In emotional distress case, judge shows horse sense.

Mr. Ed famously sang that "a horse is a horse." But in a New Jersey superior court, a prizewinning show horse named Max became something else: the symbol of a growing recognition in the law that the loss of a pet is a powerful--and compensable--loss. In a case of first impression, Superior Court Judge Ronald Graves has allowed a family to sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by the abuse and loss of an animal. (Morrisroe v. Moriarty, No. L-600-01 (NJ., Sussex County Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 18, 2004).)

The case breaks new legal ground because New Jersey law does not allow recovery for emotional distress related to loss of a pet. Indeed, the defendants moved to have the case dismissed on that basis. But Graves relied on precedent from other states and called the defendants' behavior so "extreme and outrageous" that a jury could reasonably conclude that it would cause serious emotional suffering, especially to the plaintiffs' now-teenage daughter.

"I had to chart a very careful course" between malice and negligence, explained Paul Abramo of Newton, who represented the plaintiffs. "I created a case of constructive negligence. The conduct is egregious, but without the criminal notion of mens rea. In this case, I argued that the defendant's conduct was so egregious that it approached a malicious state of mind."

In 2000, Jaimie Morrisroe and her parents boarded Max--a trained hunter-jumper with whom Jaimie had won numerous awards---at the On Course Riding Academy (OCRA). Upon arrival, Max was injured when workers made him jump from his trailer instead of walking him down a ramp. His injuries were exacerbated by the "program of forced hard exercise and outright active abuse" he underwent while he was there. Jaimie testified that the farrier for OCRA, Chris Schaeffner, brutally whipped Max and verbally abused him. The Morrisroes also said that OCRA fitted Max's shoes improperly, damaging his hooves, and made him run in deep snow while he was still lame.

The Morrisroes had Max under the constant supervision of several animal health expert--including an acupuncturist, a chiropractor, and a so-called horse whisperer--but their veterinarian testified that "the potential beneficial effects of such treatments were apparently being nullified, and the horse's condition made worse rather than better, as a result of the horse's exposure to inappropriate treatment and improper training practices."

After a year, Jaimie "rescued" her horse from the riding academy. But Max's days as a show jumper were over. The Morrisroes contacted their insurance company and were told that if Max were destroyed, they could collect what they had paid for him--about $20,000--for "loss of use." The Morrisroes chose to take half that sum and put Max out to pasture instead.

Jaimie's reaction was severe: She became depressed and planned suicide.

"The real injury here is the psychological damage to this child," said Abramo. "[She] had lost her horse, lost her relationship with him. She was having nightmares about Schaeffner. She felt guilty about what happened, like it was her fault." Jaimie underwent two years of psychotherapy and two years of home schooling because her depression made her too withdrawn to "even have a normal social life."

The judge noted all this in his ruling and also cited public policy: New Jersey recently passed Assembly Bill 2411, which stiffens civil and criminal penalties for animal cruelty. "The imposition of emotional distress damages in appropriate cases will advance the public policy of deterring and reducing animal cruelty," Graves wrote.

Abramo said publicity from the Morrisroe case had a powerful impact on that legislation. "When it was first proposed, the bill had four cosponsors and a cap of $500 for loss of companionship. After this case hit the news, the hill was reintroduced, this time with 21 cosponsors and a cap of $20,000."

In his ruling, Graves noted that "established legal doctrine classifies pets and domestic animals as personal property. Modern courts, however, have recognized that ... animals are living creatures capable of establishing very special relationships with humans. Because of their unique qualities, it makes good sense for the law to distinguish animals from inanimate objects and other fungible possessions."

The irony here, Abramo noted, is that in this ruling Graves actually reversed himself: It was Graves who wrote the 2002 decision barring any recovery for emotional distress from the loss of a pet. (Harabes v. The Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142 (2002).)

"I like to see that," Abramo said. "It's a sign of an open-minded judiciary."