Information technology for command and control.

There has been no lack of publications of late related one way or another to problems of informatization of the military. Most of them, however, look at what we think are individual, albeit important, questions of automating command and control of troops (forces). This is a clear signal that our military policy of informatization, as any policy geared to solving individual problems without first solving general problems, is doomed to the worst kind of vacillations and absence of guiding principles.

This paper is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis and classification of general problems of informatization. We wish to explain why we raise this problem at all, to outline what we think are the most important components of this problem and ask a broad range of military experts for a discussion.

Axiomatically, the state's military policy can be effective if in its general conceptual components--scientific-analytical (prognostic) and organizational-practical (managerial)--it relies on achievements of military science and new information technologies. It also transpires that, in order to be effective, the state's military policy, especially with regard to its managerial component, is supposed to furnish the necessary conditions for advancing military science and military informatization.

Let us first of all answer the question: How are Russian military science and one of its key components--theory of command and control of troops (forces)--are faring in the sea of international information and in the information space of its own military?

The decisive component of the informatization process is intellectualization [adoption of smart technology] which has to do with knowledge, or the highest form of information. It is the intellectual component of informatization that is now emerging as the most important tool of science in general and military science in particular in tackling the most important and most difficult problems of systematization and multiplication of knowledge. Our leading military experts realize this very well. For example, V.D. Ryabchuk suggests for the inclusion among the number of priorities of the military doctrine the following: "increasing and strengthening of the intellectual potential of the state's military organization as a whole and the vehicle of this potential--the officer personnel and primarily military leaders, academics and teachers; the gaining of theoretical and practical knowledge and adoption of information technologies related first and foremost to reconnaissance and command and control ..." (1)

Let us try, in light of these very correct doctrinal provisions, examine the state and prospects of using advances in informatization in the theory and practice of command and control of troops (forces). It is important to note right away that their state cannot be called satisfactory. We can quite justifiably blame military scholars for that because they are developing command and control theory not intensively enough and are not pushing strongly enough for practical use of latest information technologies by military control agencies.

But this is only partly true as are also partly true the sly attempts by military-science organizations (MSOs)* to describe the issue solely as a chronic lack of finance and continuing reorganization of agencies that are in control and that are being controlled. One of the main causes of the many negative developments in the sphere of command and control of troops (forces) are some seriously misplaced emphases in our military-technical policy of informatization which is currently more technical than military.

The largest part of military-science organizations' resources is spent on the so-called support of manufacturing chores which is useful to some extent in adapting industrial models to the current requirements of troops and staffs, but it is not--and cannot be--the symbol of the dominant role of military science in ensuring the expected efficiency and quality of C & C and in determining promising avenues of informatization of the military.

In our opinion, there are historical underlying reasons for the "semantic gap" between the military and technical components of informatization of the Russian military. The euphoria of riding the crest of initial automation successes obscured the meaning of Norbert Wiener's postulate suggesting that the computer cannot do more than what man puts into it. We are talking here about the part of human intellectual resources that can be represented as formalized knowledge at the present development stage of science and technology. It is possible in the context of formalization of knowledge to determine a fundamental difference between controlling weapons and controlling troops: whereas in a weapons control system the vast amount of knowledge can (and should) be formalized, this is impossible in principle to do in systems controlling troops, or people.

The slipping of MSOs into the deep "support rut" is also helped by the fact that, given the many declarations in support of the intellectual component of informatization of the Russian military, this component goes almost unmentioned explicitly. The customer's idea of the work done by MSOs is at best formed through observing their representatives taking part in various tests and through the monolith of special mathematical and program software (SMPS) where specks of military thought are mixed with a tremendous amount of small technicalities that have nothing to do with military thought.

In order to break what is almost a deadlock, it is necessary, we think, to first of all cut the umbilical cord joining special mathematical software (SMS) to special program software (SPS). The tasks and models of SMS should be invariant with respect to the hardware and software (platforms) selected by the chief designers of concrete automated systems. They should be regarded explicitly as product of MSO work used among the set of requirements and input data for an automated system that is being developed (upgraded).

