How to visualize and shape the information environment.

During the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), commanders were skeptical of the importance of integrating information operations (IO) into day-to-day operations in theater. At the time, few commanders and leaders realized the impact IO could have on the local population and how critical it could be to mission success.

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To illustrate this point, we use the scenario of a brigade combat team (BCT) cordon and search mission in the beginning of Phase IV of OIF I. The BCT, which was organized and trained for conventional combat operations, conducted a cordon and search over a large area near Baghdad.

The mission required the BCT to search 1,200 Iraqi homes. With no plan to influence the populace, the BCT searched the homes, confiscated one rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and 10 AK-47s and detained two citizens suspected of supporting terrorists. No evidence established that the two suspects were networked with any insurgency cell. Possessing an AK-47 technically is illegal; however, AK-47s in Iraqi neighborhoods are as common as shotguns in the average American home. Possessing the RPG is illegal; however, ownership was difficult to prove.

The mission was planned and executed without considering the impact on the populace and, therefore, the operational environment. (1) The cordon and search left the Iraqi community leaders confused and distrustful of the Coalition Forces.

Initially, the BCT considered the mission successful as it garnered illegal weapons. But, in fact, the mission was unsuccessful in the eyes of the locals. What was gained militarily was lost in the populace's trust and future cooperation.

Integration of IO into day-to-day operations in theater has improved significantly in the last few years. However, we have not fully leveraged IO's enormous capacity in contemporary battle command.

IO Today. Integrating IO into the battle command process requires intensive staff input to visualize, describe, direct, lead and assess the effect of IO. Educating leaders on integrating IO at the tactical level is now part of the curriculum at the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

The new three-week Tactical IO Course provides the basic tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for commanders and their staffs to integrate IO into battle command. The course teaches planners how to visualize and describe the information environment, use IO to shape the information environment and assess the effectiveness of IO. It includes data from the latest after-action reviews (AARs) at the Army's combat training centers (CTCs) and lessons learned from units fresh out of theater.

BCTs sometimes struggle to implement IO effectively. In many cases, IO becomes a reactive measure designed to mitigate consequences rather than a deliberate process to shape the information environment.

Today, the IO battle of ideas requires more "bytes than bullets." The military can achieve this by using the science of IO to focus on decision making in the physical environment and using the art of IO to shape the information environment. IO can be as complicated or as simple as one makes it.

Conceptualizing the IO Environment. One of the first challenges commanders face after receiving a mission is to visualize the operational environment. Understanding the adversary's capabilities, intentions, strengths and vulnerabilities is critical. However, the commander also must be cognizant of the impact of his unit's interaction with the adversary and the populace within the information environment.

For any operation, analyzing all factors is fundamental: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC). These factors also must be considered as they relate to the information environment. For a commander to analyze his battlespace effectively in terms of the information environment, he must have the answers to the questions in Figure 1.

FM3-13 Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures defines the information environment as "the aggregate of individuals, systems or organizations that collect, process and disseminate information. Also included is the information itself." The information environment has three interrelated dimensions: physical, cognitive and information. See Figure 2.

Physical Domain. The physical domain comprises the information infrastructure, including the communications infrastructure, media, Internet, word-of-mouth and rumors.

The physical domain illustrates what is real. To help the commander visualize his information environment, critical infrastructure, such as mosques, schools, police stations, markets and radio stations, should be treated as key terrain. Relationships between events and critical infrastructure are important and rarely coincidental.

Key sites on planning maps help the commander visualize his area of operations (AO). For example, he can see concentrations of Sunni mosques or know immediately if there is a school near the latest report of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack. Maps that illustrate this information can be used in command posts, on presence patrols or during the military decision-making process (MDMP).

While the commander's platoon, company and battalion leaders may be able to navigate to these sensitive locations "in their sleep," maps and overlays with key locations are vital planning tools for higher staffs that lack the situational awareness of those working in and around the key sites on a routine basis.

Media and other elements of the information environment directly affect the physical domain of the operational environment. When dealing with the media, leaders should attempt to leverage local venues rather than the Western press to publicize information or news relevant to the local populace.

The media tends to focus on the sensational. For example, it is visually easier and more sensational for the media to portray the people's disgust with the dirty, ugly, demolished building in their market place versus portraying the documented decrease of violence affiliated with insurgents in the same location. Perceived biased reporting is not always the media's fault; often it is the result of Coalition Forces' failing to recognize what is important and convey it to the population or the media audience.

The human dimension is the most difficult to comprehend. To grapple with this challenge, most BCTs have implemented an effects-based approach that analyzes the effects of their operations on the interrelated entities.

