IRAQ - Bolstering The Tribal Approach.

The tribal "awakening councils" (ACs) are part of a wider American experiment which reflects the five basic elements of society in the Muslim world: (1) the tribe, or race (hence "nationalism"), the strongest element; (2) the sect, the second strongest; (3) the ideology, the weakest of the five; (4) natural resources, controlled by the rulers or a region or a country; and (5) geo-politics, controlled by the US at present. These five elements make things happen in what is by far the world's largest energy reservoir.

The tribal ACs in Iraq are being complemented by various local groups, such as Concerned Local Citizens" organisations (CLCs) with US-paid salaries, uniforms and recognition as local security providers; in exchange, they are being provided with biometric data to facilitate vetting and enforcement of the terms of their agreements. There are now more than 60,000 CLC members, up from none last winter. The same formula is being applied in Afghanistan.

Where Iraq is concerned, the AC/CLC experiment is gradually causing both Sunni and Shi'ite Arab tribes to think of Iran is terms of Arab-Persian geo-political rivalries. Yet Iran, leading an axis of anti-US forces in the Middle East which includes the 'Alawite/Ba'thist regime in Syria, is facing a long period of tensions with the US which will make an Arab-Persian cold war a very expensive experience for Tehran. Iranian-US tensions will keep blowing hot and cold until a final turn - a military showdown or a deal - takes place (see news25-Iran-USDec17-07).

The situation in Iraq, meanwhile, is improving. Baghdad neighbourhoods which were no-go zones in March are coming back to life. Parts of Diyala province which were too dangerous to visit then are now secure. Patrols in Falluja which would have been ambushed a year ago are met by children mugging for photos from US Marines who carry lolli-pops along with their rifles. Iraq is still a war zone, but the trends are turning positive.

The reduction in violence may prove to be fundamental - a new phase in the war with a better chance for stability than seen in many years. But it may not offer much chance for deep or rapid US troop draw-downs. American experts say if the US does not keep large numbers of troops in Iraq for a long time, the gains of recent months could easily be reversed.

The Iraq conflict is a communal war. Ending a civil war first requires a ceasefire to be properly negotiated and then properly enforced by outside peace-keepers. Since the whole reason for civil war is that the locals do not trust each other, the role of outside peace-keepers must be complemented by local contributions. Hence the importance of the AC/CLC approach.

Since last winter, a combination of good fortune, enemy mistakes and a new US strategy with more troops and a mission of direct population security has created a largely unanticipated situation. Across much of Iraq, former combattants have chosen to stand down and then fight the more extremist insurgents - the Neo-Salafis on the Sunni side such as al-Qaeda and the thuggish militias on the Shi'ite side like Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (also known as Mahdi Army). Voluntary ceasefires have led to many locals joining the CLCs.

Important hurdles remain in extending this system of ceasefires to the hold-outs, especially in the northern and southern provinces. But Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow for defence policy at the US Council on Foreign Relations who has visited Iraq twice this year, said in an article published on Dec. 11 by The Washington Post: "It is increasingly plausible that we might achieve something like a nationwide ceasefire via local negotiated settlements".

Biddle wrote: "Civil war ceasefires, however, are rarely self-enforcing. Much has been made of the danger that CLC deals could collapse: Many are the same fighters who had been killing US and Iraqi troops; they retain their arms and sometimes even their leaders; some hope to seize power later if they can.

"It is true that we have not destroyed the enemy or driven him out of Iraq. An outside peacekeeping role is thus critical to success, by punishing violators and building confidence that others can safely stand down. The troop counts normally sought for peacekeeping are not much lower than those for counterinsurgency war fighting, at least in the early years, and a meaningful outside presence can be needed for a generation.

"Many hope that the Iraqi ceasefires can be enforced via positive inducements such as government salaries for CLCs. But the record of such deals elsewhere suggests that more may be needed - for years to come. For now, the only plausible candidate for this peacekeeping role is the United States. No one else can be expected to step in until and unless the war is clearly over.

"Yet pressure for a deep drawdown in US forces is growing. War opponents would cut our losses; many war supporters hope the declining violence translates into safe US troop reductions. Some reduction is unavoidable: We cannot maintain today's operating tempo without breaking the military. But if we are to maintain the gains of the past year, we must retain enough troops to enforce a system of local ceasefires as peacekeepers.

"A US commitment to police an Iraqi ceasefire is no guarantee of success. A ceasefire might collapse even if we did keep a large peacekeeping force, and the peacekeepers might ultimately be rejected as foreign occupiers. One could defend a choice to withdraw altogether given these uncertainties.

"Sticking it out to stabilise Iraq and avert the potential consequences of failure, however, is more defensible now than it has been for a long time - but only if we are willing to do what it takes to maximise the odds that Iraq does not return to bloodshed and chaos.

"A withdrawal that is too fast or too deep could create a self-defeating prophecy. The past year's decline in violence may yet signal a new phase in which the American presence shifts from war fighting to peacekeeping. But if we take it chiefly as an opportunity to come home, we could easily lose what has been gained".

UK's Iraq Combat Task Is Ending: On a brief visit to UK troops in Basra on Dec. 9, PM Gordon Brown announced that Britain was to hand over its last remaining combat responsibilities in Iraq to local Army and police "in the next two weeks". The prime minister claimed security in the region was now "so much better" and was in the coming week to back a drive to bring Iraqi and international investments to Basra, hoping to shift Britain's role in the south from the military to the commercial.

Brown was to name "a British business figure" as a senior international adviser to a Basra development commission, which aims to bring back Iraqi investors and attract foreign companies to the region. The British investors should consider putting money into southern Iraq, although his arrival in Basra in a blacked-out military C-130 aircraft was a reminder that security remained a serious problem.

Brown reported he had just spoken to Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki by phone, who had confirmed Iraqi forces would take charge of security in Basra province "within two weeks". He told his troops: "He asked me to pass on his thanks to you for what you have done to rebuild democracy in Iraq".

The British Army, which has lost 173 personnel in Iraq, will end its combat role before Christmas, handing over control in Basra province to 30,000 Iraqi Army troops and police. Brown, meeting some of the 4,500 British personnel stationed at the highly defended Basra airbase, was anxious to show his support for the military after recent attacks by former defence chiefs. In a speech citing Sir Winston Churchill and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, he paid tribute to the forces: "We are incredibly proud of what you do".

Brown envisages 2,500 troops in Iraq by next March, performing an "overwatch" role and training Iraqi security personnel. He said British troops could still intervene in a combat role if requested, but UK opposition MPs and defence experts have questioned whether such a small force could operate effectively.

In spite of Brown's upbeat assessment - he said attacks on British forces had dropped by 90% since they moved out of Basra city centre last September - concerns remained. He acknowledged worries that some of the police being recruited may have other motives than the maintenance of law and order; some are linked to local Shi'ite militia.

Brown refused to be drawn on when the remaining troops may finally leave Iraq or whether the Army could perform its training and oversight role across the border in nearby Kuwait. His visit came at a time of tension between Downing Street and the military, which claims the small real-term budget increase for defence is insufficient to meet growing commitments.