To single out SMS as an independent sphere of primarily MSO activities is a prerequisite for improving the quality of information support of the processes of making C & C decisions. At the same time, implementing this approach is a formidable scientific and practical problem. Let us try to outline some of the key aspects of this problem.

In terms of engineering cybernetics and first of all of such of its branches as computer science and programming engineering the problem consists in finding ways and methods to close the "semantic gap" (a logical "distance" between the end user's interface language and the machine language). An effective modern way of bridging the "gap" consists in methods and technology of functional standardization. It consists essentially of breaking up the "semantic gap" into a limited number of logical levels. We select from the standardized sets of available protocols and interfaces, beginning from the functional level, the so-called profile. The profile actually represents a harmonized set of standards of information-logical interaction between all the system's elements (from the microchips to functional subsystems) which are necessary and sufficient to realize the assigned functions of the system.

Functional standardization lays a good methodological foundation for the realization of the integration programming that has long been stirring the minds of automation experts. Here in this country, some notable results have been scored by teams of researchers of the IRE RAN [Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics of the Russian Academy of Sciences] and MIREA [Moscow Institute of Radio Engineering and Automatics] under Academician Yu.V. Gulyaev. However, the adoption of their techniques for troop control automation is hampered by competing corporate standards. (2) Unless a single methodology of functional standardization is adopted with regard to products of our industry, the realization of many interesting and promising concepts (like the concepts of basic protected information technologies) is likely to do more harm than good in short term.

Altogether, the end objective of C & C automation is to provide proper quality of information support of controlling decisions. The upper, functional level, of the "semantic gap" of information technology and systems implemented in programs is taken to mean special program software.

The functional requirements imposed on C & C and input data for the development of SPS is assigned by the Defense Ministry (primarily with MSO assistance). Logically, the Defense Ministry also monitors the quality of implementing the functional requirements in concrete industrial products. It is there that we see direct evidence of the flawed nature of the current SMPS concept. The point is that SMPS is identical with SPS whereas "mathematical" indicates that the narrow selection of formalized military knowledge is part and parcel of the concrete operating system, i.e., the hard and soft platforms. Directly involved in the development of SMPS, MSOs cannot be, in all fairness, arbiters of rivaling corporate standards and they are not interested in a greater number of functional requirements to be imposed on industrial products. This situation will prevail unless the Defense Ministry, mathematical software, industry and program software divorce peacefully and take their own scientific-practical, financial-economic, and organizational-technical niches. We propose to begin this most difficult and necessary procedure by formally separating the (special mathematical and program software) functional level into two sublevels: the upper (SMS) level and the lower (SPS) level. All that relates to SMS (and higher) should be the prerogative of the Defense Ministry and, accordingly, of MSOs. SPS (and lower) with regard to the "semantic gap" should be in charge of industrial organizations. We thus actually talk about two sublevels of knowledge formalization: an algorithmic (SMS) level and a program (SPS) level.

Thus, SMS can be defined as an aggregate of interacting algorithms, models and tasks that can be used as functional requirements and input data in program realization of information technologies supporting C & C decisions. Incidentally, separating SMS from SPS makes it possible to single out accurately enough two main spheres of MSO activities.

The first (main) one can be described as military-scientific provision of information support of C & C decisionmaking (we will deal with it later). The second one can be attributed, by shifting the focus somewhat, to the traditional military technical support and supervision of information technology work in industry. It can be described in the most general form as follows.

Based on these requirements we can use functional standardization methodology to determine a necessary and sufficient system of protocols and interfaces fully bridging the "semantic gap." As a rule (and this is especially typical of systems that are being upgraded), it is possible to rationally bridge the gap using standardized software-hardware modules, including SPS, aggregated to a certain level.

