Insecurity, outlawry and social order: banditry in China's Heilongjiang frontier region, 1900-1931.

Banditry poses a major social problem for frontier societies. A sparsely populated land that lacks effective jurisdiction provides room for bandits to emerge and maneuver. In China's northeasternmost province of Heilongjiang, which borders on Russia, banditry was pervasive during the period of the region's development, particularly from 1900 to 1931. According to local records, almost every county suffered raids. Nevertheless, despite the disruption caused, bandits did not possess sufficient cohesiveness or momentum to establish a regional power base. Rather, they tended to form relatively small bands of several dozen to a few hundred members, reaching a thousand men on rare occasions. They roamed the land to prey upon settlers, revenge themselves on the authorities, and even to act, as they claimed, as local agents of rough justice.

Frontier regions, almost by definition, lack strong governance. Heilongjiang was such a region. Larger than either Germany or Britain, it was designated by the last Chinese dynasty, the Qing (1644-1912), as a military frontier. Chinese immigration and settlement were prohibited. Some illegal immigrants ventured into the region, but the land was still thinly inhabited at the beginning of the 20th century. Fearing that Heilongjiang might fall victim to China's expansionist neighbors, Russia and Japan, the Qing overall opened the frontier to Chinese settlement in 1904. Three years later Heilongjiang was established as a province. With the official barrier removed, a steady flow of settlers arrived from China Proper [China south of the Great Wall], particularly from Shandong province. From 1904 to 1931, more than four million people came as new residents.

The development of civil institutions could not keep pace with the rapid growth of settlement, thus leaving something of a power vacuum which facilitated the emergence of banditry as a social phenomenon. Settlers sought assistance from the government, but much of the time they had to provide for their own self-protection. Frontier society in effect consisted of three armed camps: government acting as the legal authority, bandits roving as predators, and civilians trying to defend themselves. When the government presence was strong, banditry waned. The civilian militia was not a decisive force, though many times it successfully fended off small bands of bandits. Ironically, the three forces were interchangeable. Sometimes the government persuaded bandits to join army or local police units. Bandits, for their part, recruited both soldiers and members of civilian society. In the absence of strong governmental authority, banditry could not be eradicated, though it could be driven out of sight in limited areas when either government or settlers possessed sufficient military strength.

I. Origins of Banditry in Heilongjiang

Even a brief survey of the history of Heilongjiang shows the pervasiveness of outlawry. Local annals record bandit attacks occurring almost every year. Peaceful intervals occurred from time to time in specific areas, but banditry persisted. What caused this troublesome phenomenon?

Since Eric Hobsbawm published Bandits in 1969, his hypothesis that bandits were a product of agricultural society has been widely accepted. (1) A number of scholars have applied and broadened Hobsbawm's theory in studying banditry in various societies. (2) Phil Billingsley applied this concept to his study of North China banditry and argued that factors such as rural overpopulation, social conflict, a poverty-ridden majority and imperial decay further contributed to the phenomenon. (3) These assumptions are quite convincing in regard to outlawry in North China, but cannot properly explain banditry in Heilongjiang. A few connections to the social banditry model existed, and some myths emerged that pointed in the same direction, but the phenomenon as a whole was different.

Overpopulation was not a frontier problem. Heilongjiang needed new immigrants for its economic and social development. Poverty was not a significant cause, either. The burgeoning economy offered abundant work. Extreme poverty seldom afflicted the region. Social conflict did occur, yet never caused intense confrontation. Imperial decay, often accompanied by social chaos, administrative disarrangement and public disorder, occurred in China Proper during the last years of the dynasty, but did not have much impact on Heilongjiang. The above assumptions have little applicability, therefore, to the origins of Heilongjiang banditry, even if they are germane to North China. It is necessary to look elsewhere to explain banditry as a frontier phenomenon.

First of all, Heilongjiang's ecological setting was ideal for outlaws. This huge and sparsely inhabited land was marked by mountains, rivers, forests and other landforms. The two mountain ranges, the Greater and Lesser Xing'an, with their offshoots and ridges, occupied one-fourth of the total region. They were covered by dense forests and indented with numerous caves. The many rivers and tributaries in the region possessed countless islands and isolated headlands. In these natural hideouts bandits congregated, stored weapons, held captives, and planned future moves. These locations were hard to find and impossible for small groups of police to deal with. Since such natural landforms covered the region, bandits were dispersed throughout the land. Records show that almost every area contained landforms that at some time harbored outlaws: "nobody lived there ... yet it became the natural lodging for bandits ... it was from there that the bandits kidnapped travelers and murdered people for their property." (4) "The mountainous region northeast of Dongxing has been a notorious refuge for bandits." (5) Other county registers carry similar accounts of outlaws harassing the nearby vicinities. Even on the plains, bandits found their domicile near rivers, for example "in the Quanzi tract, about twenty kilometers from the county seat ... bandits were active along the river." (6) Crops planted by the settlers also became a seasonal haven for bandits. In the 1910s and 1920s, sorghum became one of the important crops of the region. In the summer and early fall, the fully grown sorghum was so tall and thick that even men on horseback were not visible inside a field. A local folksong says: "when the green net [of sorghum] rises, the time has come to join the band." (7) At harvest time the bandits would return home, and the "season" was over.

Regional customs, deeply rooted in the military tradition, also created a social milieu for bandits. For more than two hundred years, Manchu banner troops were stationed in Heilongjiang. Their training in horse riding, swordsmanship, use of the dagger and various forms of kungfu cast a subtle influence upon the regional culture. Military men rather than scholar literati set the tone here, in contrast to China Proper. Officials often spoke of locals as beyond redemption: "there are a few good men in Heihe but many more evil-doers." (8) In the eastern region, officials observed that the "contamination of bad habits has shaped their intractable militant disposition." (9) In Suilan Prefecture, officials complained that "it is hard to control the untamed militant persons who can suddenly turn into bandits." (10) In Baoqing, officials saw that "militant men living in the wild" were hard to control. (11) "Locals are aggressively militant and have become a serious problem." (12) Any reckless official move could turn aggressive locals into bandits ready to challenge authority and prey upon other settlers. It is an exaggeration to claim, as some did, that almost every family in the region directly or indirectly had relations with bandits, or that local youths typically saw banditry as a way to understand the outside world. (13) It is safe to conclude, though, that banditry was a byproduct of the long militarized tradition of the region.

The political vacuum in many local areas allowed outlaws to flourish. Before 1900, county or prefectural civilian administrations had been established in very few areas in Heilongjiang. The overwhelming majority of county governments were established between 1900 and 1931. When a county government was set up, the number of officials and staff was no more than a few dozen. Even if they commanded a small police force, it was impossible for them to firmly control the whole territory under their administration. County seats might be relatively well fortified, but villages and small towns were highly vulnerable. Political control by the center was at its weakest along the county boundaries, which often were defined by difficult terrain, and here bandit infestation was common. Furthermore, the size of frontier counties was much larger than in China Proper. Even south of the Great Wall, control of banditry was possible only when government authority was at its zenith. On the frontier, weak governance was characteristic and bandits seldom felt pressure from central authority. Archival sources show many local areas were deemed to be within nobody's jurisdiction. In such areas the "political whip was too short to reach." (14) Bandits brazenly targeted weak county administrations. In 1918 they occupied the county seat in Fangzheng, kidnapping the magistrate and his staff; and the following year bandits raided the county seat in Yilan, ransacking the county administrative building. (15)

Security in the frontier region was provided primarily by the provincial army, whose other obligation was to defend the national border. In fact, the army was used more often to safeguard the frontier community than to guard the border. The army, however, was trained for short-term punitive actions. Its numbers were so limited that its presence was dwarfed by the size of the territory. For example, in 1923 there were 6,399 soldiers stationed in Heilongjiang. The number in each county was less than 200, in some counties less than 100. Tangyuan, Tonghua and Nenjiang each had only forty-seven men. (16) Regardless of the army's temporary success, there remained much room in which bandits could maneuver. Furthermore, the army could add to the problem by turning locals into outlaws. A contemporary observer remarked that soldiers often exploited the local settlers by accusing them of collaboration with the bandits: "soldiers occupied settlers' home and aggravated their suffering." (17) Finally, it should be noted that in the civil wars that wracked northern China after 1912, army units were often withdrawn from the frontier areas to be sent to the battlefields further south. Whenever this occurred, the frontier immediately witnessed the reemergence of widespread banditry.

The frontier lacked the mechanism of traditional convention to regulate its social relations. Opportunities for gaining land or jobs were abundant, yet many hired hands had to move from job to job in order to survive. Psychological pressure rather than communal tension, mental stress rather than class struggle, personal jealousy rather than social poverty, pushed settlers into banditry. For them, affluence was within sight but beyond reach. The fact that the rich became richer was a source of anger, which prompted some to take the short cut to making their fortune. Zhang Yonggui, a bandit leader active in Heilongjiang, arrived there as an immigrant in 1898. He worked as a miner, railwayman, silversmith and lumberman, yet none of these jobs made him rich; then he turned to banditry. (18) Li Haiqing, a well-known bandit chief along the Songhua [Sungari] River, came from Shandong. In 1904, when he was nine, Li's parents settled in Zhaozhou County. Li worked as a herdsman, bricklayer, tile maker and cart driver, but still led an ordinary life. To fulfill his ambition, he joined the bandits and soon became a leader. (19)

Bandit recruits were overwhelmingly young males. The masculine nature of banditry reflected the imbalance of the sex ratio on the frontier. In Heilongjiang, this brought about a "bride famine." Female infanticide and abortion were not widely practiced here; the shortage of women was a result of the demographic character of immigration into the region. The frontier was largely a male preserve. According to the contemporary researcher Zhong Ming, "the sex ratio of immigrants in the first six months of 1929 is 82.8% male and 17.2% female." (20) Zhong's estimate focused on a specific year, yet his figures were not out of line. Early census reports show the imbalance. According to Xu Shichang, the governor of Manchuria who wrote a book on the region in 1910, the sex ratio in the northern frontier among settlers' children was roughly balanced, but that of the adult settlers was strikingly different. (21) In Yilan County in 1919, among 95,903 settlers, there were 63,044 males and 32,859 females. (22) By the late 1920s, as more and more immigrants poured in, the shortage of women grew worse. In 1930 Wu Shiyuan observed: "The number of females is far less than that of males. The difference is indeed astonishing ... Males predominate in poor families, less so in rich families. Even in Hulan, which has long been settled, the ratio is still 1,000 to 590. In Hailun, it is 1,000 to 777. According to the Economic Investigation Bureau, the highest ratio of women for any county is 888 to 1,000, while the lowest is 500 to 1,000. On the average, in the whole province [Heilongjiang], the ratio is 750 to 1,000." (23)

