IRAN - Internal Factors Changing Iranian Stance On The Peace Process.

Rather than international developments, it is most likely that domestic circumstances in Iran will have the biggest impact on the way in which Iran perceives the peace process. This has already been demonstrated through the 1990s. Initially, i.e. when the peace process was launched in October 1991, Iran had strongly criticised the Madrid conference. This came at a time when the Palestinian intifada was peaking and when Khomeinism still remained an important factor among the leadership. The hardline Likud premier Yitzhak Shamir led Israel at the time. It was also a time when the radical Islamist movements in the Middle East were about to stage a massive resurgence in Algeria, Egypt and other countries - in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Domestically and in terms of regional geo-politics, therefore, the position Iran had adopted at the time was "correct" from the Iranian perspective. The moderates and pragmatists, led by then President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, opposed the peace process saying it amounted to a US-Israeli conspiracy. The pragmatists hoped that a tough position against Israel and the US would allow them some room to introduce a more practical policy platform within the country.

This did not work out as they had hoped, as the traditionalists succeeded in outmanoeuvring them at every step, by taking control over the key decision making bodies like the Guardians Council and the parliament. As such, opposition to the peace process did not provide the domestic dividends that Rafsanjani was hoping for. Of course, it is important to note that at the time his government had no choice but to oppose the peace process. Supporting it would have been disastrous for his presidency. In 1997, Khatami won the presidency with a massive 70% mandate.

This was a turning point in Iranian domestic politics, as it allowed previously taboo subjects to be brought into the open - especially the question of improving relations with the US. From the Iranian perspective, improved ties with the US also meant to some extent a positive change in its perspective vis-a-vis Israel. Since 1997 there have been contacts between Israeli and Iranian businessmen, and there have been reports that Israeli government officials have visited Iran as part of business delegations of third countries. The Iranian government has denied all this.

However, the domestic political situation will continue to have repercussions on Iran's approach towards the peace process. The challenges that Rafsanjani faced will have to be faced by Khatami as well, although the latter has a much stronger hand in view of the reformists' control of the presidency, the municipalities and the Majlis (parliament). Traditionalist theologians will continue to raise the issue of Israel in a way that will make it difficult for Khatami to moderate his position on the peace process.

The "Jewish spies" trial can be seen in this light. The traditionalist hardliners, reeling from repeated electoral defeats as well as steadily declining public support on their main political platforms, are looking for an opportunity to target the Khatami administration. (The latest electoral defeat was reflected in the parliamentary run-offs that were held on May 5, with more than 70% of the 66 seats going to the reformists). The traditionalists are well aware that if sufficient heat is raised on the spying issue, and there is an equally tough response from the West, it would be very difficult (if not impossible) for Khatami to move towards normalisation of relations with the US and Israel. The Jews under trial have already made confessions, but this is seen in Israel and the West in general as the result of coercive tactics by the Iranian law enforcement and security agencies. There has already been considerable media coverage of the trial in Israel and in the West in recent months, most of it unfavourable to Iran.

It is important to note that, unlike the question of reforms and liberalisation, it is not certain that public opinion on the "Jewish spies" issue will be on the side of Khatami. The sources say that the general public in Iran is highly sensitive about "conspiracies" and are relatively well informed on high profile international political issues affecting their country. There is suspicion among the general public about Israeli spying tactics, with Mossad traditionally being known to utilise the widespread Jewish diaspora for information gathering purposes. But the sources add that, on the other hand, the Jewish community of Iran has traditionally been well integrated into society. It was noted that one of the defendants in the case, 17-year-old Navid Balazadeh, was a member of the Basij (Islamic volunteer militia) in school. Indeed, the Iranian Jewish community has vigorously defended Iran against accusations from the West about religious persecution and unfair trial practices.

For his part, Khatami is well aware of the ramifications of the trial. Once the issue became highly publicised Iranian internal politics, regional geo-politics, Israeli domestic politics and US presidential electioneering ensured that it would become an international concern. There is no way that Khatami can appear to be bending Iranian law to suit international interests. The traditionalist theologians know that and believe they can win whatever the outcome, i.e. if the Iranian Jews are sentenced heavily (including death) for treason, then Khatami looks no different from the radicals in terms of international opinion, but if the Jews are acquitted then Khatami will look as though he is bending to US-Israeli pressure. If Khatami is weakened as a result of the trial, he will be in no position to soften Iran's opposition to the peace process in the coming months.