ISRAEL AS ETHNIC DEMOCRACY: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PALESTINIAN MINORITY?

INTRODUCTION

THE QUESTIONS OF DEMOCRACY, citizenship, equality and domination are of crucial importance for the understanding of minority-majority relations in deeply divided societies. One of the main issues in multi-ethnic states which is still awaiting further exploration, research and theorization is: To what extent can democracy, in such societies, serve as a useful framework for abolishing or containing the various forms of a majority's domination -- political, cultural or socio-economic?

In Israel where the state is legally considered to be both Jewish and democratic, Israeli social scientists tended, until recently, to underplay the inherit contradiction in this definition, arguing that Israel is part of the enlightened, civilized and liberal Western-world, although geographically located in a region known for its infamous characteristics of despotism, irrationality and backwardness. Yet, this demagogic line of explanation could not hold forever, as in Israel lives a remnant of the indigenous Palestinian population. In 1997 they numbered about one million (within the pre-1967 Green Line), comprising 19 percent of Israel's population. The legitimacy and the proclaimed raison d'[hat{e}]tre of Israel as a state that attends to the needs and interests of the Jewish people -- both its citizens and those who reside in other countries -- relegate these Palestinians to a status of second class citizens, thus violating the principles of equality and shared citizenry which lie at the heart of the dem ocratic experience.

Recently, Sammy Smooha, a leading sociologist from Haifa University, offered the model of "Ethnic Democracy" as an explanatory scheme for the nature of the Israeli regime and the majority-minority relations. At the heart of this model -- which has been at the center of lively academic and public debate in Israel since 1990 -- lies the argument that the domination of the state by the Jewish majority and the nature of Israel as a tool for the achievement of Jewish goals are not opposed to the principles of democracy. The aim of this article is to locate this model in the framework of the general debate on Jewish-Palestinian relations in Israel, and to offer a critical appraisal. The main argument advanced in this paper is that Smooha's contentions represent continuity rather than a break from the mainstream scholarship in Israel as articulated by the modernization paradigm. His model of ethnic democracy does not offer any solution to the inherent contradiction between the particularistic nature of Zionism/the Israeli state on the one hand and its use of universalistic legitimizing discourse on the other.

HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Since the inception of the Zionist movement its leaders have been repeatedly confronted with the unavoidable "Arab problem", not least because the indigenous population has been able to resist. One solution that has been propagated by the Zionist leadership is the idea of transfer. [1] It even preceded the creation of the Zionist movement. Herzl reflected on the idea of transfer, and included it in his memoires in 1895, [2] two years before the convening of the first Zionist congress. Although the idea of transfer was popular among the Zionist leaders during the Mandate period, in their discussions with British and European politicians, they -- mainly the leaders of socialist Zionism -- tended to avoid dwelling on the demographic make-up of Palestine while emphasizing instead the nature of Zionism as a "progressive colonization." [3] The Zionist leaders used a western European discourse of "progress," "universalism," "the right for self-determination," and various forms of worker-ist theories, which have the ir roots in the enlightenment for rallying support, but Zionism itself was an ethnic exclusionist movement. Thus, a gap has already existed since the beginning between the nature of Zionism and the discourse used to support its claims. This contradiction was manifested in Israel's Declaration of Independence. Israel was declared as both a Jewish and a Democratic state. Until recently Israeli politicians and intellectuals presented this conflict as no more than a matter of finding the right balance between the two. Israel has been portrayed as a democratic enlightened nation amidst a region that lacks progressive civilized values. And, the problematic nature of the Palestinian minority's position in the Jewish state was presented in terms of modernization. Using the evolutionary paradigm of modernization, the exclusion and marginalization of the Palestinians was explained by their norms, attitudes, values, social institutions and identity. The traditional social structure of the Palestinian minority was given as the main cause for the "gaps" that exist between Jews and Arabs. [4] However, despite the problematic nature of this model, its universalistic premises contain critical potentials. The functionalist theory views increasing social integration, harmony and social consensus as a necessary outcome of the evolutionary development of society. This means that at one stage the "modernized" Arabs should be able to claim full socio-political participation as equal to their Jewish co-citizens. The extension of the contentions of the modernization model to their logical conclusion inevitably leads to a deadlock. Very few modernizational Israeli social scientists tackled this dilemma. For political and theoretical reasons it is preferable, from their point of view, to keep characterizing the "Arabs" as a traditional community, and in this way to continue denying the existence of an inherent contradiction in the state's structure. Shlomo Aveneri (1972) -- a leading political scientists -- almost excluded Arab societies from the human disposition of change when he wrote:

