IRAQ - Zarqawi's Global Plan.

The NYT on June 11 reported "intelligence experts" in Amman and the West as saying that, at the time of his death, Zarqawi was still trying to transform his Qaeda from one focused on the Iraqi insurgency into a global operation capable of striking far beyond Iraq's borders. The NYT quoted "high-ranking Jordanian security officials" as saying his recruiting efforts were threefold: He sought volunteers to fight in Iraq and others to become suicide bombers there, but he recruited about 300 people who went to Iraq for terrorist training and sent them back to their home countries, where they were to await orders to carry out strikes.

There have been scattered reports that Iraq had become a training ground. But the US paper said: "the Jordanian assessment was the first to offer firm numbers, and only Jordanian intelligence experts have presented them. They agreed with the overall assessment of American and European authorities that Zarqawi had not yet created an international network capable of sustaining itself. The Jordanians stand out for reinforcing and focusing their intelligence on Zarqawi".

After Zarqawi took credit for sending suicide bombers into three Amman hotels last November, killing 61 people including bombers, King Abdullah II authorised creation of "a new unit within his intelligence organization called Knights of God, hoping to challenge not only Zarqawi's activities, but also his [Neo-Salafi] claim to be doing God's work".

The NYT added: "Members of the new intelligence unit were dispatched to Iraq and neighboring countries and ordered to take the offensive in what was more than espionage - practically a personal conflict - between Jordan's new unit and Zarqawi.

"Two months ago, Jordanian officials said they first knew of Zarqawi's whereabouts and were eventually able to confirm US intelligence, which located Zarqawi on the day he was killed. Jordan's security services have been following Zarqawi...for nearly two decades, and officials...[in Amman] agreed to speak about his work, his organization and the operation that eventually killed him...

"The officials described Zarqawi as a strong, smart organizational leader who changed routines any time any of his followers were arrested - and who managed to set up logistical operations in Syria, Iran and Libya, which in turn funneled volunteers into Iraq.

"The authorities across Europe have identified dozens of young militant Muslim men who have either left Europe to fight in Iraq or have been stopped while planning to do so. US forces in Iraq have said that at least three French nationals are among the dozens of foreign fighters they have captured there. The German authorities, meanwhile, have arrested 18 suspected members of [Jaysh] Ansar al-Islam and the Zarqawi network since December 2004, including three Iraqis charged with plotting to assassinate the interim prime minister of Iraq, Ayad Allawi, last year".

The NTT quoted French counter-terrorism officials as saying they had already found Zarqawi's handiwork in Europe, in a terrorist cell broken up in December 2002. The members of the cell of Chechen-trained terrorists were arrested in working-class areas north of Paris. Chemicals, bomb-making materials and a chemical weapons protection suit were found in their possession together with elements for an advanced remote control detonator.

How Zarqawi's death will effect global terrorism is a matter of uncertainty. Zarqawi's international reach depended on practical details like organisation, recruitment and finances, which experts say were limited outside of his Iraqi activities, but also on more amorphous factors - like the appeal of his ideas to young recruits.

The NYT quoted "Marwan Shehadeh, an Islamist activist and researcher in Jordan", as saying each Neo-Salafi jihadi (mujahed) "is seeking to be killed, to have Allah's satisfaction, and he is looking to have high-class status in...heaven. Americans protect their leader. The mujahedeen (plural for mujahed) don't".

Zarqawi's international reputation hinged on his brutality and a flair for publicity connected with his operations in Iraq. But as the insurgency became increasingly driven and manned by Iraqis, Zarqawi expressed an interest in spreading his reach globally, challenging bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri as the leader of a global terrorist war. Yet despite his broader goals, Zarqawi appears to have used his foreign contacts mainly to draw foreign fighters to the insurgency in Iraq.

The NYT quoted a US counter-terrorism official as saying the only attacks outside Iraq known to be directed by Zarqawi were in Jordan, including the 2002 murder of Laurence Foley, a US diplomat; a foiled plot in 2004 to attack the US Embassy and Jordanian intelligence headquarters; and the bombings of the three Amman hotels in November [2005]. The paper quoted "a senior" counter-terrorism official as saying: "I think he really operated regionally in the Middle East" and did not think Zarqawi's death would have a noticeable effect on the threat in Europe.

The NYT, however, quoted "Zarqawi's supporters in Jordan" as saying those who under-estimated his reach failed to understand the psychology and drive of his followers. Death, they said, was exactly what his followers were after - because "in their understanding of Islam, nothing is more coveted than to die a martyr".

Shehadeh said Zarqawi's death would undermine his group's ability to operate, but he said in the long run it would fuel terrorism. He cited slogans by the followers of Zarqawi, including: "Our credibility comes by our leaders being killed", and "Those of us who die go to heaven. Those of you who die go to hell".

Shehadeh disagreed with the assessment of Zarqawi's reach outside Iraq, adding that it was much stronger and deeper in countries neighbouring Iraq, including Jordan.

