Ibrahim and Edward.

INTRODUCTION

IBRAHIM AND EDWARD, BOTH PALESTINIANS, both brilliant minds, both mentors for a generation of Arab-Americans, and both larger than life, yet still within the dimension of human failings. Ibrahim was the strategist; Edward was the public voice. Ibrahim was the charismatic leader motivating hundreds of us to seek justice; Edward articulated our grievances and guaranteed our dignity. Ibrahim was the builder of institutions and the producer and director of a library challenging the false products of Zionist construction. Edward was a library exposing in full naked form the vast colonial and Zionist institutional foundation generating bogus conceptualizations of Arabs and Muslims and of the core Palestinian/Israeli conflict. These two men complemented each other's work. They were an awesome team whose output was so politically powerful that they were "honored" by a barrage of threats and attempts to defame their characters and their work.

Reading the memoirs (1) of both men, one is struck by the totally contrasting trajectory of their lives. Born in Jaffa in 1929, Ibrahim's young years were spent in the midst of the intensified Zionist drive to transform Palestine into a Jewish State. His biography intersects with the political events happening in Palestine at that time and conveys the collective Palestinian psyche resulting from the Nakba and earlier. Consequently, Ibrahim's memoir is one of chronicling his life and values in the backdrop of family and Palestine. His is a story of the development of his political self--the resistance fighter in Palestine, the leader, doer, thinker and strategist he became over the years. It is also the story of a Palestinian refugee who was singularly adept and courageous in pursuing higher education in the United States without resources or known human support. Nonetheless, he found odd jobs, help from a friend in Chicago, and later from his wife, Janet.

Edward's memoir dwells on his inner self and the process he underwent of thinking about how to think. He had the luxury of being born to wealth and privilege, which allowed him the physical and secure comfort to dwell on self. Edward detailed his own set of insecurities and human frailties. He seemed almost obsessed in detailing his experience with his parents and teachers, which were at times painful, at times enraging. Early on, however, he understood and experienced British colonial racism. Awareness of Palestine is a thread that runs throughout Edward's early and higher education days even as it was rarely discussed in the family. All through his graduate years, he continued to be dependent on family resources which, according to his memoir, made him uncomfortable.

It was at Princeton University that Edward, an undergraduate, met Ibrahim, a Ph.D. candidate. This fortuitous meeting was later to ripen into a personal and political friendship around the cause of Palestine, a friendship that has left a rich combined legacy of struggle for justice for generations to appreciate, adapt and apply.

PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON IBRAHIM AND EDWARD

How I understand Ibrahim and Edward today is not necessarily the way I understood them in my earlier acquaintance with both men. I do not believe anyone can convey the fullness of either man More importantly, each individual experiences others differently. What I relate in this essay are my own perceptions based on the limited roles I played vis-a-vis each. No doubt, others with different experiences may not resonate with my own. It is a truism to state that we experience pieces of people, and we relate to these pieces in unique ways not replicable by others.

Ibrahim. In 1962, after receiving my Ph.D. in Sociology and Anthropology, I went to teach at Smith College in Northampton, MA. Walking through the Library trying to get oriented to Smith and feeling rather forlorn in that class oriented environment, I came across a man at a bubbler consuming water in plenty. He looked up and pointing at me, he said in his rather staccato style, "you, you, you, you're the Syrian girl, aren't you?" "Yes," I said. He replied, "come, come, come, there are three of us here." I asked, "three what?" "Three Arabs," he said. That was my introduction to Ibrahim Abu-Lughod.

The years at Smith were not particularly eventful from my point of view. Nonetheless, two events stand out. First, the head of my department, a Zionist, wanted to engage Ibrahim in one of those constructed discussion groups based on a State Department formulation--there was an actual name for it, but memory fails me as to what it was called. Ibrahim laid down one condition for his participation: the Zionist participants must admit that their people committed a grave injustice to his people in Palestine. The chairman hemmed and hawed, and fell back on the holocaust. Ibrahim simply walked away.

The second event related to an institutional grant I was given to go to Morocco for a short research trip. My chairman was pushing me to add a trip to Israel to my itinerary and that indeed he would find extra money for me to be able to go to Israel and meet with particular people. I was feeling a lot of pressure, and was too inexperienced to know what to do. I consulted with Ibrahim. What was interesting about Ibrahim was that he did not say outright "don't go, it's a trap." Rather, I had to coax a response out of him that could give me some guidance. Finally, he pointed out the problems of my taking that particular trip at that particular time, for which I remain forever grateful.

Over the years at Smith, I learned much from Ibrahim and his brilliant wife, Janet. I was not sure how to absorb it all, but a foundation was being laid for our future efforts together. What impressed me most was Ibrahim's fantastic conceptual ability.

In 1967, Ibrahim accepted a position at Northwestern University (Evanston), while I joined the faculty of sociology at Simmons College (Boston). The horrific jolt to the Arab-American resulting from the June 1967 war guaranteed not only the continued friendship and communication with Ibrahim, but also the broadening and development of tight communal bonds which configured into organizational activities. The war had remobilized pro-Israeli forces in the United States, which Israel systematically fostered. Anti-Arab racism poured out of the TV screens and radio speakers. It was a time of great upheaval, anxiety, and daily stress for the Arab-American community. Arab-Americans understood that they had neglected their responsibility to challenge the falsity of Zionist narrative. As a result, the public had only negative images of Arabs and a reverse causal sequence regarding the origins and continuation of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Arab scholars attending the 1967 meeting of the International Congress of Orientalists at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor decided it was imperative to establish an Arab-American organization to challenge Zionist constructions of the conflict in the Middle East. Subsequently, the founding meeting was held in Chicago, and the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) was established. Among the founders were Fauzi Najjar, Abdeen Jabara, Husni Haddad, Rashid Bashshur, Adnan Aswad, Cherif Bassiouni and many others. Ibrahim became the major organizer of the AAUG. His charismatic leadership and ability to communicate with many at a time when computers were not common, enabled the Association to grow and play a significant role in challenging the Zionist narrative. Ibrahim put all of his talents into play. First, he gave us all a sense of a noble mission to achieve justice, a mission whose weapon of choice was first-rate scholarship. We all believed that scholarship would enlighten, and enlightenment would bring justice. His force of will asserted itself in his oft-repeated "don't worry, we will win." I am not sure he always believed it, but he certainly motivated people to do their best by asserting an optimistic outcome.

