Inspectors charge Iraq has ongoing nuclear weapons programme.

The 45-member team, in Iraq from 22 to 30 September to conduct the sixth nuclear inspection, was detained for four days by Iraqi authorities in a Baghdad parking lot outside a nuclear facility, after having obtained what was described as "top secret" documentation on Iraq's nuclear-weapons programme. Some of the materials was returned, but the "most sensitive" was confiscated, they reported.

In a preliminary report released in Vienna on 3 October, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix stated there was evidence of: a broad-based effort on an implosion-type nuclear weapon; success in machining nuclear-weapons components from natural uranium; evidence of sophisticated computer codes of develop nuclear weapons; parallel development of a nuclear missile delivery system; substantial nuclear-weapons-related procurement from foreign sources; and on-site, on-the-spot training of Iraqi engineers by foreign equipment manufacturers.

The team, headed by Chief Inspector David Kay, also concluded that:

* Iraq still has substantial nuclear facilities, which were "part of the clandestine programme and which have not been declared";

* "Significant documentary material and equipment" had been removed from identified nuclear programme sites, some shortly before the team's arrival; and

* There was "repeated and wilful non-compliance" by Iraq with Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), as well as violation of privileges and immunities specified for UN/IAEA inspection teams.

In resolution 687 of 3 April, the terms for a formal cease-fire in the Gulf conflict were set out, including provisions calling on Iraq "unconditionally not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems, components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities".

Iraq was to declare all locations, amounts and types of such items; place all nuclear-weapons-usable materials for custody and removal under the "exclusive control" of the IAEA; and accept "urgent on-site inspection" and "destruction, removal, or rendering harmless" of all such items.

The IAEA, assisted by the Special Commission on Iraqi disarmament set up under resolution 687, was to carry out "immediate on-site inspection" of the nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations, as well as additional locations designated by the Special Commission. A plan was to be developed regarding destruction, removal or rendering harmless, as appropriate, of all items specified.

Resolution 687 made similar provision for Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and facilities, and for long-range ballistic missiles.

Between 14 May and 9 October, 18 UN inspections took place in Iraq--six on nuclear capabilities; five each on chemical weapons and ballistic missiles; and two on biological weapons.

On 15 August, after several incidents in which Iraq blocked UN inspection teams access to facilities and documents, the Council demanded that Iraq comply with the disarmament measures.

By adopting resolution 707, the Council condemned what it termed "serious violations" by Iraq of its disarmament obligations under resolution 687.

The Council also condemned Iraq's non-compliance with obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, in violation of its commitments as a party to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

It specified nine immediate orders, demanding Iraq, among others, to:

* Disclose fully "all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.";

* Allow "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation" to the Special Commission, the IAEA and their inspection teams; and

* Cease immediately "any attempt to conceal, or any movement or destruction of any material or equipment relating to its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missiles programmes . . . without notification to and prior consent of the Special Commission".

'Petro-Chemical Three'

--code name

The IAEA report also linked the Iraqi nuclear programmed--code-named "Petrochemical Three" (PC-3)--to Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and Iraq's Ministry of Defense.

"Contrary of Iraq's claims of having only a peaceful nuclear programme, the team found documents showing that Iraq had been working on the revision of a nuclear-weapons design and one linking the IAEC to work on a surface-to-surface missile project--presumably the intended delivery system for ther nuclear weapons", the report stated. Most of the important documents were obtained, photographed or seen during visits to two establishments in Baghdad--the Nuclear Design Centre and the Petrochemical Three headquarters--on 23 and 24 September, respectively.

The documents described nuclear-weapons development experiments involving neutron initiators, enriched-uranium cores, reflectors, high-explosive lenses and electronic firing setts.

The nuclear-weapons design work, the team s tated, was conducted at Al Atheer--a facility which Iraq claimed had no nuclear connection but which, according to an Iraqi to secret report, had the objective of designing and producing a nuclear device. Previous inspection teams had concluded that the facility was most probably to be used for nuclear-weapons component production, high-explosive experiments and device assembly.

