IRAN - Internal Dynamics Will Get More Complex; A Split Emerges In The Reformist Camp.

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TEHRAN - Now that the Iranian elections have yielded the expected results, the focus of attention is on what will happen next inside the theocracy. There are different types of expectations from various interested players globally, regionally and locally: (a) the West hopes for a change in outlook that will amount to a rejection of the Khomeini revolution, (b) the GCC states want to build a more predictable relationship with Iran in order to balance their distance from Iraq, and (c) the majority of Iranians wish for a dramatic change in the socio-economic situation including considerable relaxation in strictures on Islamic dress and behaviour imposed by traditionalist and hardline theologians since 1979.

APS sources say that all these parties are likely to be disappointed to varying degrees but add that, at the same time, President Mohammed Khatami Ardakani and his allies will take the country further towards democratisation, social reform and economic liberalisation. They are certain the reformist coalition will in the coming months face considerable internal debates about the extent to which reforms should go. Disagreements, and perhaps tensions, among the reformists will be a key element of Iranian politics in the lead-up to presidential elections in 2001, in addition to surprises which the traditionalists will have in store. Rifts have already emerged within the reformist camp over the electoral performance of Expediency Council head Hoj. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president.

Yet the sources point out that, while there may be a split within the reformist camp, it is not likely to cause serious damage to the political standing of the main parties. On the one hand, this is because public opinion will not tolerate any party which is seen as weakening the prospects for reform - something that was demonstrated during the latest parliamentary elections. On the other hand, the reformists will be careful not to undermine their own position. They are well aware that, while the traditionalists have been routed in the elections, they are by no means impotent. Institutions like the Assembly of Experts, the Council of Guardians, and the Expediency Council - not to mention the Supreme Leadership - all wield considerable influence over the direction of state policy, in particular on the question of whether proposed legislation is in line with Islamic doctrine.

However, the reformists who are grouped under the "May 23 Front" will set the agenda at least for the next four years. Reformists won 170 seats in the 290-seat Majlis (parliament), traditionalists took 45 and independents won 10; 65 seats will be decided in run-off elections next month. The May 23 Front represents a broad coalition of groups with varying degrees of reformist zeal. The main party within this front is the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF), which is led by the president's younger brother Mohammed Reza Khatami, who is in his early 40s. The IIPF won the most seats among the reformists, and had an especially powerful showing in the Tehran constituency - winning the majority out of 30 seats.

Another important group within the May 23 Front is the Executives of Construction (sometimes referred to as Agents of Construction). It is less reformist in its orientation, and supported Rafsanjani in his election bid. Their support for the former president was somewhat unexpected as he was also backed by the traditionalist camp. But Rafsanjani fared poorly, managing to scrape through as winner number 30 in the Tehran constituency - and even that by defeating his opponent by a very small margin. His victory was somewhat controversial, as the IIPF initially said he did not win the seat.

This revealed the split among the reformists as the Executives of Construction retaliated with allegations of vote rigging by the IIPF supporters. The result was a delay in announcing the victory of Rafsanjani until Feb. 26, when the Interior Ministry made a formal declaration. It was important to note that the counting of the ballot boxes for the 30th seat was done jointly by the Guardians Council (55 boxes) and the Interior Ministry (50 boxes), partly because of mistrust as both the Interior Minister and his deputy are pro-Khatami figures. The sources say Rafsanjani's poor showing at the polls amounted to an exposure of his "Machiavellian political style" by the voters, who disapproved of the way he compromised on reform issues during his two-term presidency.

Rafsanjani's supporters claim some of the votes actually cast for him had been mistakenly counted as being in favour of his daughter, Faezeh Hashemi, who did not win a seat. Voters had to write down the names of their favoured candidates on the ballot paper and it is said some wrote just Hashemi or Rafsanjani without giving the full names. But this claim is refuted by others from the IIPF who point out the voters also had to enter the serial numbers of their candidates and therefore such confusion could not have occurred. Observers say the results seem to indicate that a vote transfer between father and daughter did take place but add that it will perhaps never be known whether it happened before or after the poll was completed and in which direction the transfer took place.

The split that was revealed within the traditionalist camp will not go away soon. Rafsanjani remains an influential figure in Iranian politics, partly because of his position as the head of the Expediency Council and partly because he is seen as being on the side of the Armed Forces - a section of the ruling superstructure with which the reformists do not have much connections. In this capacity, and through his links to members of the Executives of Construction, the former president will remain close to the centre of the political system - although it is now highly unlikely that he would be made speaker of the Majlis as the traditionalists wanted.

The sources add that, in light of such complexities, the space which Khatami has for manoeuvre is less than it may seem from just looking at the number of seats controlled by the reformists. Khatami himself has clarified that he is not out to undermine the Islamic revolutionary principles set forward by the late Imam Khomeini. In his first comments since the elections, he said on Feb. 26 the voting exercise was a sign of Iranian political maturity, but the nation would not lose sight of its goals on the basis of "the wishes and delusions" of others - an indirect reference to Western expectations. "Reform is in the spirit of the revolution and in no way signals a retreat from its principles", he added.

Such comments may be politically motivated, i.e. aimed at calming down the traditionalists who fear a radical departure from policies of the past two decades. But it may also reflect that, having won overwhelmingly, Khatami will play his cards carefully in order to position himself well for the presidential election next year. This means, while there may be some reforms of the kind the Iranian population expects, they will be calibrated in order not to result in a violent backlash from the hardliners. Hence, the global, regional and local players will get less than they expect from the Khatami government over the coming year.