Intelligence support to information operations: today and in the objective force. (Doctrine Corner).

Today U.S. military forces face a dynamic, multidimensional, and increasingly interconnected global environment. The characteristics of warfare continually evolve with technological advancements in information systems and communications. The battlefield extends far beyond traditional parameters into the intelligence-intensive, complex realm of information operations (IO).

Terrorist groups and other adversaries use covert techniques to carry out computer network attacks, espionage, data collection, network mapping and reconnaissance, and data theft. Commanders rely extensively on multidiscipline intelligence support to furnish the information they require to target and exploit enemy information and information systems and establish protective measures to defend friendly information and systems against enemy attack or exploitation.

Background

IO is the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOPs), military deception, and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decisionmaking (Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). Information operations target information or information systems to affect the information-based process, whether human or automated. Commanders conduct IO by synchronizing IO elements and related activities, each of which may be either offensive or defensive.

Offensive IO destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence adversary decisionmakers and others who can affect the success of friendly operations. Offensive IO also target the information and information systems (INFOSYS) used in the adversary's decisionmaking processes. Defensive IO protect and defend friendly information, command and control (C2) systems, and INFOSYS. Effective defensive IO enable development of an accurate common operational picture based not only on a military perspective but also on environmental factors that may affect the situation.

A recent example of IO gone awry is the former Iraqi Minister of Information, Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf's attempt to influence the Iraqi people during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Minister al-Sahaf promised victory for Iraq, and when U.S. troops were only a few hundred meters from where he was standing in downtown Baghdad, Minister al-Sahaf boasted that Iraqi troops had forced U.S. soldiers into a shameful retreat.

Adversarial information operations have included such actions as using misinformation to incite a riot against a government, establishment, or organization. In addition to the adversary's use of misinformation, IO may also take the form of disruption, degradation, exploitation, or destruction of communications such as Internet sites, radio and television broadcasts, newspapers, etc. IO is a distinct element of combat power.

Intelligence Support to IO

Multidiscipline intelligence support is integral to the planning, execution, and assessment of IO. The integration of IO into the planning process enhances protection of friendly systems and assets while exposing windows of opportunity for attack or exploitation. To plan and execute IO, we must collect, store, analyze, and present information in a form that the commander can easily assimilate. The commander and staff, when planning the friendly scheme of maneuver, use the products and analysis developed by the intelligence staff to determine when and where in the battlespace the friendly forces must focus IO.

Intelligence collection for IO includes all possible sources--national level; special operations; multidiscipline operations; open sources such as news media, academia, Internet, and commercial publications; commercial contacts; local nationals; and more. Rapid processing, analysis, and dissemination of all-source intelligence will reinforce and confirm relevant IO information and enable the targeting and exploitation of an adversary's critical capabilities, systems, and facilities.

Specific Areas of IO Support

Intelligence support to IO includes support in seven areas: OPSEC, PSYOPs, military deception, electronic attack, physical destruction, civil-military operations, and public affairs.

Support to Operations Security (OPSEC). This intelligence support consists of identifying capabilities and limitations of the adversary's intelligence system to include adversary intelligence objectives and the means, methods, and facilities used by the threat to collect, process, and analyze information.

Support to Psychological Operations (PSYOPs). This category of intelligence support to IO includes the environment, target groups, and influence on others, to include--

[] Identifying the cultural, social, economic, and political environment of the area of interest (AOI). For example, adversary mechanisms for political control, adversary communication and broadcast systems used to elicit support from the populace, current and past adversary propaganda activities, and their effectiveness.

[] Identifying target groups and subgroups and their locations, conditions, vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, cultures, attitudes, and behaviors. This includes determining popular radio and television programs and periodicals and their audience demographics; media personalities and political cartoons; and group attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, alliances, and behavior.

[] Identifying the effect of planned PSYOPs on individuals outside the targeted group (for example, multinational partners and neighboring populations).

Support to Military Deception includes identifying the capabilities and limitations of the adversary's intelligence-gathering systems as well as adversary biases and perceptions.

