How we can win.

THE U.S. has two vital interests in the present Gulf crisis: regional stability and access to energy resources at a reasonable price. These cannot be achieved without the destruction of a significant part of the offensive capability of Iraqi armed forces. Even if Saddam Hussein ceased to be president of Iraq, a successor in command of Iraq's huge military establishment (arguably the fourth or fifth largest in the world) would have the capability to put the world through repeated Gulf crises, which the industrial democracies simply cannot afford. In brief, Iraq must be defanged by American and allied military attacks and its offensive military capability destroyed.

What military options does the President have to achieve these aims? Six basic options could be executed either alone or in combination.

Option I establishing a "tripwire" force in Saudi Arabia to deter Iraqi attack-has already been exercised. When the 82nd Airborne "Ready Brigade" landed, Saddam Hussein knew that an attack south would kill American soldiers and therefore guarantee full U.S. military retaliation. It remains a mystery why Hussein did not continue his initial attack through Kuwait into Saudi Arabia and the Trucial States before U.S. troops arrived. Without Saudi airfields and ports, the U.S. military lodgement now under way would have been exceedingly more complex.

Option 2 is to identify the locations of as many foreign hostages as possible, and to launch a night rescue operation by special-operations forces. The prerequisites for this option are intelligence information both from satellites (the U.S. reportedly now has full coverage), and from aerial reconnaissance and agents on the ground. The U.S. probably does not have adequate special-operations forces to execute a rescue operation alone. But NATO allies such as France and the United Kingdom might provide requisite special forces to permit simultaneous rescues of hostages from different locations. However, policy-makers would have to be aware that some hostages would perish in the attempt, and some would be left in captivity. The possibility also exists that a less than successful rescue attempt could exacerbate the hostage situation both at home and in the Gulf region.

Option 3 is a massive surprise air attack. Its objective would be to destroy Iraqi offensive weapons systems while minimizing Iraqi military and civilian casualties. The aim would be to hurt Saddam Hussein's forces so badly that he would be disgraced as "the caliph" of the Arab world, see his military advantage over hostile neighbors significantly reduced or even eliminated, be forced to recognize that his continuing occupation of Kuwait would therefore be risky as well as futile, and so brought to withdraw his forces.

The first aim would be to gain air superiority, destroying air defenses, surface-to-air missile sites, and as many aircraft as possible on the ground with priority targeting on Soviet-made MiG-29s, -25s, and -23s, TU-27 bombers, French Mirage fighters, and helicopters capable of dispersing chemical weapons. Simultaneous strikes would target Soviet-made SCUD-B missiles and rocket launchers capable of launching chemical attacks, and Iraqi nuclear and chemical production facilities. Following shortly behind these strikes, other ground-attack fighter aircraft and Apache helicopters would launch anti-tank missiles against the most modern Soviet-made tanks in the Iraqi inventory-the T-72s and T-62s. (These constitute only one-quarter of the Iraqi tank force, most of which is vintage 1950s.)

We have the capability for these strikes. There are four U.S. carrier task groups in the Gulf region with F14, F/A-18, and A-6 fighter aircraft; Saudi-based F-15E, F-16, F-5E, and "stealth" F-117 fighters; F-111D/E bombers operating out of Turkey; B-52 bombers now stationed in Diego Garcia; and B1-B bombers in Guam. These operations would be coordinated by U.S. and Saudi Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. Considerable in-flight refueling would be required to hit airfields in northern Iraq, a difficult operation to coordinate, but one practiced routinely by the U.S. Air Force and Navy.

Simultaneous attacks on Iraqi command centers and radar sites would be launched using ground-attack aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles, which are carried on the U.S. battleship Wisconsin, on cruisers, and on submarines operating in the region. Most of these strike sites should already have been identified via satellite reconnaissance, signal-intelligence intercepts, and agents on the ground. The objective here is to break down Iraqi C3 (command, control, and communications) capabilities and to destroy morale in the Iraqi armed forces as the British did so effectively against the Argentine military in the Falklands war. Out in the Open

MANY ARGUE that air strikes have never been decisive in combat, citing the experiences of World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. However, air strikes in the Gulf would not be attacking targets hidden in European forests or under the triple-canopy jungle typical in Vietnam. Iraqi targets are out in the open, with few places to hide. The technology of modern aircraft and their missiles and bombs is light years beyond anything available in previous wars. And Saddam Hussein simply cannot afford to see his expensive military hardware and strategic capability reduced to rubble while potential enemies in the region stand by and watch. Besides, the issue here is not decisiveness, but effectiveness.

Option 4 would be a PSYOP (psychological operation) aimed at further deterioration of Iraqi military morale and at driving a wedge between the Iraqi military and public. This military PSYOP would be coordinated carefully with the U.S. Information Agency to achieve a further political objective of eroding Arab support for Saddam Hussein by portraying him as a loser in power politics.

Option 5 is of an altogether higher order. It is a coordinated ground/air/ sea offensive into Kuwait and Iraq. In addition to Arab and European military contingents moving into Saudi Arabia, the U.S. will soon have in place in the Gulf region the following divisions: 82nd Airborne, 24th Mechanized Infantry, 101st Air Assault, 1st Cavalry, and 1st Marine; the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment; the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade; and (potentially) two more infantry divisions which may be on alert status.