Iraqi position

On 30 September, Iraq informed (S/23102) the Secretary-General that the inspection team's "contrived and biased mode of behaviour" was being used to "give currency to allegations against the Iraqi nuclear programme dedicated to peaceful purposes within the framework of the concerted campaign of animosity against Iraq".

Iraq said it would not acknowledge any document or visual material with respect to which no joint record had been drawn up by the two sides. If an accusation should present itself involving documents or visual materials that had not been entered in the joint record, that would indicate that there was "a deliberate intention to do a disservice to Iraq."

On 2 October, in a communique (S/23110) to the Secretary-General, Iraq charged that Chief Inspector Kay was reporting "important information relating to Iraqi documents" to the United States Government before it was received by the UN, even though the team was "answerable only to the International Atomic Energy Agency and to the Special Commission itself."

On 23 and 24 September, the team had inspected buildings and "confiscated documents", Iraq said, "before the employees concerned arrived, without their knowledge and without tem seeing." That was unacceptable, Iraq stated. The Chief Inspector and those of the team members who had "private links with foreign intelligence circles" had sought to "insinuate spurious documents that had nothing to do with us" in order to provide a rationale for "false accussations".

Iraq also accused the team of behavious "incompatible with prevailing customs and values in Iraqi society", including forcing and breaking open doors and locks; beginning visits to facilities before the official start of the workday; and tampering with private property, such as staff members' handbags and briefcases, and opening envelopes containing private letters.

Iraqi officials accompanying the team and the staff at the visited sites "exercised the greatest degree of self-control and behaved judiciously despite such provocative modes of behaviour', Iraq reported.

Detention drama

The sixth inspection team arrived in Baghdad on 22 September and undertook its first inspection the next day at the Nuclear Design Centre in the capital city, arriving at 5:59 a.m. local time. Shortly after 10 a.m., the team found four boxes of classified documents in the basement.

When the team attempted to leave the facility at 3:45 p.m., they were prevented from doing so. At 4:30 p.m., Iraqi authorities began to review the documents obtained by the inspectors and at 7 p.m., they were confiscated by the Iraqi authorities. Seven hours later--at 2 a.m. on 24 September--most, but not all the documents were returned.

At 6:20 a.m., a second inspection began at the Petrochemical Three programme headquarters in Baghdad. At 10:50 a.m., Iraqi authorities demanded that all work stop and the team leave immediately. At 12:30 p.m., Dr. Jaffar Dhla Jaffar, a senior administrator of the programme, arrived and demanded all documents and film, after which a stalemate ensued.

Iraqi security surrounded the premises. The inspectors were told they would be detained until they underwent personal searches and surrendered all photographs, films, videotapes and copies of Iraqi documents.

Almost four days later, at 5:46 a.m. on 28 September, the team detained in the parking lot of the facility was released. The same day, a joint IAEA/Iraq inventory was undertaken of the documents collected during the second inspection.

On 29 September, the team conducted unproductive searches for documents at the IAEC Training Centre, the Reactor Siting and Planning building and other facilities. On 30 September, the team departed for Bahrain.

Meanwhile, in

New York . . .

On 23 September in New York, Special Commission Chairman Rolf Ekeus informed the Security Council of the standoff in Baghdad. Council President Jean-Bernard Merimee of France said its members had asked him to contact Iraqi Foreign Minister Ahmed Hussein immediately to demand, on the Council's behalf, that the inspectors be permitted to leave the site with the documents, in line with Council resolutions.

After consultations on 24 September, President Merimee, on behalf of members, said the Council fully supported the Special Commission and the inspection team, which had fulfilled its tasks "with exceptional dedication". The Special Commission, acting under Council authority, was the sole judge of the definition of the documents, sites or materials subject to inspection.

The Council expressed its "strong condemnation" of how Iraqi authorities had repeatedly prevented the inspectors from carrying out their duties. In particular, it was "unacceptable" that the inspectors could not freely leave the premises they had inspected earlier that day.

It demanded that the team immediately and unconditionally be allowed to leave the site where they had been kept and, in particular, that they could take with them all documents they deemed appropriate. The Council wanted its "serious concerns" conveyed to Iraq.