The sex ratio imbalance posed a further problem. While polyandry became a habit for some male settlers who shared one woman and produced their offspring as such, many males who could not find wives remained bachelors all their lives. (24) The bride shortage had a pernicious social impact. Restless and sexually active young men might kidnap women and keep them in the mountain caves as so-called "wives on hold." Court records show that many executed bandits had never married or had become bandits only after the death of their wives. (25)

Natural disasters sometimes caused settlers to turn to become outlaws. Settlers often failed to realize the long term risks of cultivation. There was no preparation for calamities, such as flood, drought or fire. Settlers were unfamiliar with the local ecology and often expected to turn wasteland overnight into rich farms. Although drought and flood were not frequent in Heilongjiang, they might strike suddenly. Only long-term settlers were likely to foresee such dangers. Fire was also a hazard, and a whole village or town could be consumed, as happened to the city of Hailun in 1921. (26) Floods, such as the one along the Songhua River in 1910, took 200 lives and swallowed the nearby land. (27) Such calamities were especially felt by new immigrants, who were driven into insolvency, unable to meet loans or rent. To escape these burdens, some turned to banditry. In some villages, settlers confronted with natural disasters refused to pay rent and turned themselves en masse into brigands. (28)

In dealing with the origins of banditry, fundamental questions present themselves. To what degree was frontier outlawry linked to other provinces, in particular Shandong, the source of the majority of immigrants to the region? To what extent did bandits deliberately relocate themselves from their home province to the frontier? Since the fall of the Qing Dynasty, banditry had been a festering problem in China Proper, which the national government and the local authorities continuously endeavored to eradicate. Under such pressure, some bandits sought new havens and joined the great migration. Some bandit gangs migrated wholesale in response to official pressures. Rural poverty also acted as a stimulus to bandit relocation, because the poor conditions of much of China Proper meant that local banditry yielded little. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that bandits in any way epitomized the great migration. Yet, it is undeniable that they constituted a portion of the emigrants. Some bandit leaders who were captured and executed by the government were of Shandong origin. (29) Furthermore, quasi-bandit bands, such as the Big Sword Society and the Red Gun Society, moved from Shandong to the frontier in large groups. (30)

It is ironic that some refugees, whose settlement on the frontier was assisted by government and local organizations, turned themselves into bandits. These refugees were disillusioned by the frontier reality, which was different from the official propaganda that had offered them a life of ease. What they had to face was a wilderness and years of hard work. Disillusionment drove some refugees to take to robbery as a way of life. A famous Chinese scholar Chen Hansheng noted in the late 1920s that "of the Henan refugees sent to the Xing'an military colonization area by the Famine Relief Commission of Henan ... a number went over to the bandits." (31)

Immigrants from South Manchuria included bandits. In Liaoning, the warlord Zhang Zuolin, originally a bandit, had built a strong regional regime. Zhang now aimed to eliminate banditry as he sought to build a stable society. Faced with this situation, bandits slipped into Heilongjiang. Although Zhang was nominally ruler of all Manchuria by the mid-1920s, the frontier region was not under his firm control, and displaced bands of bandits in the south found it easy to move north. (32) In the 1910s and 1920s, as South Manchuria was starting to modernize, more bandits migrated to the north. Among them was the notorious female bandit Tuolong [Camel Dragon], who was a native of Liaoning. Along with her husband, she built a domain in Shuangcheng, Wuchang and Yushu counties. (33) Other bandit leaders such as Deng Wenshan also had origins in Liaoning or southern Jilin.

Banditry in Heilongjiang was multi-ethnic with Han Chinese composing a majority. Contemporary official documents frequently used the term "hufei" [ethnic bandits] to designate the outlaws. (34) A number of bandits came from local ethnic groups such as Manchus, Mongols and Solons (including Elunchun, Dawoer and Ewenke). Though their motivations were mixed, the threat to their traditional life by the relentless spread of farmland was an important one. The Qing and the Republic urged the Manchu banner soldiers, Solon hunters and Mongolian nomads to settle as farmers, while encouraging Han immigrants to move into the region. Solon hunting grounds and Mongolian pasturelands dwindled. Some Manchus gathered in the mountains, building local domains and engaging in banditry for decades. Solon tribesmen "entered the mountains as hunters but emerged [on the plains] as bandits." (35) In the farming areas Mongols rode to attack settlers. (36) The banditry of these ethnic peoples was in part attributable to their inability or unwillingness to adopt a sedentary agricultural life.

Invasion by foreign powers also contributed to the spread of banditry on the frontier. The Russian incursion of 1900 and the Japanese conquest of 1931 inflicted serious damage on local political and social structures. In the name of suppressing the Boxers, the Russians sent a huge number of troops across the border in the summer of 1900. They overwhelmed the Qing troops and occupied the region. With the loosening of state control, bandits at once appeared in large number. Qing army remnants also turned themselves into brigands to survive. In Suihua "bandits and routed soldiers roamed about ... along with evil elements ... and could not be eliminated." (37) From 1900 to 1906, bands varying from a dozen to several hundred men roamed throughout Qinggang County. (38) In Bayan, large hordes of bandits ravaged the county and could not be brought under control by local officials for several years. (39) In Zhaozhou, army units sent north from Liaoning, upon hearing that the Russians had already occupied North Manchuria, turned themselves into bandits without fighting the enemy. (40) In Hulan, when the Russians occupied the county seat, Liu Zhentang gathered more than 300 locals and pillaged settlers. Although some Hulan bandits, such as Liangxiang [Two Guns] and Zhanbei [The Northern Lord] targeted Russian soldiers, they inflicted more suffering on local settlers than on the invaders. (41) This chaos lasted for several years after the Russian withdrawal. Thus, Heilongjiang, as a national border, bore the brunt of the Russian incursion, and suffered not only from foreign invaders but also from local bandits who themselves were the products of the invasion. (42) The brutality of the invaders towards the settlers allowed bandits to exonerate themselves from their own cruelty. Wang Delin was an example. An immigrant from Shandong in 1895, Wang settled in Mishan. Witnessing the Russian soldiers' brutality, he organized a band to resist the foreigners, but also engaged in kidnapping, robbery and raids on the local community. (43)

It was not only invasion by a foreign power that added to frontier banditry. Turmoil on the other side of the border also played a role. The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the ensuing civil war led many White Russians to seek refuge in Heilongjiang and among them were bandits. Soon after the revolution, Heilongjiang cities along the Chinese Eastern Railway witnessed robbery by Russian bandits. In Harbin, "it is becoming a daily event that Russian bandits waylay passengers and loot them of valuables." "Since the beginning of the Russian Revolution, there has been turmoil in Harbin. Bandits roam and rob in full daylight." (44) Chinese bandits followed suit. Urban and rural areas were both affected by the internecine fighting which spilled over the Russian border. (45) Russian warlord Grigory Semyonov's white army entered Heilongjiang time and again, brutalizing the populace, and leaving in its wake new gangs of bandits. (46) A Hulin county magistrate lamented in 1919 that the "Russian turmoil of these years has led to bestial violence by our local bandits against their own people." (47)

Banditry was an inseparable part of Heilongjiang's frontier history. The evidence above argues that the Billingsley hypothesis for interpreting banditry in North China is inapplicable to this frontier. There is no doubt that the hypothesis explains the banditry in established regions, but it is not helpful in dealing with a frontier society. Here the evolution of the frontier to a mature society should be followed closely. Factors such as ecological habitat, regional military traditions, loose political control, rapid social changes, sex ratio imbalances, natural disasters, immigrant bandit elements, resistance of ethnic minorities to abrupt changes of living patterns, foreign invasion, and even violence on the other side of the border all promoted banditry. As a frontier region, Heilongjiang became a haven not only for poor migrants, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population, but also for a number of outlaws, who found ample space to maneuver. Banditry in Heilongjiang was more a product of frontier society rather than of the conditions which existed within the established society of China Proper.

II. Sustainable Outlawry: Banditry as a Way of Frontier Life

A close examination of Heilongjiang banditry reveals the existence of two worlds: the settler world administered by the government and the bandit world managed by the outlaws. The two clashed, interacted, and absorbed each other to shape this frontier. The bandit world was seemingly minuscule. One source estimates the ratio of bandits to settlers was perhaps no more than one to a thousand. (48) All the same, banditry had a strong impact on the settler world. This dichotomy itself has posed the following questions about the bandit world. To what degree did the bandits devastate frontier society? How did the bandits sustain themselves? How did they organize themselves? What was the relationship between the bandit domain and settler society?

The description of bandits being "as thick as fleas," as reported in some official documents or personal accounts, was an exaggeration. Nevertheless, the ruinous effects of banditry on the frontier were highly tangible. Bandit raids were so common that some part of the frontier was affected every year. Banditry created an obstacle to sustained agricultural cultivation. Because settlers were scattered in small groups, with insufficient protection, they were vulnerable to raids and lived in a constant state of fear. "In reclamation areas, bandits gathered in bands and harassed farmers; they took hold of farmers' horses, seized their grain and even killed their cattle." (49) Worse than this, farmers' lives were at risk. In Qinggang, at the turn of the century, the Guang family and their hired hands, altogether sixteen people, were murdered in one attack. Some large bandit gangs "ravaged the land, ruined crops and left not a blade of green grass." (50) Agriculture slackened in bandit-infested areas as settlers moved to new locations. This was especially the case in more remote parts of the country, where there was no official presence. For example, because of bandit raids, only fifty or sixty of the original five hundred families remained in Longzhuagou in Boli County in 1923. (51) In border areas such as Qigan, "bandits ... crippled local farming." (52)

Damage to local commerce by bandits was often severe and could be ruinous. To a certain degree bandits may be seen as consumers, but their income for their purchases came from spoils and ransom money. Merchants were often the targets for cash. Bandits demanded large ransoms and families usually complied by immediate payment. The result was the bankruptcy of the business, or at least a heavy blow to normal commercial operations. The most brazen method used by bandits was direct attack on shops. For example, along the Hulan River, Yang Chuanbao and his band ruthlessly pillaged local businesses for two months in 1918. When Yang distributed the spoils among his followers, each received between $300 and $700, which was more than several years' income for a farmer. (53) Sometimes bandits targeted a specific area for an immediate haul of cash and goods. In 1919, a band of three hundred men looted more than fifty firms at Yimianpo, a town on the Chinese Eastern Railway. (54) Raids on business not only affected proprietors but also the local settlers, since normal commercial activity and access to the market were disrupted, and prices went up as merchants sought to recoup their losses.

