I MEF fires in OIF.

The I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) deployed to Kuwait incrementally through a series of orders for what eventually became Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The command element (CE) deployed in November 2003. Major subordinate commands (MSCs) and detachments flowed into theater during the following months and, ultimately, fleshed I MEF out to more than 80,000 personnel by May of 2003.

I MEF (or any MEF) is the largest echelon Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). By definition, it is task-organized for a specific purpose but normally will include an aviation combat element (ACE) built around a Marine air wing (MAW), one or more ground combat elements (GCEs) up to division-sized and a force service support group (FSSG) for logistics. A MEF roughly equates to an Army corps-level combat organization.

In practical terms, MAGTF aviation provides robust, agile combat power at the tactical level to support or achieve decisive combat. This power is inextricably linked to the GCE's concept of operations and the logistics required by both.

Organization for Combat. In accordance with doctrine, I MEF's standing organization was augmented by other MEFs and services, Coalition partners and the Marine Corps forces reserves (MCFR).

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I MEF's standing GCE is the 1st Marine Division (1 MARDIV) with three task-organized regimental combat teams (RCTs) and the 11th Marine Artillery Regiment. Also part of 1 MEF was Task Force (TF) Tarawa built around a fourth RCT (it was not a MAGTF because it lacked organic aviation).

The 1st (United Kingdom) Armoured Division under the tactical control (TACON) of I MEF consisted of three brigades: the 3d Commando Brigade (Royal Marines), 16th Air Assault Brigade and 7th Armoured Brigade. Each brigade had a habitually associated artillery regiment (battalion equivalent) organized for combat under the division's Commander of Royal Artillery (CRA). Cannons include the L118 105-mm light howitzer and the AS 90 155-mm self-propelled (SP) howitzer.

The 1st Armoured Division had the Mamba Arthur counterbattery radar, which is roughly the equivalent of our TPQ-46A radar The UK division also had the Phoenix unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which is launched from a truck and recovered by net. The Phoenix is an intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) asset at the UK division level. For more information, see the article "1st (UK) Armoured Division in Iraq, January to April 2003" by Brigadier Andrew R. Gregory in the January-February 2004 edition.

The 1st FSSG provided combat service support to the MEF CE and MSCs. A new MSC joined the MEF: the MEF engineer group (MEG). The MEG was built around three Navy Seabee regiments with a two-star admiral commanding them. The MEG provided significant general engineering and construction support that were invaluable throughout all phases of the operation.

Equally important was the Patriot coverage from the Army's 108th Air Defense Brigade.

Subordinate to TF Tarawa and the 3d Commando Brigade were Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) complete with their own air, ground and logistics elements. This was a nonstandard organization. Normally, MAGTFs are not contained within other MAGTFs. But for a limited duration, this organization made sense.

The 3d MAW from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar in San Diego, California, was the ACE for I MEF Subordinate elements included flying, support and control groups. The aircraft mix was 60 F/A-18 Hornets, 74 AV-8B Harriers, 10 EA-6B Prowlers, 58 AH-1W Cobras, 18 KC-130 Hercules, 30 UH-1N Hueys, and 122 medium- and heavy-lift helicopters. Assuming standard planning factors of 80 percent availability of aircraft on any given day and an average of 2.5 sorties per aircraft per day, the 3d MAW could plan to execute 384 strike sorties per day.

The 3d MAW performed a wide variety of tasks too numerous to mention and showed amazing agility by operating fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft from forward operating bases (FOBs) as far north as Salman Pak just outside of Baghdad.

Combat Operations. When Iraq began setting fire to oil wells in the southern Rumaylah Oil Fields, I MEF commenced OIF. The MEF prosecuted the "Opening Gambit" on 19 and 20 March with a combination of air and surface fires against Iraqi naval coastal defense forces on the Al Faw Peninsula, observation and border stations on Safwan Hill and along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border, and III Regular Army Corps command and control ([C.sup.2]) and long-range fire support units. (See the map.) Fires included fixed-wing aviation from the 3d MAW; artillery from the 11th Marine Regiment, TF Tarawa and 1st (UK) Division; and Army tactical missile systems (ATACMS) from V Corps to the west.

After crossing the line of departure (LD) on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border on 21 March until approximately 22 March, the 1 MEF MSCs focused fires on the destruction of III Regular Army Corps, including the corps [C.sub.2] and long-range fire support capabilities, the 11th Infantry Division, the 51st Mechanized Infantry Division and the 6th Armored Division. The MEF focused its deep shaping fires on the destruction of the IV Regular Army Corps arrayed along Route 6 in the vicinity of Al Amarah and the Baghdad Republican Guard Infantry Division in the vicinity of Al Kut.

