IRAQ - Resurgence In The Shiite World - Part 8.

Outline: The Iraq survey will be serialised in 12 parts through Vol. 48 (July-Dec. 2004) and Vol. 49 (Jan-June 2005) as follows:

A - Overview, Executive Summary & Background - July 04. B - The Elements of Iraqi Society & The Main Factors to Success- Aug. 04. C - The Position of The US & Its Allies - Sept. 04. D - The Iran & Jaafari Shiite Factors - Oct. 04. E - The Saudi & GCC Factors - Nov. 04. F - The Syria & Baathist Factors - Dec. 04. G - The Turkish & Kurdish Factors - Vol. 49, Jan. 05 H - The Jordan & Hashemite Factors - Feb. 05. I - The Internal Forces - March 05. J - The Regional Environment - April 05. K - The Baghdad Superstructure & Who's Who - May 05. L - The Perspective & Conclusions - June 05.

Iraq A - Overview, Executive Summary & Background:

Iraq is a test case of a Middle Eastern country trying to emerge under, or from, a new US scheme for this part of the world which is yet to crystallise as an order. None of Iraq's main communities is certain whether or not the success of this US scheme will be in its interest or in the interest of all the communities for the sake of a federal democracy. All the neighbouring regimes but Kuwait's are certain that the success of the US scheme will not be in their interest.

Iraqi society consists of five basic elements, listed in the following order of importance relative to its unity or dismemberment: the ethnicity, the tribe, the sect, the ideology, and natural resources. For the US scheme to succeed, the five elements must inter-act positively with these main factors to an Iraqi unity based on a federal democracy:

- A successful US geo-political performance in the Middle East. - A global economic environment favourable to the US scheme and to Iraq. - A regional political environment favourable to the unity of Iraq.

It will be extremely difficult for the five basic elements of Iraqi society to establish a balance favourable to all of the country's communities. The success or failure of the US scheme in Iraq will depend on the three factors mentioned above (see Part B).

For the US to have a successful geo-political performance in the Middle East and for the five basic elements of Iraqi society to establish a viable balance, the American administration must first prove to be an honest broker of peace between the Arabs and Israel and of peace among the various communities in the Middle East. It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the US to achieve these objectives in the near future. But who is to define success for the US scheme in the Middle East? Should the Middle East remain the product of Sykes-Picot - itself a product of World War I (see background on following pages) - or should it be re-ordered partitioned into many smaller entities? The fate of Iraq should answer these questions (see Part C).

Of all the external factors other than that of the US, Iran is the most important where the future of Iraq is concerned. Iran as a Jaafari Shiite theocracy has both the historical opportunity to help the US succeed for the sake of a viable democracy in Iraq, in return for a prosperous American-Shiite alliance, and the risk of becoming historically responsible for a re-ordering of the Middle East. Iranian society is made up of five basic elements similar to those of Iraq (see Part D).

Saudi Arabia is the second most important among the external factors to the success or failure of the US scheme in the Middle East. Saudi society consists of four basic elements - the tribe, the sect, the ideology (Wahhabism), and natural resources - which, however, lack the balance required for the kingdom to survive the consequences of what will happen to Iraq (see Part E).

Already there is a civil war in Saudi Arabia, where the question of legitimacy is the subject of dispute between the royal regime (House of Saud) and radical elements of the Wahhabi religious establishment (House of the Shaikh - known locally as Aal Al Shaikh). Although the balance of power is weighted heavily in favour of the royal regime, it is questionable whether the House of Saud will win this war (see News Service of this week's APS Diplomat).

Syria comes next to Saudi Arabia as a factor to the success or failure of the US scheme in Iraq. But the Baathist regime of Syria stands to lose either way. If Iraq emerges as a prosperous federation of democracies, this "virus" will move to Syria before reaching any other of the country's neighbours.

If Iraq is dismembered, which in the long run may not mean a real failure for the US, Syria could be among the first neighbours to be partitioned into several ethnic and tribal entities (see Part F).

Turkey today is the most successful democracy in the Muslim world and, as such, it must be a most positive factor to the US-proposed democratisation of Iraq. However, the Kurdish factor could produce negative effects on Turkey and all other countries which have large Kurdish minorities including Iran and Syria.

The Kurds of northern Iraq insist on including the oil-rich region of Kirkuk in their autonomous region (see OOD of this week's Diplomat Package), a move which the Turks have warned they could intervene to prevent. The question is whether the US will allow such intervention or let Turkey be de-stabilised as a result of a potentially explosive Kurdish revolt (see Part G in Vol. 49).