We entered into the production of scholarly studies, information papers, and outreach programs. Our products began to enter the public forum, and the reactions from the pro-Israel were confused initially as they continued to reiterate their discredited narrative out of habit. However, they soon organized themselves into an effort to defame, demonize, delegitimize and ultimately neutralize our efforts to break their monopoly on defining the origin of the conflict.

Edward. It was in this early period that Edward Said entered into the growing circle of Arab-Americans. His early years were marked by awareness and discomfort with the injustices committed against Palestine and Palestinians. The 1967 war moved him to employ his extraordinary talents to give voice to the downtrodden Arab person. He was then 32 years of age. His renowned facility for critical exposure of patronizing Orientalist treatises designed to legitimize colonial/imperialist encampment in the Arab/Muslim world is legion. It was evident in the first piece most all of us in those days read by Edward, "The Arab Portrayed." The essay was originally published in a special December 1968 issue of The Arab World, edited by Ibrahim. Ibrahim had invited Edward to write a piece for the publication. Later, Ibrahim convinced Northwestern University Press to republish the articles in that special issue, along with several additions. Ibrahim was beginning his main educational effort to challenge the accuracy of Zionist literature. The resultant book was The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective (1970) that he also edited.

What emerged from the reunion of these two friends was a determination to step up to the challenges presented by the 1967 war. This became manifested in major works of scholarship they produced, which documented the transformation of Palestine specifically, and exposed and demolished politically contaminated Orientalism, the then dominant paradigm for understanding the Arab/Muslim world in general. Not only did Ibrahim introduce and nurture Edward's engagement with the tragedy that was Palestine and the struggles of non-western peoples, but he also introduced Edward to worldly Eqbal Ahmed, himself one of the most analytically brilliant political activists in recent history. Edward acknowledged his intellectual debt to both men in a 13 December 2001 obituary essay, "My Guru" in the London Review of Books. (2)

I first met Edward at one of the early AAUG Board meetings held at my apartment in Arlington, MA. He struck me at that time as a sort of dilettante. Why? He was elegant in appearance, interested in good food and excellent wine, and he just did not fit the purist image I had of the engaged activist. In my mind, we were not supposed to be interested in dress, food and wine. After all, this was the late 1960s and early 1970s, a period of civil rights struggle, anti-Vietnam war, and anti-corporate rage. We were to show our pain on our sleeve, commit ourselves to righting huge injustices--especially in Palestine--with knowledge as our sword. We were some kind of socialists, leveled by equality. Work--even the most banal--was to be evenly distributed. Somehow, Edward was exempt from this, and I remember being quite annoyed. Ibrahim assured me that we were in the presence of a brilliant mind, and that Edward's contribution would be his scholarship, biting political analyses, and his growing international stature, guaranteeing him a wide public audience.

I reversed my perception of Edward after reading his "The Arab Portrayed" and other pieces. The original 1968 piece was not only sensitive and brilliant, but it represented what all of us of Arab origin felt. I understood immediately that this man would uphold our dignity, our humanity, and be a voice for justice not only for Palestinians, but also for all oppressed peoples. He and Ibrahim together, one by informed strategic action and charismatic leadership, and the other by unchallengeable voice, would inspire and equip us to advocate for justice and to confront head-on attempts to defame our character when our analyses could not be disputed.

Ibrahim and Edward Together. In 1969-70, Ibrahim gathered a group of outstanding scholars, including his wife Janet, to write the monumental set of comprehensive and impeccably documented essays published by Northwestern University in 1971 under the title, The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict edited by Ibrahim. Later it came out as a paperback. It remains today as one of the most important reference works on the Palestine/Israeli conflict.

Simultaneously, Edward was encouraged and prodded by Ibrahim to develop the theme of "The Arab Portrayed" into a major analysis that would expose the whole institutional production of deprecating portrayals of Arabs/Muslims. He spent several years researching Orientalist scholarship and its political underpinning aimed at legitimizing colonialism and imperialism. It attained remarkable success. Edward's Orientalism altered the paradigm studying the Arab/Muslim world and the formerly colonized peoples. Acknowledging his intellectual debt and gratitude to Ibrahim and Janet, he dedicated the book to them.

Edward went on to publish numerous other major works on or related to Palestine and the Middle East. At the same time, Ibrahim was applying his diverse talents to building the organizational structure of the AAUG as the instrument of producing directly relevant publications in several forms: books resulting from annual conventions whose themes addressed the comprehensive facets of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, the Arab World itself, and the role of Arab-Americans; information papers; occasional papers; Arab World Issues: Special Reports like the one on Camp David (1978) and South Lebanon; and the launching of the journal, Arab Studies Quarterly. His concern was not to be "the writer/analyst," but rather to draw other scholars into the process of scholarship on Palestine, the Arab World, and U.S. foreign policy in the Arab region. He was also interested in giving young scholars publication opportunities that would enhance their own resumes and development their community bonds and leadership skills. Nonetheless, it was most always his vast conceptual ability that provided the frameworks for the publications. He himself, in addition to his 1963 book, Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters, published by Princeton University Press, edited and produced several books and numerous articles. In 1983, Ibrahim and Edward collaborated with others in the 1983 publication by the Palestine Human Rights Campaign, A Profile of the Palestinian People. By the way, the Campaign was something Ibrahim fostered to give specific exposure to the violation of Palestinian rights by Israel. Both collaborated on and contributed to other AAUG publications conceptualized by Ibrahim. But I get ahead of myself. Let me backtrack to 1977.

1977 was marked by the Carter Administration's attempt to reconvene, post the 1973 war, the Geneva conference, co-chaired by the USSR, which was aimed at facilitating a comprehensive peace in the region, an attempt opposed by the Israelis. On 1 October 1977, Carter announced the US-USSR Joint Statement which referred for the first time to "Palestinian legitimate rights." Within days, Israel and its supporters in the U.S. Congress shot it down. I recall that Ibrahim was also upset by the Joint Statement, and communicated his objections to the USSR Ambassador to the U.S. The Statement continued to have the vague wording of UNGA Resolution 242, which did not call for Palestinian self-determination or grant Palestinian refugees their specific legal rights to repatriation.