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From 22 March to 3 April, I MARDIV progressed north, destroying the Baghdad Infantry Division, while TF Tarawa battled Ba'ath and Fedayeen in An Nasiriyah and the 1st (UK) Division fought for possession of Basrah, the second largest city in Iraq. I MEF focused its aviation and V Corps ATACMS deep shaping fires on the 10th Armored Division in Al Amarah and Republican Guard units defending the southeastern approach into Baghdad, including the II Republican Guard Corps.

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By this time, I MEF was receiving significant numbers of Coalition Force Air Component Command (CFACC) sorties.

From 3 to 11 April, 1 MARDIV crossed the Tigris River and attacked north along Route 6 into Baghdad. TF Tarawa attacked east into Al Amarah, and the 1st (UK) Division pushed into Basrah and north along Route 6, ultimately, linking up with TF Tarawa to secure the northern Rumaylah Oil Fields. The large influx of USAF A-10s, USNF-14s and F-18s, and Royal Air Force GR-8s to provide close air support (CAS) for the attacks augmented the 3d MAW.

The MEF focused MAGTF and CFACC aviation and V Corps ATACMS deep fires on elements of the Al Nida Republican Guard Armored Division in the vicinity of Baqubah and the 3d Regular Army Armored Division farther north.

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After defeating all Iraqi forces in the MEF area of operations and securing all major cities in southern Iraq, I MEF was given the additional mission of securing Tikrit north of Baghdad. TF Tripoli pushed north from Baghdad and secured Tikrit by 15 April. TF Tripoli was composed of several RCTs and light-armored reconnaissance battalions from I MEF.

Overall, I MEF defeated the III and IV Regular Army Corps that had six divisions and the II Republican Guard Corps. In the II Republican Guard Corps, I MEF defeated the Al Nida and Baghdad Divisions and two brigades from the Medina Division.

The Targeting Process. In OIF, the corps-level MAGTF was I MEF, which included other MAGTFs as MSCs. But the targeting process is the same for any MAGTF.

The future fires section consists of the plans and target information sections. Together, they conduct all planned fire support coordination functions, including supporting operational and contingency planning (OPLANs/CONPLANs) as well as deliberate targeting and developing fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).

The plans section develops the MAGTF commander's concept of fire support in coordination with G3 future operations and future plans. This section works closely with MAGTF representatives at the CFACC and the Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) deep operations coordination cell (DOCC).

The target information officer (TIO) organizes and conducts the MAGTF targeting board for the MAGTF chief of staff. Based on the MAGTF commander's targeting guidance, the TIO recommends targeting objectives, target priorities and asset allocation for approval or modification by the targeting board.

The Coalition Force Commander (CFC) and CFACC requirement to produce an air tasking order (ATO) every 24 hours drove the MAGTF targeting cycle. This process presented a considerable challenge as the force fires coordination center (FFCC) had to harmonize the MAGTF commander's event-driven fire support requirements within a time-driven ATO cycle.

MAGTF-level targets most often are attacked by air although there are other assets available to service targets, such as artillery and naval surface fire support (NSFS). During OIF, UK ships provided NSFS to I MEF on the Al Faw peninsula. I MEF received more than 90 ATACMS from the Army's 214th Field Artillery Brigade.

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Fire support planning begins with the MAGTF commander's guidance. During the planning process, the fires plans officer becomes intimately familiar with the guidance and intent of both the MAGTF commander and that of higher headquarters (HHQ). Using his knowledge of the assets available to the MAGTF and their capabilities, he develops an initial concept of fires, initial targeting objectives and initial fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs) and advises the target information section of likely future requirements. It is within this future operations planning cycle that lethal and nonlethal fire support plans are developed and harmonized.

The TIO, in coordination with the target intelligence officer from the G2, uses the MAGTF commander's guidance and targeting objectives to develop target priorities. A weight of effort or apportionment recommendation is also developed based on the MAGTF commander's guidance. This recommendation takes into account current capabilities, projected requirements and previous fire support guidance.

For MAGTF aviation assets, the ACE commander provides the number of fixed- and rotary-wing strike sorties available and recommends an apportionment between CAS and air interdiction (Al). The TIO recommends apportionment, tactical missions and additional support sorties from other fire support assets available.

Target development is the process of determining and identifying those nodes of enemy capabilities, which, if struck, will achieve the MAGTF commanders' objectives. The end product of target development is a single prioritized list of targets against which fire support assets are applied. MSCs and the MAGTF battlestaff provide input for prioritization and recommend changes.