In a 24 September letter (S/23065) to the Council President, Iraq protested the team's actions, which it said "exceeded its original mandate" by photocopying personal files of industrial and metallurgical personnel, including scientists and researchers. That had "endangered the security of the personnel concerned and their families", since the files contained details of their private lives, their private addresses and other data unrelated to the implementation of resolution 687.

On 25 September, the Secretary-General appealed to Iraqi Foreign Minister Hussein during their meeting in New York for the release of the inspection team.

On 28 September, the IAEA reported that at 11 p.m. the previous day, Iraq had notified Chief Inspector Kay that it had agreed to the terms, which were not disclosed, set out by the Council for the team's release.

Nuclear inspections

Nuclear inspections began on 14 May, with the first team completing its work on 22 May. During a second nuclear inspection from 23 June to 3 July, the IAEA reported that Iraqi military authorities had twice denied or restricted access to a designated site. After protests, access was granted but materials that the team wished to inspect had been removed.

The Council met on 26 June to discuss the matter and adjourned without taking action. It reconvened on 28 June, issuing a statement asking for "immediate and unimpeded access" to inspection sites, and stating that "any recurrence of non-compliance would have serious consequences".

On 30 June, a special UN mission arrived in Baghdad to convey to Iraq the Council's "urgent demand for unequivocal assurances that the Government will take all necessary measures to ensure that no hindraces are placed in the way of the discharge of the Special Commission's mandate".

The mission was composed of Special Commission Executive Chairman rolf Ekeus, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix and Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Yasushi Akashi.

In early July, the mission reported that Iraq had stated it would not hinder UN inspection activities and had issued orders to ensure the safety and security of UN personnel engaged in those tasks. It also reported that Iraq's response to the request for access "fell short" of what had been called for by the Council.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on 5 July affirmed (S/22762) to the Secretary-General the guarantees given to the UN mission, ensuring "prompt and unimpeded access" to "locations and items designated for inspection", in accordance with Council resolution 687.

Other nucler

developments

On 10 July, the IAEA announced that France and the United Kingdom would jointly recover and render harmless the nuclear fuel elements present in Iraq, in fulfilment of resolution 687. The recovered materials would be subject to IAEA safeguards. The Agency had asked for assistance from Member States possessing appropriate capabilities.

On 11 July, Director-General Blix reported (S/22788) that, in the wake of the first two inspections, Iraq had declared evidence of the research and development required for electromagnetic isotope separation technique (EMIS) and that a large EMIS process plant had been under construction at Tarmiyah. It was watated that conclusive evidence of uranium isotope separation must await the results from environmental samples.

The thrid nuclear inspection took place from 6 to 19 July. The team worked from a list of sites and items provided by Iraq on 7 July, giving details of an extensive nuclear programmed, an important part of which had not been declared earlier, according to a UN official.

An initial examination indicated the existence of three parallel programmed for uranium enrichment and related equipment and facilities. Iraq had reported that half a kilogram of slightly enriched material had been produced during testing.

After the third inspection, the team reported it had placed under Agency seals "a considerable amount of nuclear material and a number of equipment items" related to the newly-disclosed Iraqi uranium enrichment programme. However, it stated that much work and analysis remained to be done before any conclusions could be reached as to the completeness of Iraq's declarations to date.

The Security council held informal consultations on 15 July on UN nuclear inspections and Iraqi compliance. The Council was told of Iraq's uranium enrichment programme and considered whether it was fundamentally directed at peaceful energy production or for nuclear weapons production.

Director-General Blix said that the Iraqi programme had not been conducted in compliance with Iraq's obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, under which Iraq would have been obliged to declare some of the materials which had only just become public.

On 18 July, the IAEA Board of Governors condemned Iraq for non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. It was the first time a State party to the NPT had been condemned for concealing a nuclear programme.

The Board declared that Iraq had violated its safeguards agreement by "not submitting nuclear material and relevant facilities in its uranium enrichment programmed to the Agency's inspection".

Mr. Blix said major changes were needed to strengthen the safeguards system. The case of Iraq demonstrated the "challenges that may need to be met and the ability of the Agency to meet them".