A caution in understanding the human dimension--some units generalize about the populace. One of the most common Western generalizations is that "Arabs are Arabs" or "Iraqis are Iraqis." But the truth is that colloquial traditions, cultures and languages are so varied, that it is like saying, "New York City is New Orleans." The people in New Orleans use a different vocabulary, have different experiences, have a different cost of living and cope with different sets of private and public issues than people in New York City. Both cities are located in the US, but each has different people, cultures, language and ambience.

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The human dimension affects and is affected by the information environment. Planners must pay attention to the distinct characteristics of their populations and the environments in which they plan to interact.

Information Domain. This domain is where the information exists and flows. For example, most houses in Baghdad have satellite TV as the primary means of viewing Arab news sources, such as Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera. Both news sources highlight and encourage anti-West messages, discrediting non-Muslim societies, governments and religions. Consequently, Westerners tend to avoid Muslim-dominated media sources.

The fact is that these organizations don't have "evil motives." Truthfully, they have a story to tell, and we don't like what they say.

Despite our disagreements with many non-Western media outlets, we must aspire to co-opt their support. Reaching audiences within tactical spheres of operations requires it.

Advocating the truth as they know it is the rule for the Coalition Forces. But, historically, our battle drills for releasing stories advantageous to Coalition and Iraqi security forces are slow and bureaucratic. Normally, we are "beaten to the punch" by anti-Coalition organizations' telling their side of the story first. Sensational news travels quickly.

Gaps in information are quickly filled by adversaries seeking to exploit the same media potential. So if one is not zealous in marketing his side of the story, someone with a different side of the story will market it ahead of him.

Information also can be disseminated by word-of-mouth or through public information awareness drives, such as advertisements in local businesses. Often word-of-mouth can be the quickest and most direct route to the intended target audience. Influential messages can be distributed easily in places where gossip and news may "run wild." Business and recreational centers are frequently gathering places for socialization and story telling. In these types of settings, handbills and posters with meaningful illustrations can be useful for distributing information to specific groups or individuals.

The information domain is difficult to develop. The need to understand the community's literacy rate and favorite television stations are apparent. Media infrastructure and population assessments are useful in determining which media outlets are likely to reach the intended target audience.

These assessments are also useful in determining correlations between population demographics and adversarial activities. In many cases, direct parallels exist between a population's literacy rate or economic status and the likelihood of insurgent activities.

Surveys may cover questions that provide information about literacy rates, unemployment rates, population densities, favorite television and radio stations, and the percentage of households with sewer systems, running water and trash removal. This information adds to the knowledge base enabling planners to gain unique insights into the population. In Iraq and Afghanistan, many units have successfully relied on local experts to support survey efforts.

In addition, unit patrol reports, commanders' narratives and other input from subordinate units clarify situational understanding and add relevance to the staffs' knowledge of individual and population attitudes, motivations, concerns and other characteristics. Gaining the fullest possible understanding of the information domain is vital.

Cognitive Domain. The cognitive domain is where human decision making takes place. This is where values, religion, norms, perceptions and situational awareness influence human behavior. Intangibles, such as morale, unit cohesion and public opinion, reside in this domain as well. The cognitive domain is heavily influenced by cultural and social values. If the commander can influence the people's decision making, he can influence the way they behave and the environment in which his unit operates.

Unless IO planners understand the threat and their populace, adversarial or populace reactions to specific IO efforts can be surprising. To avoid unanticipated negative effects from an IO effort, working with local experts is essential. Local interpreters and paid cultural experts provide key insights into the Iraqi psyche during major events, such as religious holy days, celebrations and elections. Additionally, information from the Internet, country studies and cultural books provides religious sensitivities, cultural norms and traditional values important to the locals.

Commanders and their staffs must consider the second and third order of effects their IO efforts may have on the populace--not just the immediate IO effects. See Figure 3 for a model of the IO effects hierarchy.

Visualizing and Describing the Information Environment. There are several elements the commander must consider while visualizing and describing the information environment. The information infrastructure, populace, political situation, economics and enemy actions within the information environment deserve thorough analysis. See Figure 4 for a checklist of questions to analyze the elements of the IO environment.

A commander's visualization of the information environment is a continuous process. He and his staff must maintain running estimates as missions and situations develop. His staff accomplishes this by developing a combined information overlay depicting the elements of the information environment. Using a fictional AO, Figure 5 on Page 30 shows an IO media overlaid on other demographic information while Figure 6 is an IO overlay of the AO, combining the area's populace, threat, information infrastructure and population information needs.

