IRAQ - Karbala' Under Iraqi Command.

The US military on Oct. 29 handed over security control for Karbala' province, home to one of the holiest cities in Shi'ism, to the local authorities. It was the eighth of Iraq's 18 provinces to be transferred to Iraqi control. The top US civilian and military officials in Iraq, US Ambassador Crocker and Gen Petraeus said it was a significant moment in Iraq's transition to self-reliance.

Karbala' City, the provincial capital and a centre of Shi'ite pilgrimage and worship, has been largely peaceful. But tensions between local Shi'ite factions in the holy city boiled over in August during a major festival and 52 people were killed.

The US military has poured 30,000 extra troops into Iraq as part of President Bush's new strategy to quell an explosion of sectarian violence which erupted after the bombing of a revered Shi'ite shrine in Samarra by Neo-Salafis on Feb. 22, 2006.

Allawi Using US Lobbyists To Gain Power: Iyad Allawi, a secular Shi'ite who was Iraq's interim PM from June 2004 to early 2005, is paying $300,000 over six months to Barbour Griffith & Rogers, a powerful Washington lobbying firm, with the aim of returning to power in Baghdad. The key man for Allawi at this firm is Robert Blackwill, who in the spring of 2004 was the influential Iraq director on the White House National Security Council (NSC). At the time, Blackwill pushed hard to make Allawi, a tough man with close ties to the CIA, the interim PM.

In the nearly three years since he left the White House, Blackwill has built a thriving business lobbying for the foreign governments, officials and companies he knew as President Bush's deputy national security adviser, as the US ambassador to India and as a veteran of decades in government. Among his clients are India, Serbia, Taiwan, the KRG, the Alfa Bank in Moscow and Thaksin Shinawatra, the former prime minister of Thailand and a billionaire communications tycoon who was ousted in a coup in 2006.

Since late 2005, lobbying disclosure reports at the US Justice Department show that Blackwill helped bring in fees to Barbour Griffith & Rogers from foreign clients which total more than $11m. Blackwill's story is hardly an unusual one in Washington, where foreign lobbying has been good business since at least the early 20th century. Edward von Kloberg 3rd, once known in Washington as the lobbyist to dictators, represented Saddam Hussein, Nicolae Ceaucescu of Romania and Mobuto Sese Seko of the former Zaire.

More recently, Turkey has spent millions of dollars on PR and prominent lobbyists, among them Richard Gephardt of Missouri, the former House majority leader and a Democrat, and former Representative Robert Livingston of Louisiana, a Republican. But Blackwill stands out for his success and for his representation of countries and officials central to Bush's foreign policy. The New York Times quotes Qubad Talabani, the son of Iraq's Kurdish President Jalal Talabani who is the Washington representative of the KRG, as saying: "We have had a long-term relationship with the firm". The paper says the KRG has paid Barbour Griffith & Rogers $1.4m since Blackwill joined the firm's Kurdistan lobbying team in late 2005, and is pushing for support in Washington of its oil contracts with foreign companies.

New Delhi, which has paid Barbour Griffith & Rogers $1.24m since Blackwill began lobbying for the country in late 2005, has hired Blackwill, among others, to push for a nuclear deal between the US and India which has run into resistance in Congress and the Indian parliament. On April 2, 2007, US Justice Department filings show, Blackwill met on the issue of US-India relations with R. Nicholas Burns, the under secretary of state for political affairs and the administration's point man on the nuclear deal.

Blackwill's firm has also had lobbying contracts, now expired, with the secular National Dialogue Party of Lebanon; the Confederation of Indian Industry; Dubai International Capital, the private equity firm of Dubai's ruler, Shaikh Muhammad bin Rashid al-Maktoum; and Eritrea, the state in the Horn of Africa which the State Department has been threatening to designate terrorist for its support of Neo-Salafi rebels in Somalia.

Blackwill, who grew up on the Kansas plains and worked in the mid-1970s for Helmut Sonnenfeldt, the counselor to then secretary of state Henry Kissinger, is known within the Bush administration for his intellect and irascibility. In India, his tough management style prompted complaints from embassy staff members and a review by the State Department's inspector-general. In 2004, he was reprimanded by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser, after he was accused of abusive behaviour towards a State Department secretary when he discovered he did not have a seat on a flight. But Blackwill, who taught for 14 years at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and has a wily, Kissinger-like ability to cut through layers of government, is also a gifted raconteur who mixes policy, politics and personality in his analysis of issues.

Although Blackwill now works out of Barbour Griffith & Rogers's luxurious Pennsylvania Avenue offices which look out towards the White House, his lobbying visits to former administration colleagues, when he often comes laden with information, are not so different from the conversations he had with them while he was in government. Blackwill might have continued to lobby in relative peace for his foreign clients had it not been for Allawi, who retained Blackwill's services on Aug. 20 and then said six days later on CNN that Barbour Griffith & Rogers had been hired "to help us advocate our views, the views of the nationalistic Iraqis, the non-sectarian Iraqis".