On 23 July, Iraq informed (S/22826) the Secretary-General that the IAEA condemnation was based on predetermined political concepts and motives, the intention being to bestow technical legitimacy through a specialized agency in preparation for a fresh act of military aggression against Iraq, following the full revelation by Iraq of its nuclear programme".

On 29 July, the IAEA informed the Secretary-General, based on the third inspection, that "the possibility exists that there are still undeclared locations with sensitive equipment and material". Also, Iraq had accumulated a large inventory of natural uranium and it was likely that the full extent of the centrifuge enrichment programme had not yet been disclosed.

By removing concrete that had been poured over a key uranium- enrichment component at a main production site at Tarmiyah, the team had confirmed earlier suspicions that the installation had been constructed for enrichment purposes. If fully operational, the facility could have produced up to 15 kilograms (93 per cent) of highly- enriched uranium (HEU) a year, or more at a lower enrichment level, the team concluded. Iraq denied that "any political decision had been taken to use the enrichment programme to develop nuclear weapons".

On 30 July, the IAEA reported to the Council that the team had concluded that the full extent of Iraq's enrichment programme had not yet been disclosed.

More than 30 nuclear sites in Iraq had been visited during the three inspections, it was reported, and more than 300 samples of nuclear and environmental material had been taken.

Immediate on-site inspections would continue, but a permanent inspection presence in Iraq might be necessary in the future to allow inspections on short notice.

Fourth nuclear inspection

A fourth inspection team visited Iraq from 27 July to 10 August. During that time, Iraq provided further information regarding nuclear activities which the IAEA said should have been previously declared under Iraq's safeguards agreement with the Agency.

The information concerned details of experimental activities involving fabrication of natural uranium oxide fuel, its irradiation in research reactors at Tuwaitha and separation of minute quantities--3 grams--of plutonium.

Although the activities were on a very limited scale and the reactor used would only have been capable of producing insignificant quantities of plutonium, Iraq's interest in the plutonium separation was noteworthy, the IAEA said. Failure to declare the data in a timely fashion constituted "clear non-compliance", it stated. Particularly disturbing was the fact that the activities could take place in safeguarded facilities.

The fourth team reported (S/22986) that, in addition to the clandestine programme that had separated 3 grams of plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel, there was a fast-paced uranium enrichment project at the stage of initial industrial production at Tarminyah. The plan was to bring on line a production facility of 90 separators which could have produced 15 kilograms of HEU per annum using natural uranium as feed, it was reported. Furthermore, Iraq had indicated a project to produce enriched uranium by gas centrifuges beginning in 1993.

A fifth team, visiting Iraq from 14 to 20 September, said Iraq had reported that 2.2 tons of heavy water which had been imported had been lost because of bomb damage to the storage tank. The chemical exchange enrichment facilities shown to the team had been thoroughly cleaned, leaving no evidence of the extent of the programme.

Chemical inspections

The first chemical weapons inspection was carried out from 9 to 15 June by a survey mission at a 25-square-mile site with 70 buildings near Samarra. It was reported to be heavily contaminated by chemicals and had unexploded ordnance.

On 31 July, Special Commission Chairman Ekeus told reporters in New York that the inspectors were surprised at the size of Iraq's chemical weapons programme, reported to be four times greater than acknowledged by Iraq.

Iraq had previously declared having from 10,000 to 11,000 chemical weapons, but the team found some 46,000 pieces of field chemical munitions located near airports in and around Baghdad.

Mr. Ekus said the long-term monitoring of Iraqi weapons would diverge from the current "search and destroy" missions and enter into a new territory -- production capabilities. The monitoring would be based on data reporting from Iraq, on-site inspections of declared and non-declared sites, and surveillance from above.

The Secretary-General remarked that the Iraqis were "apparently concealing chemical weapons, which, of course, is very bad news".

A second chemical inspection was undertaken from 15 to 23 August in the Baghdad area and a third from 31 August through 8 September at Dujayl and Fallujah.

A UN team of experts had undertaken a fact-finding mission in Iraq from 11 to 14 August to discuss possible options for direct Iraqi involvement in a chemical weapons destruction programme, under appropriate Special Commission control.