The goal is to achieve and maintain information superiority by pinpointing centers of gravity within the environment. For example, an insurgent's ability to develop an ammunition cache near a village may label the village population as a center of gravity due to an increase in the number of VBIED incidents in the area.

Information superiority is an operational advantage that is achieved either by causing the adversary to take specific actions in the physical domain or by making specific decisions in the cognitive domain. It derives from the ability to use information better than the adversary. IO seeks to gain an information advantage over the adversary by affecting the adversary's use of information. (2)

Directing IO in Stability Operations. Successful integration of IO into battle command requires the commander's emphasis. Commanders and staffs direct IO into the concept of operation by having a coherent and focused intent. For example, the commander's concept of operations may involve the integration and implementation of all elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military and economic) simultaneously. Furthermore, it intertwines IO, maneuver and civil-military operations (CMO). IO's goal is to influence the population to accept the new government and Coalition efforts while CMO reconstructs, improves and develops the dilapidated infrastructure while establishing positive relationships among the Coalition Forces, the Iraqi government and the populace. Finally, in the commander's concept, maneuver units concentrate on establishing and maintaining security.

The commander's desired end state is to elicit hope in the minds of the Iraqi people, discredit the insurgency, establish a relationship of trust with the local populace, and reinforce and promote confidence in the stability and legitimacy of the Iraqi government. In short, the commander envisions a stable environment--one in which adversarial forces lack support and are unable to operate freely.

We can show this IO development concept in practical terms by applying the FA's targeting methodology: decide, detect, deliver and assess ([D.sup.3]A).

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But before discussing [D.sup.3]A, several cautions are in order about applying the conventional targeting process absolutely to the process of determining IO efforts in an AO. Currently, most unit staffs understand the importance and mechanics of creating a target synchronization matrix (TSM) to focus on their mission targets. However, most TSMs are created generically with a "cookie cutter" approach. The TSM becomes macroscopic, not microscopic. In other words, one unit's data for its particular TSM in its particular AO may be so generic that the data also applies

to almost any part of the country.

Many times, units fail to understand that each community is unique. Every community has its own set of problems, personalities, challenges and historical significance, making its existence notably different from that of the community 40 miles down the highway. As outsiders, units sometimes have difficulty seeing that.

People often like to "generalize to organize." In many cases, units rely too heavily on the TSM as the driving mechanism during planning. The TSM is a tool to prioritize and allocate targets, not to synchronize maneuver assets in time and space.

Typically, units are accustomed to mapping out the 24-hour targeting solution rather than focusing on the more perpetual factors that may lead us to success in the long run, such as understanding Arab behavior and psychology that has unfolded through generations of practical experiences and learning.

Decide. The main purpose of the Decide function is to determine what to engage and the desired effects. Target selection requires careful consideration when dealing with individuals or sections of the population as targets for nonlethal engagement. Before selecting IO targets, the staff should ask, "What are the desired effects, and what are the potential consequences of these effects?" and "Is the populace the target or is the actual target a group or individual within the populace?"

Once selected, information pertaining to specific targets, including engagement history and other relevant information, should be vetted and updated in the targeting folder. Detailed and complete target data may be vital to plan a successful meeting or negotiation that leads to a desirable outcome.

Doctrinally, part of the target selection process must include target-value analysis--to this end, the ability to assess the effects of nonlethal engagements must be considered during the Decide phase of the targeting process. Leaders must articulate the desired effects on the enemy or populace. The enemy's nature must be broadened significantly to include adversarial forces, not simply belligerents.

Detect. The G2, S2, psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) provide valuable intelligence and relevancy regarding a particular target. However, one often overlooked source of intelligence is the combat patrols operating within the AO.

Presence patrols have the potential to see things that more technologically advanced assets cannot. Technology may provide the visuals and patterns of the environment, but it never can give us the "pulse and aura" of the environment.

One caution about patrols as detection assets: as professional Soldiers, we easily are vacuumed into restoring order in the community and not being involved. We normally execute our assigned urban mission in our assigned urban AO. Once complete, we extract ourselves from the community to our protected domains until called out again. We execute "play by play" instead of the whole game--missing the real pulse and aura of the community.

A key aspect of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), now called the War on Terrorism (WOT). is the fact that every Soldier is considered a collector. To be effective, the information collected by combat patrols must make its way into the intelligence and operations arenas through debriefings and reporting.