The NYT quoted Steven Simon, a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, as saying: "My sense is that the next step might have been mobilizing his recruitment networks to attack Europeans. That's one reason I think his death makes a difference". The NYT quoted Lorenzo Vidino, author of 'Al Qaeda in Europe", 2005, as saying he believed Zarqawi's death did not necessarily end the threat posed by the recruitment channels he helped set up. Vidino, an analyst at the Investigative Project, a Washington research group, said in April the Italian authorities uncovered a group of North Africans who had travelled to Syria to join Zarqawi's fighters in Iraq, adding: "The gatekeepers in Damascus told them, 'We don't need you in Iraq. It's better if you go to Italy and do something there'".

The Christian Science Monitor on June 12 quoted Rohan Gunaratna, a terrorism expert at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore, as saying: "Zarqawi had penetrated at least 20 European countries, Canada, ...and even established cells in Southeast Asia... Zarqawi was building a global terror network parallel to al-Qaeda of bin Laden. The killing of Zarqawi is a huge victory - not so much against the Iraqi insurgency...[but] internationally... And this network will suffer".

Depending on what media survived the June 7 US bombs and the caliber of the many suspects detained in subsequent raids, the information obtained by the US could be in league with that gleaned from the fall of Kabul in late 2001 or the capture of al-Qaeda mastermind Khaled Shaikh Muhammad in Pakistan in 2003.

The Monitor quoted Michael Radu, co-chair of the Centre on Terrorism at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia, as saying: "There is a pattern of senior associates of al-Qaeda that they keep so much information, so much data - they like to have everything close to their chest, and have it with them". He said Zarqawi's network, especially in Europe, "is much more extensive than that of bin Laden or...Zawahiri. I wouldn't be surprised if we see another wave of arrests in Europe. Then we will know if what was captured [in Iraq] and after was indeed important for [Zarqawi's] network".

US military spokesman Maj. Gen. William Caldwell said he was pushing to have some information quickly declassified. Gen. Casey on June 11 told Fox News: US forces "had a steady drum beat of operations against the al-Qaeda network here in Iraq since the Zarqawi operation. We will continue to go after [Zarqawi's] network and disrupt it in what we feel is a very vulnerable period. And so we hope to take advantage of that".

Gunaratna said: Zarqawi's top followers will assume that US forces were exploiting the new leads, adding: "Some key operatives will change their venue and their methods. They will know that Zarqawi's material has been compromised". The value of the intelligence from "such a big event depends on how [Zarqawi's group is] organized". The Monitor quoted a "US official in Baghdad familiar with terrorism investigations" as saying: "The goal is always to cut off the head. Think about it like a corporation. The little guy is going to have information about his boss, who will know about the subdivision - the best thing is to get them all. But not everybody is organized that way; it is not necessarily a hierarchy".

Zarqawi's network appeared to operate alongside - not necessarily over - a broader Iraqi insurgency. In January Zarqawi helped form the Mujahideen Shura Council, bringing together several Neo-Salafi groups which share al-Qaeda's ideology of turning Iraq into a Neo-Salafi state - a step towards a broader Sunni caliphate.

Gunaratna said: "His Shura Council is 80% Iraqi, so [US and Iraqi forces] will continue to hunt those people. But Zarqawi has made this group very Iraqi. He has seeded his ideas and values to those Iraqis".

Zarqawi's adherents worked on revenge. A string of attacks continued unabated in Iraq, killing 19 people a day on June 9-11 - one example given by the Monitor. On June 10, a more prescient clue: a gruesome video on the Internet of the beheading of three uniformed Shi'ites, who were claimed to be members of a death squad - a tactic often used by Zarqawi against Western hostages.

Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, the Iraqi leader of the Shura Council, said: "Iraq is the front defense line for Islam and Muslims, so don't fail to follow the path of the mujahideen (holy warriors), the caravan of martyrs and the faithful. As for you, the slaves of the cross (Christian MNF], the grandsons of Ibn al-Alqami (Shi'ites), and every infidel of the Sunnis, we can't wait to sever your necks with our swords" - according to an Associated Press translation of the Internet statement. But the ability of Zarqawi's acolytes to produce and disseminate such videos also may prove to undermine such technically savvy groups.

Radu of FPRI said about al-Qaeda leaders: "They have to keep track of all these little cells they have, and contacts. And the fact that so many have computer training is a temptation to put everything on a hard drive, because who can memorize all those individuals and aliases? The electronic age is a double-edged sword for them, because it makes them vulnerable if those things are captured".

The isolated little house in which Zarqawi and his small group were attacked was in the village of Hibhib, near the city of Ba'quba. On June 9 the NYT quoted US officials in Baghdad as saying they had a source deep inside Zarqawi's group. Zarqawi, the source told them, was in the little house in the palm grove.

The NYT quoted Rubai'e as saying: "We have managed to infiltrate this organization". The NYT quoted a "Jordanian official close to the investigation" as saying the mission which killed Zarqawi was a joint operation conducted by the Americans and Jordanian intelligence. The source inside Zarqawi's group, the Jordanian official said, had been cultivated at least in part by Jordanian intelligence agents.