Subjects discussed included: interlinked topics of collection and transport; defusing and rendering munitions explosively harmless and checking that munitions were defused and explosively inert; breaching and draining of munitions; destroying unfilled and emptied munitions; and destroying chemical weapons agents and precursors.

"Considerable progress was made in identifying potential Iraqi contribution to all those aspects of the overall destruction programme and in identifying the scope for direct Iraqi participation in that programme", the Commission stated.

The Special Commission had placed priority on survey, inspection and recording of Iraq's chemical weapons assets. In addition to inspecting undeclared sites to establish that all chemical weapons assets had been recorded, the Commission would also inspect declared sites with a view to preparing munitions and agents for destruction.

The second team visited chemical production sites in the Al Fallujah area, the pilot plants at Al Muthanna and the declared storage site at Tammuz (Al Taqqadum) Air Base at Habbaniyah. Discussion with Iraqi officials clarified previous ambiguities about the Al Muthanna State Establishment, also known as the State Enterprise for Pesticide Production (SEPP).

Some commercially available chemical weapons precursor chemicals were found. Three intended precursor production sites were extensively damaged by bombing during the hostilities.

Iraqi authorities stated that chemical weapons agents were neither produced nor stored at any of those sites. The team found no evidence which contradicted that statement.

The third chemical team visited sites that Iraq declared were used for storage, as well as sites not declared but considered by the Special Commission to be of possible interest. The condition of munitions was examined. Samples were taken to be analysed in Finland, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

The team also inspected chemical warheads for the Al Hussein ballistic missile, stored closed to the main road between Baghdad and Samarra. Some were filled with a nerve agent. Mustard agent-filled bombs were also found, some of which had ruptured due to excess internal pressure, releasing mustard gas. They were to be transported to a facility near Samarra for destruction.

No undeclared filled chemical weapons were found. However, some 6,000 undeclared containers for chemical warfare agents to be used in rockets were found, as were considerable quantities of tear gas munitions and devices, which Iraq said were intended for training purposes.

During the fourth chemical inspection from 31 August to 4 September, the Al Muthanna State establishment, where all chemical weapons were to be destroyed, was surveyed. The 10-member team also supervised the destruction by Iraq of more than 8,000 individual munitions--mostly bombs, artillery projectiles and rockets--all clearly designed to be used as chemical weapons.

A fifth chemical inspection was scheduled to take place from 6 October through 9 November.

Biological weapons

The first biological weapons inspection was undertaken from 2 to 8 August. The team visited a site near Salman Pak, where facilities for fermentation, production, aerosol testing and storage existed. However, no evidence of biological weapon per se was obtained and no facility for filling weapons was determined. The site had been extensively damaged by coalition force bombardment and by the recent physical removal by the Iraqis of key buildings.

Discussions were also held with the Ministries of Health and Agriculture to define a base of microbiological, especially pathogen, activities within Iraq.

On 5 August, Iraq stated that it had begun biological research for defensive military purposes in 1986. The substances included anthrax, botulinum, brucellosis and tularaemia. That research was terminated in August 1990, Iraq said, adding that no production or weaponization of biological agents had taken place.

A second biological weapons inspection team visited 10 declared and undeclared sites in Iraq from 20 September to 3 October. Four were inspected without advance notice. The 10 site included a pharmaceutical plant, a blood bank, vaccine production facilities and research and development laboratories with fermentation capabilities and specially designed facilities to enable work with hazardous disease-causing organisms of humans and animals to be carried out.

No biological weapons or facilities for filling weapons were found. However, the inspection team unanimously agreed that the Iraqi biological weapons programme, which consisted of a research component at Salman Pak, logically would have included a plan for a development and production component.

Ballistic missiles

The fourth in a series of inspections of Iraq's ballistic missile capabilities took place from 6 to 12 September.

Three previous inspections took place from 30 June to 7 July, 18 to 20 July and 8 to 15 August.

Destruction of ballistic missiles began with the first inspection team's activities, before a comprehensive destruction policy had been established. The first team carried out the initial inventory and supervision of the destruction of all declared missiles, launchers and support equipment, visiting seven different sites and facilities. Missile systems and components destruction was primarily a straightforward task of crushing by bulldozers which was readily carried out by the Iraqis. Three of the sites were former production and repair facilities that had been destroyed by coalition bombing.