Nonetheless, during this period, PLO representative in Beirut and then member of the Executive Committee, Shafiq al-Hout, came to the U.S., and was granted the right to travel outside of the United Nations twenty-five mile radius zone imposed on Palestinian representatives. Edward worked with a Cambridge, MA-based Palestinian scholar to arrange a series of meetings for Shafiq with individuals assumed to be "proxies" for Israel. Clearly, Shafiq was to feel out these individuals, given the activity emanating from the Carter administration. Carter did not and could not recognize the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In 1975, Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, had placed a condition on talking with the PLO, namely that it had to accept UNSC Resolution 242, considered as the sole legal framework for negotiations. Edward called me and asked me to facilitate Shafiq's meetings in Cambridge. Shafiq gave a public presentation at Harvard University in Dr. Herbert Kelman's Middle East seminar series. There, he stated clearly that the PLO had accepted the two-state solution, as was first indicated in 1974 and adopted by the Palestine National Council in 1977. In meetings with local Zionists and scholars, Shafiq's official statement regarding acceptance of a two state solution was questioned, challenged, rejected, and in short, simply dismissed as those present tried to put him on the defensive. It was clear that these individuals, with perhaps one exception, were not interested in any solution that would require Israel to give up any part of the Palestinian territory it had occupied in 1967.

Regardless of the failed meetings, options were still being tested about the possibilities of the PLO being a part of peace negotiations. Arguing for inclusion of the PLO in any immediate and future negotiations, a group of Arab-Americans met with Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State, on 8 November 1977. William Quandt, then part of the National Security Council on the Middle East, had argued further for a Presidential meeting with Arab-Americans. That meeting took place on 15 December 1977. In between these two meetings, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made his famous trip to Jerusalem to address the Israeli Knesset on 19 November 1977.

It was Edward who was contacted by his old Princeton schoolmate, Hodding Carter III, then spokesman for the Department of State and Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, about the Vance meeting. Edward led a group of us AAUGers to that meeting, and we were also joined by the conservative National Association of Arab-Americans representatives. I recall that Edward sat off to the rear of the room. Vance did not stay long. Under Secretary of State for the Middle East, Philip Habib replaced him. Habib tended to berate whatever we raised with him. For example, I remember raising the issue of Israeli soldiers who were operating in Southern Lebanon, and Habib retorted that "the Christians invited them in." Edward saw which way it was going, and said very little. It seemed pointless. I recall that several of us caught a taxi after the meeting, and noted to each other that Vance and Habib had rejected outright the notion that the PLO should be party to any negotiations. Edward commented wryly in the taxi, "All Arafat really wants is any piece of Israeli-occupied Palestinian land over which he can raise the Palestinian flag."

Edward did not come to the December meeting with President Carter. Some of us present at that meeting were quite upset when we learned that Carter had just finished a press conference at which he said that the PLO had excluded itself from the peace process because it had not accepted UNSC Resolution 242. National Security Director, Zbigniew Brzezinski was at that meeting and uttered his famous words, "Bye Bye PLO". Later, we saw our meeting with the President broadcast on television news preceded by Carter making his press conference statement about the PLO. It gave the impression that we approved of what he said. What was more interesting was that one of the conservative Arab-Americans from the National Association of Arab-Americans tried to draw us into a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Begin who was in Washington at the time. The AAUGers declined. It was not only useless, but it was also inappropriate. Edward was not present at that meeting with Carter. If memory serves me right, he was abroad at the time.

As a result of Camp David I meetings in 1978, Israel and Egypt signed a peace agreement on 17 September. Also resulting from the Camp David meetings was a Framework for Peace in the Middle East, which included an Israeli-defined autonomy solution for Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied 1967 territories, with no mention of the refugees. Allegedly, neither Sadat nor Carter were pleased with that document, but accepted it nonetheless.

In 1978, the Carter administration sent a message to Edward that if the PLO would recognize Israel, Carter would push for a two-state solution whereby the 1967 Israeli-occupied territories would basically become the State of Palestine. Edward sent the offer to Arafat, but there was no answer. Shafiq al-Hout confirmed that Arafat had received the letter but did not bother to respond to it. This annoyed Edward, and more so later in light of what Arafat accepted at Oslo in 1993 and thereafter.

In the early 1970s, Ibrahim went to Lebanon on leave from Northwestern to serve on a U.N. program on curriculum development and teacher-retraining. His experience there rekindled his interested in the importance of education to create an informed Palestinian people capable of critical thinking, leadership, and professional expertise. Ibrahim's grasp of what was needed was comprehensive. He focused on creating institutions as the foundation for Palestinian liberation. He understood that Palestinians needed coherent curriculum and a broad based educational system that could accommodate Palestinian youth with varying levels of education. He was convinced that a quality education for all Palestinians would be essential for the Palestinian future.

That conviction would bear fruit in 1979-1980 when he directed a UNESCO-sponsored feasibility study to establish a Palestine Open University, a distance-learning system with unique characteristics suited to the needs of a dispersed and dispossessed population. I was fortunate and honored to be on the team that worked on that study. Both Janet and Ibrahim labored long and hard to get it off the ground and to provide its intellectual and organizational foundations. As part of the process, a curriculum colloquium was held in Beirut at the UNESCO building in the midst of the Lebanese civil war. Ibrahim pressed Edward to attend the colloquium. I recall him saying to Edward that what he could do in one day in developing the humanistic studies that were to be a main feature of the curriculum would take others months.

The final report of the feasibility study, compromising some 1,000 pages, was outstanding. Ibrahim had pulled it all together. UNESCO recognized it as one of the best studies ever even though for political reasons, it was never issued as an official document nor was it released to the public. Ibrahim continued to seek Arab support and PLO approval and ultimately he was authorized to move ahead on setting up the University, which meant finding a location where the educational materials could be produced and a communication and delivery system organized. In the spring of 1982, Ibrahim was in Lebanon negotiating for a building previously used by the British in Chemlan, a Druze area. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon on 5 June destroyed that opportunity.

Ibrahim was caught in the 1982 war. In spite of pleas from friends and family alike that he agree to being evacuated with other Americans, he refused. In his memoir, he describes the Zionist advance on Jaffa in 1947, his work with the resistance, and then ultimately the closing of options for the resistance, and his recognition that he had to get on the last boat out of Jaffa. It seems that Ibrahim always faulted himself for leaving Jaffa, though clearly there was no other option. Hence remaining in Beirut while it was under Israeli bombardment and siege was a reliving of Jaffa, only this time he was determined to stick it out. Ibrahim's bonds to Edward were deepened when, after his apartment was destroyed in the opening bombardment, he and a friend were given refuge in the apartment of Edward's mother for the duration of the war.

