IRAQ - 'Iraq Syndrome' In US Foreign Policy.

As Washington's politicians and pundits argue about how and when the US should get out of Iraq, another debate is just beginning: what kind of "Iraq syndrome" will take hold over American foreign policy in the wake of this war and how will the lessons of the past four years shape the contours of future decisions about US power and the potential uses of military force?

In an article published on June 15 by the Financial Times, Kurt Campbell, chief executive and co-founder of the Centre for a New American Security, and the centre's senior fellow Derek Chollet, said: "While most correctly focus on Iraq's tremendous cost to US leadership and prestige, an odd twist is that many elements of the Iraq syndrome may have a marginally positive impact on the future of American foreign policy".

Many expect Iraq's legacy to be unambiguously and even dangerously negative. There are fears of a more inward-looking US, fuelled by public distrust of government and scepticism about US intelligence and an unwillingness to accept future assertions about security threats. This could cripple the next president regardless of party and undermine foreign policy for decades. But some aspects of an Iraq syndrome might be surprising - and not all bad.

For example, Campbell and Chollet, said: "there is bound to be greater appreciation for the role of international institutions and the importance of gaining legitimacy for US actions. Even the loudest US neo-conservative (neo-con) champions of the Iraq war now recognise this and call for a stronger UN, or the creation of new institutions such as an alliance of democracies, to provide greater international capacity and legitimacy. One might also expect a better balance of shared powers between the Congress and the president in the making of foreign policy, with greater legislative oversight and a healthy scepticism of presidential sabre-rattling - already illustrated by congressional warnings against unilateral military action on Iran.

Campbell and Chollet wrote: "When the US does use force again, there will be higher expectations for 'post-conflict' planning and wider public awareness of its importance. In addition, there is stronger political will to develop the other tools in the US foreign policy toolbox, such as building greater civilian capacity for stabilisation missions, strengthening the diplomatic corps and reforming foreign development assistance.

"Perhaps most important, there will be more humility about what American power can accomplish alone and a deeper sense of the limits to what the US can do by itself.

"For the military - whose members and families have been the only Americans asked to make sacrifices for the Iraq war - many aspects of a post-Iraq world will prove difficult. As after Vietnam, there will be the inevitable second-guessing of the civilian architects of the war and allegations of a dereliction of duty among the senior uniformed military who meekly followed along, and there will be a profound and lasting sorrow for the fallen.

"Yet there may be some positives here as well. The morale and effectiveness of the military have shown remarkably few signs of breaking or even bending under the enormous strain.

"Military men and women appreciate the stakes of the larger and longer battle they are engaged in and there is no real 'quit' in the force. In fact, while the post-Vietnam years were devastating for the military - as budgets dropped, morale cratered and the force atrophied - the post-Iraq years promise revitalisation, with a larger force and a commitment to improve training and equipment.

"Unlike in the Vietnam war, the US military retains the deep respect of a grateful nation, as illustrated by widespread outrage following the scandal over soldiers' treatment at military hospitals. This is a far cry from the post-Vietnam years, when military personnel did not wear their uniforms in public around Washington until President Ronald Reagan signed an executive order requiring active duty military to do so.

"How the Iraq war ultimately ends will have a great deal to do with the kind of shadow the conflict casts on American politics and foreign policy. The implications of an orderly withdrawal would be very different from a hasty and chaotic exit.

"While even the most hopeful admit that when the US disengages from Iraq it will have not nearly met the lofty ambitions which provided the rationale for the war, the kind of Iraq the US will leave behind certainly matters. But it is not too early to glean a few insights about what the Iraq syndrome may look like - and the modest positives that might come out of it".