The second ballistic missile inspection was conducted on short notice to investigate information suggesting additional undeclared missile and support equipment. That team found undeclared decoy missiles and additional support equipment in the vicinity of a site previously inspected by the first ballistic missile team. Those were also destroyed.

The third ballistic missile team conducted inspections focusing on declared and undeclared suspected ballistic missile production facilities. In addition, a survey of the declared "supergun", propellant and unassembled parts at three different sites was undertaken. A significant number of documents and blueprints related to the construction and development of that system were provided to the inspection team. The information obtained and photographs taken were collected for study and use later in a planned inspection/destruction activity.

Production, repair and test equipment and machinery associated with the Scud, Al Hussein and Badr 2000 missiles were inspected and identified for destruction at five declared and seven undeclared sites. All sites suffered damage during the coalition bombing, some extensively, with structures and equipment being completely destroyed or damaged and others virtually intact. Identification for destruction of specific missile tooling and test equipment was readily accepted by the Iraqis.

Machinery and equipment identified for destruction, which also had non-missile application (dual use) or use in missile systems not prohibited by Security Council resolution 687, generated vigorous controversy and opposition. That equipment was sealed and guidance was requested from the Special Commission. An inventory was made of all other equipment to enable to Special Commission to decide on its destruction, removal or rendering harmless in consonance with policies being developed by the Commission in those respects. After the return of the team to New York, the destruction of certain equipment was called for in a letter to the Iraqi Government, based on the inspection report and the provisional guidelines on destruction, removal or rendering harmless initiated by the Special Commission.

At one undeclared site, the team discovered an additional 187 Scud fuel, oxidizer and starter storage tanks. The team also found 30 Scud warhead canisters containing chemical-filled warheads in the same vicinity. Although the warheads had been declared to the Special Commission, they were not at the location specified in the declaration. Upon completion of that inspection, Iraq provided the team with a declaration of additional Scud fuel and oxidizer storage tanks.

The fourth team inspected and monitored the destruction of fixed SCUD missile launchers declared by Iraq in the "Western Zone".

The team was to be the first to use UN-provided helicopters to cover the significant distances involved. Although Iraq had offered the use of its helicopters, the Special Commission preferred to use its own aircraft.

The team reported that Iraq denied entry and use of the UN helicopters. After conducting two inspections in the vicinity of Baghdad, operations were suspended pending resolution of the helicopter problem.

Results of the two inspections were significant, the team reported. Iraq had taken four of eight previously eliminated SCUD missile transport vehicles, temporarily welded them together and moved them to a facility south of Baghdad containing missiles with a range of less than 150 kilometers. At that site, an additional triple-missile support, not previously declared, was noted. The Chief Inspector gave instructions that the transporters and the missile-support equipment were to be destroyed, and subsequently they were verified by the team as inoperable.

After four days without resolving the problem, the team was withdrawn from Iraq, in accordance with its original schedule.

In consultations on 23 September, the Council met to continue its discussion of Iraq's refusal to let UN inspection teams overfly Iraqi weapon site with its own helicopters.

In a Council statement, President Merimee said that the oral response by Iraq on 22 September did not meet Council requirements. It had specifically asked for a formal, written commitment by Iraq that it would implement unreservedly provisions of resolution 707.

Iraq, he said, had stuck to the conditions linked to its acceptance of Council resolutions and had never referred to resolution 707, only to resolution 687.

Council members unanimously thought Iraq's reply fell short of its demand and that the Council President should immediately start bilateral consultations on the matter.

The matter was resolved on 24 September when the Iraqi Ambassador sent a letter (S/23064) to the Council on the use by the Special Commission of its own helicopters. The Council considered the letter's contents as an unconditional acceptance by Iraq of resolution 707. On 27 September, a UN official said Mr. Ekeus had sent a letter to Iraq setting out the modalities for the use of UN helicopters.