Arab society is a truly baroque society, where manners and style, facade and imagination are all the outgrowth of an overripe culture. Such a society may have greater difficulties in coming to terms with the modern world than a purely tribal 'primitive' society of the African variety. [5]

Others explained the exclusion of Palestinians by security reasons, the Israeli-Arab conflict, the uniqueness of the Israeli case etc. In this way the universalistic discourse is adopted and rejected simultaneously. It is adopted for describing the trend of development (from traditional to modern societies); the role of the state as a modernizing agent etc., while it is rejected as far as the state's nature is concerned.

The contradiction in the simultaneous acceptance and rejection of modernization is also reflected in discussions on Palestinians' identity. There are few dimensions, if any, in Palestinians' existence which have been researched so intensively. Identity is viewed as a psychosocial phenomenon that lacks any historical or cultural depth. Individual identification is supposed to develop -- in the course of modernization -- from identification with primordial, local or religious groups to identification with the nation, a wide and abstract category. [6] In other words, it is the journey that each individual passes from concrete to abstract thinking as (the psychologist) Piaget would have put it. Following this rationale, if the Arabs have been modernized then their national identification is supposed to strengthen. However, such an evolution endangers Israel's self-conception as a nation state. Yegael Alon expressed that clearly:

It is necessary to declare it openly: Israel is a single nationality Jewish state. The fact that an Arab minority lives within the country does not make it a multi-national state. It only requires that the state grant equal citizenship to every citizen of the state[ldots] The Arabs have many states; the Jews have one state only. The Arabs of this country must understand that they also must make a substantial contribution toward the alleviation of Jewish suspicion regarding most of the Arab population. [7]

The Israeli sponsored modernization of the Arabs seems to lead them nowhere. Identification with the Palestinian people was negatively appraised as expressing alienation, radicalization etc., identification with an Israeli nation is impossible because of the absence of an overarching framework of identification for all citizens, therefore the "modernized" Arabs are supposed to be devoid of nationalist consciousness in the age of nationalism. In other words, the state modernizes the Arabs but they should not develop a national identification! The "modernized" Arab could be either like Rashed Bey -- in Herzel's Aithenuland -- a Western educated young man who praises Zionism, or the collaborator -- in Koeing's memorandum -- who uses nationalist rhetoric for his personal coldly calculated ends. This perspective in its both sociological and political versions leads to a bizarre conclusion that Palestinians live in different parts of the world but not in the part of Palestine upon which Israel is established.

Already during the 1970s various scholars have tried through different conceptualizations to unveil the inherent conflict between the nature of the state and its presentation. Using a Marxist version of the dependency theory Elia Zureik [8] employed a colonialist model to describe the position of the Palestinians in Israel. The state's efforts to modernize the Arabs were exposed as no more than methods of social reproduction which aim at continuing the exploitation of the Palestinian minority for advancement of Zionist goals. Ian Lustick (l980) [9] used a model of political control, which led him through different conceptual fields to view Israel as a particularistic Jewish state. In later works [10] he argued that the adoption of universalistic values is the main viable option for Israel. "Creeping hi-nationalism" is the way ahead for Israel's future. At the same period Sammy Smooha (1978) [11] argued that the structure of the Israeli state is multi-faceted. The state relates to various groups differently. Basically he agreed with Zureik and Lustick concerning the particularistic nature of the state. This becomes blatant when he describes the affinity of the state to the Palestinian minority. Israel "posses deplorable features of a Herrenvolk democracy in the case of the Arab minority." [12] "Only limited improvements in the Arabs' status in Israel can be expected" because "The Zionist idea is inconsistent with an equal status for the Arabs." [13]