Once the objectives are prioritized, all target categories are ranked against each other from the most to least important. If the number of targets exceeds the number of assets, this process ensures the most critical targets are attacked. The battlespace shaping matrix (BSM) summarizes this prioritization process in tabular form.

The daily MAGTF targeting board is the forum for the FFCC to present the MAGTF commander a fire support plan for the scheme of maneuver for 72 hours in the future. At the targeting board, the MAGTF commander approves the BSM target prioritization and air apportionment recommendation. The TIO then creates the final prioritized target list (PTL) from the approved BSM.

The TIO, assisted by subject matter experts (SMEs), provides an initial recommendation as to which fire support assets are best suited to service the PTL within the required time and synchronizes the timing and effects of those fires. This is normally done at the synchronization working group (SWG) that meets after the targeting board. The result is a PTL recommended for attack for each MAGTF fire support asset with guidance and direction on sequencing, timing and coordination. Additional assets required are identified and considered for request.

During force application, MSC fire support personnel apply assets against the list of targets approved for attack. The result of this portion of the targeting cycle is an ACE direct support ATO, a fire plan for the surface fire support assets (often a refinement of the initial plan) and an obstacle/barrier plan. It also includes a list of targets recommended for common source assets available from joint or Coalition resources. These may include CFACC aviation. Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs), ATACMS, etc. The MSCs also report whether or not there are enough assets to address all targets recommended for attack. This feedback allows the SWG to modify the plan, if required, and refine subsequent plans.

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Execution begins with the implementation of the ATO and schedules of fires. About 12 hours before execution of the fire plan, the FFCC prepares a reactive attack guidance matrix (RAGM). At the RAGM working group, the FFCC determines if any changes in priorities are necessary to the plan approved at the targeting board about 48 hours prior, based on updates to the scheme of maneuver or enemy order of battle. FFCC has three key responsibilities during force execution: validate planned targets, monitor execution of the plan and respond to emerging requirements.

Fire support requires constant, accurate assessment to evaluate the effectiveness of the fire support plan. Under the cognizance of the MAGTF G2, the combat assessment process occurs within the intelligence operations center (IOC) and compares targeting results with the MAGTF commander's original objectives and guidance.

The document that guides the assessment effort is the attack guidance matrix (AGM), which is produced in advance of hostilities. The AGM helps to determine the level of destruction required to have the desired effects against enemy battlefield operating systems (BOS). The G2 determines if the desired effect on the enemy is being achieved and whether or not deliberate or immediate re-attack is required.

Combat assessment and battle damage assessment (BDA) are used to modify guidance and priorities as the targeting cycle continues.

Lessons Learned. There were processes and equipment that performed well, and those that require improvements.

Cross-boundary fires were a great success. I MEF received more than 90 ATACMS fires from the 214th Field Artillery Brigade. A multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battalion was scheduled to be TACON to the MEF, but it flowed too late into theater for major combat operations. However, I MEF requested and routinely received preplanned ATACMS fires from V Corps. Also, approximately three-fourths of I MEF's immediate requests for ATACMS were filled.

Cross-boundary procedures were honed during command post exercises (CPXs) before the war and extensive real-time coordination during the war. On occasion, the MEF provided 3d MAW sorties in support of V Corps. Cannon cross-boundary fires were frequent and coordinated at the lowest level possible.

Although not a system of record, the automated deep operations coordination system (ADOCS) software went a long way toward helping warfighters. This application was easy to use for target nominations, gave system-of-record capabilities in a laptop platform and tied systems together in a user-friendly format.

I MEF was unable to track its air support requests (ASRs) submitted through the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS). In transfer from system to system, data fields appeared to be lost. Once submitted, the ASR number usually could not be tied to a mission on the ATO. Target numbers, descriptions and coordinates systems varied, so they were not useful to correlate requests to missions. I MEF often resorted to guessing how many of its targeting objectives were being met, based on which area missions were tasked against.

Another challenge was the ability of the AFATDS to handle large geometries. The system would lock up while attempting to process the approximately 13,000 targets on the no-strike list (NSL) and restricted target list (RTL).

Collateral damage estimation (CDE) and mitigation was an important and necessary procedure to analyze potential damage to noncombatants. However, the process was time-consuming and difficult and seemed to be designed with strategic targeting in mind, making it a challenge for operations at the lower levels.

The process was not well suited for joint fires, such as the MEF's deep shaping of mobile, fleeting targets. It may work well for a small number of targets, but the process must be able to scale up, perhaps through decentralization, to the large number of battlefield targets serviced in an operation as large as OIF.

