IRAN - Opposition To Middle East Peace Ending - Part 11.

The Iranian theocracy has since the beginning had an unusual perspective on Israel. On the one hand, there was a dramatic reversal of the politico-economic linkages between Israel and Iran which existed during the Shah's era. On the other hand, Jews in Iran have been relatively free to practice their religion, participate in business, and even to take part in political life - relative to the Arab countries in the Middle East. Within this context, the Middle East peace process threw up new challenges for the Iranian regime. These challenges, compounded with the complexities of the post-cold war world, are creating a situation whereby Iran is obliged to take a nuanced position on peace-related developments in the Middle East.

Iran was the only non-Arab state that openly opposed the peace process at the time of its launch in October 1991. Over time, however, it has been making adjustments to its position. This was a reflection of both internal and external factors. The internal factors include the changes in the Iranian political scene, with moderates, liberals and reformists gradually gaining power in the major decision making institutions through the 1990s. The external factors are the changes which have occurred during the past decade in the Middle East itself, including the peace treaties that the Palestinians and Jordan have signed with Israel, the implications of the isolation of Saddam Hussein, the repercussions of globalisation, etc (see following pages).

Iranian opposition to the peace process today is a carefully thought-out position aimed at keeping all the country's options open. The government has clearly articulated that it regards the peace process as another instrument of the US applied towards spreading American hegemony in the Middle East. On the other hand, government officials have declared that Tehran would not be actively against a solution acceptable to the Arabs. In diplomatic terms, the Iranian position is finely calibrated in order to maintain distance from the US-sponsored process while not moving actively to undermine it.

Aware Of Strengths & Limitations: What this implies is that Tehran is well aware of its limitations, i.e. it will not be forced into a position whereby its opposition to the peace process undermines its own security. The new moderate leadership in Iran, under President Mohammed Khatami, Iran has been putting more emphasis on maintaining the credibility of the theocracy among the various Islamic groups that look to the 1979 revolution as a source of inspiration. Iran can be expected therefore to continue providing some aid to militant groups in the Middle East opposed to the peace process.

These groups include both Sunni and Shiite formations, but again Iran will be careful in selecting the Sunni groups that would benefit. Groups like Hamas, for instance, which has long maintained channels to Iran and which is not known for anti-Shiite tendencies will fall into this category. However, the focus of Iranian assistance has been and will continue to be the Hizbollah movement of South Lebanon. It is important to note that this aspect of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, i.e. the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, will come to a head in the coming months if Israel keeps its promise of pulling out by July 7, 2000.

Among other things, the planned Israeli will be (1) a test of the Syrian capability for strategic manoeuvre, keeping in mind its long-standing alliance with Iran; (2) a test of Iran's control over the Hizbollah, which has for long indicated that its only objective is to drive the Israelis out of south Lebanon, as opposed to the 1948 Palestinian refugees' desire to "drive the Jews into the sea"; and (3) a test of Iranian diplomacy if Hizbollah crosses the northern Israeli borders after the proposed pull-out. In other words, the exact depth of Iran's opposition to the peace process can be gauged in the coming two months.

Most observers feel that President Khatami, given his internal difficulties, will not be keen to open an external front. Iran is already under a negative spotlight in view of the trial of "Jewish spies". The ongoing trial of 13 Jews accused of spying for Israel has become a major issue in the Western media, with emphasis being on the "persecution of Jews" and other similar charges. This is despite the fact that the 2,700-year-old Jewish community in Iran has been quite open in saying that they do not regard the spying case as a religious issue (see following pages & News Service, No.17).

Another viewpoint is that the traditionalist theologians, whose public expressions on Israel are not very different from those of the radical Islamists elsewhere in the Middle East, may choose to use the Israeli pull-out as an opportunity to strengthen support for themselves domestically. With their support base among the Revolutionary Guards and among Shiite militants in Lebanon, it is not inconceivable that they could instigate a flare-up on the south Lebanon/north Israel frontier and thus create a difficult international and domestic situation for Khatami.

It is quite clear, however, that Iran will not play any overt role if military hostilities flare up on the Lebanon/Israel frontier after the Israeli pull-out. Apart from providing assistance, perhaps including weapons and other material aid, to Syria and the Hizbollah in the event of a conflict in the area, it is highly unlikely that Iran will get militarily involved in a big way. Yet it is possible that the strength of the Revolutionary Guards based in Lebanon would be boosted and that they may take part in clashes.