[] Profiles of crucial adversary leaders.

[] Cultural, religious, social, and political characteristics of the country and region.

[] Sources of military, economic, or political support.

[] Adversary decisionmaking processes, patterns, and biases.

[] Adversary perceptions of the military situation in the area of operations (AO).

[] Capabilities and limitations of adversary counterintelligence (CI) and security services.

Support to Electronic Attack (EA). Intelligence support to IO in the area of EA includes identification and assessment of the adversary nodes and capabilities discussed below.

[] Identifying critical adversary information; command, control communications, and computers (C4); and intelligence nodes. This includes determining and presenting the adversary's electronic order of battle (OB) and the information system infrastructure, the enemy's C2 system vulnerabilities, and their means of protecting their C2 systems.

[] Assessing adversary EA capabilities (numbers, types, and disposition of EW systems, technical characteristics, methods of employment, and vulnerability to counteractions).

Support to Physical Destruction is the identification of critical adversary information, C4, and intelligence nodes, and systems (adversary information infrastructure) to include C2 systems, nodes, and locations; adversary C2 system vulnerabilities; and adversary IO systems, locations, and facilities.

Support to Civil-Military Operations (CMO) consists of identifying the cultural, social, economic, and political environment of the AO, including--

[] Population demographics.

[] Civilian populace attitudes, alliances, and behavior.

[] Availability of basic necessities (food, clothing, water, shelter, and medical care) and the ability of the populace to care for itself.

[] Locations and potential routes, destinations, and assembly areas or sites of displaced persons.

[] Local government type, status, character, organization, and capabilities.

[] Availability of local material and personnel to support military operations.

[] Nongovernmental organizations or private volunteer organizations in the AO, their agendas, resources, and capabilities.

Support to Public Affairs (PA). This area of intelligence support to IO includes identification of factors in the environment as well as in collective opinion, to include--

[] Identifying the coalition and foreign public physical and social environment (propaganda and misinformation capabilities, activities, targets, themes, and dissemination means of the adversary).

[] Identifying world, national, and local public opinion (location, biases or predispositions, and agenda of national and international media representatives in the AO, and trends reflected by the national and international media).

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and IO

The purpose of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) in support of IO is to gain an understanding of the information environment and to determine how the threat will operate in the information environment. The goal is identification of--

[] Threat vulnerabilities that friendly IO can target and exploit.

[] Threat information capabilities against which friendly forces must defend.

A detailed understanding of an adversary's information infrastructure--a combination of numerous elements--is a very important component of IPB in support of IO. An information infrastructure consists of multiple types of systems, such as intelligence, logistics, medical, personnel, operations, fire support, EW, etc., that may operate as separate information systems but support the adversary and his supporting organization as a whole. The different systems, while separate, may physically share the same communications pathways or processors and are, therefore, high-value targets (HVTs) for physical destruction and a vital part of the IPB process that supports IO. To focus analysis on the information environment, the IPB steps relate to IO as shown in Figure 1.

For offensive IO, IPB is a continuous process used to develop a detailed knowledge of the adversary employment of information and information systems. IPB for offensive IO uses a process of overlapping and simultaneous actions that produces situation updates, thereby providing joint forces commanders and their subordinate commanders with flexible offensive IO options. IPB in support of offensive IO builds upon traditional IPB and requires the following:

[] Knowledge of the technical capabilities of the adversary's information systems.

[] Knowledge of the political, economic, social, and cultural influences.

[] Ability to develop templates used to portray the battlespace and refine targets for offensive IO courses of action (COAs).

[] Understanding of the adversary's or potential adversary's decision-making process.

[] In-depth understanding of the biographical background of major adversary leaders, decision-makers, communicators, and their advisors, to include motivating factors and their leadership styles.

[] Knowledge of the area of the responsibility (AOR) and joint operational area (JOA) geographic, atmospheric, and littoral influences on adversary and friendly operations.

