IRAQ - Iraq's Unique View Of Israel.

Despite the apparent clarity of Iraq's opposition to Israel and the peace process in particular, the Baathist regime under Saddam Hussein has long had a unique attitude towards the Jewish state. Baghdad has in recent years sent some contradictory signals on the question of relations with Israel. Some observers have detected a possibility for pragmatism based on a "quid pro quo" whereby Baghdad may be prepared to back the peace process in return for an end to the embargo.

Indeed, there have been hints from former officials on the Israeli side that some kind of talks should be initiated with Saddam who may reciprocate positively in order to repay Arafat's past backing for Iraq and to find a way out of the sanctions regime. It has been pointed out that there is no real bilateral conflict between Iraq and Israel over water and settlements and they do not even share a common border. Of course, all such ideas were floated in private and very discreetly. In fact, Baghdad's position reflects intriguing and complex motivations which cannot be addressed purely in terms of material benefit for Iraq.

The matter has been further complicated by Saddam Hussein's own comments, which give the impression of leaving a very small room to explore the possibility of rapprochement. For instance, he reportedly told Arab officials in early 1993 that Iraq's missile attacks on Israel during the Gulf war of 1991 had avenged Israel's attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981 and that hence there was no longer any cause for hostility between the two. But in 1995, however, when speaking on the Iraqi army's feats during that war he stated: "I believe that the Arab nation has the right to ask: Thirty nine missiles? (the number fired at Israel by Iraq in 1991) Who will fire the 40th?"

In this context, it is important to note that Baghdad has for decades adopted a position towards Israel that is rather different from that of other Arab states. Although Iraq has no common border with Israel and thus was not a "frontline" state like Syria, Jordan and Egypt, it has behaved like one. It participated in all the major Arab-Israeli wars in far more than the symbolic manner of states such as Saudi Arabia or Libya. Iraq sent at times one-third of its armed forces to the battlefront against the Israelis.

Yet, unlike the frontline states, Iraq did not sign the armistice agreement of 1949 with Israel, and did not accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338. In some ways, therefore, Iraq's position towards Israel was harder than that of the regular "frontline" states.

Equally important to note is the fact that, unique among the non-frontline states, Iraq has been subjected to attack by Israel. Thus Iraqi-Israeli relations became more than a function of the general Arab-Israeli conflict (as is the case of other non-frontline states like Saudi Arabia or Algeria) but assumed strong bilateral dimensions as well. In addition, Iraq is the only Arab country to have initiated hostilities against Israel (during the 1991 Gulf war) without organising an Arab coalition behind it. Finally, Iraq is the only Arab country to have used unconventional weapons (missiles) against Israel and the only attacker to whom Israel did not retaliate.

Geo-strategic, political, ideological and historical factors account for Iraq's attitude towards Israel. The geo-strategic element in Iraq's attitude can be explained to some extent by the oil factor. Iraq is constrained by the fact that it has a very small sea access, barely 70 km when the Shatt Al Arab waterway was open. As such, Iraq has always felt a kind of strategic strangulation (and its invasion of Kuwait which gave it a greater sea access can be seen partly in this light as well).

Baghdad had in the past sought to escape this strangulation by laying pipelines to the sea ports. The Israeli angle can be seen by recalling that the Kirkuk-Haifa Oil Pipeline operated from 1935 until 1948, i.e. until the state of Israel was created. The closure of the pipeline after the 1948 war has left Iraq with a latent desire to reach out to the Mediterranean Sea.

Politically, Saddam Hussein used the Arab-Israeli conflict as an instrument to enhance the legitimacy of his own regime - something that was done by virtually all the Arab rulers. What was unique about Iraq was that the Baath doctrine has a commitment to the cause of Palestine as one of its core tenets.

Therefore, it will be ideologically difficult for the regime itself to disengage from the Arab-Israeli conflict even if it wants do so - unless the Palestinians themselves accept a deal. (In this regard, the Baathist regimes in Iraq and Syria have something in common).

For Saddam, a tough position against the Jewish state has always been easy to justify on historic grounds. The invasions of the territory that today forms Israel by different ancient Mesopotamian kingdoms as well as by Muslim forces served both as an inspiration and as an excellent tool to boost legitimacy for rulers. In fact, Saddam has consciously tried to liken himself to Babylonian ruler Nebuchadnezzar and to the victorious Islamic conqueror Salah Al Din Al Ayyubi (known in the West as Saladin) - especially during the Gulf war.