Aerial surveys 

On 12 August, a UN official said the Special Commission would have to undertake its own direct high-altitude aerial surveys to determine further designations of Iraqi sites for inspection and to monitor and secure compliance with resolution 687.

After receiving available possibilities, the Special Commission asked the United States to put at its disposal a high-altitude one-seater aircraft--a U-2--designed for aerial surveys. Operations began in the first half of August.

It was to receive photographs of all sites, locations, facilities and objects surveyed. It could then independently evaluate the material necessary to fulfil its functions.

On 11 September, Mr. Ekeus told reporters that, while "some progress" had been made with regard to inspections, the Commission had not received full cooperation from Iraq in major areas of its work. The body, he said, was trying to understand the interrelationships of the various Iraqi military activities, in what he called an Iraqi "master plan". Inspections were continuing to gain full disclosure of all Iraqi military capabilities.

The Commission, he went on, needed helicopters to carry out flights over Iraq, as mandated by resolution 707 and for destruction of weapons in areas remote from Baghdad. Germany had provided three helicopters with a full crew. Iraq's offer to use its own helicopters was, he said, "inappropriate" because of the need for surprise visits and short-notice activities.

Security Council members discussed the Commission's use of helicopters during consultations on 10 September. On 13 September, the Council held consultations on Iraq's reported refusal to allow an inspection team of the Special Commission to fly UN helicopters over Iraqi weapons sites.

Following the meeting, President Merimee told reporters the Council had decided that he should summon the Iraqi Ambassador and tell him that the Council considered the matter "very serious".

Monitoring and

verification

On 27 August, the Council discussed in closed consultations a long-term plan to monitor and verify Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. However, no action was taken.

It considered two reports on the subject: one from the IAEA (S/22872) dealing with nuclear materials; and a second from the Secretary-General (S/22871), prepared in close cooperation with the Special Commission dealing with Iraq's long-range ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons.

Both called for continued monitoring and verification of declared and non-declared military and civilian sites, facilities and material to ensure that Iraq did not use, retain, possess, develop, construct or otherwise acquire any long-range ballistic missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear-weapons-usable material.

The IAEA proposal called for Iraq to supply an inventory of its nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable materials and installations, as well as equipment and non-nuclear material, and notify the Agency of any changes one month before they were made.

The IAEA required complete design information for any planned nuclear installations 180 days before construction begins. It also required the right to full the free access at any time to all locations, all persons and all information it decided was necessary for the verification programme. In addition, the Agency plan stipulates freedom of entry and exit to Iraq for IAEA experts and UN personnel, supplies and equipment.

Under the plan, Iray must declare all locations, amounts and types of weapons to the UN Secretary-General and the IAEA Director-General within 15 days of approval of the plan by the Security Council.

Iraq was also required to place all of its nuclear-weapons usable materials under the exclusive control of IAEA for custody and removal, and to accept urgent onsite inspections and destruction, and removal or rendering harmless of all nuclear items.

The plan on long-range ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons would be carried out by a compliance unit to be organized under the Special Commission. Financing would be determined by competent UN organs.

To ensure that no weapons mateirals were imported to Iraq, a mechanism would be developed--before sanctions were lifeted--to uphold the prohibition on the sale and supply to Iraq of any weapons or related items. The mechanism would provide for timely information about any sale or supply of dual-purpose items.

Iraq would have to provide the Special Commission, within 30 days of approval and thereafter on a regular basis, full, correct and timely information on activities, sites, facilities, material and otehr items, both military and civilian, that might be used for purposes prohibited in resolution 687.

The Special Commission would have the right to inspect, at any time and without hindrance, any activity, material or facility, and to carry out air surveillances over any part of Iraqi territory. In addition, it would have the right to sotp and inspect vehicles, ships, aircraft or any other means of transportation within Iraq, and to inspect imports or exports upon arrival or departure.

The plan specified that Iraq must cooperate fully with the Special Commission in all aspects of its work, including the allowance of unrestricted freedom of entry into and exit from Iraq without delay or hindrance.

Annexed to the report were separate lists of chemicals, biological items and materials used in missile production which require close monitoring.

The Special Commission would, through the Secretary-General, report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the plan and at any other time the Council might request.