Military-technical supervision and support in this case essentially consists in controlling the completeness and quality of meeting the functional requirements in a system that is being developed, operated or upgraded. Supervision and support in terms of program engineering is continued development or upgrading during operation. Since the quality of subjects and objects of control are changing rapidly and as new types of weapon systems and methods of their combat employment appear, this calls for a frequent rethink of sets of functional requirements to see if they should be updated. This and the lure of using new and latest information technologies prompt as frequent upgrades. Thus, military-technical supervision and support is an important (albeit not the principal by definition) sphere of MSO activities. It should also be noted that the high frequency of change in functional requirements clearly prompts the developers to use new methods and means to rapidly upgrade the systems. We can list among them quite justifiably the methodology and technology of functional standardization whose motto says that systems should be open to upgrading, adaptation and expansion.

Let us now turn to the main sphere of MSO activities which is military-scientific provision of information support to making C & C decisions. We have already mentioned that knowledge is the highest form of information. Military science is concerned with systematizing and upgrading military knowledge in particular in the sphere of C & C of troops.

Success of military operations depends to a considerable extent on the standard of knowledge of military commanders of all categories. It also depends to a similar extent on their intuition, will and their God-given field generalship talents. In other words, we talk about those qualities of C & C systems that cannot be formalized and are associated with the category of military art.

Military art is mastered through and manifests itself only in practical C & C. Two military commanders with similar military knowledge are likely to achieve incomparable battle management results. Like precious alloys, field generalship talents are assessed by the content of military art in them. For example, a number of Napoleon's battles and all battles conducted by A.V. Suvorov are pure gold. (3)

Considering the military science and military art duo where military art plays first fiddle, we should note that there is a very close dialectical interdependence between these components of military affairs. At the same time, military science not simply procures, accumulates and sums up military knowledge: its job is to help harmonize this knowledge with individual styles and methods of management of the top people in C & C systems and with the "collective mind" (4) of their staffs. Military science is in no position to solve all these most complex problems if it does not rely on the third fundamentally important component of modern military affairs. Let us call it military informatization and define the main content (task) as the development and continuous upgrading of systems of information support of commanders' decisions in C & C of troops (forces).

The general character of interaction in terms of C & C within what are now three main components of the state's military affairs is seen from Fig. 1. Military art and C & C practice remain the primary element, of course. Military art, however, cannot either normally exist or develop without military science in the same way as military science cannot do without military informatization today. Military informatization, for its part, fills demands formulated by military art and military science and it is simply obliged to rely on the achievements of engineering cybernetics. The border (interface) between problems of engineering cybernetics and military informatization encountered in realization of concrete systems of information support of C & C decisions runs on the functional level (Fig. 2) and, as was mentioned above, it separates the spheres of responsibility of industry and MSOs.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

In order to outline the sphere of military informatization problems it is advisable to expand the model of open systems by adding a supra-functional intelligence level. This level is responsible for work with military knowledge. Accordingly, military informatization is supposed to pay closer attention to knowledge engineering the ideas of which here in this country stay frozen on the level of expert systems of at least ten years ago.

The approach to classification, accumulation, integration and employment of information resources should also be substantially updated. We think it is necessary first of all to put all information resources into three basic groups inside each of them it would be easy to decompose the resources (and access them) in accordance with the levels of integration. Thus, we propose to divide information resources into the following groups:

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

* information-computational groups, which accumulate in them all types of computers (PCs, servers, graphics workstations, etc.), standardized automation means systems, as well as (on the upper level) information and computation systems that have been completed (being developed);

* infocommunicational groups, which bring together all equipment and technology of local, corporate, regional and global computer networks and, of course, similarly to infocomputational resources, completed automated systems of communications control;

* intelligent groups to examine which in the context of our discussion is of fundamental importance and directly related to breaking up SMPS and the "intelligent" superstructure above the traditional model of open systems.

Effective and high-quality information support of C & C--the principal goal of military informatization--calls for achieving at least two global objectives.

Objective one (main objective) is to create and continuously upgrade the system of models of virtual wars and battles against the "aggressor."