These ideas, although fiercely attacked by the "establishment scholars" in Israel, opened up a fruitful debate during the 1990s on the nature of the Israeli state by a younger generation of scholars. Through using new conceptions such as frontier society, internal frontiers, discourses of citizenship (republican vs. liberal) etc. and employing current debates on civil society and cultural resistance a growing bulk of critical social science research has emerged. [14] In this respect the flourishing research on the Palestinian minority seems to result from the understanding that the status of this minority represents the ultimate test case for the nature of the regime. For example Kretzmer's book The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel [15] unveiled the use by the regime of legal manipulations and selective imposition of laws to discriminate against the Palestinian minority. His main thesis is that the formal rule of law and discrimination on national grounds are not antithetical in Israel. These debates shou ld be viewed as part of an increasing disillusionment with the hegemonic socialist Zionist ideology by Israeli scholars and the wider public.

THE MODEL OF ETHNIC DEMOCRACY

Between the critical research of the late 1970s and that of the late 1990s Sammy Smooha changed his position several times. In the rest of this article I am going to discuss these changes; particularly I will critically review his model of ethnic democracy not least because it has been gaining currency in academic circles. Furthermore, I will argue that some of the support for the model ensues from a misunderstanding of the model's theoretical basis and political implications.

In 1989 Smooha published his book Arabs and Jews in Israel (vol. 1) [16] in which he not only described Israel as a liberal democracy but went as far as presenting the regime's ideology as the yardstick for analyzing the political orientations of Palestinians. His typology of Palestinians' political attitudes includes the following categories: accommodationists, reservationists, oppositionists, and rejectionists. By presenting the regime's ideology as the criterion for judgment he abolishes it as a subject for inquiry and awards it a moral and canonized status, which stands above any questioning or criticism. This trend has increased in his latter writings. In 1990 Smooha published his article, "Minority Status in Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arabs in Israel," [17] in which he advanced the thesis that Israel represents a new type of democratic regime. It has not adopted the principles of liberal democracy where citizens have equal right and a direct affinity to the state. It has neither adopted the pr inciples of consociational democracy where representative bodies of the various ethnic groups mediate state/citizen relations. Nor is it a Herronvolk democracy like South Africa during the apartheid era where only whites enjoyed full citizenship rights. The Israeli regime of ethnic democracy "combine(s) the extension of political and civil rights to individuals and certain collective rights to minorities with institutional dominance over the state by one of the ethnic groups." [18] As to the minorities they will be "disadvantaged but [ldots] can avail themselves of democratic means to negotiate better terms of coexistence." [19] In more recent articles he proposed the adoption of this model by multi-ethnic state in Eastern Europe and various "Third World" countries. [20] While Smooha tries to present his model in general terms his case study is Israel, therefore I will also rely on data taken from the Israeli context in my critical review.

THE DOMINANCE OF THE MAJORITY

In the model of ethnic democracy the majority practices control over the state and defines its orientation.

Driven by ethnic nationalism, the state is identified with a 'core ethnic nation', not with its citizens. The state practices a policy of creating a homogenous nation-state, a state of and for a particular ethnic nation, and acts to promote the language, culture, numerical majority, economic well being, and political interests of this group. Although enjoying citizenship and voting rights, the minorities are treated as second-class citizens[ldots] At the same time, the minorities are allowed to conduct a democratic and peaceful struggle that yields incremental improvement in their status. [21]

This conception is alien to the idea of democracy as developed over centuries. Various theoreticians such as Aristotle, Rousseau, Locke, and de Tocqueville warned against the control of any group of society over the state. Proponents of the democratic type of government attribute the higher moral ground of this regime to the neutrality of the state. The state is viewed as a neutral arena where various groups compose changing coalitions to promote their goals. In this dynamic process all groups of society can organize themselves, participate in coalitions and achieve some of their goals. In this way the democratic regime is supposed to give expression to the principle of equality between all citizens. [22] So far, Smooha is the first to declare that democracy is not about the fulfillment of the principles of the French Revolution: libert[acute{e}], egalit[acute{e}] et fraternit[acute{e}].

Smooha's characterization of the state as an institution used to advance the interests of only one group has been advocated long ago by theoreticians and politicians who dismiss the democratic type of government. This position is well known in the Marxist tradition, which views the liberal democratic state as a part of the super-structure of capitalism. For example Marx and Engels wrote in the Manifesto of the Communist Party: "The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." [23] Thus, Smooha cannot present himself as a champion of democracy and at the same time adheres to the position of those who dismiss it.