Bandit raids on local government offices also disrupted political administration. An attractive lure was the fragile county-level administration, which consisted of the magistrate, a few officials and a dozen or so policemen. Since the magistrate and his subordinates received monthly pay as well as annual allowances in cash from the provincial government, they often attracted bandits around payment time. In 1913, the Hulin county seat was pillaged and all of the official cash was seized. In 1921, Lanxi County seat was occupied for three days by Wu Jun [Five Armies] and his 500 fellow bandits. They made off with all the government funds. In 1929, bandit Wei Laoguo and his band of forty raided the county seat of Huma. After three hours' heavy fighting, they forced their way into the city and made off with the official treasury. Occasionally, county magistrates were kidnapped. That happened to magistrates in Hulin in 1913, Fujin in 1917 and Fangzheng in 1918. (55)

Another reason bandits attacked the county government was to release imprisoned fellow brigands, as occurred in Nehe in 1921 and Tonghe in 1923. The Nehe case was notorious. Over 800 bandits overwhelmed the local police, burned government offices, released all prisoners, and recruited them into their band. The five-hour rampage turned much of the city of Nehe into a wasteland. Other county seats suffered the same fate, for example Jiamusi in 1914, Huachuan in 1920, and Wangkui in 1923. In Huachuan, the bandits occupied the city for over a month. (56) Bandits sometimes forced the local government to move to another location or even forced the provincial government to dissolve the local administration. For instance, in Fengshan, the provincial government established a reclamation bureau as the first step in the installation of a county government. However, bandit raids were so frequent that the bureau was abolished in 1925. (57) Boli county seat was relocated to a "safe" site in 1919 due to raids. (58)

It would be erroneous, however, to give the impression that Heilongjiang was an entirely chaotic frontier. While the bandit problem continued throughout the three decades from 1900 to 1931, the violence occurred in specific locations at specific times. Moreover, many communities were victimized only once. The bandits did not merge into a large force to establish a powerful regional regime dominating the whole frontier. However, the psychological distress suffered by settlers was enormous. Since it was hard to foretell the coming of bandits and because of their quasi-guerrilla tactics, settlers felt imperiled whenever they heard reports of a bandit attack, even if it happened far away. For several months in 1906, when bandits roamed in Hailun, settlers there said they thought they were living in a hell until the largest band was suppressed. (59) From 1918 to 1924, settlers in the counties of Wuchang and Shuangcheng lived in nightmarish conditions every day when "Camel Dragon" [Tuolong] and her husband "Big Dragon" [Dalong] led 2,000 bandits in an indiscriminate rout of plunder and murder. (60) Although the psychological impact is hard to measure, records have left numerous accounts of settlers' reactions to the raids. This constant mental pressure upon the settlers constituted a particular aspect of frontier life.

Perhaps the greatest devastation visited upon frontier society came at the hands of soldiers who had turned themselves into bandits. This was a common phenomenon throughout Heilongjiang. Poor pay, officer tyranny, the youth of the soldiers, and the affluence of local settlers helped create soldier bandits. (61) Having gained some formal military training and with access to arms, soldiers who defected from their units inflicted much damage upon settlements. Sun Xuewu, an army officer, turned himself and his fellow soldiers into bandits in 1912. They robbed, burnt, and kidnapped. One year later, his band allied itself with several local bands. With Sun as leader, this enlarged force numbered more than a thousand men in five well-organized columns. They roamed through Qinggang, Hulan, Anda, Suihua and other counties in the Song-Nen plains. County registers recorded their crimes with phrases such as "no peaceful days," "no green grass left," and "no settlers untouched." (62)

Individual soldier defection was quite common, and the defection of a whole unit was not rare. For example, in 1914 in Qiqihar a battalion of soldiers, over one hundred men, turned themselves into bandits, pillaging stores and robbing residents. In the same year in Nehe, soldiers under the command of the battalion leader robbed stores and banks. In 1914, a company of soldiers in Yuqing killed their commander and took to banditry. The most serious defection happened in 1922 when a regiment of 1,300 soldiers killed their officers, pillaged settlers and merchants, then fled into the mountains. (63) Although some of these exsoldier bandits were killed by government troops, remnants survived and even established their own base in the mountains.

Bandit domains on the plains tended to be short-lived. Since settlers gradually reduced the wilderness by building villages, the plains made bandits vulnerable to pursuit by government forces. However, the plains presented the bandits with targets too tempting to resist, so in some areas they set up more long-lasting bases. Northern Anda, for example, was bandit infested at the turn of the century. As more settlers moved in, a village was even named "peace village" to indicate the settlers' desire for a stable life. (64) From 1913 to 1918, bandit bands of varying strength intensified their raids in this area. (65) The topography of Taikang [Du'erbote] was flat, yet because of its affluence and proximity to the railways, bandits turned the nearby area of Fengziduan into a den from which they attacked merchants and rich landowners. (66) Even populous Hulan, on the plains with a population reaching 300,000 in the late 1920s, witnessed bandit activity. Since Hulan was one a highly productive agricultural area, bandits frequently attacked grain shipments en route to railway stations. "Bandits may suddenly appear, murder the cart drivers and seize the goods. Local settlers suffered most from these raids." (67) In attempting to suppress this kind of banditry, more than ninety soldiers died in Hulan County in the late 1920s, including a number of officers. (68)

If the plains offered bandits easy prey, they also allowed the government greater ease in mobilizing army and police. As time passed, and security strengthened, few bandit domains remained on the plains by the 1920s. However, hilly ranges and mountains remained bandit hideouts. In northern Suihua, the forested hills had been controlled by bandits for many years. Tieshanbao, meaning fortified mountain, was one such place. In 1915, prefectural officials stated that "with its huge area and scarcity of settlers" Tieshanbao had become a place "where bandits multiplied." (69) On the border of the four counties of Mulan, Tieli, Qing'an and Bayan, was the notorious base of "Black Mount" [Heishan], described in a surveyor's report of 1917 as a "vast ocean of verdant trees in an endless ranges of mist-covered mountains." (70) The Black Mount bandits extorted their provision from the local settlers and dominated an area as large as a county. Similar bases could also be found in other areas, such as the one near Fengshan in Tonghe County. When government soldiers withdrew from the county in 1923, bandits mustered and built strongholds in the mountains. They demarcated the area to the north of the Maling River as their domain. For more than six years this county-sized area was controlled by a thousand bandits. Fortifications to fend off outside attack were built. These bandits were so strong that they forced the provincial government in 1925 to abandon its plan for a preparatory county administration. (71)

Under similar conditions, the border with Russia often served as an ideal space for banditry. The two mountain ranges of the Greater and Lesser Xing'an, paralleling the Heilong River [Amur], served as hideouts while the bandits could also slip across the river to the Russian side to avoid justice. Many bandits, even if operating on the plains several hundred miles away, moved to the border for consolidation or to escape official pursuit. Government documents often noted criminal elements among migrants who had settled near the border: "people arrive there from every direction, and the bandits among them outnumber honest men." (72) Chinese bandits even allied with Russian bandits for joint action. During such operations, the Russians often killed their Chinese victims since they could not understand the language. As one source wrote, "Russian bandits first murder their victims and then loot their property ... while Chinese bandits seize property and often let their victims go." (73) Some Russian bandits hid on the Chinese side to escape the Russian police. The area along the river in Xunke County had been a Russian bandit base for many years and was a headache for Chinese administrators. (74) Small Russian bands merged with a larger Chinese band. Among the four hundred bandits led by Chen Dongshan, more than thirty were Russians. In one operation in Luobei, Chen's band seized several hundred cattle and robbed settlers of their grain. (75) Some Russian bandits in Hailar claimed they had become naturalized Chinese in order to escape the Bolshevik Revolution, but that the Chinese failed to protect them, forcing them to turn to banditry. (76) On August 27, 1927, a train on the way from Harbin to Suifenghe was stopped, 50 people were kidnapped and property valued at $60,000 taken. Passengers on the train found to their surprise that the leader of this mixed band was a Russian. (77)

Such Russian involvement in Chinese bandit activity was rare, however. Most of the bandits in Heilongjiang were Chinese nationals. Both Confucianism and Buddhism, the two most important components of traditional Chinese culture, were reflected in outlaw society. Confucian values, despite their stress on social hierarchy, emphasized group solidarity. This became fraternity in bandit social practice. To join a band, a Heilongjiang recruit had to pledge allegiance through a number of oaths. Among these were solemn promises to be faithful to the band, maintain filial piety to parents, display warmhearted sympathy to the weak, and give full loyalty to the leader. (78) Confucian values were complemented by certain Buddhist beliefs. Most Heilongjiang bandits worshipped the traditional eighteen Buddhist arharts [Luohan], among whom was Damo, credited as the founder of the bandit profession. Damo was said to be the founder of a Buddhist sect and was a master of the martial arts. (79) The brotherly co-operation of the eighteen arharts was emulated by bandits. To symbolize this, most Heilongjiang bandits wore a small bronze Buddha on their chest. (80)

Besides their deformed faith in Confucianism and Buddhism, most Heilongjiang bandits enforced a strict communal life on their members. To join the band, one required referees, sometimes more than twenty bandits. Meanwhile, acolytes had to possess basic skills in the martial arts. (81) One band, whose discipline was especially strict, was led by Whitehorse Zhang [Zhang Baima]. Zhang became a bandit around 1900 soon after the fall of the Zheltuga Republic. (82) He enforced a rigid disciplinary code known as the Thirteen Creeds. This code decreed "moral" behavior for his followers, assistance to other bandits, capital punishment to violators, and rewards for whoever did good deed for the band. (83) The punishment of violators was especially severe, particularly those who were deemed traitors and deserters. Only under the most exceptional circumstances could bandits leave the band, which otherwise was regarded as betrayal. These strictures reinforced the communal life. (84)

Once bandits consolidated their power in one area, they endeavored to develop a special relationship with the local settlers and tried to integrate themselves into "normal" life. (85) Since the political reach of the state was weak or non-existent on the frontier, they functioned as a "shadow government" and acted as local "police" to safeguard local communities against other bandits. The correspondent A. R. Lindt observed that the "bandits defend the plains against the warrior tribes ... the horse thieves. The bandits protect the peasants from the injustice of the mandarin. The bandits are the friends of the poor, the enemies of the rich. They are the distributors of wealth." (86) In the words of a Heilongjiang man, "When bandits arrived, local settlers provided them with drinks and provisions; when the officials and soldiers came, locals sent them in the wrong direction." (87) Such assertions likely romanticized the relationship between bandits and settlers. Yet they suggest that some bandits tended to be social bandits rather than hardened criminals. And long-term survival demanded some modus vivendi with the local settlers.