Allawi also said his $300,000 bill with the firm was to be paid by a supporter whom he declined to name. Allawi's contract with Barbour Griffith & Rogers was first disclosed on IraqSlogger, a Website devoted to Iraq news. The contract, filed with the US Justice Department, states that "B.G.R. will provide strategic counsel and representation for and on behalf of Dr. Ayad Allawi before the U.S. government, Congress, media and others". The contract states that Blackwill would lead the lobbying firm's "core team of professionals" in representing Allawi.

However, The NYT says "American officials in Baghdad take a dim view of Allawi's chances to be prime minister again because of the deep resentments he stirred up during his time in office - in 2004 he supported the American assaults on Najaf and Falluja - and his increasingly distant ties to Iraq". Allawi has homes in London and Amman where he spends much of his time. The paper quoted Ambassador Crocker as saying: "I appreciated the opportunity to see Dr. Allawi when he was back in Iraq in August-September. I can only wish he spent more of his time here".

The NYT says: "White House officials insist that Blackwill's support of Allawi does not represent administration policy. Although administration officials spent much of the summer criticizing the current Iraqi prime minister...Maliki - in August, Bush publicly acknowledged 'a certain level of frustration' with the Iraqi government's failure to unify its warring ethnic factions - the criticism has ceased. Administration officials say they see no viable alternative at this point to Maliki. But that has not stopped Allawi, and Barbour Griffith & Rogers, from pressing his case. Shortly after the contract was signed, the lobbying firm blanketed Washington's congressional staff members and policymakers with e-mail messages on behalf of Allawi describing Maliki's government as a failure".

The Kurdish-Turkey Front: As his troops mass along the border with Iraq's Kurdistan, chief of the Turkish General Staff Gen Yasar Buyukanit has promised to make the rebels of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) "grieve with an intensity they cannot imagine". But the aim behind PKK's deadly attacks against Turkish troops in recent weeks may be to cause a rift between Turkey and its allies while involving the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in a dangerous winter campaign in Iraq's inaccessible northern mountains.

The PKK has threatened to cut the crude oil pipeline from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan and even strike oil tankers heading for Turkey. The July 22 electoral success of Turkey's ruling neo-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) in former PKK strongholds in south-eastern Turkey has put pressure on the rebels to try and draw Turkey into a major struggle in northern Iraq with international implications for Ankara.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, a Kurd, claims the PKK has been infiltrated by Turkish intelligence, and suggests that Ankara is seeking a provocation to allow it to intervene in northern Iraq to "disrupt the Kurdish regional administration, [and] to cripple the infrastructure".

TSK troops and Cobra helicopter gunships are making "hot pursuit" of PKK fighters across the border. Turkish tanks and artillery shell targets in northern Iraq almost daily. The difficulty for Ankara is that a quick raid on PKK bases in Iraq is likely to have little long-term effect. Turkey has since the 1980s launched dozens of major raids on northern Iraq without doing anything to end the PKK presence along the border.

PKK guerrillas have little more than what they can carry on their back, and are thus ready to pull out to safer, pre-planned positions at a moment's notice. Only an extended occupation stands any chance of success, and this will be difficult, if not impossible, without co-operation from Baghdad, Washington and northern Iraq's KRG.

Ankara gets mixed messages from the US. The US military commander in northern Iraq, Gen. Benjamin Mixon, has said US forces were not involved in tracking PKK movements and intended to do "absolutely nothing" to end PKK cross-border attacks on Turkey. Secretary of State Rice, in Ankara on Nov. 2, says the US "will do what is necessary" against the PKK while warning Ankara to abandon plans for a major cross-border incursion.

An APS source on Nov. 3 said the US offered Ankara its use of Predator reconnaissance aircraft to supply the TSK with the intelligence necessary to make pinpoint strikes against PKK targets while avoiding a larger invasion. The source said Ankara had specifically asked the US to help with "concrete steps" to reduce the PKK threat. On Nov. 2, it was indicated the US was offering Turkey a package of measures to dissuade Ankara from mounting a large-scale incursion into Iraq. Ahead of a Nov. 5 meeting in Washington between President Bush and Turkey's PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan, US officials said Ankara would have to get concrete American help to combat the PKK.

The FT on Nov. 2 quoted Matthew Bryza, US deputy assistant secretary at the US State Department responsible for Turkey policy, as saying: "Erdogan has to go back with the belief that for whatever reason, the US is serious" about tackling Turkey's concerns regarding the PKK. The Bush-Erdogan meeting is critical to preventing an escalation. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan on Nov. 1 said the Nov. 5 White House meeting "will determine the steps Turkey would take".

The FT said the US approach had three main elements: concrete measures to allow Erdogan to show government-to-government co-operation against the PKK has improved, support for limited Turkish action to punish the PKK for its behaviour, and a longer-term strategy to force it to change tack.

Babacan on Nov. 1 spoke as Turkish leaders appeared to tone down the fierce rhetoric about moving military forces into Iraq which has characterised their recent discussion of the PKK issue. He said Ankara was not planning "an invasion" of northern Iraq and would not seek to disrupt or endanger either Iraqis or Turks in any further operations.