When Ibrahim returned to the States, he was a restless and angry man, though his outward demeanor remained the same to his friends, but it seemed almost forced. The 1980s were not particularly pleasant or highly productive for Ibrahim. The AAUG was having problems. The Lebanese civil war, the Israel invasion and occupation of Lebanon, the ousting of the PLO and its fighters from Lebanon, and Egypt's earlier peace treaty with Israel, contributed to the factionalization of the AAUG membership and some of the Lebanese and Egyptian members left the all-Arab organization. The Iraq/Iran war (1980-88) also impacted the organization. Ibrahim was still active in AAUG, but not as engaged as he once had been. It was almost as though the organization, which he helped to foster and which gave him meaning and mission after the 1967 war was no longer enough for him, although he remained committed to it.

The withdrawal of the PLO and its fighters in 1982 combined with the Iraq/Iran war, moved the Arab focus of attention away from Palestine and Palestinians. More importantly, the perceived support for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait by Arafat did not sit well with the Gulf States. They were pre-occupied with fear of a spillover of Iranian Shi'ism into their area. Palestinians were isolated and alone and felt they had to cope with Israel and the U.S. on their own. They were in a weak position. The outbreak of the December 1987 intifada however demonstrated the will of the people not to give up. Those in the territories were also concerned that Israel would attempt to annex the occupied land, and they were intent on salvaging the remainder of historic Palestine.

In January 1988, Secretary of State George Shultz produced a new plan at least partially in response to the intifada. Basically the plan was a rehash of the 1978 Camp David accords, the September 1982 Reagan plan and others. The basic elements were: negotiations hosted by the five permanent UN Security Council members, attended by all parties accepting UNSC 242 (and 338) and renouncing violence and terrorism. The Palestinians from the territories would be represented by a joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation that would negotiate the terms of a three-year transitional period for the territories. It proposed an international meeting that would facilitate separate bi-lateral negotiations for a final settlement, but have no veto or enforcement power. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir objected to the plan. Egypt and Jordan supported it as did Shimon Peres, then the Israeli Foreign Minister. Syria and the PLO objected to it. West Bank and Gaza Palestinians refused to meet with Shultz on his various shuttle trips to the area.

Nonetheless, on 26 March 1988, Ibrahim and Edward met with Shultz at the State Department at Shultz's invitation. I do not know Ibrahim and Edward's motivation for meeting with Shultz--both were members of the Palestine National Council at the time--although not allegedly authorized by that body or by the PLO Executive Committee to meet with Shultz. The Palestinians in the 1967-occupied territories were clamoring for action to salvage the territories for Palestinian statehood. Both men understood the weakness and isolation of Palestinians, but they also understood the situation was critical and that perhaps the intifada offered some limited leverage to impress upon Shultz the need to draw the PLO into any peace negotiations. In any case, it was clear that they both saw the Shultz invitation as some form of recognition of the Palestinian right to represent Palestinians. I believe they also wanted to assess the U.S. position for any flexibility. While both succeeded in stating the Palestinian position forcefully to Shultz, the transcript of their press conference given directly after the meeting did not convey success in impacting the existing American stance. (3) Both men were criticized in Palestinian and Arab circles for meeting with Shultz given the unforgiving inadequacy of his "peace" plan. Was the criticism fair?

The Shultz plan did set off a debate within the PLO and the PNC about the issue of accepting UNSC 242 as the condition for the U.S. to deal directly with the PLO. The 15 November 1988 Algiers Declaration of Palestinian Independence led to Palestinian recognition of UNSC 242, as conditioned by the United States. Ibrahim and Edward voted for the Declaration with its inclusion of recognition of 242, by which Israel was de facto recognized by the PLO. Reading the Declaration, it is clear that the Palestine National Council was attempting to retrieve the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem for a Palestinian state, and to block and reverse Israeli settlements, confiscation and annexation of the land. My sense is that Ibrahim and Edward were attempting to neutralize Israeli designs by giving in to the U.S. condition of accepting 242, and by declaring Palestinian independence rooted in the principle of partition established by the 29 November 1947 UN partition plan (UNGA 181). I believe that neither one was happy about making concessions to Zionist colonialism. It became clear, however, that the 1988 concession, initially feared by the Israelis for its moderation and appeal to the international community, initiated an Israeli course of action that stalled, blocked, and totally obstructed negotiations by conditioning each round on yet more Palestinian concessions. It also led to more intensified Israeli military repression

Ibrahim's Return to Palestine. Although he made many trips over the years to Jordan and the West Bank before the 1967 war (looking longingly toward Jaffa), he never entered through Israel and, after the occupation, refused to enter at all. In 1990, Ibrahim had lung surgery that almost took his life. As he states in his memoir, he realized that he might die without ever seeing Palestine again. In December 1991, he traveled to Palestine, landing at Ben Gurion Airport. His excitement was palpable, especially when he visited his home city of Jaffa. He did a second trip in 1992 which was decisive. He made up his mind to move permanently to Palestine while teaching at Birzeit University during the 1992/1993 academic year on leave from Northwestern. He had resigned from the PNC earlier, and tendered his resignation to Northwestern during his experience at Birzeit. His mission was now to "build our state and our people." (4) He focused on curriculum development, teacher training, leadership training through legal and international studies at Birzeit, and planned a Palestine Historical Museum and Library.

In the summer of 1993, Ibrahim encouraged the AAUG to sponsor a trip for its members and others to Palestine. I had led a group to Syria that year, and then went on to Palestine via Amman to join the AAUG group. Ibrahim had scheduled a conference at Birzeit University in which I participated. It was consistent with his life's work to have physically experienced Palestine and hence to reinforce our commitment to it.