At the practical level the implications of the model of ethnic democracy are disturbing. Smooha legitimizes the dominance of the majority over the state but fails to delineate the boundaries of this rule, especially in the light of the absence of constitution in Israel. If the majority decides about the prime objectives of the state, then the claim that right wing politicians and public voice regarding the need to take decisions, on fundamental issues, by a Jewish majority sounds not only legitimate but reasonable too. Even if this is not Smooha's position these are the implications of his model.

THE MINORITY'S STATUS: DISADVANTAGED BUT THERE IS ROOM FOR CHANGE

In the model of ethnic democracy minorities are disadvantaged but can improve their position through politics of wheeling and dealing. This means in practice that achievements are not accumulative, as Smooha argues. Besides the possibility of gains there is the probability of loss and marginalization. This happened during the Netanyahu Government, when the Palestinian minority lost most of its "gains" acquired during the Rabin-Peres era. The Palestinian minority could be driven back to square one each time that a right wing coalition comes to power. Moreover, Smooha does not pay attention to the price of the politics of wheeling and dealing that leaders of the minority have to pay. In an anthropological research on the political mobilization of Palestinians in Nazareth Illit, Rabinowitiz (1994) [24] illuminates that vividly. Palestinian political activists at the local and national levels face a dreadful dilemma. On the one hand campaigning and successful mobilization of the Palestinian public touch upon iss ues that evoke deep nationalist sentiments of dispossession, heritage of loss etc. Being faithful to one's political platform and presenting his voters at the center of power, the politician would be denied the ability of delivering tangible resources to his constituents. On the other hand the achievement of material benefits entails co-option by the establishment, which would tarnish the politician's image in the community. This small margin of maneuvering between powerlessness and co-option made Palestinians politically active and at the same time disillusioned with politicians. But even if the Palestinians choose the option of collaboration what can they achieve? Smooha himself wrote in 1978 that "only limited improvements in the Arabs' status in Israel can be expected." [25] Is it that easy for the minority to alienate itself from its history, and to forego its moral and political claims for the sake of small material gains?

CITIZENSHIP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

The evolution of citizenship as portrayed by T. H. Marshall [26] represents a project of social inclusion and integration. The main driving force behind it has been the achievement of national coherence by integrating the various groups into the national culture and way of life, yet without damaging the material interests of the dominant classes. Although not always clearly stated, citizenship in its both traditions the social-democratic and the liberal contains the element of experience. Citizenship is not only about a set of rights (civil, political and social) but also about the ability of the citizen to use these rights; experiencing citizenship is more significant than its mere formal existence. Therefore various groups in society -- women, the poor, minorities - could be marginalized even in societies with long liberal traditions. [27]

In the case of Israel, Smooha argues that the Palestinians were awarded civil and political rights, although in various occasions these rights were violated. Yet he points to a trend of continual improvement. The changes, however, are not going to bring about social integration and inclusion, nor can they enrich the Palestinians' experience of citizenship. This suggests that only the formalistic side of citizenship is what has been present, and the Palestinians will continue to be on the margin. If this is the case, then what is the intent of citizenship?

An alternative analysis of citizenship could view the majority-minority relations in terms of control. To achieve legitimacy and international support, the dominant majority employs various methods of governance including the awarding of formal citizenship to the minority group as long as this does not challenge its rule. From this viewpoint the scheme of formal citizenship aims first and foremost at bolstering the dominance of the majority and the legitimacy of its regime.

IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

The model of ethnic democracy is an ideological presentation, and Smooha does very little to conceal that. Even his self-righteous statement that "The model of ethnic democracy is scientific, theoretical and empirical model, not a normative one," [28] is not supported by substantial evidence. The ideological characteristic of the model is manifested in various ways, mainly through the use of the three devices: normalization, universalization, and the language of power and authority.