Jordan, ruled by a Hashemite monarchy, is trying to project itself as being a positive factor to the democratisation of Iraq. But the pan-Arab activists in the Hashemite movement still have claims to Iraq. They have a kin in Iraq who represents them and who has refused to join the interim administration in Baghdad.

Where the success of the Iraq project is concerned, both the positive and negative effects of the Jordan/Hashemite factor will not become clear before a Baghdad government has been elected by Jan. 31, 2005 (see Part H).

The internal forces in Iraq are diverse, including forces for each of the smaller communities like the Chaldeo-Assyrian Christians (remnants of the ancient Semitic people of the great Mesopotamian empires) and the Turkmans, and have become numerous. The interim administration of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi has adopted a decision taken in mid-June 2004 by the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) of Paul Bremer - the CPA was dissolved shortly after Iraqi sovereignty was transferred to the interim cabinet on June 28 - to dissolve the militia forces of the country's nine biggest political parties. That was to be the first step towards establishing law and order in Iraq.

However, it will take quite some time for a workable balance of power to be established among the various Iraqi groups. The first test would be what will follow Iraq's first free elections next year (see Part I).

The regional environment in 2005 will be one of the three main factors to the success or failure of the Iraq project. In turn, the success or failure of the Iraq project will have immediate effects on the regional environment, which consists mainly of the six countries bordering with Iraq: Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey.

The foreign ministers of these countries and their Iraqi counterpart, Hoshyar Zibari, recently met in Cairo to discuss Iraq's future. But they failed to come up with a unified stand. On July 22, Egypt and Syria voiced concern about reports of an Israeli presence in northern Iraq, which they warned could threaten regional stability. But PM Allawi, then visiting Cairo, denied Israelis were on his territory and pledged that Iraq "will not be used against Arab and Muslim brothers".

Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Shara of Syria, which is still technically at war with Israel, said there was "anxiety" among Iraq's neighbours about the Jewish state's reported activities and warned it was trying to fragment Iraq, telling a press conference in Cairo: "I do not want to exaggerate, there is no real danger at the moment, but we have to pay attention and stay awake". His new Egyptian counterpart, Ahmad Abul Gheith, expressed a similar concern.

The US media have reported increased activity by Israelis in Iraqi Kurdistan, suggesting Israeli agents were using the territory to monitor Iran's nuclear facilities. One report said Israelis, including members of the intelligence agency Mossad, entered northern Iraq as businessmen to train Kurdish commando units, although the Israelis have dismissed the claims.

Iraqi political analysts have warned in recent days that, if neighbouring states continued to help insurgents in Iraq, in turn this country's violence will spill over to them. One analyst warned that the chaotic situation in Iraq will only end when chaos has returned to the country of origin (see Part J).

The ruling superstructure in Baghdad will not assume a definitive course before early 2006 or the middle of that year. So many problems will have to be resolved in the meantime, including the issue of the US-led foreign military presence in the country.

As long as this presence remains a central problem, Iraq as a united country will continue to be in deep trouble. Strategists in Washington have warned that the US "has invested so many American lives and so much money in a united Iraq that it will only leave willingly when its purpose has been served, or be compelled to leave prematurely at the expense (peril) of this country" and the regional environment.

The worst scenario for the US in Iraq is "no longer another Vietnam", the same strategists have warned in a talk with APS, recalling that Vietnam was united and Indochina was not fragmented after the American departure. The worst scenario for the US will be "the worst scenario for the Iraqis and their neighbors": a Middle East consisting of up to 98 small entities with Israel to become a super-power in the region. The future rulers of Baghdad will have to be extremely careful, therefore, and will have to weigh the likely implications of every major decision they will take (see Part K).

The perspective for Iraq will depend more on the Iraqis themselves than on the US or any other power. Iraq can be said to be an artificial country, stitched together after World War 1. But in the historical context, this is the cradle of civilisations, a country of great empires.

Despite 35 years of Baathist dictatorship which practically destroyed the quality of the country's educational system, on average the Iraqis are still among the fairly well educated people in the Middle East. The more educated Iraqis, notably including those of the diaspora who have been returning to the country since the US-led invasion toppled Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003, are among the best of the Middle Eastern elite. Together, the various segments of this society have the potential of turning Iraq into a viable and prosperous democracy - a model for other countries in the Middle East to follow.

The perspective for the US in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East will depend more on the American geo-political performance, notably including its brokering of a fair peace between the Arabs and Israel, than on what Washington expects of the Iraqis. If the US fails in Iraq, it will fail in the Middle East, and only the promoters of Greater Israel will gain from what the Americans call "the worst case scenario" for this part of the world (see Part L).