Ankara has laid plans for economic sanctions to target the PKK, but has not said what they might be. Babacan said: "Our only target is the terrorist organisation". The PKK is branded a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the US and the EU.

Bryza said Erdogan was "absolutely reasonable" in demanding the capture of PKK leaders in Iraq, closure of their offices in the KRG area and a clampdown on the flow of support from Iraq to PKK forces in Turkey. He said the Nov. 5 meeting should give Erdogan "clarity" about how to achieve these goals, adding: "We are talking about Turkey and Iraq having primary responsibility to [tackle the PKK] with the US supporting, but there is a heck of a lot the US can do. I would make the argument that we have been doing the best we can, but [so far] we haven't produced the results and if you're a Turk you have to feel we haven't been trying. We have made...commitments and we have not been able to fulfil them yet - that is merely a statement of fact" - referring to a four-year-old US promise to stop Iraq from becoming a haven for terrorism.

Turkish air capability is limited. There are few attack helicopters available, and Turkish F-4s and F-16s flying from the Diyarbakir air base are largely ineffective against PKK mountain positions without the specialised munitions used by the US or the fuel-air explosives Russia used against Chechen hideouts in the Caucasus Mountains.

For now though, the Turkish warplanes continue to mount strikes on Kurdish villages and PKK positions inside Iraq while providing air support for search-and-destroy missions within south-eastern Turkey. Turkey's nine US-built Cobra attack helicopters have undergone extensive refits to enable them to carry out night missions against the PKK.

Snow is already falling in the higher mountain passes. There is a danger that a Turkish winter offensive could get bogged down in difficult and roadless areas without the help of the Iraqi Kurdish guides who used to accompany Turkish missions against the PKK. As the earth turns to mud under heavy rains and snow, the TSK's armour will find the going difficult. Winter storms could mean troops on the ground might lose the benefit of air cover and medical-evacuation services. There are several other options available.

The onset of winter usually marks the end of the PKK's campaigning season until spring, as the fighters retire to bases well inside the border while only a small number remains behind in south-eastern Turkey. The TSK will have to penetrate 20 to 40 km deep into Iraq to get to PKK's winter camps. The alternative would be to create a buffer zone on the Iraqi side of the border and wait until spring for a major offensive - barring the success of diplomatic efforts in the meantime; but the US and KRG are opposed to this. Even if Turkey gets Baghdad's co-operation against the PKK, there is little chance the beleaguered Iraqi army could carry out a successful campaign in the Kurdish mountains.

The Kurdish President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, says even the Kurdish Peshmerga militias could not expel the PKK. The effect of a military offensive on the future status of the disputed and oil-rich Kirkuk also must play into the calculations of Turkish planners.

Sanctions would include closing the Habur border gate through which $3 bn in trade used to pass annually. A large quantity of US military supplies also pass through the Habur gate, and it is not yet known how this will be affected by the new measures.

Iranian Mediation Sought: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Baghdad on Oct. 31 and PM Maliki asked him to intervene on Iraq's behalf at the Nov. 2-3 meeting of Iraq's neighbours in Istanbul. Maliki's office said: "The prime minister asked the Islamic republic to present their full support to Iraq during the Istanbul meeting and also to participate in solving the border crises between Turkey and the PKK".

An APS source on Nov. 3 said Mottaki, who on Oct. 31 was supposed to move from Damascus to Beirut, received an urgent call from Tehran to go to Baghdad to discuss Maliki's mediation request. The source said this was an opportunity for Iran to stop a dangerous deterioration in the tension between Tehran and Washington over Iran's nuclear and regional ambitions as the US was leading efforts to have additional pressures on the Shi'ite theocracy (see news19-SaudiBoom&ChallegesNov5-07).

Zebari discussed the situation with Mottaki and had warned Iran "of the serious consequences" if there were to be a major military incursion by Turkey into Iraq", adding: "It will have consequences for the entire region". Zebari pointed out that Iraq had many other problems with which it needed help from neighbouring countries, saying: "The Istanbul meeting should not be hijacked by the PKK terrorist activities in Turkey".

There are Kurdish minorities in Turkey, Iran and Syria, all of whom will be at the meeting. Although Kurdistan is part of Iraq, the central government has little control over its policies. The KRG functions as a semi-autonomous state with its own military force which is only nominally under the control of the Iraqi Defence Ministry. This means that, for Iraq to oust the PKK, it would need the support of the KRG. Traditionally, the Kurds of northern Iran have been reluctant to take on fellow Kurds.

Zebari said Baghdad would reinforce Iraq's border to prevent the PKK from receiving supplies, in one of the first concrete proposals made by the central government to forestall a Turkish incursion. He said his government would set up checkpoints along the border to prevent food, fuel and supplies from reaching the PKK.

The PKK maintains several enclaves inside Iraq, including some lightly garrisoned mountain ranges near the Turkish border and a much larger base relatively far from Turkish territory, on the Qandil Mountains along the border with Iran.