Smooha uses all his efforts to present the Israeli regime not only as positive but also as the sole viable option. The description of existing social formation as inevitable, and therefore as possessing the features of "laws of nature" has long ago been identified as a defining feature of the hegemonic ideology. Reality is also idealized by the concealment of existing contradictions and the presentation of current relations as attending to the interests of the various groups. On the basis of the results of his 1995 survey Smooha tells us that:

There is no majority in favor of liberal democracy: only 40.5 percent of Arabs as against 4.5 percent of Jews favor it. Moreover, Arab support for this solution drops to 29.4 percent when liberal democracy is defined as requiring the forfeiting of separate Arab education with government funding, and to 24.4 percent when they become aware of the danger of intermarriage. (A)nd the most important conclusion, the only point of agreement between the majority of Arabs and the majority of Jews is that in favor of a model of 'improved ethnic democracy'. [ldot] [29]

In short Smooha argues that both Jews and Palestinians oppose liberal democracy and support ethnic democracy with some amendments; 65.9 percent of Palestinians and 71.5 percent of Israeli Jews supported the last alternative. [30] These conclusions are surprising in the light of the antagonism expressed by the interviewees. For example 30.9 percent of the Jews favored the obliteration of voting rights for Palestinians, 45.6 percent supported the outlawing of the communist party, 36.7 percent thought that Israel ought to look for an appropriate opportunity to "encourage" the Palestinians to leave. [31] On the opposite side 75.0 percent of the surveyed Palestinians objected to the idea that Israel should keep a Jewish majority, 50.1 percent said that they cannot identify themselves with Israel in its current Jewish-Zionist structure, and 50.3 percent thought that Zionism is racist. [32] How is it possible to reconcile these attitudes with the above-cited conclusion? If three quarters of the Palestinians object to the idea of a permanent Jewish majority, how can they favor a continued Jewish dominance over the state? Moreover if about three-quarters of the Jews think that the state should award them preferential treatment, why should they opt for an alternative that entails their making of some substantial concessions? Beyond that however, it is essential to look at the alternatives, which were rejected. Why should the Palestinians reject the option of liberal democracy? It is because Smooha warns them that a liberal democracy involves dreadful implications for them, above all mixed marriages, the institution of a Hebrew educational system for all and the ability of Jews to live in their communities (from their experience this means the confiscation of their lands). Is this what liberal democracy is all about? Or that Smooha used the issues of identity, honor and land, highly sensitive subjects for Palestinians (and for Jews as well) to impose his predetermined conclusion. Smooha's operative definition of liberal de mocracy is applicable to one type of this regime, namely the republican. What about the liberal type of the UK where the Welsh and the Scottish have their own schools, local TV channels, cultural life etc., and at the same time live in an open society where each citizen regardless of his ethnic affiliation enjoys equal rights. Is not this model more reasonable than the American or the French ones? Then why does Smooha preclude it? In sum, it is argued that through techniques of inquiry and representation Smooha endeavors to prove that the existing regime (with which he identifies) with some changes is the best viable option for both Jews and Palestinians.

The second ideological device that Smooha employs is that of universalization. According to this principle abnormal reality is legitimized by its prevalence. Therefore, Smooha suggests to various nations to adopt the Israeli model. For example, he contends that ethnic democracy could be an attractive option for Egypt if it is to deepen its democratic experience. By doing so he ignores the fact that in Egypt as well as in the other candidates for imitating the Israeli experience, there are nations that stand above the ethnic and religious particularities. Despite the problems between Muslims and Copts all of them are undeniably Egyptians, but unlike them Jews and Arabs in Israel are not part of an Israeli nation. [33] Israel, unlike all the post-colonial states, is the only case where the notion of nation building has been rejected.

Another ideological device that Smooha uses is the employment of the language of power and authority, which, notwithstanding his claim of scientific objectivity, places him in the camp of the ruling majority. For example, he identified five main Arab demands: the de-ethnicization of the state, the legitimization of Palestinian nationalism, granting them equal individual rights, awarding them certain collective rights and accepting them as legitimate actors in the political system. The rejection of these demands by the Jewish majority is presented as legitimate, reasonable and in line with the principles of democracy. [34] Nowhere does Smooha hint at the fact that the Arabs' demands are claims for the employment of universalistic values, and that in the name of these principles various revolutions, liberation and social movements waged their struggles. However, to validate his political stand, Smooha disregards human history of struggle for equal treatment, while presenting particularism, ethnic domination an d the de-legitimization of a group in society on ethnic basis as pillars of a "new type of democracy".