Some bandits maintained a particular tie with settlers, even recruiting a number of them into their ranks. In Lindian County, 151 bands of bandits were identified during 1912-31 period. The sheer number suggests local recruitment. Banditry here even survived Japanese colonial rule. Settlers often maintained permanent relationships with the bandits. In Tianxijiu village, among the forty families, ten were bandits and another four occasionally participated in bandit activities. (88) In Suihua, around 1910, "the rich settlers could not resist the brigands and were forced to bow down before the bandits. Some idle, lazy and poor settlers, influenced by what they constantly saw and heard, ended up joining the bands." (89) Numerous documents point to collaboration between local elites and bandits [tongfei]. This happened frequently enough that the government targeted such collaborators. In 1928, Zhao Xianzong, chairman of the Mingshui County Commercial Society, was accused of "colluding with bandits, accumulating his wealth through defrauding locals ... and conniving with a band ... to waylay, seize ... and kidnap." (90) Some collaborators were punished, yet more eluded prosecution, especially members of the local elite whose social and economic power ensured their acquittal.

Even local police at times co-operated with bandits. The frontier was steeped in stories about bandits and their relations with the local military police. Frontier heroes and villains were many times the same person, and a police and outlaws were often seen as one and the same. A notorious bandit could be a policeman the next morning and turn back into a bandit at night. Frequently police benefited from illicit connections with bandits. Chen Detai, who commanded the police force of two counties [Hailun and Baiquan], "assisted bandits, harassed settlers, misused his power, and exerted a pernicious influence upon the region." (91) Xiao Bozhen, a police officer in Bingzhou, provided weapons to bandits to kill local people. (92) With the tacit agreement of police, bandits were allowed to extort payments from wealthy families or to levy taxes on goods in transit. A bandit with the name of Sihai [Four Seas] in 1919 demanded each local elite family contribute at least $800 within a few days. In 1921 in Ning'an, Jinlong [Golden Dragon] and his band imposed a "tax" on several rich families, who were to contribute $80,000 before the deadline. (93) These demands fell not only on rich families and merchants, but also on ordinary settlers. Bandits simulated government officials in levying "taxes" in exchange for "protection." The taxes they imposed were paid in cash, grain, clothes and other necessities. (94)

Some bandits were remembered, however, as local heroes for their "good deeds". This was the case with Tian Bianyang in 1913 in the Song-Nen plains. Tian and his band "possessed the chivalrous style of ancient knights,... they took from the rich and gave their wealth to the poor." (95) Some bandits who gained temporary possession of local political and economic resources acted as "holy almsgivers." The dual images of robber and benefactor in remote regions benefited bandits. Their former criminal records were often ignored and they could continue to take advantage of the situation to maintain their "rule." Since there was no effective way to enforce government authority in far-off isolated regions, the bandits served to fill the void.

Nevertheless, no bandit in Heilongjiang ever attained the level of regional ruler. As new immigrants settled in ever larger numbers and governmental control was steadily strengthened, large bandit bands were gradually pushed into the more remote parts of the province areas and their influence declined. This is not to minimize the ruinous impact of bandit raids on local settlements, agriculture, commerce and administration. During the thirty-one years from 1900 to 1931, bandits flourished on the plains, in the mountains, and along the national borders. However, as time passed and the bandits withdrew steadily into the mountains, they sought to preserve their shrinking domains by enforcing strict discipline and maintaining at least a minimally beneficent relationship with the settlers. Yet, to sustain their life, they had to continue to rob, extort and kidnap by targeting the rich and even the poor. Even if they established good relations with some locals, they were still seen by the government and by majority of settlers as the most dangerous threat to social stability.

III. The Unending Campaign: Battling Banditry in Heilongjiang

The campaign against outlaws went on without break from 1900 to 1931. Officials and settlers tried a variety of methods to rid themselves of the menace. Improved local security, direct military action, and reform of captured bandits were the three principal means used.

Civilian defense measures were essential, as settlements in the sparsely inhabited land were often far apart. New communities were established in isolated and remote areas. Settlers often welcomed incoming immigrants as reinforcement for their own safety. Young immigrants were seen as natural defenders of their new homes. Local officials allowed settlers to purchase guns for self-defense, under the condition that guns were licensed and carried registration numbers. In some cases, officials equipped settlers who lived in the mountains with weapons not only for self-defense, but also for assistance to government forces in dealing with nearby bandits. (96) Rich families and merchants often hired young men as guards. (Bandit attacks were seldom reported by them: only one out often according to one estimate. (97)) Members of the local elite organized their own defense forces. One such person was Gao Yutang, who at the beginning of the century recruited men to fight the bandits infesting Hulan County. Gao gradually built it into a powerful local militia, which proved effective in protecting both his county and the nearby counties. (98)

As more newcomers arrived, settlers organized village associations [lianzhuanghui] which served as a local militia. In Bayan County, where bandit infestation was serious and the government could offer no assistance, settlers began forming village associations as early as 1901. They divided the county into four districts and each one elected a commander. Below this, every four to seven villages elected a chief. Basic militia regulations were as follows: "Every family must contribute one young man. Those who own two hundred forty sang [65.9 acre] of land must contribute a gun. If a village or district is attacked by bandits, the gong will be struck to warn the whole area. Other districts or villages will bring help ... all expenses are to be equally apportioned according to land ownership and calculated at the end of each year." This military network helped forge community solidarity: "Under bandit attacks, the comradeship of settlers is deepened and their will for unity increased." The growth of local militia played an important role in developing local institutions. As a county historian recorded, "settlers willingly contribute what they have to their own defense without governmental help. The village associations often bear the brunt ... in battles against bandits." (99) Village associations in some counties were seasonal, only active in summer and fall, when crops needed protection from theft and revenge-motivated arson. In some counties, village associations were regularized into organs under which each household provided a young male, and leading families elected a head who was responsible for gun purchase and other issues. (100) Throughout the decades from 1900 to 1931, village associations and local civilian militia played a vital role in local safety.

Members of the local elite who protected property and lives were often praised as community heroes. Militiamen who died on the battlefield were enshrined as martyrs. Females who sacrificed their lives were seen as epitomizing settlers' fortitude. A Mrs. Xue was such a figure. An immigrant from Sichuan and a settler in Baiquan County, she became part of the elite in Sandao town. In 1911, the town was suddenly attacked. Since her husband was away when her home was besieged, she challenged the bandits by blocking their way to her house in order to protect her family. In front of the bandits, she committed suicide, shocking the outlaws into flight. For this, she was canonized as a local martyr. (101)

This act of suicide was regarded as a heroic deed. The Xue model, however, was not meant to urge settlers to die, but rather to encourage them to deal bravely with the outlaws. The example of another heroine testifies to this. Mrs. Ruan, the wife of the county magistrate of Yilan, was the victim of an attack in 1919, when the bandits burnt the government offices. She offered to pardon them in return for their agreement to preserve lives and property in the town. She then held a banquet and persuaded them to withdraw without taking a single cent from the settlers. (102) For her bravery, she was rewarded by the government and achieved fame as a heroine. Even foreigners could be accorded the status of hero. Morgan Palmer, an American agricultural expert employed by the provincial government, was killed in bandit raid upon the village in which he was working. To commemorate him, a local village was given his name: Paerh-mo Tun [Palmer Village]. (103)

The civilian defense forces were vulnerable since they were not well trained and were often outnumbered by large bands. In such cases, heroic resistance still meant defeat, often with heavy casualties. Only the army could deal with bands of large size. Numbering several thousand men, the frontier army served primarily to suppress banditry. Between 1900 and 1931 it played a vital role in doing so. (104) The army was sent out to pursue and engage bandits in battle, as well as to besiege them in their lairs and in villages. When bandits were pushed into a corner, they fought desperately and often took a heavy toll of the soldiers. (105)

Extermination [huijiao] campaigns, in which the army simultaneously attacked bandit refuges over a wide area, were launched intermittently. In 1909, such a campaign extended over several thousand square kilometers and lasted for four months. The army captured many bandit chieftains, killed hundreds of their followers and releasing more than three hundred hostages. (106) Such campaigns were intended to entrap bandits in a net, but invariably many escaped. Army units were stationed throughout the counties, but often the garrisons were not large enough to deal with a large band of bandits. The number of direct engagements with bandit forces increased during the Republican period. In 1913, a famous general, Xu Lanzhou, besieged a large band in Suihua County and killed fifty men. It then went into battle in Wangkui County against a band of 250, killing many of them, including their leader. (107) Direct engagements, however, could not guarantee "extermination." For example, in 1922, a fierce encounter between an army unit and a band of 180 in Suiling County resulted in only twelve killed or wounded and two captured, while the rest escaped. (108) In 1923, in Baiquan County, the army fought a band of 170. Some thirty bandits were slain and thirty hostages released, while the rest of the band fled. (109)

All things considered, the army remained the most effective weapon against banditry. Local settlers said that: "In dealing with bandits, the police are stronger than the civilian militia, but strongest is the army." Police could only patrol local communities and fight off small bands, while they were at risk from large bands. In 1913, the murder of Qinggang County policemen by bandits caused settlers to ask for an army unit to be stationed there. (110) Settlers in remote areas particularly sought the presence of the army. (111) In border areas, such as Raohe County, local officials asserted that "even a battalion stationed here could help reduce bandit infestation and enhance the confidence of settlers." (112) Settlers hoped for disciplined soldiers, as exemplified by the brigade under the command of Ma Zhanshan in Hulan County. These men "never gave trouble to the settlers," and later a stele inscribed in praise of the brigade was erected. According to it, Ma's soldiers assured the security of the settlers by their immediate response to bandit raids, their thoroughness in eliminating outlaws, and the excellent discipline they maintained in their relationship with the local inhabitants. "The settlers in Hulan saw that bandits had gone, and never experienced any wrongdoing by the army," concluded the inscription. (113)

Chinese authorities occasionally asked the Russians in the region for help in eliminating bandits. Since the Russians maintained a military force along the Chinese Eastern Railway and in the Russian quarter of the city of Harbin, Chinese authorities could readily request their assistance, either through loan of weapons or Russian participation in bandit suppression. The Russians were inclined to cooperate since they feared attacks on the Chinese Eastern Railway; furthermore, bandits were likely to cross the border and hide out in Russian territory. Sino-Russian cooperation took place mainly before the Russian Revolution. Several times in 1906, for example, the Russians loaned weapons and dispatched soldiers when called upon by the Heilongjiang government and the Hulan district magistrate. (114) On one occasion in 1917, Russia dispatched more than two hundred soldiers to assist the Chinese in fighting off a regional bandit attack. (115) Messages often went back and forth to warn of the approach of bandits or report the capture of them. Extradition followed, and if necessary, witnesses from the other side of the border were called to court to verify the identities of the bandits and testify to their crimes. (116) The thousand mile long border was full of gaps, but Sino-Russian cooperation played its own small role in property recovery and criminal apprehension.