At lower echelons, the S2 will process information concerning IO, which is collected in accordance with the information requirements (IR) and the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and forwarded to higher echelons for analysis, use in IPB, and decisionmaking. Higher echelons will direct OPSEC measures and other IO-related tasks. Intelligence tasks performed in support of IO, identified through IPB, include providing intelligence support to--

[] Offensive IO which includes support to PSYOPs, military deception, and EA.

[] Defensive IO which includes support to OPSEC.

[] Activities related to IO which includes support to CMO and PA.

[] Targeting (IO).

[] Battle damage asssessment (BDA) (IO).

The physical description and overlays of IO targets can be combined with an IO decision-making and execution matrix to form an accurate assessment of an adversary's information capabilities and vulnerabilities. The adversary's strengths and weaknesses are compared with the assessment of friendly capabilities to determine friendly C2 vulnerabilities and strong points.

Information Environment Templates

Based on the threat's normal or "doctrinal" organization, equipment, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), the intelligence officer creates threat models to depict how threat forces prefer to conduct operations under ideal conditions. Threat models generally consist of doctrinal templates, descriptions of preferred tactics and options, and identification of HVTs. Figure 2 depicts some of the types, descriptions, and purposes of information environment templates.

The intelligence officer produces several other products which contain IO-related information, including:

[] Situation Template. A situation template is a graphic depiction of expected threat force dispositions for a specific COA. A situation template that focuses on IO depicts how the threat may employ its information assets both offensively and defensively to achieve an operational advantage.

[] High-Value Target List (HVTL). The HVTL should include threat information assets, even those that the unit is not going to attack by lethal means. Typical information target sets include decisionmakers and information system assets.

[] Event Template and Matrix. An event template and supporting event matrix identify specific areas and threat activities that predict which COA the threat will chose. IO input to the event template and matrix helps develop intelligence collection requirements for IO.

The intelligence officer evaluates and rank-orders the threat IO COAs according to their likely order of adoption. The purpose of prioritizing these COAs is to provide the staff with a starting point for the development of a plan that addresses potential threat COAs. Based on the time available, the intelligence staff develops each threat IO COA with as much detail as possible. In some instances, they may only develop the threat's most likely and most dangerous IO COAs. As part of determining threat COAs, the staff postulates how, when, where, and why (to what purpose) the threat will use its information systems to support its likely objectives and achieve its desired end state.

Intelligence Support to IO in the Objective Force

Intelligence support to IO will be increasingly critical to safeguarding U.S. information and information infrastructure in the future. Factors that contribute to this include projected technological advancements, growing reliance on information technology, and the future combat system's potential to enable easy access to products such as the common operational picture at all levels of command. Even if the adversary succeeds in interrupting portions of the friendly system, individual soldiers' initiative must automatically take the appropriate countermeasures and report information of intelligence value in support of IO. This individual initiative will be a product of training and a command climate instilled across the force long before enemy offensive IO disable components of our information systems. Intelligence support to IO in the Objective Force will be a collaborative, coordinated effort at all levels of command. Intelligence support--including collection, analysis, developing and prioritizing adversary IO COAs, IPB in support of IO, requirements management, presentation of IO-related information, etc.--is integral to conducting IO.

Intelligence support to IO in the Objective Force will essentially have the same objectives that exist today. However, development of new TTPs will be necessary to reflect the changes in future systems and organizations. The significance of intelligence support to IO will be paramount as future information technology takes information access and dissemination to higher levels. The future information environment and its associated threats are a primary focus in Objective Force. To this end, staff structure in the Objective Force will organize not by echelon (e.g., S2/G2/J2) but rather by function in order to better focus efforts on such operations as IO.

Objective Force Staff Structure

The Objective Force Battle Command will consist of a core staff structure, organized into functional groupings, to operate within the environment of knowledge-based warfare. The nodal construct for staff organization within the Battle Command involves five nodes: one integrating node and four multifunctional nodes. The five nodes (cells) are:

[] Command Integration Cell (CIC).

[] Information Superiority Cell (ISC).