Eventually, Smooha's model of ethnic democracy falls-apart when he analyses the foundations of the regime. The regime persists uninterruptedly not because of the citizens' conviction of its fairness neither by its moral qualities nor by the practicality of its procedures. Rather force and force alone is what guarantees its continuance: "For the foreseeable future, however, the Jews, being strong, determined and self-righteous, will no doubt decline to relinquish their dominance." [35] In this state of affairs one wonders why such a regime is subsumed under the heading of democracy and not domination? And why does Smooha burden himself with lengthy explanations regarding the regime's basis of legitimacy, if force is what counts in the final analysis.

CONCLUSION

Smooha's writings are frequently considered in Israel pioneering and path breaking. He introduced new conceptions to the academic and public debate on issues relating to the Jewish-Arab relations and the Palestinian minority. His notion of Arab politicization during the late 1970s and 1980s as opposed to the, then, popular thesis of radicalization is well known. [36] Moreover one frequently finds echoes of his ideas in the writing of many specialists. During the 1990s he opened a new realm of debate regarding the nature of the Israeli state. Various studies that discuss the categorization of Israel as an ethnic democracy has been published, and the list of labels denoting the Israeli regime has been increasing. Despite that I have argued in this paper that Smooha has failed to introduce a new insight as to the inherent contradiction between the particularistic nature of the Zionist project and later on the state of Israel on the one hand, and their use of a universalistic legitimizing discourse on the other. While, the first generation of Israeli social scientists tried to conceal this contradiction by describing the Palestinians as a traditional community and therefore incapable of being integrated into the modem Israeli system, Smooha seeks to universalize the particular. He does that through the employment of various ideological devices, mainly through normalization, universalization and twisted conceptualizations. To my judgment, the way ahead should involve a courageous discussion on this contradiction instead of covering it by one form or another of ideological argumentation.

On a more general level Smooha's main argument that the state, in multi-ethnic societies, could be legitimately used as a tool for the advancement of the majority's goals is disturbing. Leaders, elites and oligarchies that wish to preserve their dominion could, under the claim of saving a legitimate rule of the majority, use all kinds of extreme actions (such as in Yugoslavia, and various cases in Africa). And this model could comprise a useful vindicatory framework for that. The question is not of interpretation or misinterpretation; indeed every model could be misused and misrepresented, rather, what is at stake here are the issues of responsibility, integrity, and defense of basic human rights including the endorsement of equality.

Ahmad H. Sa'di teaches in the Department of Politics and Government, BenGurion University of the Negev.

ENDNOTES

(1.) See e.g. Israel Shahak, "A History of the Concept of 'Transfers' in Zionism", Journal of Palestine Studies, 18 (1983), 22-37; Nur Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of Transfer in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948 (Washington D.C: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992); Yossi Melman and Daniel Raviv "A Final Solution of the Palestinian Problem", The Guardian Weekly, 21 February 1988, 19.

(2.) Theodor Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl. Vol. 1. Raphael Patai (ed.) (New York: Herzl Press and Thomas Yosefloff, 1960), 88.

(3.) Paul Kelemen, "In the Name of Socialism: Zionism and European Social Democracy in the Inter-War Years", International Review of Social History, 41 (1996), 331-350; Paul Kelemen, "Zionism and the British Labor Party:1917-39", Social History, 21 (1996), 71-87.

(4.) Ahmad H. Sa'di, "Modernization as an Explanatory Discourse of Zionist-Palestinian Relations", British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 24 (1997), 25-48.

(5.) Shlomo Avineri "Modernization and the Arab Society: Some Reflections", in I. Howe and C. Gershman (eds.), Israel, The Arabs and the Middle East (New-York: Bantam Books, 1972), 306.

(6.) A comprehensive discussion of this research is found in Ahmad H. Sa'di, "Between State Ideology and Minority National Identity: Palestinians in Israel and Israeli Social Science Research", Review of Middle East Studies, 5 (1992), 110-130.

(7.) Quoted in Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 65.

(8.) Elia Zureik, Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism (London: Routhledge & Kegan Paul, 1979).