What was stunning about that visit was Ibrahim's absolute ecstasy in showing all of us attendees his Palestine, and particularly, Jaffa. I remember being overwhelmed emotionally by our visit to Jaffa. We started out from Jerusalem on that July date to go first to Nazareth, then to Acre, then to Haifa, and on to Jaffa. Our bus broke down in Nazareth. We were delayed in getting to Acre and Haifa. Ibrahim had promised everyone a swim in the Mediterranean and so most people on the bus changed into their bathing suits, and went for a dip in the Mediterranean at Haifa. We were running late, but Ibrahim was determined to show us Jaffa. We got to Jaffa at 10 p.m. Ibrahim asked us to get off the bus, and he led us to his old school where he, Farouk Kaddoumi, Shafiq al-Hout, and Baha Abu-Laban had all studied. There were Israeli guards there, but he ignored them. He kept pointing to the school and to specific classrooms, and essentially reclaimed the school, Jaffa and Palestine. His manner was highly excited and affirming. He seemed to be saying as he pointed, "this is mine, and this is mine, and this is mine, etc." His brother Ahmed was with us, and his expression with tears flowing down his face seemed to convey "paradise lost." But not Ibrahim; he was reasserting Palestinian ownership and historical authenticity in Palestine. We got back to Jerusalem after midnight. I can't and I won't ever forget Ibrahim's facial expressions, animation, and determination in his reclamation of Palestine.

After Oslo, some faulted Ibrahim for not publicly condemning Arafat for the concessions he gave. However, Ibrahim had not abandoned any part of Palestine at all. In fact, Professor Tarif Khalidi once told me that Ibrahim had said to him, "You should return to Palestine; it is our country." Ibrahim chose to ignore the Palestinian Authority since there was no point in condemning it. Having chosen to return to Palestine, he focused his energy and talents on institution building for the future of Palestine. He could not do that and attack the Palestinian Authority at the same time when some of his work depended on it for support and facilitation. His was a tactical choice to achieve the strategic goal of Palestinian nationalism. Some were disappointed that Ibrahim did not openly criticize the Palestinian Authority leadership. However, strategist that he was, he chose to try to build for the future rather than satisfy the urge to tear at the transitorily entrenched. Besides which, he wanted to stay in and to die in Palestine. Was it a right decision? For the record, it is important to note that he was a critic of the Oslo process itself, although he could not be as openly critical as Edward could be from a position abroad.

Perhaps one of the most important endeavors Ibrahim undertook during this period was the planning and holding of a 12-15 November conference sponsored by Birzeit University on the "Landscape Perspective on Palestine." This conference was held ten years after the declaration of independence. Edward presented an absolutely brilliant Prologue, "Palestine: Memory, Invention and Space." A book of extraordinary importance resulted from the conference, edited by Ibrahim, Roger Heacock and Khaled Nashef titled, The Landscape of Palestine" Equivocal Poetry, Birzeit University Publications (1999). Perhaps no other set of studies exposes and demolishes the fabricated Zionist narrative regarding exclusive, ancient claims to Palestine as does this book. I consider this book and Ibrahim's original 1971, The Transformation of Palestine, to be the irrefutable and documented knowledge foundation on which the case for Palestinian national rights is made clear and unimpeachable. It is indeed unfortunate and disgraceful that the Landscape book has not been made accessible to a wider audience by republication.

Although 1993 was the last time I saw Ibrahim, I did keep in touch with him. He asked me to put him in touch with my cousin, Munir Farah, a curriculum development expert who was in Syria at the time, and to suggest a science/math curriculum expert. E-mail became a way of communicating. But I never lost touch with his incredible commitment to Palestine. One thing is certain: no one should or ever can doubt Ibrahim's sense of ownership of all of Palestine, not at the expense of Israeli Jews living there, but at the expense of Zionist ideology. Ibrahim died on 23 May 2001. He sparked a cord in all of us by somehow prearranging his right to return, even in death to be buried with his father in Jaffa. Joining members of Ibrahim's family, Edward Said, Ibrahim's longtime friend, and Mahmoud Darwish led the emotionally moving entourage.

Edward, South Africa, Jerusalem, Bi-national State. In May 1991, Edward made a journey to South Africa. Mandela had been released, South Africa was embarking on the one person, one vote road demanded consistently by the African National Congress. The ANC had never wavered from that goal. Edward spoke with Walter Sisulu, who had just returned after thirty years of exile. He learned from him the secret of the ANC victory: it was by forcing the issue into the international arena to expose the morally reprehensible white South African policy of apartheid. Edward insisted that Palestinians should adopt the South African approach, it being moral and humane. Expose Israeli colonization, racism, and repressive methods to the world, and the pressure will build on Israel to come to human terms with the Palestinians. "We must show Israel and its supporters that only a full acknowledgment by them of what was done to us can bring peace and reconciliation." (5)

In September 1991, just a few weeks before the opening Madrid "peace" conference was to take place, Edward assembled Palestinian intellectuals, leaders, and activists to a seminar in London to share his South African experience and to have them listen to the South African ANC Ambassador in London. It was during that seminar that he learned via telephone that he had Leukemia. Total psychological devastation set in when the news spread to the community.

After the initial shock, Edward found a new rhythm to his life. On the one hand, more and more time was given over to treatments that often laid him flat for days. On the other hand, there was a quickened pace and intensified urgency in focusing on Palestine, Palestinians, Iraq, and U.S. foreign policy. Edward attended the 1991 AAUG convention at Northwestern University organized by Ibrahim. There he spoke of his South African experience and spelled out what he felt should be our approach in advocating for Palestinian rights. I recall vividly his saying that the South Africans were appalled to think that any colonized people would negotiate away any part of their homeland. After all, Israel was/is a colonial settler state as was South Africa.

Both Ibrahim and Edward had contributed to a 1974 AAUG book on Settler Regimes that drew the parallels between South Africa and Palestine. The book had Ibrahim's comparative conceptual stamp that put in relief the inherent weaknesses of such regimes. Edward's essay on "Arabs and Jews" was quintessential Said, focusing on the horrors of the ethnic conflict while pointing out its futility and demonstrating that the lives and identities of Arabs and Jews were interlocked because of their contested narratives. Early on Edward understood, and this was reinforced by his South African experience, that both peoples must find a way to coexist based on equality. The South African solution applied to the Palestine/Israel conflict was the moral and humane outcome that he felt would happen if Palestinians pursued exposing the immorality of Zionist Israel in the international arena. The bi-national state solution began to appear more directly in Edward's writings and talks, especially during and after the Oslo process debacle.

In 1992, Edward and his family visited Palestine. It was his first trip back to Jerusalem since his family departed from the city in 1947. Ibrahim was already teaching at Birzeit University. Edward was no doubt encouraged by Ibrahim to visit the homeland. When he returned, he wrote a very moving piece on a visit to his old home in Jerusalem for Harpers magazine. Writing in Commentary (a right-wing pro-Israeli magazine) in September 1999, Justus Reid Weiner challenged Edward's Palestinianism in his "My Beautiful Old House" and Other Fabrications by Edward Said" and charged that Edward was trying to make propaganda gains by implying he was a refugee. I recall Edward feeling frustrated and exasperated with this new attempt to defame him and discredit his work, but as usual, the attempt failed.

