Information on biological weapons programme reported hidden.

Iraq had hidden information about a biological weapons programme that had been conceptualized, researched and put into effect before the 1990 Persian Gulf war, according to Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) set up under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in connection with the disposal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Munitions, bombs and long-range missile warheads filled with biological warfare agents had been deployed and prepared for use, he reported on 13 October.

Since the Commission's report in June, Baghdad had released "new and significant information", he stated, revealing that in addition to imports from the former Soviet Union, Iraq had indigenously produced Scud-type missile engines and carried out research and development on a variety of projects on missiles of prohibited ranges (i.e. more than 150 kilometres).

Furthermore, Mr. Ekeus said, Iraq's efforts to conceal its biological weapons programme, its chemical missile warhead flight tests and work on missile development for the delivery of a nuclear device had led it to provide incorrect information on certain of its proscribed missile activities.

The new revelations had cast into doubt the veracity of Iraq's previous declarations in the missile area. Inaccurate information on how many missiles existed had handicapped the Commission's ability to verify whether or not all had been destroyed, and that was of particular significance if the weapons had chemical or biological warheads, Mr. Ekeus said.

In 1991, Iraq had declared it had destroyed all proscribed weapons and "components". The Commission had been unable to verify this because the orders for destruction had, according to Iraq, been given orally and there was no written documentation. The Commission could not accept that explanation at face value. This aspect needed further verification, including supporting evidence such as authentic documentation from Iraq.

Misleading actions

As an example of how Iraq had been misleading the Commission, Mr. Ekeus said that, as recently as a few weeks ago, Iraqi officials had taken Commission members to a site where they had announced that a considerable amount of biological and chemical warheads had been dumped and burned. They had then modified the account of the number of warheads involved and the location of the alleged destruction site. The condition of the rubble made it impossible to verify what was there.

He knew that Iraq had the facilities to produce chemical warfare agents. Those facilities were being used for legitimate civilian purposes and being monitored by cameras.

The Commission's monitoring system had detected and exposed Iraqi efforts to circumvent UN sanctions by importing missile related equipment without having notified the UN Sanctions Committee. A monitoring video camera, in particular, had also unmasked the use of prohibited equipment in their current permitted missile programme.

Also, the abrupt departure of Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan (Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's son-in-law) from Iraq for Jordan last summer could still not be fully explained, Mr. Ekeus said. Nevertheless, he believed that the Commission's consistency of method and purpose had been a major element in pushing the Iraqi Government into an untenable situation, leading to its volte-face in early August. In his view, the Commission's monitoring and verification system, far from being stale, was lean, dynamic, effective and reactive.

Report to the

Security Council

In an 11 October report to the Security Council (S/1995/864), Mr. Ekeus stated that Iraq had agreed to provide a full, final and complete disclosure in the missile, chemical and biological areas.

In the chemical weapons area, the Special Commission's investigations had led to disclosure of proscribed activities aimed at acquiring a considerable capability for the production of the advanced nerve agent VX. Whether Iraq still stored precursors for immediate VX use had not been fully clarified.

The Commission would have to adjust some of its monitoring activities to prevent Iraq from using its chemical compounds and equipment for secret acquisition of chemical weapons, the report stated. Further destruction of some Iraqi chemical facilities and equipment had to be contemplated.

The Commission had detected and identified a hitherto secret offensive biological weapons programme in Iraq comprising a large-scale production of biological warfare agents, and the filling and deployment of missile warheads and aerial bombs with those agents, as well as biological weapons research and development activities of "considerable width and depth".

As late as August, Iraq had presented to the Commission a formal, but essentially incorrect, declaration on its biological weapons activities. Consequently, the Commission had requested again and Iraq had agreed to provide a full, final and complete disclosure. Much remained to be verified, in particular the destruction of munitions and bulk agents, the report stated.

The increased flow of data, whether originating in Iraq's new admissions or in recently obtained documents, had opened up new possibilities for a solid and credible account of the proscribed weapons, the report added. Prospects for the full implementation of Council resolution 687 (1991) had improved.

The system for ongoing monitoring and verification was now in place and had been tested for some time, the report said. Even if the new revelations had led to adjustments, redirection and augmentation of activities, the system had already proved to be robust and fundamentally sound.

`Full openness' needed

Iraq must demonstrate "a full openness and a manifest willingness" to cooperate in all its dealings with the Special Commission, the report went on. Iraq's stated preparedness to provide such cooperation was a hopeful sign. If Iraq were genuinely to translate its statements into action, there would be a real hope for the completion of the task entrusted to the Special Commission within a reasonable time-frame, the report concluded.

On 25 August, Mr. Ekeus told reporters that new information obtained from Iraq had revealed the development of a "full-scale" biological weapons programme, which had matured after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

Iraq had admitted to having gone far beyond what it had stated in its written declaration on biological weapons of 4 August, he added. It had also admitted having produced ten times more Anthrax than it had previously declared. Furthermore, three different types of biological warfare agents, including one that had been kept secret until now, had been put into a total of 191 bombs and missiles.

In all, he said, Iraq had admitted to producing some tens of thousands of litres of various biological agents. The process of filling weapons with agents had taken place in December 1990, just before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf war.

Mr. Ekeus added that Iraq had denied it had used any biological weapons during the Persian Gulf war. Iraq had declared that all agents were destroyed in July and August 1991, which would require the provision of evidence from Iraq and verification by the Commission.

Iraq had also admitted to the development of indigenous missiles, which required vigorous investigation. Further, it had supplied the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with information that it had been working on a nuclear crash programme, immediately after the invasion of Kuwait, to produce a nuclear bomb from highly enriched uranium by April 1991, Mr. Ekeus said.

Following the departure of Gen. Hussein Kamel from Iraq in early August, the Commission's Executive Chairman and the IAEA Director-General had been invited to Baghdad to receive more information from Iraq on its various weapons programmes. At the end of this trip, an Iraqi official had asked Mr. Ekeus to go to a chicken farm owned by Gen. Kamel, where the special forces had found eight large shipping containers and roughly 150 metal boxes containing documentation relating to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and missiles. The Commission was now analyzing the information which could be a lengthy and difficult process, Mr. Ekeus said.

Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, in a letter of 6 October to the Security Council (S/1995/846), claimed Iraq had cooperated with the Special Commission and the IAEA to achieve the objectives of Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991).

Since the end of 1991, Iraq had kept none of the weapons banned by resolution 687 and had undertaken no activity that contravened its obligations under that resolution, he added. He hoped that the Council would take this fact into consideration during its next deliberation.

However, the Special Commission pointed out that it was still in the process of verifying Iraq's compliance with the various prohibitions outlined in resolution 687. To that end, Iraq had to provide relevant documentation and other types of evidence needed by the Commission to fulfil its mandate.

Sanctions continued

After informal consultations on 8 July and 8 September, the Council President informed the press that the sanctions remained in place.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, in a meeting with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 6 October, reiterated Iraq's refusal to accept Council resolution 986 (1995), which allowed for a partial lifting of sanctions against Iraq to enable it to sell oil and use the proceeds for humanitarian purposes.

Also on 6 October, the Council accepted the recommendation of the Secretary-General that the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) should be continued. In a 2 October report (S/1995/836), the Secretary-General said the Mission had contributed significantly to the calm in its area of operation and enjoyed the effective cooperation of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti authorities.