Large-scale military campaigns were often accompanied by serious property destruction and high civilian casualties. The latter could be high. In 1913, the extermination campaign in Raohe dealt the local bandits a major blow, but the settlers "also suffered heavy losses while the ensuing disorder persisted for some time." (117) Hence, the authorities experimented with peaceful solutions to the bandit problem. This happened especially when their forces were short in numbers, or when officials desired for whatever reason to avoid bloodshed. When bandit leaders indicated a desire to abandon their profession, amnesty was immediately offered and overnight the whole band became a unit of the army or local police. Sometimes bandit leaders negotiated particularly advantageous conditions from the government, such as conferral of military rank upon themselves, a closing of the book in regard to their past actions, and control of their forces free from direct administrative control. (118) In 1902, a number of local governments were compelled to adopt this strategy of converting bandits into soldiers, as the Qing army had been routed two years earlier during the Boxer Rebellion. Sun Lou's band of 200 in Ningguta, Baoshan's 650 in Bingzhou and Hao Wenpo's 130 in Sanxing were all recruited into the army and the leaders rewarded with high rank. (119) On occasion settlers pleaded with the government to negotiate with the bandits for a wholesale intake. For example, in Yanshou in 1902, when a bandit leader was arrested, his fellow bandits threatened to retaliate by killing all settlers in the county. The intimidation worked. The settlers begged the government to offer immunity and the solution was the integration of bandits into the army. (120)

After a wholesale "conversion," former bandit leaders usually enjoyed quick promotion. Some became high-ranking officials, or important members of the local elite. Their previous record was ignored, while their "good deeds" were magnified. After his surrender, Tian Bianyang became a company leader and was described as a "Robin Hood," who "never waylaid passengers or attacked wedding ceremonies and who taxed only the rich while assisting the poor." (121) Ma Zhanshan, a well-known general in Heilongjiang, was also a former bandit leader. His band of several thousand men was incorporated into government forces after a middleman's negotiation. Once Ma became an important figure, his bandit life was romanticized. "He punished the local tyrants and supported the honest; he taxed the rich and distributed their wealth to the poor." (122) Such examples could lead to settlers joining the brigands, because they saw banditry as a channel for promotion to official position. A sardonic couplet mocked the quick social elevation of bandits: "Unless he's been a bandit, no man can be an officer; unless she's been a trollop, no woman can be a noble lady." (123)

Not all bandits were willing to succumb to the offer of official position. As a bandit leader said, to be a "wild emperor" was to be at ease. In the official view, this was nothing but the "barbarity of the wilderness, absolutely incompatible with decency, morality, righteousness and honor." (124) During the Republican period, a new strategy was used in hope of eradicating banditry. This was the pacification campaign [qingxiang]. It was sometimes provincial in scope, but more often than not was limited to a county or several counties. In 1913 and 1914 pacification was conducted over several counties. Settlers were encouraged to anonymously accuse whoever had befriended or sheltered bandits. During the campaign, the authorities enforced residence registration in an attempt to identify non-settlers. Those accused of banditry were punished by execution, imprisonment, or forfeit of property. During the 1913 and 1914 pacification campaigns, several hundred cases relating to banditry were settled and local officials boasted that settlers once again lived in peace. (125) In late 1915, a special administrative section called the Pacification Department was set up by the provincial government to coordinate punitive operations. The next year, a major provincial pacification campaign was launched. (126)

In 1923, the Pacification Department was raised to the level of a bureau. (127) This reclassification shows the importance accorded pacification as a solution to the bandit problem. However, campaigns cost money and drained manpower, so much so that officials admitted that "pacification cannot be conducted very often." (128) While its temporary effectiveness cannot be denied, the long term bandit problem remained. Bandits still held out in their mountain domains and when the time was ripe they would attack settlers. In his report to the president of China in 1915, the governor of Heilongjiang stated that "since the pacification campaigns began, bandits have been under control and the province has reached a state of basic security." (129) The "basic security" [cu'an] did not imply a lasting solution of the problem. The basic security, on the contrary, could turn into sudden catastrophe when new bandits materialized, especially when governmental control loosened, as it did in 1923 when troops on the frontier were withdrawn to fight a civil war in China Proper.

The objective of the pacification schemes was to eliminate every trace of banditry from the existing communities. However, as Heilongjiang was a developing frontier region, the need to safeguard new cultivation areas posed a further problem. Early in 1905, local authorities organized "reclamation defense units" and sent them to designated farming areas. These units consisted of both cavalry and infantry, funded by the provincial and county governments. (130) They provided an effective shield for the new communities, and settlers sought their protection. In fact these units had a dual purpose: they were to fend off existing bandits and also prevent settlers themselves from becoming bandits. (131) This type of military formation was utilized primarily in the newly opened areas, and not in the older settled parts of the frontier region.

At the county level, local administrations organized constabulary districts and assigned police to each of them. This was a result of the so-called New Policies [xinzheng] promulgated by the Qing. In Suihua County, the government divided the territory into five districts, which remained through the Republican period, and stationed several hundred police in each of them. Police stations were set up and detectives trained. (132) When the Boli County government was established in 1917, the administrative town of each of its several districts was made responsible for an area of roughly twenty square kilometers. Districts were to assist others in time of emergency: "When peaceful conditions prevail, police patrol their own district, but when bandits attack, police undertake joint operations to guard the county." (133) In some counties, magistrates themselves took charge of the police force in order to strengthen local security. Ma Liuzhou, who was magistrate of the two counties of Mulan and Bayan from 1908 to 1915, became well known for his bandit suppression measures. A terror to the bandits, he was a hero to local settlers. (134) In 1921 in Binjiang County [near Harbin], magistrate Mo Dehui divided the county into five defense districts coterminous with the regular police districts, and recruited men into the constabulary to defend the county as a whole. (135) Some counties set up schools to provide intensive six-month training programs for police. (136) The maintenance of a police force imposed a financial burden on the settlers both through regular taxes and a special surtax. The latter was increased as police numbers grew, but since police numbers were not unduly large, and the settlers benefited from their presence, there appeared to have been little opposition to the surtax. (137)

The location of new county seats was a further measure to safeguard county administrations against banditry. Since most county governments in Heilongjiang were established between 1900 and 1931 when banditry was an endemic problem, officials took pains in choosing in situating them. Authorities knew that a safe county seat would not only protect regular administration, commerce and trade, but would also attract more immigrants. For reasons of security, the seat sometimes had to be moved to another location. In Boli, the first county seat was recognized as an easy target for attack. Therefore, it was moved to a new location and surrounded with a moat. (138) In Fengshan, local officials noted that the old seat "was at the corner of two mountain peaks and was surrounded by a river. It was susceptible to bandit attacks, since it was confined in such a small and narrow place ... The new seat is in an open area to the north of the river and offers ready fortification against bandit raids." (139) Not all placements were defensive in intent. Some county seats were selected for offensive purposes. In choosing Dongxing, which was close to bandit lairs in the mountains, officials stated that the area was "a passageway for bandits to come and go.... The establishment in this place of the county government, with military support, will isolate the bandits from their food supply." (140)

The government also sought through persuasive policies to transform bandits into law-observing citizens. Bandits were told that past wrongdoing would be forgiven as long as they were willing to "make a fresh start." (141) Since discipline among bandits was tight, individual members could not leave their band unless the leader decided to accept the government's offer. Captured bandits subjected to judicial punishment might be taught farming and handicraft skills, and lectured on proper social norms. (142) Such activities were carried out mainly in local prisons, which were established concurrent with the new county administration. Prisons initially were no more than simple shelters, or clusters of thatched buildings, both highly unsanitary. (143) However, it was there that a certain number of former bandits underwent a new process of rectification, discipline and adjustment. The penitentiaries were known by several names, such as reform prisons [gailiang jianyu] or inmate learning centers [zuifan xiyisuo]. (144) It is obviously difficult to assess the effectiveness of this program, but as a different approach to the bandit problem, it indicates government willingness to look beyond purely military solutions.

During the struggle against bandits, abuse of power by officials occurred, and innocent settlers might find themselves victimized. The police and the army had final authority to enforce capital sentences on outlaws or potential bandits. This could result in gross miscarriages of justice, since it was common that "when soldiers arrived to punish bandits, they often settled accounts with settlers suspected of collaboration. Settlers' houses were burned ... sometimes settlers were killed." (145) When bandits killed a Russian officer and his staff in 1904, the local Chinese authority immediately executed fourteen villagers and arrested over thirty in order to placate the Russians. (146) Normally the execution of captured bandits required provincial approval, but county governments often issued execution orders beforehand: in 1905, for example, Tanghe County issued a decree to "execute on the spot and then report to the provincial government." (147)

Conclusion

The sub-culture of banditry was an inescapable by-product of Heilongjiang frontier society in the first three decades of the twentieth century. The distinctive nature of the frontier provided the space in which bandits could survive and prosper. While Heilongjiang was not a chaotic frontier society and bandits never accumulated momentum to establish regional power, they were still able to continually threaten the settlements in the plains. As more immigrants arrived, they were slowly forced to withdraw from the plains for refuges in remote areas or in the mountains. The bandits sustained themselves through their disciplined communal life and their symbiotic ties to local communities, who were sources of recruits and plunder. Even though bandits at times portrayed themselves as local "guardians," they were for the most part a scourge to the settlers. Apart from the damage done to life and property, their presence was a continuing mental burden to those who were struggling to build their lives in the new land.

