1953       5      Executed in 1953 during
                                            Kim 11 Sung's power
                                            consolidation effort
Nam Il             1953-1959       6      Died in office of cancer
Ho Tam             1959-1969      10      Chairman, Committee for
                                            the Peaceful Reunification
                                            of the Fatherland; Kim 11
                                            Sung's brother-in law;
                                            died in 1991
Pak Song Chol      1969-1983      14      Honorary VP, SPA Presidium
Kim Yong Nam       1983-1998      15      President of SPA Presidium
  (concurrently
  deputy prime
  minister)
Paek Nam Sun       1998-2007       9      Died in office of natural
                                            causes
Pak Ui Chun        2007-
  (unofficial,       present
  acting)

Source: Compiled from multiple sources by the author.

Table 2 Aging Elites (as measured by SPA composition)

Term
(Inaugural
Year)             Laborers      Farmers    Intellectuals

1st (1948)
2nd (1957)          39.1          31.6          27.9
3rd (1962)          56.1          16.2          26.4

4th (1967)          63.9          15.3          20.8
5th (1972)          64.1          13.3          22.6
7th (1982)          34.6          10.2
8th (1986)          36.4          12.0
9th (1990)          37.0          12.0
10th (1998)         31.3          9.3

Term
(Inaugural
Year)          Businessmen       Others        Total

1st (1948)
2nd (1957)          1.4                         100
3rd (1962)                        1.3           100
4th (1967)                                      100
5th (1972)                                      100
7th (1982)                        55.2          100
8th (1986)                        51.6          100
9th (1990)                        51.0          100
10th (1998)                       59.4          100

Source: Yonhap News Agency, North Korea Handbook (London: M. E.
Sharpe, 2003), p. 125.