(9.) Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State.

(10.) Ian Lustick, "Creeping Bi-nationalism Within the Green Line", New Outlook, 31(1988), 14-19, also Ian Lustick "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs", in A. Arian and M. Shamir (eds.), The Elections in Israel-I988 (Boulder: Westview, 1990), 115-131.

(11.) Sammy Smooha, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

(12.) Ibid., 256

(13.) Ibid., 252, 255.

(14.) Considerable amount of literature on this subject has been published, including, Yoav Peled and Gershon Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking: The Dynamics of Citizenship in Israel", International Journal of Middle East Studies, 28 (1996), 391-314; Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Gershon Shafir, "Israeli Society: A Counterview", Israeli Studies, 1-2 (1996): 189-213; Dan Rabinowitz, "Common Memory of Loss: Political Mobilization among Palestinian Citizens of Israel", Journal of Anthropological Research, 50 (1994), 27-49; Ahmad H. Sa'di, "Minority Resistance to State Control: Towards a Re-analysis of Palestinian Political Activity in Israel", Social Identities, 2 (1996), 395-412; Orin Yiftachel, "Planning as Control: Policy and Resistance in Deeply Divided Society", Progress in Planning, 44 (1995), 119-184; Oren Yiftachel, "Internal Frontier: Territorial Control and Ethnic Relations in Israel", Regional Studies, 3 0 (1996), 493-508; Orin Yiftachel, "Political Geography of Ethnic Protest: Nationalism, Deprivation and Regionalism Among Arabs in Israel", Transaction, 21(1997), 91-110.

(15.) David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel, (Tel-Aviv: The International Center for Peace in the Middle-East, 1987).

(16.) Sammy Smooha, Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared attitudes in a Divided Society, (Boulder: Westview, 1989).

(17.) Sammy Smooha, "Minority Status in Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arabs in Israel", Ethnic and Racial Studies, 13 (1990), 389-412.

(18.) Ibid., 319.

(19.) Ibid., 410.

(20.) Sammy Smooha, "The Status of Minority in an Ethnic Democracy: The Arab Minority in Israel", Reading in the Revival of Israel, 6 (1996), 277-311 (in Hebrew, luonim Be Tquomat Ysrael); Sammy Smooha and Theodor Hanf, "The Diverse Modes of Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Society", International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 33 (1992), 26-47; and Sammy Smooha, "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype", Israeli Studies, 2 (1997), 198-241.

(21.) Sammy Smooha, "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype", 199-200.

(22.) See e.g. the classical work of Gabriel Almond, "Introduction: a Functional Approach to Comparative Politics", in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds.) The Politics of Developing Areas (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), 3-64; also Darryl Baskin "American Pluralism: Theory, Practice and Ideology", Journal of Politics, 32 (1970), 71-95; and Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary, Theories of the State. The Politics of Liberal Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1988), 13-46.

(23.) Karl Marx and Fredrerick Engels, Selected Works, (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991), 37.

(24.) Dan Rabinowitz, "Common Memory of Loss: Political Mobilization among Palestinian Citizens of Israel", Journal of Anthropological Research, 50 (1994), 27-49.

(25.) Sammy Smooha, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict,252.

(26.) T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class", in Sociology at the Crossroads, (London: Heinemann, 1963).

(27.) See e.g. Ruth Lister, The Exclusive Society (London: CPAG, 1990); Fred Twine, Citizenship and Social Rights (London: Sage, 1994).

(28.) Sammy Smooha, "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype", 235.

(29.) Ibid., 230.

(30.) Ibid., 231.

(31.) Ibid., 219.

(32.) Ibid., 209.

(33.) Sammy Smooha, "The Status of Minority in an Ethnic Democracy"

(34.) Sammy Smooha, "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype", 209- 227.

(35.) Ibid., 236, emphasis added.

(36.) See e.g., Sammy Smooha, The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel (Haifa: University of Haifa, The Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 1984). This debate is also summarized in Sammy Smooha, Arabs and Jews in Israel; and in Aveshai Ehrlich, "Are Israeli Arabs Becoming More Extreme or More Assertive?", Israeli Democracy, 1 (1987), 20-23.