Objective two (auxiliary but mandatory) is to accumulate, systematize, integrate and employ intellectual resources (military knowledge) in C & C. Now we are on the subtle subject of man-machine interaction: from establishing the procedure and rules of working with formalized knowledge (on the level of SMS tasks and models) to empirical procedures of harmonizing the irrational and rational components of military art.

In light of the above it becomes necessary to rethink some of the fundamental provisions of the military-technical policy of informatization. For example, it appears logical to discard the concept of a single asset of algorithms and programs and dividing the problem of assigning information resources on the functional level into parts corresponding to SPS and SMS. At the same time, industry (chief designers) should stay in charge of the assets of tasks and models of medium-oriented SPS developed by it. Single assets of algorithms (tasks and models) of SMS for their part is the sphere of interests and responsibility of MSO.

Ideally, of course, it would be nice to have in the military a single operational environment that could integrate with comparative ease information and computing resources with regard to all SPS tasks and models. We do not think this is possible to do in the foreseeable future. To solve an even more pressing problem of today--to integrate intellectual resources--it is necessary to gear MSOs to implementing the concept of a SMS single asset of algorithms (SAA). The SAA case can be likened to a strategic hill abandoned for tactical considerations and which we are compelled today to retake expending considerable efforts and resources. The rivalry between two schools of system programming of ALGOL-68 in Leningrad and ADA in Moscow had created fine theoretical and technical prerequisites for the creation of a SMS SAA. It was only because of inconsistency of the military-technical policy of informatization, a lack of interest on the part of industry and the failure to grasp the importance of this problem on the part of MSO specialists and military educational institutions fixated on the Assembler and the PL-1 that the SMS SAA problem was not solved fifteen or twenty years ago.

Today, the creation of SMS SAA should be one of the top-priority strategic problems of military informatization without solving which it is hard to score important results in building the much talked about unified information space or a unified information system of the Armed Forces.

Our established and even canonized approaches to building automated systems call for a rethink in light of adopting smart technology. We have in mind in particular inspections of informatization facilities. A classical inspection pattern is as follows: a team of smart automation experts arrives at a facility, they study documents, poll those who run it to extract knowledge about the nature of information-logical interaction of the facility's component elements and of the critical points of this interaction. The pattern works when as a result of inspection we can arrive at a structure, which makes possible optimization (rationalization) of bulk time characteristics of C & C processes or decide on obvious quality requirements with regard to presentation of information by assigned personnel of C & C organs. For example, it is comparatively easy to prove the need for protected video conferencing, geoinformation systems with a 3D simulation of objects, and systems of electronic flow of documents. All these things are sophisticated dual-purpose information techniques that can be adapted for military uses, and difficulties involved in such adaptation are mainly of technical and technological nature. This elaborate statistical study is not quite useful for the extraction, accumulation and systematization of knowledge by assigned personnel of C & C organs, given the individual styles, experience and preferences of concrete military leaders. This is the case for customized formalization of knowledge whose emergence and proliferation is due to such a revolutionary development in computer technology as the PC. (5) The method of customized formalization of knowledge has to do with the intelligence level of the "semantic gap" and it is intended to support "from the top" the PERSON IN CHARGE-SMS interface. It can be interpreted in broad terms as a MILITARY ART-MILITARY SCIENCE interface.

We can describe the process of customized formalization of military knowledge as follows.

The supra-functional intelligence layer (let's call it a knowledge management system) "deciphers" the meaning of queries from members of the C & C organs assigned personnel to the system and builds a suitable composition from the available SMS algorithms (tasks and models). This composition gives a clear enough idea of the way the concrete official prefers to control the troops under prevailing conditions. If no satisfactory solution is found, the system develops a new algorithm and forms a composition of algorithms. Both the algorithm and composition can be placed into the SAA.

It should be noted that it is extremely undesirable, when you create automated systems, to "skip" the critical interfaces of the "semantic gap." To give an example, the SPS-SS [special program software-system software] interface "alienates" the program developer from his product. The SMS-SPS interface releases the algorithm developer from the need to take into account the specifics of chief designers' operational environment and enables him to deliver to the customer his finished product. The PERSON IN CHARGE-SMS interface ensures the knowledge restructuring dynamics in accordance with the requirements of the specific person in charge with the latter's direct participation.