Upon the suggestion of Ibrahim, the AAUG organized a conference at Birzeit University in July 1993 as I noted above. At this conference, Ibrahim announced a special event and asked us all to remain in the auditorium. The special event was the awarding of an honorary degree to Edward by the Birzeit faculty. It was a moving moment because it was a Palestinian university honoring an internationally respected Palestinian scholar. Later we went on to An-Najah University in Nablus where Edward was again honored. Watching Ibrahim and Edward enjoying a mutual camaraderie was uplifting for all of us. Here were two brilliant men--great friends--and they were our brothers, not simply in a solidarity sense but as family. They strengthened and gave us pride in our communal bonds.

Edward and Oslo. Upon reading the terms of the Oslo Declaration of Principles signed on the White House Lawn in September 1993, Edward was absolutely incensed. He noted, "I was an early dissenter from what I interpreted as a poor deal for Palestinians; for the past two decades I had had few doubts that a negotiated political settlement was the only valid option for our struggle with Israel, but after the Gulf War and his disastrous alliance with Saddam Hussein, I had lost confidence in Arafat's abilities to lead or truly represent our national interests." (6) Speaking at the 1993 AAUG convention some two months after the signing, Edward presented a scathing condemnation of the Oslo agreement and of Arafat. Looking yellow, and sweating profusely as a result of a recent chemotherapy treatment, Edward went further. He expressed his disgust at the sons of noted Palestinian scholars who negotiated the security arrangements part of Oslo with the Israelis, arrangements that favored Israel's security rather than that of the victims. No sooner had Edward finished his talk then the 1993 AAUG President, Dr. Ziad Asali rose and disclaimed Edward's remarks as representing the position of AAUG. Asali was not authorized by his Executive Committee or Board of Directors to state this. In fact, the majority of AAUGers were in consonance with Edward's views although there were those who wanted to "give it a chance."

Edward also expressed deep disappointment with the head of one of the Washington-based Arab American institutes who not only supported Oslo, but also partnered with noted Zionist--Mel Levine--who has now been appointed as chief advisor to Senator Kerry on the Middle East--in a lucrative "development" project in Gaza. I chaired that session, and I remember my reaction at the time. I was so moved by Edward's courage and forthrightness, giving voice to the many of us who saw Oslo as a disaster. Edward used a number of profanities during his impassioned talk. I recall his daughter sat shyly in the audience rather wide-eyed hearing her father employ swear words. When I think of that day, I confess that the memory of Edward's pure moral outrage on behalf of his people continues to bring tears to my eyes.

In the following years, Edward continued to dissect the purposeful defects of each Oslo agreement entered into by Arafat. It was clear that Israel had no intention whatsoever to allow Palestinian statehood. In fact, the Israeli/U.S. approach remained constant, retaining much of the language of the 1988 Shultz plan and earlier. Even so, if Edward felt there was a chance to influence/change American policy, he explored it. In 1996, after Clinton's reelection, Edward and Fouad Moughrabi were invited to meet with Jimmy Carter, theoretically in preparation for a meeting with Clinton. President Carter, out of office, made better observations on the Palestine/Israel conflict than when he was in office, and he enjoyed the role of broker. The meeting with Clinton, however, never took place because "Carter and Clinton were no longer on speaking terms apparently because Clinton did not want him to get involved in Middle East Diplomacy." (7)

Edward and the Younger Generation of Arab and Arab/American Students. For several years, I had been encouraging the younger generation of Arab and Arab/American students to take over leadership roles in the community from the older generation. In 1997, I suggested to students at MIT that they sponsor and intergenerational conference, bringing in activists of the older generation to share with them and area students what they thought they had accomplished and where they had failed. The idea was to have the younger generation learn from those experiences and to go on from there to lead their own efforts for justice in Palestine and the Middle East. I told them I would contact members of the older generation if they would organize the event. We all wanted Edward to be the keynote speaker, and indeed Edward immediately agreed to come. Among others who came were the late Dr. Hala Maksoud, then president of the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) and a former president of the AAUG, and Attorney Abdeen Jabara, a founding member and officer of AAUG, and a former president of ADC. A plethora of young activists, including Rania Masri, also presented talks. The noted African-American scholar, Cornel West also attended and participated.

The conference took place in October 1997 at MIT. It was a time when Edward was feeling quite wretched from one of his many chemotherapy treatments. Nonetheless, he came and presented an extraordinary and impassioned talk. He had many things to say, but several stand out:

1. The activists who developed after the 1967 war tended to be attached to particular factions in the Arab World, and tended to be defensive about the Arab world. That was understandable given the incredible anti-Arab racism that intensified after the 1967 war. But such attachments led to the internal divisions that resulted from the 1973 war, the Lebanese civil war, Camp David I, and the 1982 war so that national organizations that had organized around an Arab identity began to fragment along separate state nationalisms.

2. It is important that Arab and Arab/American students and non-students detach themselves from factional identities and be ready to criticize Arab parties, regimes, leaders, etc. for their failure to promote justice and democracy in the Arab World. Honesty is more important to just causes then indiscriminate loyalty to corrupt and undemocratic regimes and factions. We Arab-origin people must recognize that there are problems in the Arab world of its own making.

3. The language of the past insisted on calling Israel "the Zionist Entity." Using such language and refusing to speak to Israelis was foolish.

4. The major contribution made by the older generation was that it got us to understand ourselves as Arabs and Arab-Americans, not as separate state identities. It also got us in the habit of trying to speak out as a political community against injustice.

5. The new generation, he said, has many pluses: more of you; you are bicultural, understanding both American and Arab societies; critical of Arab regimes and the injustices of women's rights, human rights abuses, lack of democracy, torture, etc.; more of you are branching out into diverse fields instead of studying ourselves in Middle East studies, or taking up engineering, and this allows for more humanistic and critical thinking; you have a great curiosity about Israel and can talk to Israelis; and those of you who go back need to bring your critical thought with you and not just plug into existing corrupt regimes.

6. Palestine is important to all Arabs not simply because of land, but rather because of its universalism embodied in the challenges of justice issues at a cosmic level ranging from the holocaust to colonialism and its defining impact on the three monotheistic faiths.

