Information operations for the joint warfighter.

Information Operations (IO) are growing in importance, playing a critical role in national security. Uniquely, IO effects often transcend the traditional battlefield, extending beyond the intended military target and breaching the bounds of the commander's kinetic battlespace. Occasionally decisive, more often a force multiplier, IO can shape the battlefield, creating the conditions for the commander to employ his chosen defeat mechanism.

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Increasingly, fire supporters are responsible for integrating IO into theater and operational campaigns as well as tactical plans. Therefore, as fire supporters--Field Artillerymen--assume responsibility for coordinating IO, and given the distinctive characteristics of IO, we must become professionals in the field of information operations.

To begin the process of becoming an IO professional, one must understand why IO is important and where it fits into Department of Defense (DoD) and interagency operations, what functions and tools comprise IO, and how IO has contributed to recent DoD operations. While not exhaustive, this article discusses these points.

IO Importance. In June of 2000, DoD published "Joint Vision 2020," a document that narrowed the scope of future military doctrine. JV 2020 described IO as one of two essential elements for success in military actions (with the other intellectual and technical innovation).

The "National Security Strategy," published in September of 2001, began the call for the transformation of the military. Concurrently, DoD published the "2001 Quadrennial Defense Review" and named IO as one of six transformational goals.

The "Transformational Planning Guidance" of April 2003 called for a force transformation strategy that would shift us from an industrial age to an information age. In the process of implementing the transformation of DoD, the "Defense Planning Guidance" directed the development of an "Information Operations Roadmap" to bring IO to a level of maturity that would enable IO to be supported as well as supporting. (See the figure.) In the fall of 2003. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld codified his desire to make IO a core military competency by signing the "Information Operations Roadmap."

IO Organizations. Responsibility for IO resides in many organizations across DoD and the interagency, including the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff Director for Operations (D-J3) coordinates IO through the Assistant Deputy Director for IO (ADDIO). The Assistant Directorate reports to the Deputy Director for Global Operations. This construct reflects a recent change (March) that combines the previously separate Deputy Directorates for Global Operations and IO.

The ADDIO has approximately 74 personnel, 44 of whom are military, augmented by 30 liaison officers (LNOs), civil servants and contractors. Currently, ADDIO's top three priorities are to fight the Global War on Terrorism, advance IO as a core military competency and provide information operations/special technical operations support to combatant commanders and services.

Within DoD, the Commander of the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is first among those military leaders responsible for planning and coordinating IO, having that responsibility assigned in the most recent "Unified Command Plan." Other organizations involved in planning, coordinating and executing IO include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Combatant Commanders, to name a few.

Clearly, DoD and other US Government agencies recognize the growing influence and importance that IO plays in the successful execution of the US Government's National Security Strategy and military operations.

IO Functions and Tools. Information operations existed well before the publication of the previously mentioned documents. In fact, the current Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations came off the presses in 1998. As an emerging concept, this 1998 Joint Pub reflects an immature doctrine, often at odds with itself.

This lack of maturity spawned some interesting myths and urban legends about IO. For example, one myth is that IO equates to computer attacks; the reality is that computer network operations (CNO) is just one of the five IO core capabilities. Another myth is that IO is strategic communications; the reality is that military IO enhances and is informed by the US Government's strategic communications, but strategic communications encompasses much more, as does IO. A third myth is that IO is anything that influences enemy decisions; the reality is that this definition is too broad--all aspects of war influence the enemy. Another myth is that IO equates to deceit, lies and misinformation; in fact, military deception that is focused on the enemy is only one aspect of IO.

Dispelling those myths and ending the spread of IO urban legends starts with those who would be IO professionals--Field Artillerymen--gaining a clear understanding of information operations. The IO roadmap defines IO as shown in the figure. An exhaustive study preceded the publication of the roadmap. Fortuitously, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) ran concurrently with the IO study, providing valuable insights for the roadmap, including some measurable and groundbreaking IO successes.

IO Successes in OIF. In their turn, occasionally in isolation, more often coordinated, each of the IO core capabilities contributed to the successful completion of major combat in OIF. Electronic warfare (EW) denied and degraded Iraqi command and control, suppressed enemy air defenses, supported special operations objectives and located emitting targets.

CNO defended computer networks, including protecting against threats from within Iraq and other sources, such as "anti-war hackers." CNO developed responses to these hackers, such as blocking Internet protocol (IP) addresses and closing network ports hackers likely would use, to mention just a few of the unclassified actions.

Deception operations contributed by protecting the timing of the beginning of the ground war while Marine Corps diversionary operations supported prisoner-of-war rescues, including the widely reported rescue of Private Jessica Lynch.

US Central Command actively implemented operations security (OPSEC) methodology throughout the operation, recognizing risks and actively applying countermeasures, limiting and protecting friendly information that could have been exploited by the enemy. Further, OPSEC awareness training occurred at every level of command, resulting in a significant reduction of open-source material that may have revealed troop movements, telephone numbers and email addresses.

As the most mature IO capability, psychological operations (PSYOP) has produced and broadcast more than 5,800 hours of AM, FM and SW radio programs via the special operations media system, series B (SOMS-B); produced themes, messages and leaflets, delivering more than 64 million; conducted TV broadcasts; and provided tactical loudspeaker support for units.