Both government and settlers continually sought a solution to the problem of endemic banditry. Government at the provincial and county levels mounted military operations, set up police forces, and undertook further measures which have been treated above. Settlers organized their own defenses, often out of desperation because of minimal or non-existent government presence. However, regardless of the approaches taken by government during the Qing and Republican periods, it was never possible to gain a firm official grip on the frontier region. While military operations achieved a short-term respite in specific areas, most bandits remained untouched in their hideouts. Government forces were too few in too large a land to deal with bandits who relied on local social ties and their familiarity with local topography. And even though the settler world was expanding and the bandit domain was shrinking, bandits still could maneuver under the eyes of the government. As an author reported in 1928, "when a village in Hulan County suffered from bandits three years ago, the army was called in ... The village has been safe since then, but bandits still roam outside and walk openly along the roadways. Villages five or ten kilometers away are frequently the victim of bandit raids and cases of kidnapping occur time and again." (148) As long as the frontier was in the development stage, banditry would continue to be an undesirable yet inseparable part of the life of the settled community.

Banditry in Heilongjiang continued to exist after the Japanese conquest of the region in 1932. The national crisis prompted some bandits to join the anti-Japanese resistance. (149) However, many bandits continued in their traditional role of pillagers of the local settlers. Soon after the surrender of Japan, Heilongjiang was viewed by the Chinese Communists as a potential base. To achieve this goal, the Communists first had to deal with banditry. According to one estimate, about 70,000 bandits were operating in the region in 1946 when Communist troops moved in. To consolidate this vital base, the Communists spared no effort in eliminating bandit gangs. Between 1946 and 1949, as many as 1,731 Communist soldiers were killed in the campaign in southern Heilongjiang alone. (150) The number of casualties in the whole province was certainly much higher. By 1949 the Communists had transformed Heilongjiang into a bandit-free land. Along with the Communist triumph came the rapid development of the province's industrial and agrarian sectors, thus ending both Heilongjiang history as a developing frontier region and the banditry that had so much been a feature of it.

Department of History

Allendale, MI 49401

ENDNOTES

The author wants to thank Dr. David Barrett for his insightful comments and editorial help and to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions which were instrumental in the process of revision. Dr. Peter Stearns' encouragement for revising the original paper is greatly appreciated.

1. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Bandits (London, 1969), 15.

2. For critical comment on Hobsbawm, see Richard W. Slatta, "Eric J. Hobsbawm's Social Bandit: A Critique and Revision," A Journal on Social History and Literature in Latin America (2004). Some scholars reject Hobsbawm: Robert J. Anthony argues that "it is time to go beyond Hobsbawm, and to rediscover the real bandits in historical fact." See Robert J. Anthony, "Peasants, Heroes and Brigands: The Problems of Social Banditry in Early Nineteenth-Century South China," Modern China (vol. 15, no. 2) (April 1989), 123, 143.

3. Phil Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China (Stanford, 1988), 5, 16, 20, 41, 281.

4. Wu Jisun, "Duban fu Taonan, Xincheng, Qiqihar yantu riji" [Diary Written on the Way to Taonan, Xincheng and Qiqihar on Official Business], (1908), in Li Shutian, Menghuang anjuan [Documents on the Mongolian Wilderness] (Changchun, 1990), 6.

5. "Heilongjiang qingzhangjianzhaokenzongju juzhang Du Yintian wei fuyi Dongxingzhen yingshe zhaokenju bingchou nijingfeicheng" [A Report to Propose Establishment of a Reclamation Administration in Dongxing Town by Du Yintian, Head of the Heilongjiang Provincial Survey and Reclamation Bureau], (May 24, 1917), Heilongjiang Provincial Archives: Heilongjiang Shezhi [The Establishment of Local Government in Heilongjiang, 1985], 407: Heilongjiang Shezhi henceforth HS.

6. "Mingshui shezhiyuan Zhao Quanbi zhuanbaominyi qingqiu gengzheng xianjie bingqinggaixiancheng" [Report of Mingshui Administrator Zhao Quanbi to Redefine the County Boundary and Establish a County Government on the Behalf of the Local People] (December 22, 1928), HS, 546.

7. Cao Baoming, "Shenmide Guandong qisu" [The Colorful Customs of the Northeast] (Beijing, 1994), 58.

8. "Heihedao weiniqingyuanan zhunyu Woximen xianzuojianli susongcheng" [Petition of Heihe Prefecture to Establish a County Administration in Woximen] (March 31, 1921), HS, 892.

9. "Jilin jiangjun Ming'an zoubiantong Jilin guanzhi zengshe futingzhouxian dagaizhangchengzhe" [Report to the Emperor by Jilin General Ming'an concerning the Establishment of New Local Administrations] (September 9, 1878), HS, 1.

10. "Suilandaoyin Yu Sixing weizhuanbao Suileng guihuashezhi qingxingxiang" [Report of Suilan Prefecture Governor Yu Sixing concerning Local Planning] (June 4, 1915), HS, 501.

11. "Jilin caizhengtingtingzhang Xiong Zhengqi weizunyi Baoqing gaishexianzhi qingzibuzhuanzouxiang" [Report of Jilin Financial Minister Xiong Zhengqi concerning Establishment of a County Administration in Baoqing] (February 21, 1916), HS, 697.

12. "Neiwu, Caizheng liangbu huixiannizhun Baoqing fenzhidifang gaishengxianzhicheng" [Approval of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Finance for Establishment of a County Government in Baoqing] (1916), HS, 699.

13. Yang Jun, Fangtan Dongbeiren [Random Remarks on the People of the Northeast], (Beijing, 1995), 102. One scholar claims that many youths saw banditry as a window to explore the outside world. Such banditry was called "The University of the Greenwood [lulin daxue]". Ding Yifu, Dongbeiren shi zhayangde: dui heitudiren xinggede jiedu [What Kind of People are Northeasterners? An Understanding of Dongbei People of the Black Land] (Beijing, 2002), 177.

14. "Mingshui shezhiyuan Zhao Quanbi zhuanbaominyi qingqiu genggai xianjie bingqinggaixiancheng", (December 22, 1928), HS, 546.

15. Yang Buchi, Yilan xianzhi, [A History of Yilan] (Yilan, 1921), 113. Zhang Xiangling, Heilongjiang shengzhi dashiji [The History of Heilongjiang: A Chronological Record] (Harbin, 1992), 391: Heilongjiang shezhi dashiji henceforth HSD.

16. Zhang Boying, Heilongjiang zhigao [A History of Heilongjiang] (Harbin, 1992), 1243-1247; henceforth abbreviated as HZ.

17. Nan Yang, "Ruhe kaifa Dongsansheng" [How to Open up the Three Northeastern Provinces], in Manchuria Economic Monthly: Zhongdong jingji yuekan (March 1930), 11.

18. Ma Fang, Heilongjiang renwu zhuanlue, v.4 [Biographies of Heilongjiang Personages] (Harbin, 1992), 33-34; hereafter abbreviated as HRZ.

19. Ma Fang, HRZ, (v. 3, 1990), 81.

20. Zhong Ming, "Wunianlai sansheng jingji fazhan zhi huigu jiqi qiantu" [The Past Five Years of Economic Development in the Three Provinces in Review, and Prospects for the Future] Zhongdong jingji yuekan: Chinese Eastern Railway Economic Monthly (May 1930), 67.

21. Xu Shichang, Dongsansheng zhenglue [A Sketch of Northeastern Politics] (Beijing, 1911), 4371-4373. Figures for adult males and females in select areas are as follows: Heishui, 11349:4833; Zhaozhou, 12651:7283; Anda, 395:195; Suihua, 78444:48632; Yuqing, 37165:24873; Hulan, 70849:50767; Bayan, 62898:49258; Lanxi, 41417:36605; Mulan, 25163:14801; Hailun, 98643:86751; Qinggang, 13091:11609; Tangyuan, 1044:672; Heihe, 6858:6011; Nenjiang, 2875:2292; Dongxing, 2652:1863; Tieshanbao: 9207:6482. Other regions receiving immigrants experienced the same imbalance.

22. Yang Buchi, Yilan xianzhi, 113.

23. Wu Shiyuan, "Ji Hei yimin wenti zhi yanjiu" [A Study of Immigration into Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces], in Manchuria Economic Monthly: Zhongdong jingji yuekan (March 1930), 32.

24. Cao Baoming, Shenmide Guandong qisu [The Colorful Customs of the Northeast], 30.

25. In Hailun county, Fu Guisheng, a leader of a dozen bandits, "had no family"; Li Tianhe "had no wife"; Dai Shan "never married"; Li Fu, the head of seventeen bandits, became a bandit "after his wife died"; Qu Guancai, who had belonged to nine bandit gangs "did not get married" and his comrade Li De became a bandit "after the death of his wife". Most of the documents drawn on here date from 1915. "Hailunxian chengzhi daofei" [Punishing Bandits in Hailun County] (May 1, 1915), Heilongjiang Provincial Archives, Document No. 62-4-8347.

26. "Guanyu Hailunxian huozai chouban shanhuo shixiang" [The Handling of Post-fire Issues at Hailun County Seat] (April 1921), Heilongjiang Provincial Archives, Document No. 62-5-1201.

27. In 1910, floods along the Songhua [Sungari] River covered more than 3,000,000 mu of land. Zhang Boying, HZ, 2768. In 1921, in Qinggang County, floods along the Hulan River and Tongken River inundated the land along their banks for over 30 kilometers. Drought was infrequent, but occurred in Zhaodong County in 1921 and in Tailai in 1926. Zhang Xiangling, HSD, 422, 424, 467.

28. A.R. Lindt, Special Correspondent: With Bandit and General in Manchuria (London, 1933), 102.

29. Heilongjiang Provincial Archives, 62-4-8347. Ma Fang, HRZ, (v. 1, 1988), 81-83; (v. 2, 1990), 66; (v. 3, 1990), 81; (v. 4, 1992), 33.

30. Whether the Big Sword Society was a bandit organization is open to debate. It fought other bandit groups. Nevertheless, its members were regarded as bandits by the government. He Nian, Jiu Zhongguo tufei jiemi [Bandit Secrets of Old China] (Beijing, 1998), 707. In 1928, Heilongjiang governor Wu Junsheng commanded forces, including cavalry and infantry, to do battle with the Big Sword Society and killed some 1,260 of its members. Zhang Xiangling, HSD, 476.

