IRAQ - The Sadrist Background.

The 1920 revolt was eventually put down after four months when British forces bombarded the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, but only after 500 British troops and 6,000 Iraqis had lost their lives. The similarity of circumstances surrounding the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 with those of the British is striking.

When the British force captured Baghdad in March 1917, "liberated" Iraqis were baffled by the apparent lack of planning for what was to come next. The revolt began with rumours that Iraq, liberated from Ottoman rule, was not about to be handed over to the locals. Sir Arnold Wilson, Iraq's civilian administrator from 1918, worked on annexing the country to the British empire, against the wishes of his oriental secretary, Gertrude Bell.

Wilson was to be deeply humbled by the Shiite rebellion. Four months of fighting blamed on his insistence on direct rule left him convinced that autonomy should be granted to the Iraqis as quickly as possible.

Ayatollah Mohammed Al-Sadr formed an Independence Guard from discontented Shiites, rapidly attracting Sunni dissidents from Baghdad and central Iraq. When the 1920 San Remo conference handed the mandate for Iraq to Britain, the reaction was immediate.

In Karbala, a fatwa was issued declaring service in the British administration unlawful. Units of the Independence Guard set up offices in the major southern cities while Shiite and Sunni leaders in Baghdad arranged massive demonstrations. Britain at first ignored their protests and continued the policy of giving limited self-rule to the Iraqis. In June, British authorities announced that elections would be held for a Constituent Assembly. But armed revolt was breaking out in central Iraq, triggered by the arrest of one of Sadr's deputies.

Fatwas declaring an all-out war were issued and British garrisons in Najaf and Karbala were quickly overwhelmed. Rebellions sprang up in Basra, and Kurdistan in the north, but by September the revolt was beginning to flag. British forces, finally realising the danger, assumed a more aggressive course. They arrested tribal leaders and flooded the country with troops.

In Baghdad, Sunni leaders began to express reservations at the wisdom of following a revolt led by Shiite theologians. Many Shiite tribes in the south had yet to take up arms. When British forces shelled Najaf and Karbala into submission in October, the fighting came to an end.

The Iraqi revolt of 1920, which began as a general protest against British rule, ultimately failed to unite the Shiite and Sunni communities against the occupation. Its leaders were exiled or kept under house arrest. Sadr himself kept a low profile, later to resurface as a prime minister in the country.

The effects of the revolt were profound. Eventually, it curtailed the British occupation in Iraq. The mandate was scheduled to last 25 years, but the British had to pull out after 12 years, retaining influence but diminishing control over the country.

Iraq's Shiite community, defeated but unbowed, was left out of government for the next 80 years. Its exclusion from power has provided a powerful source of resentment currently driving Muqtada's revolt, which Saddam had overseen before the US' March 2003 invasion and partly depended on for his Baathist-Wahhabi-Sadrist insurgency (see below).

Washington seems to hope that, with US forces having recaptured Sadr-controlled Kut, Najaf and other areas and with a final offensive on Sadr City imminent, American military power will eventually force Muqtada to capitulate. He may not.

Last month Muqtada's spokesmen were telling the press that Jaysh Al-Mahdi would transform itself into a political movement, with candidates and policies. Tribal shaikhs from Sadr City, a sprawling working-class slum of 2.5m, have been meeting with government authorities to work out the details.

On Oct. 9, the Allawi government and Sadr's aides announced an agreement for Jaysh Al-Mahdi to hand over its heavy and medium weapons in Sadr City within five days from Oct. 11 in return for the release of Sadrist prisoners and a role in the political process. This was part of a peace initiative in Sadr City and other hotspots. The agreement came after a senior Sadr religious figure, Shaikh Mo'ayed Al-Khazraji, was released from Abu Ghraib. He had been detained nearly a year ago along with other religious figures close to Sadr. Khazraji was among the 230 Iraqis freed from the prison last week.

In return for the arms surrender, the government promised that Sadr's followers will not be "prosecuted" except in cases of "crime" - with Sadr himself facing an arrest warrant on the charge of his involvement in the murder of Khou'i - and that more of his aides would be freed from US detention. The deal focused on militiamen holed up in Sadr City but could be extended to other "areas of tension". Sadr, through his aides, also indicated that he wanted the government to pay reparations for damage that recent US bombing has done to Sadr City.

Abdul Hadi Al-Darraji, an aide to Sadr, had said on Oct. 7: "We are ready to lay down our heavy and medium-sized weapons in return for the release of all those imprisoned from our movement, a commitment that members of our movement will no longer be pursued and the restoration of basic services to areas like Sadr City. This initiative is being presented only to the Iraqi government". He said Sadr's movement was willing to take part in January's elections as long as they were "free of US influence and overseen by international monitors".

The government wants Jaysh Al-Mahdi to disarm totally and "unconditionally" and full control over Sadr City and other Shiite areas to Iraqi forces. Talks have also been under way to defuse Iraq's most stubborn trouble spot, Falluja, and the negotiators for the Sunni city have said they could bear fruit soon.

Militarily depleted by the Najaf and Sadr City standoffs and yet politically energised by growing disenchantment among Shiites, Jaysh Al-Mahdi already has turned into a potent political force. If Sadr's movement does well in the elections - with Muqtada considering calling his movement Patriotic Alliance - it should not be surprising if it got one-third of the Shiite vote. The first resolution would be to demand that US forces leave Iraq.

Yet commanders in Jaysh Al-Mahdi - at best a third-rate force within the Shiite fold, with Muqtada being far behind the religious authority of Sistani and better-connected secular Shiite politicians like Allawi - are more likely to play the spoiler. They believe that Allawi and the US forces intend to liquidate Muqdata and Jaysh Al-Mahdi.

Meanwhile, Iran is watching.