INF: the Soviets cheat.

LAST YEAR, writing in NATIONAL REVIEW, I noted that the very nature of the INF treaty, combined with verification difficu"may actually encourage the Soviet Union to violate its terms" ("INF: Invitation to Cheat?" March 4, 1988). The Soviets have accepted that invitation.

The evidence is contained in President Reagan's last official report to Congress on Soviet non-compliance with arms-control treaties. This report was issued in December, six months after the treaty went into effect, and is the first review of Soviet behavior under INF. Despite a cheery declaration that "issues and questions regarding noncompliance which have been discussed with the Soviets have been resolved to U.S. satisfaction or are in the process of resolution," the report confirms the suspicions of treaty opponents.

One main criticism of INF was its failure to allow inspection of all locations where prohibited INF systems might be stored or deployed. The Soviets insisted that they had declared all INF systems in their possession, but opponents of the INF treaty believed it likely that they had some systems at non-declared sites.

The report shows that the skeptics were right. Our intelligence sources discovered that the Soviets had failed to list all treaty-limited items in the updated data base required by Article IX of the treaty. They have never acknowledged the violation. However, they have quietly dismantled or removed those items "previously observed at non-declared sites"-but only after a formal U.S. diplomatic demarche. Similarly, the report cites approximately two hundred illegal transits of SS-20s between operating bases, repair facilities, and elimination facilities, in violation of Article VIII, paragraph 8. Again, such transits are said to have ceased, but in this case too the Soviets have never acknowledged that their actions constituted a violation.

In addition to these violations, the report notes that "non-compliant activities occurred with regard to . . . unnotified movements of training launchers" (a violation of Article IX, paragraph 5), "treaty-limited items at a facility declared ready for elimination" (a violation of Article X, paragraph 8), "removal of SRMs (shorterrange missiles) from an elimination facility" (a violation of Article V, paragraph 2), and "treaty-limited items at non-declared locations" (a violation of Article VIII, paragraph 1). One additional issue that arose involving Soviet failure to provide accurate and complete data did not result in a finding of violation.

Since the issuance of President Reagan's final non-compliance report, other Soviet violations have been reported. Most serious are the Soviet refusal to agree on methods for measuring a missile's weight and length, and the reported restrictions the Soviets have placed on X-ray imaging of missile canisters by U.S. inspectors at Votkinsk-a procedure necessary to distinguish prohibited SS-20s from allowable SS-25s.

Taken together, these findings represent much more than mere "technical" violations. They show a continuing pattern of Soviet misbehavior, corrected only through diligent intelligence and firm diplomacy on our part. And this, of course, suggests the existence of cheating we have yet to detect. Furthermore, since the Soviets have for the most part refused to admit that their behavior violates the treaty, they implicitly reserve the right to resume such activity in the future-at a time when the U.S. may be less willing to contest the issue.

It is understandable that the Reagan Administration, during its final days, did not wish to publicize the flawed implementation of its sole arms-control legacy. And the Bush Administration appears wary of ending the current warmth in U.S.-Soviet relations by calling attention to these most recent examples of Soviet cheating. But the new Administration has decided to review the whole strategic landscape before proceeding with any further nuclear-arms-reduction negotiations. Prudence dictates that this review include the issue of how to respond to Soviet violations; realism cannot forever take a back seat to inflated hopes.

The most obviously necessary action is improvement of U.S. verification capabilities, already severely strained before INF. We must also develop a clear policy on what to do with the knowledge we gather of Soviet noncompliance. The Administration should craft, in consultation with Congress and the United States' allies, an effective compliance policy, formulating a variety of options the U.S. can pursue, including perhaps the deployment in Europe of enhanced-radiation weapons or a defense against tactical ballistic missiles to nullify the potential Soviet advantage from cheating.

The time may be right for the creation of a separate Compliance Policy Office within the Department of Defense-or, preferably, a high-level bipartisan commission reporting directly to the President. Our experience with INF demonstrates that it is unrealistic to assume we can rely on our wish for better U.S.-Soviet relations to deter Soviet cheating.