31. Chen Han-seng [Chen Hansheng], Notes on Migration of Nan Min [Refugees] to the Northeast (Shanghai, 1931), printed by Thomas Chu and Sons, Shanghai. This pamphlet was bound with other articles into one book by Cornell University Library with a new title Institute of Pacific Relations: Publications on China, 1931 (Cornell University Library, 1931), 28.

32. Even during the Qing Dynasty, defeated bandits often moved to North Manchuria to seek secure "nests". See Heilongjiang Provincial Archives: Heilongjiang tongzhi caiji ziliao [Selected Sources in Heilongjiang Local History] (Harbin, 1985), 607; henceforth abbreviated as HTCZ.

33. He Nian, Jiu Zhongguo tufei jiemi [Bandit Secrets of Old China], 249.

34. As China changed, so did the term. Ever since the late 1940s the neutral expression "tufei"--local bandits--has been adopted. The problem was further compounded by the Communist ethnic policy that stressed national unity and avoided singling out ethnic groups, who were deemed to have been oppressed under previous regimes.

35. "Ali Duopukuer luxieling Jin Chunde chabao suoshu Elunchun zu xingshi cheng" [A report by Ali and Duopukuer Commander Jin Chunde in regard to the surnames of Elunchun], (January 9, 1918), Heilongjiang Provincial Archives, Heilongjiang Shaoshu Minzu: 1903-1931 [Heilongjiang Ethnic

Minorities: 1903-1931] (Harbin, 1985), 111-112; title hereafter rendered as HSMZ.

36. Zhang Boying, HZ, 1447.

37. HTCZ, 551.

38. HTCZ, 607.

39. HTCZ, 769.

40. HTCZ, 1012.

41. Zhang Boying, HZ, 1439-1440.

42. Once again, in 1931, when the Japanese invaded the region, "local bandits appeared like swarming bees." The invasion drove desperate settlers into banditry for survival. Occupation by a foreign power removed from the scene whatever security the Chinese authorities provided. "Wei Man Heilongjiang shenggongshu wei Duqi nijiang Taikang shezhiju caiche renggui gaiqitongzhi ancheng" [Petition of Heilongjiang Puppet Government for Retaining Duqi within Taikang Administration] (May 5, 1933), HS, 823.

43. Ma Fang, HRZ, (v. 1, 1988), 81.

44. "Jilin dujunshengzhang gongshu weipai waijiao guwen huitong jiaoshepaidui hushangshi gei Li Hongmo dexunling" [Order from Jilin Military Governor to Li Hongmo in regard to Organizing Defense for Business], (July 31, 1917), Harbin Shidang'anguan [Harbin City Archives]: Harbin jingji ziliao wenji (Harbin Economic History Materials) (Harbin City Archives, v.1, 1990), 89.

45. Ma Fang, HRZ, (v. 5, 1994), 56.

46. Ataman Grigory Semyonov's troops were notorious in North Manchuria for robbery and murder. In January 1918, for example, they robbed a number of Harbin businesses and kidnapped seventy clerks. Zhang Xiangling, HSD, 388.

47. "Hulin xianzhishi Xiong Mianzhang weifengling buque ganji xiachencheng" [Hulin County Magistrate Xiong Mianzhang Expresses Gratefulness to the President for his Promotion] (May 16, 1919), HS, 737.

48. Estimates of bandit numbers vary. According to a South Manchuria Railway report, about 20,000 were active in Heilongjiang and Jilin. South Manchuria Railway, Third Report on Progress in Manchuria, 1907-1932 (Dairen [Dalian], June 1932), 19. Another source claims there were over 200,000 private guns in Manchuria, of which 180,000 were held by bandits, a substantial number of whom were in Heilongjiang. Ding Yifu, Dongbeiren shi zhayangde: dui heitudiren xinggede jiedu [What Kind of People are Northeasterners? An Understanding of Dongbei People of the Black Land], 179.

49. Nan Yang, Ruhe kaifa Dongsansheng, 11.

50. HTCZ, 608.

51. Jilin Shengzhang Gongshu Dang'an [Jilin Governor Archives]: 11(7-7)-2092; quoted in Yi Baozhong, Dongbei nongye jindaihua yanjiu [A Study of Agricultural Modernization in the Northeast] (Jilin, 1990), 56.

52. "Neiwudengbu huihe Heilongjiangsheng qingyu Qiyahe kalun sheli Qigan shezhiju niqing zhaozhuncheng" [Interior Ministry Approval of a Petition by Heilongjiang Province to Establish an Administration in Qigan] (1920), HS, 915.

53. He Nian, Jiu Zhongguo tufei jiemi, 211.

54. Zhang Xiangling, HSD, 404.

55. Zhang Xiangling, HSD, 360, 419, 490, 384, and 391.

56. He Nian, Jiu Zhongguo tufei jiemi [Bandit Secrets of Old China], 79; Zhang Xiangling, HSD, 414, 437.

57. "Fengshan shezhiyuan Yu Wenying jusong sheshijihua jieluecheng" [Report of Fengshan Administrator Yu Wenying concerning the Proposal to Establish a Local Government] (May 19, 1929), HS, 424.

58. Zhang Xiangling, Heilongjiang shengzhi: diming lu (A Provincial Record of Heilongjiang: A Record of Place Names in Heilongjiang) (Harbin, 1998), 77.

59. "Hailun Zhiliting weichengbao yishuriqi dengbing" [Report from Hailun and Zhili Districts concerning the Date to Move the Seats] (July 1, 1906), HS, 497.

60. He Nian, Jiu Zhongguo tufei jiemi [Bandit Secrets of Old China], 249. Zhang Xiangling, HSD, 450.

61. Zhang Boying, HZ, 1456.

62. HTCZ, 228, 854, 607-608.

63. Zhang Xiangling, HSD, 228, 854, 607-608.

64. Zhang Xiangling, Heilongjiang shengzhi: diming lu [A Provincial Record of Heilongjiang: A Record of Place Names in Heilongjiang], 459.

65. HTCZ, 854.

66. "Taikang shezhiju weiqingjiang Xiaohaozi huaguizhilicheng" [Petition of Taikang Administration for Including Xiaohaozi as a Part of the County] (1929), HS, 819.

67. Wu Shiyuan, "Hu Hai tielu zai jingji shang zhi jiazhi" [The Hu-Hai Railway and its Economic Value], in Eastern Province Economy Monthly: Dongsheng jingji yuekan (February 15, 1930), 4.

68. Hulan County, Hulan wenshi ziliao, v. 1 [Hulan Literature and History Materials] (Hulan, 1989), 12.

69. "Suilan daoyin Yu Sixing luchenyingjiang lianglulinwufenjucaiche, zengshe Tongbei, Shangjichang, Tieli shezhijuxiang" [Statement of Suilan Prefecture Governor Yu Sixing concerning the Reorganization of Local Government] (February 6, 1915), HS, 117-118.

70. "Heilongjiang qingzhangjianzhaokenzongju juzhang Du Yintian weifuyi Dongxingzhen yingshe zhaokenju bingchou nijingfeicheng," (May 24, 1917), HS, 406-410.

71. "Fengshan shezhiyuan Yu Wenying jusong sheshijihua jieluecheng", (May 19,1929), HS, 424-425.

72. "Heihedao weiyiqingyuanan zhunyu Woximen xianzuojianli susongcheng," [Petition of Heihe Prefecture to Establish a County Administration in Woximen] (March 31, 1921), HS, 892.

73. Zhang Boying, HZ, 1446.

74. "Aihui bingbeidao weiqingtianshe Xunhekou kalun cheng" [Petition from Aihui Military Administration to Establish a Military Post at the Xunke River Mouth] (March 6, 1910), HS, 570.

75. "Guanyu gufei Chen Dongshan goujie Edang raoluanshixiang" [Bandit Chen Dongshan's collaboration with the Russians in Despoiling Border Areas] (January 1923), Heilongjiang Provincial Archives, Document No. 62-5-1201-586.

76. Owen Lattimore, "Byroads and Backwoods of Manchuria: Where Violent Contrasts of Modernism and Unaltered Ancient Tradition Clash," National Geographic (January 1932), 130.

77. Su Liao, Minguo feihuolu [The Calamitous History of Bandits during the Republican Period] (Nanjing, 1991), 112-113.

78. The "thirty-six oaths" of Heilongjiang bandits included basic Confucian precepts, if somewhat amended. He Nian, Jiu Zhongguo tufei jiemi, 80-84. Also see Cao Baoming, Zhongguo Dongbei hangbang [Guilds and Societies in China's Northeast] (Changchun, 1992), 116-120.

79. Cao Baoming, Shenmide Guandong qisu [The Colorful Customs of the Northeast], 60-61.

80. He Nian, Jiu Zhongguo tufei jiemi [Bandit Secrets of Old China], 107. Su Liao, Minguo feihuolu, 109.

81. Yang Jun, Fangtan Dongbeiren (Random Remarks on the People of the Northeast), 103.

82. The Zheltuga Republic was established by several thousand Russian and Chinese miners in the Mohe region in 1884. Working illegally in the region, they set up a "republic" with its own political and legal system. It was destroyed by the Qing in 1886. Zhang Baima may have recruited some former miners. See He Nian, Jiu Zhongguo tufei jiemi. 86.

83. He Nian, Jiu Zhongguo tufei jiemi, 86.

84. Ding Yifu, Dongbeiren shi zhayangde: dui heitudiren xinggede jiedu [What Kind of People are Northeasterners? An Understanding of Dongbei People of the Black Land], 182.

85. Ma Ziyi, "Qiansuoweiyou de minbian gaofeng--Xinhai qianshinian minbianzhuangkuang fenxi" [An Analysis of Popular Rebellion in the Ten Year Period before the 1911 Revolution], Shanghai Jiaotongdaxue Xuebao (May 2003), 65-72.

86. A. R. Lindt, Special Correspondent: With Bandit and General in Manchuria, 190.

87. Yang Jun, Fangtan Dongbeiren (Random Remarks on the People of the Northeast), 99.

88. He Nian, Jiu Zhongguo tufei jiemi [Bandit Secrets of Old China], 794-795.

89. HTCZ, 551.

90. "Guanyu renmin tongfei" [Concerning Collaboration with the Bandits] (June 1928), Heilongjiang Provincial Archives, Document No. 62-6-6168.

91. "Hailun gongmin kong youjiduizhang Chen Detai fuzi tongfei qingchaban yi'an" [A Case concerning the Accusation by Hailun County Locals against the Head of the Guerrillas Chen Detai and his Son] (January 1926), Heilongjiang Provincial Archives, Document No. 62-5-1500.