Units normally fall into the routine of having only one member (the patrol leader) present during debriefings. When possible, every member of the combat patrol should be present. Soldiers witness and observe things their leaders don't. For example, a vehicle gunner elevated 12 feet off the ground with a 360-degree view of the battlespace is likely to see more. In comparison, the patrol leader seated in the vehicle flush with the street with the distractions of his reporting on the radio to higher headquarters or leading the patrol, he may or may not see a particular truck drive by. But the gunner not only can see the truck, but also spot the mortar tube hidden in the bed of the truck.

Presence patrols can be invaluable sources of intelligence if trained and briefed properly.

Deliver. This is where planners determine how to attack the target using either lethal or nonlethal means. It is pertinent to mention that there are times when units must engage an IO target with lethal means to discourage others in the target audience from taking a particular action or inaction.

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The engagement of targets must satisfy the guidance developed in the Decide function. Planners must ensure that engagements are tracked and information is collected to support their assessment of the effectiveness of the engagements.

Answering the questions in Figure 7 on Page 32 helps the commander determine if the unit should engage the target by lethal or nonlethal means.

Assess. Assessment is the continuous monitoring--throughout planning, preparation and execution--of the situation and the progression and evaluation of an operation to make decisions and adjustments. (3) Unfortunately, assessment often is overlooked as part of planning, targeting and execution.

BCT staffs are beginning to recognize the value and importance of establishing a methodology for assessing lethal and nonlethal engagements. As a result, assessments have become one of the most significant contributions to an effects-based approach for many tactical units. Most BCTs have found it necessary to adopt a campaign-style framework for assessing the operational environment. (4)

Assessing the information environment is challenging for two reasons. First, the environment where IO creates effects is not always physical. Second, the effects of an IO effort can be difficult to assess because they often are intangible. The effects of IO engagements often are intended to influence the populace's ideas, perceptions and attitudes. Units must measure these intangible effects indirectly, often making the assessment process difficult and time-consuming and requiring a depth of analysis beyond the capabilities of many undermanned staffs.

The most common instruments for assessing IO effects are measures of effectiveness (MOEs), measures of performance (MOPs) and battle damage assessments (BDAs). These tools are not the assessments themselves but provide input for assessments during specific execution cycles.

MOE. The term "MOE" refers to observable, quantifiable and subjective indicators that an activity is proceeding along a desired path of operational design. (5) According to doctrine, MOEs measure the results achieved in the execution of tasks to accomplish the overall mission. More practically, MOEs seek to measure the effectiveness of actions taken by a military force.

Because IO objectives are written to articulate the command's desired effects against threats in the information domain, most MOEs are crafted and used to measure IO objectives. An MOE also may be used to measure the effects after executing a specific task as well, especially if the task has a specific desired effect (using the task, purpose, method and effects format).

An example of an MOE is as follows: "The number of IED attacks against Coalition Forces and the Iraqi Army in Mosul decrease." If the IO efforts are effective, the IED attacks will decrease; if they increase or stay the same, then the efforts did not accomplish the objective or meet the MOE. Analyzing the rates and degrees of changes is vital when measuring progress.

MOP. An MOP is an assessment of friendly force execution of the IO effort. IO won't create the desired effects if friendly forces don't execute the planned tasks successfully. Failure to execute a specified task or the failure of that task to create the desired effect is part of an MOP.

For example, say, the number of presence patrols a unit is required to conduct in its AO with IO messages for the populace is 25 per month. If the unit can only conduct 15 one month because of additional mission requirements, then it has failed to meet its IO MOP.

BDA. BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military action, either lethal or nonlethal, against a predetermined objective. For IO, BDA measures the negative effects against IO targets. BDA results are used to determine if targets must be re-engaged. (6)

For example, if Coalition Forces want a local imam to deliver a message about the credibility of the local security forces to the community during Friday's prayers, they must ask him far enough in advance to allow him to incorporate the message into his sermon. If Coalition Forces fail to give the imam enough time, then they have caused "damage" to the IO campaign and must reengage the IO target.

Shaping the IO Battlespace. Once brigades and battalions have the tools in place, leaders and staff members can visualize the information environment while planning operations and counteracting insurgent attacks and incidents. IO integrated into operations planning helps to shape the battlespace, for example, in a cordon and search of a mosque.

When the brigade S2 receives intelligence that insurgents and a cache of weapons are hidden in a local mosque, the BCT S3 begins planning the cordon and search. The brigade IO officer provides demographic data of sensitive sites surrounding the targeted mosque, including locations of schools and police stations. Congruently, the IO officer and S2 have databases that show a new imam in this mosque has been giving anti-Iraqi government sermons for the past several weeks.