A quote from an Iraqi missile defense commander in Baghdad provides an example of PSYOP's effectiveness: "I would talk to my missile crews, and suddenly, the Americans would come on the same frequency ... they [the Americans] would talk in Arabic. It was the psychological war that did the worst damage to us.... The Americans knew all our frequencies. We had no radio news broadcasts, just the Americans talking to us on our radio net." (Quote taken from "Central Command Observations and Lessons Learned from OIF.")

While not always as visible or dramatic as kinetic operations. IO have demonstrated utility, effectiveness and a clear ability to create conditions that make it easier to achieve decisive results. In some cases. IO achieved these results without Coalition Forces having to fire a shot or place a Soldier in harm's way. IO successes in OIF are due to the dedication, detailed planning and diligent execution of professional IO warriors, officers and Soldiers alike.

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Fire Supporters as IO Coordinators (IOCOORDs). Like any specialty, developing individual technical and tactical expertise takes dedication and time. Fire supporters, charged with integrating IO into plans and supervising their execution, must gain a working understanding and appreciation for IO capabilities, vulnerabilities and shortcomings. The charter is clear, the responsibility is ours--fire supporters must seek opportunities to learn the fundamentals of IO through education and training, individual and collective. Fire supporters should--

* Become familiar with joint and Army IO doctrine, educating themselves and their Soldiers. The "Information Operations Roadmap" is a good place to start. The roadmap represents 18 months of effort to determine IO issues and makes 57 recommendations for implementation. Execution of these 57 recommendations has begun. Setting the course for IO's future as a DoD core competency, the roadmap provides a common framework and definition for understanding IO, empowers combatant commanders with the authority to plan and integrate IO, and improves education and training opportunities designed to strengthen IO efforts.

The new keystone publication JP 3-13 is informed by the roadmap, on "fast-track" development and due out in September. Additionally, fire supporters should develop an understanding of the Army's maturing IO doctrine, beginning with FM 3-0 Operations and FM 3-13.

* Must become familiar with the Army's IO organizational structure. This includes S7s/G7sIOCOORDs and two premier IO organizations: the 1st Information Operations Command-Land, or 1st IOC, headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the 4th Psychological Operations Group (4th POG) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

* Must become familiar with the Army's Information Operations Career Field, FA 30, and develop an appreciation for the knowledge and skills FA 30 officers bring to the fight. These uniquely qualified officers are experts in planning, integrating and executing IO.

* Seek out and attend Army IO training offered by 1st IOC and via Army Knowledge Online. Fire supporters also should take advantage of 1st IOC's field support teams and the 4th POG's military information support teams (MIST) and psychological support elements (PSEs), integrating them into training and exercises and demanding their support on deployments. Fire supporters can gain a thorough knowledge of IO by learning about the robust IO organizations and training opportunities extant under the joint and Army constructs.

* Follow closely STRATCOM's lead on joint IO issues and take joint IO training courses. STRATCOM has extensive resources available at its lead IO organization, the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) in San Antonio, Texas. The JIOC is a well established and robust unit manned by IO professionals who provide support to IO planning and execution around the world. Additionally, the JIOC offers courses ranging from IO orientations to developing qualified IO planners.

The Joint Forces Staff College's Joint Command, Control and Information Warfare School in Norfolk, Virginia, also offers a wide variety of courses dealing with IO.

Finally, fire supporters can contact the Joint Staff, DJ3 Operations Directorate, Assistant Deputy Directorate for Information Operations to learn about limited and selective training opportunities available for planning and executing deception operations and special technical operations.

The education and training opportunities outlined in this article are only a small sample of those available to the Soldier wanting to expand individual or unit IO knowledge and skills.

Obviously, DoD, the joint and interagency community, and the Army believe in the future utility of IO. As fire supporters--Field Artillerymen--assume the lead role in integrating IO into plans and operations, the requirement exists to become technical and tactical IO professionals.

Proven on the battlefield, IO tools are increasingly effective combat multipliers. In terms well understood by fire supporters, IO can produce desired effects, shaping the battlefield for decisive action, but only when employed by professionals who know what they're doing.

Core Capabilities
 Electronic Warfare (EW)
 Computer Network Operations (CNO)
 Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
 Military Deception
 Operations Security (OPSEC)
Supporting Capabilities
 Information Assurance
 Physical Security
 Counterintelligence
 Physical Attack
Related Capabilities
 Public Affairs (PA)
 Civil-Military Operations (CMO)
 Intelligence Support

DoD Information Operations: "The integrated employment of the core
capabilities of EW, CNO, PSYOP, military deception and OPSEC, in concert
with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence,
disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision
making while protecting our own."

The Department of Defense (DoD) IO Framework taken from the
"Information Operations Roadmap"

By Colonel Allen W. Batschelet

Colonel Allen W. Batschelet took command of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery, Fort Hood, Texas, in July. In his previous assignment, he was an Action Officer in the Deputy Directorate for Information Operations, J3 Operations Directorate, Joint Staff at the Pentagon. He served as Commander of the 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (3-82 FA), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood. In 1996, he deployed as the S3 and then Executive Officer for 1-7 FA, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) out of Germany to Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard. In the Persian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Storm, he commanded A Battery, 3-82 FA and, afterward, A Battery, 21st Field Artillery, also with the 1st Cav. He holds a Master of Military Arts and Science from the Command and General Staff College and an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies, both at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a Master of Strategic Arts from the War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.