7. Arab identity and culture represent a mixture of many traditions that define them. Many have tried to destroy that identity, but you cannot allow that.

8. In the past, we did not know where we want to go. First it was no recognition of Israel, then it was recognition and two states, and then it was Oslo and the two states went out the window. Israel and the West have worked hard to impose a sense of defeatism on us. We must restore our sense of will and morality to pursue justice not only for ourselves but also for others. Our vision is inclusive and insists on coexistence that allows for cultural differences, not separation and partition. Israel's vision is exclusion and intolerance. Never fall into the trap of believing that our allies are in the White House, State Department, or in Corporations. If you do, you give up your agency. Our allies are the oppressed people of the world and the exercise of our collective moral agency must be pursued. Your generation must work for the inclusion of minorities throughout the Arab world on the basis of equality.

Edward was clearly elated to address the new generation, and they were equally euphoric to hear his clear thinking and absolute honesty. As tired as he was, and indeed he was exhausted, he took questions for some time. At lunch, he returned to his hotel, rested, and then returned to listen to the other speakers, especially the young people. His presence there was so important to the young people. They understood that he respected them and saw in them a better future for Arab leadership. Arabic Hour Television videotaped all sessions of that conference. The present MIT Arab Students Organization has a copy of Edward's talk, as indeed do I as well. It should be housed in a reliable video library of Edward's work, because it remains and will remain an important moral inspiration for generations to come.

Edward and the Holocaust. One of Edward's more controversial observations was his insistence that Palestinians recognize the felt meaning of the holocaust for Jews, "not as a blank check for Israelis to abuse us, but as a sign of our humanity, our ability to understand history, our requirement that our [sic] suffering be mutually acknowledged." (8) He said further, "I cannot see any way at all (a) of not imagining the Jews of Israel as in decisive measure really [sic] the permanent result of the Holocaust, and (b) of not also requiring from them acknowledgment of what they did to the Palestinians during and after 1948. This means that as Palestinians we demand consideration and reparations from them without in any way minimizing their own history of suffering and genocide." (9)

It was controversial not because he recognized the holocaust as a horrific experience for Jews, as indeed it was, but because it was recognized in conjunction with Palestine. There were those who argued that the Zionist project began long before the holocaust, forgetting, it seems, the pogroms and anti-Semitism that motivated the Zionist movement. Others argued that the Zionists had not acknowledged the intentional Zionist dispossession and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. Why, they asked, give the impression that Palestinians accept the relationship of the holocaust to Palestine's fate even though Edward was not saying that at all? In the end, most Palestinians understood that Edward was helping both sides to overcome their anger and rage by acknowledging each other's humanity. His relationship with Ilan Pappe and Daniel Barenboim as well as his talks before various Israeli academic circles, bridged the gap of separation and silence. He sought to replace it with compassion for Jews, coupled with the demand that Israel acknowledge responsibility for the Palestinian catastrophe and make full restitution. As more Palestinians moved toward the notion of a bi-national state, the early criticism disappeared, and "one-state solution" groups mushroomed in the United States, Europe and in the Middle East, especially among the refugees an the overseas diaspora.

Edward and the Right of Return Conference, 6 April 2000. In the fall of 1999, the recently founded Trans-Arab Research Institute (TARI) Board of Directors decided to hold a conference on the Palestinian Right of Return at the suggestion of Dr. Nancy Murray. Arafat was being pressured by President Clinton to attend a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David in July 2000. Many feared that Ararat would be politically bludgeoned into renouncing the Palestinian right of return, although in theory he could not do that. The right of return is an individual right under international law. Nonetheless, were Arafat to do that, it would have made pursuit of that right much more difficult and complex. The idea of the conference was to publicize the right of return and to impose a chilling effect on any propensity Arafat may have had to renounce that right.

As program chairperson, I asked Edward if he would be the keynote speaker for the conference, and he readily accepted. Sharing the program with him were Noam Chomsky, Ilan Pappe, Alain Gresh, Robert Fisk, Susan Akram, Ingrid Gassner (Badil), Jaber Suleiman (Aidun, Lebanon), Nahla Ghandour (Ghassan Kanafani Cultural Foundation, Habilitation School for the learning and physically disabled Palestinians and some local Lebanese at Mar Elias Camp, Beirut), Wadie Said, and a host of activists from around the United States and Canada. The idea of the conference struck a cord in the Palestinian community both in the U.S. and abroad. It was held at the Boston University Law School to an overflowing crowd. Literally, more than 1,000 people tried to sign up for the conference, but the auditorium and overflow room could only hold 700 people. This was the first Right of Return conference ever held in North America, and it came at a crucial time in Palestinian history. The atmosphere was emotionally charged. Palestinians, other Arabs, and non-Arabs were pulled by a sense of resurgence of the struggle for justice.

On the night before the conference, Edward agreed to do book signings in what was then a fledging Arabic bookstore in Harvard Square. Looking yellow and tired, he went to the bookstore anyway, primarily to help the Lebanese-American owner promote the only Arabic bookstore in the Greater Boston area. This was but one example of Edward's commitment to helping community members, in spite of is illness, and especially for efforts that exposed others to Arab arts and literature.

He was introduced by Roger Owen of Harvard University on the morning of the conference. Edward spoke his first words on that historic day, "Finally we have returned to the core issue, the fight of our people to return to historic Palestine and live in peace and equality." These words galvanized resolve on the part of the attendees, and reseeded the hope for justice that had been withering. Edward was even more ill on that day than I had seen him since his 1993 talk at the AAUG convention. Nonetheless, he understood the importance of the day, and stuck it out even though it was stifling hot in the un-air-conditioned auditorium. The temperature on that day climbed to 90 degrees Fahrenheit. Edward not only remained for the whole morning session, but he also consented to do a television interview directly thereafter at the request of a Palestinian-American for a local program she produced. He returned to the hotel to rest, and then returned to the conference. His son, Wadie, a lawyer, was speaking on the civil rights of refugees in Lebanon under international humanitarian law. Edward sat with rapt attention listening to his son, and facially expressing great pride in him.

I sat with Edward in the outer lobby for some time. He was signing his newly released memoir. We spoke and I expressed my gratitude to him for coming in spite of his ill health. Instead of focusing on that, Edward asked, "now what is the next step?" Clearly, he was invested in seeing results. And indeed, there were results. The following morning, activists met at Boston University and formed the Al-Awda (the return) movement. This movement has chapters throughout North America and Europe and has sponsored marches, rallies, conventions with strategy sessions, scholarships for individual refugees for higher education, informational programs, websites, etc.