This is a formidable and versatile fighting force which will enable the President to choose among different military strategies. Let us examine the first version of Option 5. In view of the fact that the Iraqis have dug into prepared positions, permitting them to take a heavy toll on troops launching frontal attacks, the allied forces could initiate a "holding attack" by fire along the Iraqi front in southern Kuwait while turning the Iraqi flank in a combined amphibious and airmobile assault north of Kuwait City. Iraqi forces in Kuwait would thus be cut off from the main body of Iraqi forces. Allied special forces working with Kuwaiti resistance forces might then be used to secure Kuwait City, eliminating the need for extensive city fighting, which would result in high civilian casualties. Or, in conjunction with a PSYOP campaign similar to that outlined in Option 4, Iraq's occupying forces could be reduced by a combination of blockade and air strikes.

Under this option, it would be important to ensure that Iran and Syria remain neutral. (At the moment, Iran is neutral, and Syria is part of the anti-Saddam alliance, but neither condition is necessarily permanent.) And Turkey should be persuaded to undertake mobilization exercises along its border with Iraq, preferably in conjunction with U.S. and other NATO military contingents. If solid contacts with the Kurds in northern Iraq could be made, special forces might support their attacks against selected Iraqi military installations. These military and diplomatic maneuvers would force the Iraqis to divert military units to protect their northern flank. Iraqi forces could only break out of this stranglehold by launching an offensive against allied forces in which the defense would have an overwhelming advantage.

A larger-scale version of Option 5 would be a main attack out of Saudi Arabia directly into southern Kuwait to drive out Iraqi forces. This would be equivalent to fighting the kind of war of attrition Iraq fought against Iran, and it is the kind of war for which Saddam Hussein's forces are best prepared. This option would presumably involve a ground attack by two allied corps beginning in the relative cool of the night, and with U.S. night-vision technology providing a war-fighting edge. Upwards of one thousand American M-1 tanks would be available, backed up by 160 M60-A3 tanks of the 1st Marine Division and six hundred Saudi tanks. Bomber and ground-attack strikes supported by artillery and multiple rocket launchers would also be available. Mechanized infantry would follow the tank advance, with the men dismounting for final assaults and the dirty job of digging Iraqi infantry out of foxholes and gun emplacements. Such an offensive would probably require about five days and leave approximately eight thousand casualties.

A still more ambitious version of Option 5 would be an allied attack through southern Kuwait to northern Iraq and Baghdad. Based upon technical analyses of the Israeli experience in the 1973 Sinai campaign, allied forces attacking through Kuwait into northern Iraq would have an advance rate of approximately twenty miles per day. What would be the likely casualties of such an operation?

A key factor here is the number of Iraqi forces considered to be "front line" and battle tested (in the war with Iran). Iraqi military cohesion will also be important, along with the effectiveness of allied attacks against Iraqi C3 centers. In the best case, the morale of the Iraqi military would be broken in the first few days, resulting in mass surrenders such as those of the Argentine military in the Falklands war and of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War. This scenario is plausible even though the military establishments of Iraq, Argentina, and Nasser's Egypt are quite different from each other. Allied casualties, on this estimate, would be fairly low.

Let us now examine the worst-case scenario. Say the advance into northern Iraq meets stiff resistance and lasts about 25 days. Allied forces would in all likelihood sustain high casualties from Iraqi artillery and mines and from tank and infantry weapons. The casualties (killed and wounded) could be as high as 2,300 on the first day and 1,400 for each additional day of combat. A 25-day attack into northern Iraq could thus result in more than thirty thousand allied casualties. Worst-case casualties of this order would probably ensure that an advance to Baghdad would be recommended by U.S. military planners only as a last resort.

But in the event that Baghdad and other major objectives on the ground were taken and consolidated, plans for withdrawing U.S. units would be put into early effect. The objective is to destroy Iraq's offensive forces, not to occupy territory. An all-Arab or UN force would pass through U.S. lines and replace U.S. and other non-Arab units in place. Stabilization of the situation in Iraq would be an undertaking for them.

What of the long term? Here Option 6 might be to sustain U.S. forward deployed forces at bases in the Persian Gulf region, perhaps on the territory of one or more of the Gulf Cooperation Council states. This would be in the context of a new Gulf security arrangement designed to deter future military aggression-a major new political undertaking. Since the Carter doctrine of January 1980, America and its allies have not had in place the military capabilities to prevent a single power from seizing control of Gulf energy resources. Option 6 must address this problem. A long-term alliance presence is an option for which the U.S. military could easily prepare, and one which would make the U. S. Central Command mission a great deal easier to achieve in future Gulf military scenarios. But this is essentially a political, not a military, issue.

Selection of any of the military options alone or in conjunction with other military and political options should be based in the context of a U.S. grand strategy. Such a strategy has yet to be articulated by the Bush Administration. In the absence of strategy, it is easy for decision-makers to go marching off rapidly in unknown directions, never doubting their ability to get there.