Attacking conventional military high-payoff targets (HPTs), such as missile launchers, was much easier than the gray- or black-list HPTs. Using fires to prosecute individuals designated as HPTs creates several challenges. The first challenge was to establish positive identification (PID) of the individual HPT. Information latency and the fleeting nature of these targets complicates efforts to carefully establish PID and perform CDE.

During major combat operations from 21 March through 15 April 2003 in OIF, I MEF swept from Kuwait up through Iraq into Tikrit. Although I MEF targeteers faced several challenges, overall combat operations accessed joint and Coalition fires in one of the most effective, integrated military operations in history.

US forces must continue to improve these capabilities by training and equipping joint forces to be synergistic in defeating any future enemy on any future battlefield.

RELATED ARTICLE: Types of Joint Close Air Support Controls

In Joint Pub 3-09.3 Joint Tactics. Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS) (3 Sep 03), the terms for direct and indirect terminal attack control changed to Types 1, 2 and 3. The three are not ordnance-specific but based on risk assessment. Ground commanders consider the risks in a situation and issue guidance to joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) based on the level of acceptable risk. Commanders have the flexibility to determine what type of control best accomplishes the mission. The 9-line brief to the pilots is required for all three types of control.

Type 1 Control. This requires JTACs to visually acquire both the attacking aircraft and target. It involves close coordination and detailed integration. Examples requiring this control include close proximity of the target to friendly forces, language barriers with coalition pilots, difficulties in target acquisition, troops in contact and conditions with adverse weather.

Type 1 control is the default method unless the 9-line states otherwise.

Type 2 Control. Type 2 is when the JTAC remains in control of each attack but visual acquisition of the attacking aircraft at weapons release is not possible or required. This procedure occurs during night employment, adverse weather or with the use of standoff weapons. Type 2 control depends on the tactical risk and timely, accurate targeting data.

Type 2 is anticipated to be the most common control procedure used in CAS and should greatly increase clearance for Maverick or laser-guided weapons as employing these systems puts aircraft well beyond ground forward air controllers' (GFACs') visual limits.

Type 3 Control. This control is used when the tactical assessment indicates that CAS attacks impose a low risk of fratricide. This procedure allows a blanket clearance to employ air support on targets in a pre-determined area of the battlefield.

Using Type 3 control, the JTAC passes the 9-line brief and defining limits for the attack clearance along with any other restrictions to the attacking aircraft. Defining limits often will be a readily identifiable geographic features.

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The JTAC then provides a "Cleared to Engage" call. This means the flight lead may initiate the attack within the parameters imposed by the JTAC. After the attack, the a pilot provides an "Attack Complete" call with the time, ordnance expended or number of targets engaged. The JTAC still maintains situational awareness on the attacks and retains overall abort authority.

Type 3 controls facilitate attacking targets well beyond the closest friendly troops safely but allow the ground commander control of the systems operating in his battlespace.

Ground forces must understand the details of the types of controls to maximize the flexibility of air power while minimizing risks.

CPT Raymond E. Johnson, Jr.

GLO, 51st Fighter Wing, Osan Air

Base, Korea

By Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Andrus, Lieutenant Colonel Randol D. Rule and Major Robert J. Terselic, All USMC

Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Andrus, USMC, is the Force Fires Coordinator (FFC) for I Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) at Camp Pendelton, California, and deployed with the MEF for combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). He is an F-18 pilot and was deployed to the Persian Gulf aboard the USS Constellation for Operation Southern Watch. He has five combat missions in the No-Fly Zone over Iraq. He also flew 31 combat missions during Operation Desert Storm (ODS).

Lieutenant Colonel Randol D. Rule, USMC, is the Assistant FFC for I MEF and deployed in OIF as the MEF Information Operations Liaison Officer (LNO) to the Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC). As a Field Artilleryman, he also served as the Combined Marine Forces Component Commander Representative to the Combatant Commander's Combined Forces Command Korea Targeting Board. He deployed to the Gulf in ODS; Beirut, Lebanon, for peace enforcement operations; and Grenada for Operation Urgent Fury.

Major Robert J. Terselic, USMC, is the Targeting Officer for I MEF and deployed for combat in OIF. He is a Field Artilleryman who has commanded four companies and batteries, including Headquarters and I Batteries in the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, 29 Palms, California. He also was a staff officer for the Defense Language Institute in Presidio of Monterey, California, and an Acquisitions Officer at the Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia, responsible for fielding the AN/TPQ-46A Counterfire Radar.