Ibrahim and Edward: Last Words. The importance, commitment and intellectual legacies of these two men can only be fully known when all of us who have known them share our pieces of experience with them. Still they had their human frailties. I do not know them all, and certainly their greatness overshadow the ones I did experience or sense. Ibrahim, I believe, had great faith in his ability to persuade even people like Shultz. He also had great faith in his strategic scenarios, and indeed no one was greater at strategizing than Ibrahim, but these too did not always work. Because of the confidence he had in his thinking, if someone disagreed with him, he would dismiss that person or patronize him/her as if he/she were of a lesser intellect. If his thinking were challenged by someone of equal intellect, he could become somewhat angry at that individual. More often than not, he sought discussion and debate with others he respected. None of this takes away from his extraordinary contributions, but it does broaden the parameters of his human dimension beyond the greatness of his core. His enduring quality of character was his care for and kindness to community members and compatible colleagues.

The last time I heard Ibrahim's voice was three weeks before he died. He had called to ask me to organize a special session on Palestine in Washington, D.C., featuring Edward to counter an Arab-American organization event to which State Department speakers upholding U.S. foreign policy in Iraq and Palestine were invited to without an opportunity to rebut their arguments. Edward had apparently called Ibrahim about the situation, and Ibrahim went into action. [In the end, it was not necessary to organize the suggested session]. I knew Ibrahim was quite ill, but I had not allowed myself to believe he was nearing death. His voice was strong, commanding, and projected his signature bravado. He joked and chatted and then thanked me for my many years of friendship and advocacy for Palestine. It was painful to say goodbye to Ibrahim, especially over the phone, but his jocular banter refused to acknowledge that this was the end of the conversation. His death left a leadership and mentoring vacuum that no one has been able to fill.

What was particularly interesting about Edward was how much he cared about what other people said or thought about him. He welcomed praise, sought evaluation of a particular television interview or talk and welcomed corroboration of his intellectual prowess. Given what he wrote about himself in his memoir, it is not surprising that this was the case. However, over time, and especially after learning about his illness, Edward dwelt less on his feelings and more on the urgency of the tasks he wanted to complete before his life ended. He put his name to every effort that worked for justice for the Palestinians, and attended meetings for that purpose no matter how ill. He was rushing not only to leave a body of analytical literature behind, but also a set of organizations to which his name gave a boost.

The last time I saw Edward was when he gave his talk in 2000 at Tufts University about his memoir. He was lighthearted, brilliant, funny, and honest about his memoir and the feelings it generated for others. He even kidded about having chemotherapy in a Jewish hospital, in a room sponsored by mafia figures, with an Indian doctor. He said he did not fear death in a tone of one telling a merry story. It was the most extraordinary presentation I ever heard Edward give. After the talk, Leila Fawaz, organizer of the event invited me to joint her, Edward and Tufts people for dinner. Edward was suffering from a cold, but you would never guess his discomfort. He was on a true high that evening, enjoying the conversation and the dinner. It's the way I want to remember Edward, looking elegant, enjoying good food and wine, and having a great good time. I had come full circle realizing that it did not compromise the cause to enjoy some of the good things in life. Little did I know then that that would be the last time I would see him. It was a more civilized good bye than my telephone goodbye to Ibrahim. While Edward's voice remains in his body of work, his daily voice cutting through imperial lies and propaganda and upholding our dignity is no longer. His public-commanding voice has no equal, and we, and all oppressed people, are spiritually impoverished as a result.

Finally, it is significant to note that while Edward voted for the two-state solution embodied in the 1988 Algiers Declaration, his early writings and the whole thrust of his life's work called for mutual recognition and coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis. His core sense evolved into advocacy for a binational state as the most humane and just solution. To this end, he built political and cultural bridges with Israelis.

Ibrahim started out with the idea of a Democratic Secular State--the original PLO position--turned pragmatic in 1988, and then in 1992 reclaimed all of Palestine while living under Israeli occupation and the incompetent Palestinian National Authority. His energy was focused not on advocating for a bi-national state, but on strengthening Palestinians from within. His primary goal was to develop a capable Palestinian population, one able to negotiate from a position of informed and moral force. Ultimately I believe that these two friends were going to the same city by different roads.

ENDNOTES

(1.) Ibrahim Abu-Lughod: Resistance, Exile and Return, Conversations with Hisham Ahmed-Fararjeh. (Birzeit University, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies, Palestine, 2003). The only other publication chronicling part of his life was in the French version of the Journal of Palestine Studies some years ago; and Edward W. Said, Out of Place: A Memoir. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).

(2.) Edward Said, "My Guru," London Review of Books, 13 December 2001, 23:24. He noted, "Ibrahim believed in scholarly, intellectual standards, whether in Arab culture or in the West. He was elated when he found someone in whom he discerned promise or talent, because that would give him an opportunity to bring out what was hidden and make it shine. There are many people--and I am one--who feel that they were discovered, appreciated and subsequently enlisted in the ranks by Ibrahim." Further on in the essay, Edward says, "Ibrahim introduced me to the subject and the experience, as it were, of Palestine. Seven years older than me, and more embedded in the life of Mandatory Palestine, he aroused in me and many others the wish to recapture long-buried memories of our early days, before the nakba changed everything." Speaking of both men, Edward notes, "Like Ibrahim, Eqbal was (to use one of Ibrahim's highest terms of praise) asil, an 'authentic', with the same gift of endlessly fertile, untiring eloquence.... Neither of my gurus was ever stingy with time ... What dismays me is that they should have died before me ..."

(3.) "The Shultz Meeting with Edward Said and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod," in the Journal of Palestine Studies, XVII: 4. Summer 1988, pp. 160-165.

(4.) Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Conversations, p. 140.

(5.) Edward W. Said, The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After (New York: Pantheon, 2000), p. 197.

(6.) Said, The End of the Peace Process, p. 77.

(7.) Quoted from an Email sent to me by Fouad Moughrabi on 19 August 2004.

(8.) Edward Said, The End of the Peace Process, p. 285.

(9.) Ibid: p. 208.

Elaine C. Hagopian is Professor Emerita of Sociology, Simmons College, Boston.