Generally speaking, before bringing troops into an automated control system in the shape of SPS, it is necessary to develop, select, bundle and test algorithms, models and tasks of special mathematical software in the form of SMS prototypes implemented in programs in the suitable technological operational environment. In order to design a successful C & C automated system meeting the present-day requirements, the military-technical policy of informatization should be focused precisely on intellectual resources and the procedure of their accumulation and employment. This means that all major Armed Forces informatization projects* should start with most diligent studies and design efforts on the intellectual level (the level of military knowledge) with military-science organizations playing the leading role and with technical-technological support from industry.

No one is of course ready today for such a radical change. Moreover, such a radical change of course in one fell swoop in the military-technical policy is most likely to be destructive rather than constructive. But it is essential to start immediately correcting the strategic policy of military informatization. We think it should begin by standardizing the principal means of forming a single intellectual space of the Armed Forces. We have in mind a body of definitions of notions and concepts and professional military-affairs language of the state.

The actual point being raised is that of creating in the RF Defense Ministry an automated system of terminological expert examination taking care of the entire flow of documents in the Armed Forces. This paper focuses on a system whose core is a basic electronic dictionary of C & C of troops (forces) theory terms and definitions. The logistic aspects of this subsystem appear in the most general form in Fig. 3.

Winding up this analysis of global problems of current military affairs of the state, we admit that many of our judgments are too general and far from indisputable. We do not claim to be the final arbiters of the truth, but there are several fundamental points we are ready to defend most earnestly. They are as follows.

One. Today's military affairs of the state discussed in this paper in terms of military art (C & C practice) and military science (C & C theory) cannot exist and develop without their third fundamental component, which is military informatization.

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

Two. One of the most important global objectives of military informatization should be to create and continuously upgrade a system of C & C of troops (forces) information support. This system should enable C & C practice in virtual wars and combats against the "aggressor."

Three. Military informatization, as a certain military theory, has to do with military knowledge. It forms a kind of intellectual layer between the customer and the designer (in formulating input data and requirement specifications for an automated control system, or authorized C & C persons and an operating automated control system (in deciding on the C & C strategy and an appropriate pattern of control decisions process support). Military informatization is obviously the realm of military-science organizations.

There is an obvious need and opportunity to delimit powers between MSOs and industry distinctly enough along the SMS-SPS line.

Four. In view of what has been said, there is a need for a substantial adjustment of the military-technical policy of informatization as a component of the national defense policy. Stress should be laid on speedy research and development in the field of formalization, accumulation, systematization and extraction of military knowledge. We do not say this because we underestimate the importance of implementing the designer's ideas of an automated control system in hardware but only because we cannot get an efficient automated control system without having first tried out its software on the level of prototypes of interrelated algorithms, tasks and models of SMS.

NOTES:

1. Voennaia mysl', No. 11, 2004, p. 61.

2. E. Toffler, Metamorfozy vlasti, Izd-vo AST, Moscow, 2002, pp. 166-190.

3. A.V. Kersnovskiy, In the Compendium "Filosofiya voyny," Izdatelskiy tsentr "ANKIL-VOIN", Moscow, 1995, pp. 11-98.

4. Praktika globalizatsii: igry i pravila novoy epokhi, INFRA-M, Moscow, 2000, pp. 88-95.

5. G.R. Gromov, Natsionalnye informatsionnye resursy: problemy promyshlennoy ekspluatatsii, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1984.

Col. Yu.N. GOLUBEV (Ret.)

Candidate of Technical Sciences

Col. V.N. KARGIN

Candidate of Technical Sciences

* Military-science organizations imply here first of all military research organizations and military educational institutions of the Defense Ministry, as well as other agencies studying problems of military science (military-science committees, military departments of civilian educational institutions, academies, etc.).

* For example, it could be possible to develop an "ELECTRONIC STAFF" project by analogy with the RF MoD "ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT" project.