92. Xie Ruqin, Anhsu kaocha riji [A Diary Written during a Local Investigation] (1910), in Li Xingsheng, ed. Heishui Guoshixilu [A Record of Heilongjiang's Guo Family] (Harbin, 2002), 2058.

93. He Nian, Jiu Zhongguo tufei jiemi [Bandit Secrets of Old China], 210.

94. It was quite common for bandits to coerce local farmers to supply them with food. "Heilongjiang qingzhangjianzhaokenzongju juzhang Du Yintian weifuyi Dongxingzhen yingshe zhaokenju bingchou nijingfeicheng", (May 24, 1917), HS, 408.

95. HTCZ, 607.

96. "Fengshan shezhiyuan Yu Wenyingjusongsheshijihuajieluecheng," (May 19,1929), HS, 426-427.

97. "Binzhouting tongzhi Du Yuheng chenqing Shaoguodian xunjian gaishe xianzhibing" [Petition of Binzhou Prefecture Governor Du Yuheng to Establish a County Government Seat at Shaoguodian (Yanshou)] (April 6, 1902); HS, 452.

98. Zhang Boying, HZ, 1439-1441.

99. HTCZ, 769-770.

100. Xie Ruqin, Ansu kaocha riji [A Diary Written during a Local Investigation] (1910), in Li Xingsheng, ed. Heishui Guoshixilu [A Record of Heilongjiang's Guo Family], 2039.

101. HTCZ, 415. Zhang Boying, HZ, 2507.

102. Yang Buchi, Yilan Xianzhi, 113.

103. Owen Lattimore, "Byroads and Backwoods of Manchuria: Where Violent Contrasts of Modernism and Unaltered Ancient Tradition Clash," National Geographic (January 1932), 128. Palmer was involved in bringing modern farm machinery to the rural areas in Heilongjiang.

104. Number One Chinese Historical Archive (Beijing): Folder No. 543-75-1, Documents No. 175, Zhao Erxun Dang'an [Zhao Erxun Archive], File No. 142: "Heilongjiang xieling Chengchun deng wei zhengdun Dongsansheng zhi guangzhi, junwu, licai deng fangmian zhi tiaochen" [Report of Heilongjiang Local Military Leader Chengchun on Governmental, Military, and Financial Affairs in the Northeast]. File No. 175: "Jinjiang diaocha Heilongjiang sheng shangwu shiye dagai qingxing bing guanjian ji shanlu gongcheng" [Report of my Proposals concerning Commerce and Business in Heilongjiang]. This is a report by Yuan Keding (Yuan Shikai's elder son) after his trip to the region. It would appear to date from the first decade of the century. Yuan Keding recommended that a large number of soldiers be sent from China Proper to deal with banditry in Heilongjiang.

105. The government side also sustained serious casualties. The Shandong native Fu Qibiao commanded a battalion which killed several hundred bandits in numerous engagements in Hulan, Bayan and Lanxi, but was himself killed in 1906 in the course of a pursuit. Fu later was canonized as a hero by the Qing court. Ma Fang, HRZ, (v. 6, 1996), 145-146.

106. Zhang Xiangling, HSD, 336.

107. HSD, 357.

108. HSD, 432.

109. HSD, 437.

110. HTCZ, 608.

111. "Tangwanghe kenwuxingju weiyifushezhishiyi bingbiantonghuangwu zhangcheng dezhe" [Report of Tangwang Administration concerning the Establishment of a County Government for Opening up Land] (1905), HS, 650.

112. "Shu Raohe xianzhishi Zhao Bangze tiaochenzhengjian cheng" [Report of Raohe Governor Zhao Bangze Concerning Local Governance] (December 28, 1913), HS, 690.

113. Lang Daming and Shang Chenglin, Re tu xiao xiang: Hulan [Warm Soil and Natural Country: Hulan] (Harbin, 1998), 33-34.

114. On June 17, 1906, the governor-general's office of Heilongjiang borrowed a number of guns and cannon from the Russians; at the same time the Hulan prefecture government borrowed one hundred guns from them. On July 9, the governor-general's office borrowed a further fifty modern guns and three cannon. On August 8, the Russians dispatched four hundred soldiers to Hulan to fight the bandits. On November 4, Hulan requested fifty Russian soldiers for the pursuit of bandits. Zhang Xiangling, HSD, 325-326.

115. Zhang Boying, HZ, 1450.

116. In 1907, Russian bandits active on the Chinese frontier were captured by Russian authorities, who then asked Chinese witnesses to attend the Russian court across the river. HSMZ, 282. In 1913, the Huma administration demanded the return of property stolen by bandits who fled to the Russian side. HSMZ, 284. In 1915, at Chinese request, the notorious bandit Li Qingyun, who had raided a gold mine and then fled to Russia, was seized by the Russians and returned to China, where he was executed. "Guanyu zai Ejing jina jufei Li Qingyun shixiang" [The Matter about the Seizure of the Big Bandit Li Qingyun within Russian Territory] (September 1915), Heilongjiang Provincial Archives: Document No. 62-4-5189.

117. "Shu Raohe xianzhishi Zhao Bangze tiaochenzhengjian cheng", (December 28, 1913), HS, 689. In 1901 Zhao Dinggong's entire regiment was overwhelmed by a large bandit force and Zhao himself was killed in the engagement. See Zhang Boying, HZ, 2419.

118. Yan Ying, Dongbei yiyongjun zhanshi [A Military History of the Northeast Righteous and Brave Armyl (Hong Kong, 1965), 87.

119. Zhang Xiangling, HSD, 316.

120. Liu Chengdong, Qingdai Heilongjiang guben fangzhi sizhong, [The Four Extant Local Histories of Heilongjiang during the Qing Dynasty] (Harbin, 1989), 492.

121. HTCZ, 609.

122. Yan Ying, Dongbei yiyongjun zhanshi (A Military History of the Northeast Righteous and Brave Army), 87.

123. Yan Ying, Dongbei yiyongjun zhanshi, 68.

124. HTCZ, 551.

125. HTCZ, 551-552.

126. HTCZ, 773.

127. Zhang Boying, HZ, 1230.

128. Zhang Boying, HZ, 1964.

129. Zhang Boying, HZ, 1964.

130. Zhang Boying, HZ, 1209.

131. "Tangwanghe kenwuxingju weiyifushezhishiyi bingbiantonghuangwu zhangcheng dezhe," (1905), HS, 650.

132. HTCZ, 547-548.

133. "Boli xian chenglibaogaoshu zaibugaobajian" [Eight Announcements in the Report concerning the Establishment of Boli County Government] (1917), HS, 632.

134. Ma Liuzhou trained the local police and led them against the bandits. He retired in 1915. In 1917, on his way to Bayan, he was kidnapped. He refused to cooperate with the bandits, and was thrown into a river and drowned. His fate remained unknown until 1925 when his son discovered the circumstances of his death through a private detective. Ma Fang, HRZ, (v. 6, 1996), 74-75. Zhang Boying, HZ, 2172.

135. Ma Fang, HRZ, (v.5, 1994), 56.

136. HTCZ, 549-550.

137. The police surtax was sometimes levied on market commodities, theatre and brothel earnings, though it was usually apportioned as part of the land tax. HS, 426, 693, 408.

138. "Daili Bolixian zhishi Zhang Baoshu zeqiqianshucheng" [Report of Acting Governor of Boli Zhang Baoshu concerning the Date of the County Seat Move] (October 30, 1919), HS, 646.

139. "Heilongjiang Shengzhengfu weihuikan Fengshan shezhiju jiezhi gei caizhengting de xunling" [Directive of the Heilongjiang Provincial Government to Ministry of Finance concerning the Survey of a Site for Fengshan Administration] (May 15, 1929), HS, 422. "Heilongjiang sheng minzhengting jubao Fengshan shezhiju jiexian huafencheng" [Report of Ministry of Civil Affairs, Heilongjiang Provincial Government, in regard to the Boundary of the Fengshan Administration] (1929), HS, 430.

140. "Heilongjiang caizhengtingzhang Zhang Xinggui, Suilandao daoyin Song Wenyu yifu Dongxingzhen yiyushezhicheng" [Report of Heilongjiang Finance Minister Zhang Xinggui and Suilan Prefecture Governor Song Wenyu in regard to Establishment of a County Seat at Dongxing Town] (December 29, 1926), HS, 411.

141. "Fengshan shezhiyuan Yu Wenyingjusong sheshijihuajieluecheng", (May 19,1929), HS, 425.

142. HTCZ, 619.

143. "Binzhouting tongzhiluchen Mayanhe gaisheng xianzhicheng" [Report of Binzhou Prefecture Governor in Regard to Establishment of a County Government at Mayanhe] (October 8, 1902), HS, 461. Also, "Datong xian weibao qianyi xianshu riqicheng" [Report of Datong County concerning the Date of the County Seat Move] (March 25, 1914), HS, 420. HTCZ, 619, 317.

144. Zhang Boying, HZ, 2128.

145. Nan Yang, Ruhe kaifa Dongsansheng [How to Open up the Three Northeastern Provinces], in Manchuria Economic Monthly: Zhongdong jingji yuekan (March 1930), 11.

146. Zhang Xiangling, HSD, 321.

147. Tanghe was too far from the provincial capital and the fastest return mail required over a month, during which time the bandits might escape. "Tangwanghe kenwuxingju weiyifushezhishiyi bingbiantonghuangwu zhangcheng dezhe," (1905), HS, 650. Jiang Yong, 'a lawyer during the Republican period, called for an end to the abuse of power in dealing with bandits. He said that "Originally I did not oppose the quick suppression of bandits ... but many innocent people have been killed by hasty execution. This should be stopped as soon as possible." Zhu Hanguo, Zhongguo shehui tongshi [A Social History of China] (Taiyuan, 1996), 592.

148. Dongsheng Tielu Jingji diaochaju [Chinese Eastern Railway Economic Investigation Bureau], Beiman Nongye [North Manchuria Agriculture] (Harbin, 1928), 256.

149. Gao Lecai, "Jiuyiba shibianhou Dongbei tufei kangri shulue" [A Study of Bandits and the Anti-Japanese Movement in the Northeast after the September 18th Incident] Shehuikexue Zhanxian [A Forum of Social Sciences] (Changchun) (No. 4, 1992), 223-227.

150. Zhang Xiangling, Heilongjiang sishinian [Forty Years in Heilongjiang] (Harbin, 1986), 87.

By Patrick Fuliang Shan

Grand Valley State University