[] Fires and Effect Cell (F&EC).

[] Build and Sustain Combat Power Cell (B&SCPC).

[] Maneuver and Support Cell (MSC). (See Figure 3).

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

Information operations will be one of the principle functions of the ISC.

Role of the Information Superiority Cell

The ISC will develop and maintain a superior knowledge edge for the commander to execute knowledge-focused warfare. The ISC executes a variety of staff planning functions to reach this knowledge advantage. These include staff planning for information operations (offensive and defensive), network operations, surveillance and reconnaissance planning and execution, counterintelligence, information assurance, space asset access, intelligence synchronization, intelligence planning and analysis, and overall data, information, and intelligence fusion. The ISC directs the planning and management functions essential to all knowledge-based warfare. The ISC will have staff expertise traditionally represented by IO, signal, intelligence, cavalry, and space with the organic reach to global assets necessary to develop and maintain the commander's knowledge advantage.

Conclusion

U.S. force readiness depends upon our ability to provide intelligence and analysis concerning the current and future IO methods and capabilities of potential adversaries and incorporate these considerations into the planning and execution of military operations. The operational environment will continue to change as adversaries acquire access to more advanced information systems and technologies. U.S. military forces must evolve to meet the needs of the dynamic information environment.

For more information concerning Intelligence Support to Information Operations, see JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, and FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Final approved DRAG dated October 2002). FM 2-0, Intelligence (DRAG dated 19 February 2003) provides in-depth information concerning IPB in support of IO. Further information regarding IO in the Objective Force is in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-0.1, The U.S. Army Objective Force Battle Command Concept, and other Objective Force 525-series TRADOC Pamphlets. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, provides a detailed breakdown of IPB.

Rewrite of the Warfighter's Guide to Communication Architectures

We are in the process of rewriting this guide to get it up to date with the contemporary communication architectures currently in use in the tactical arena. You have many success stories about how you delivered intelligence support throughout the battlefield; please share your input with us.

Please tell us if you have done something different from the norm or if you put another piece of equipment in the loop to help a process be more useful--we are interested! The point of contact (POC) will be traveling throughout the community to validate these architectures before we publish, so if you have something that you believe could benefit other organizations, please send it and we will research it. We plan to publish this updated guide in early 2004.

Please contact the POC with your contributions for this update: CW2 Robert D. Rounds, Officer in Chief, Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Support Team, Operations Support Activity, and Headquarters, Operations, 743d MI Battalion. You may E-mail me at [e-mail] or [e-mail] and call me at [phone]/4244 or DSN 877-5286/4244.

Figure 1. IPB and IO Focus.

IPB Step                     IO Focus

Define the battlefield       Define the information
environment                  environment

Describe the battlefield's   Describe information
effects                      environment's effects

Evaluate the threat          Evaluate the threat's
                             information systems

Determine threat courses     Determine threat actions
of action                    in the information
                             environment

Figure 2. Information Environment Templates.

Template         Description                 Purpose

Decisionmaking   Depicts who in an           Determines how an
                 adversary organization      adversary organization
                 makes decisions.            operates to achieve its
                                             mission or goals.

Information      Describes what nodes,       Identifies critical
Infrastructure   links and systems an        adversary information
                 adversary organization      system nodes, links,
                 uses to collect, process,   and systems (to include
                 and disseminate             those assets capable of
                 information.                impacting the information
                                             environment).

Information      Depicts how the adversary   Identifies adversary
Tactics          employs available           information and
                 information assets.         information system
                                             capabilities,
                                             vulnerabilities, and
                                             susceptibilities.

Lori Sieting (Chief Warrant Officer Three, U.S. Army, Retired) is currently a contractor supporting the Doctrine Division, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. In addition to writing Military Intelligence doctrine, Mrs. Sieting has worked as a training developer for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and has served in a variety of MI assignments (tactical, strategic, and deployed) as a warrant officer. Readers may contact her via E-mail at Iori. [e-mail] and telephonically at [phone] or DSN 821-9966.