One of two F-16s in position over Hibhib released a laser-guided 500-pound bomb. Seconds later, a second bomb landed on the house. Zarqawi was still alive almost an hour after the air strikes. He died after he was carried in a stretcher by Iraqi police.

In a bid to prevent reprisal attacks, the Iraqi authorities on June 9 imposed a driving ban in Baghdad and the volatile Diyala Province to the north where Zarqawi, 40, was killed on June 7.

PM Maliki on June 8 said: "Every time a Zarqawi appears, we will kill him" - an implicit acknowledgement that others will rise to take his place. The Jordanian-born Zarqawi, whose real name was Ahmad Khalaylah, joined Arab Islamists fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s before he returned home and was jailed for radical activities. He came into his own when Iraq's Sunni insurgency - including his Neo-Salafi group - flared after the first US attack on Falluja in April 2004. At a time when the insurgency was struggling to define itself, the black banners of his Tawhid wal-Jihad movement, hoisted in Sunni areas in the summer of 2004, helped to stamp his bloody and sectarian vision on an ideologically diverse movement.

Zarqawi is believed to have participated in the videotaped decapitation of an abducted US engineer, Nicholas Berg, in 2004, and the resulting publicity helped spur a surge of hostage-taking across Iraq. His diatribes against Shi'ite "infidels", the latest a week before his death, suggest he was the driver behind the devastating bombings of Shi'ite mosques and marketplaces.

Zarqawi's gift for self-publicity, in addition to his ties to foreign Neo-Salafi networks which could provide cash and suicide volunteers, is believed to have helped him win the loyalty of many lower-level insurgent commanders. US officials described guerrilla leaders competing with each other to win the resources and prestige associated with being a regional representative of Zarqawi's Tawhid wal-Jihad franchise, renamed al-Qaeda in Iraq with the blessing of bin Laden in late 2004.

Al-Qaeda-associated cells are still thought to be the most active - if not necessarily the most numerous - insurgent groups in Iraq, although it is unclear how much authority Zarqawi himself was able to assert over his movement. Despite his prominence, many Sunni insurgents reportedly detested Zarqawi for associating their "resistance" with the slaughter of hostages, or questioned the wisdom of attacking Shi'ites and fomenting sectarian strife.

By late 2005 the US was hoping it might get the majority of insurgents, whom it believed pursued mainstream nationalist goals, to cut their ties with Zarqawi and his fellow Neo-Salafis. The idea was to divide the insurgents between those with political ambitions and those who pursued a war against Shi'ism and the US. These hopes, however, appear to have been damped by the widespread sectarian violence which broke out after the Feb. 22 demolition of a Shi'ite shrine in Samarra', with al-Qaeda cells finding themselves a new role helping to defend Sunni neighbourhoods against Shi'ite reprisals.

That Zarqawi had taken refuge in the mixed Sunni-Shi'ite province of Diyala, where he died, rather than the Sunni heartland of Anbar where he once made his base, may be an indication of the extent to which the insurgency has transformed into a sectarian conflict from an anti-occupation struggle.

The aftermath of Zarqawi's death may reveal whether or not there is a political solution to Iraq's bloodshed. Iraq observers have disagreed on whether a strategy of attacks on Shi'ites by groups based in Sunni areas with the aim of fomenting civil war was imposed on the insurgency by Zarqawi and his fellow Neo-Salafis. If those attacks diminish, it may be easier for Shi'ite and Sunni Arabs to co-exist, each policing their own parts of the country. If they continue, however, it may mean the significant sections of the indigenous insurgency have always endorsed Zarqawi's strategy, so as to push out the Americans and regain control of Iraq in a civil war.

Alternately, it may suggest that the sectarian violence sparked by those terror attacks has taken on a life of its own, and that Zarqawi's strategy succeeded even if he did not long survive his success.

A "sectarian war", Zarqawi wrote, was the only way Sunni insurgents could win in Iraq, by provoking a Shi'ite backlash and a rallying of the millions of Sunnis outside the country. The bloodletting in the mixed Sunni-Shi'ite cities like Baghdad is unfolding quickly, with hundreds of burned and bullet-riddled bodies turning up each week in the city morgues. The NYT on June 9 quoted Bruce Hoffman, a terrorist expert at the Rand Corp in Washington, as saying: "Zarqawi may be gone, but the conflagration...he set alight continues to burn. That is the reality. He has already set in motion powerful forces that won't necessarily stop just because he is dead".

Zarqawi fought on the front lines with his men. US and Iraqi officials believe he probably played a central role in planning some of the most spectacular attacks which his group carried out against foreigners and Shi'ites - the suicide bombing on the UN's Baghdad headquarters in 2003; the bombings on the Ashoura rituals March in 2004 which killed more than 140 Shi'ite pilgrims; and the destruction of the Askariya Shrine on Feb. 22, 2006.

Striking a cautiously understated note US commanders adopted in announcing Zarqawi's death, Gen Caldwell said new raids, following more than 50 others launched in the first 48 hours after the Hibhib strike, had made additional progress against al-Qaeda's network, adding: "As far as the Qaeda network, we're cautiously optimistic that we have been very successful...".