The operation is planned using the brigade mosque checklist of considerations to reduce the risk of negative publicity and battle drills to handle a negative media event. The checklist requires battalion commanders to brief the brigade commander on mitigating the risk of US forces coming in contact with religiously sensitive rooms in the mosque, techniques to show Iraqis that the unit respects their mosque and religion, the plan for using unit photographers and combat camera teams extensively to document the entire operation and plans for mitigating negative responses from local residents.

In one case, after a successful raid that captured several insurgents and a cache of weapons and munitions, the unit showed pictures of the cache inside the mosque to local residents. Instead of the residents' expressing outrage for the unit's entering the mosque, they were happy to have the insurgents removed.

In another operation, the unit was able to refute false media reports that US forces desecrated a mosque. They did this by publishing photographs of the operation that clearly showed no such desecration took place. In fact, the photographs showed US and Iraqi security forces conducting the search with respect for the imam and mosque. The photos also served as hard evidence in the Iraqi judicial system that made it easier and "cleaner" to prosecute accused criminals and their supporters.

The old message of "winning the hearts and minds" of the Iraqis may be viewed as a cliche from the past. Instead, one may want to win their "trust and confidence." Uninformed people who have their world changed tend to distrust outsiders and are naturally angry at those who are responsible for changing their world.

This concept is easily summarized by the degree of change one is forced to face and adapt to. The diminished quality of life and degree of fear that an Iraqi experienced before the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime may be minimal compared to other Iraqis. Some Iraqis may convey that life was good until the arrival of the Coalition Forces. Others will convey that their lives are now much better.

Challenges continuously arise in a nation with a turbulent history and a lot of "old scores to settle" within their own civilization. In the war against terrorism, understanding the people's and media's perceptions, propaganda and anti-propaganda is essential. Proactively distributing information via digital photos, posters and messages through television and radio are integral to IO to keep the insurgents from undermining Coalition efforts. If Coalition efforts are undermined, then IO efforts are put on the defensive and focus on counterpropaganda measures designed to discredit the insurgents and their efforts.

Digital photos a Soldier takes may convey a very powerful message. Taking into account that a "picture is worth a thousand words," photos of injured or dead innocent civilians published in local news sources project how indiscriminate an IED or VBIED truly is.

After the photo is published, the Coalition questions of the populace should be, "Is this how you want the future of Iraq (or Afghanistan) to be?" "Why are your children dying for such a cold and selfish cause?" "Will you help us stop those who want to butcher your family and friends?"

Stability operations tend to lose momentum after a few months of execution. Habitually, units "wear out their welcome" no matter how good their intentions are. IO injects longevity into stability operations. It "softens" the Coalition Forces' stay and attempts to make their presence more acceptable to the Arabs. IO may be viewed as "stability operations on steroids."

Today, components that conventional combat units are not accustomed to working with--PSYOP, CA, public affairs, electronic warfare (EW) and military deception--are commonly imbedded in every mission. These IO components are now decisive instruments in WOT to bring about "understanding" which, to be successful in stability operations, is more important than physical domination.

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Major Erin A. McDaniel is the Senior Instructor for the Tactical Information Operations (IO) Course, E Company, 1st Battalion, 30th Field Artillery Regiment (E/1-30 FAR), Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Previously, he served as an Observer/Controller Battalion Assistant Operations Trainer, Light Firing Battery Trainer (Airborne) and Combat Service Support Trainer at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. In other assignments, he served as Commander of A/1-94 FA (Multiple-Launch Rocket System) and a Personnel Officer in 4-27 FA, both in the 1st Armored Division in Germany, and as the Battalion Logistics Officer, B Battery Executive Officer, Support Platoon Leader and Company Fire Support Officer in 3-6 FA in the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York.

Captain Julio A. Perez, an FA30 IO Officer, is a student in the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course, Class 07-06, in the FA School, Fort Sill. He worked as a Fire Direction Officer for B Battery, 2-2 FA, 30th FA Regiment, in the FA School at Fort Sill. He served as a Firing Platoon Leader and Support Platoon Leader in 3-13 FA (MLRS), 214th FA Brigade, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill. In Operation Iraqi Freedom III, he was a Battalion Maintenance Officer for 3-13 FA attached to the XVIII Corps Artillery. Captain Perez served 10 years as a Military Occupational Specialty 11C Mortarman, rising to the rank of Staff Sergeant, before attending Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Tactical IO Course. This three-week course is open to Soldiers, Marines and Airmen, 30 students per class, with a class beginning 27 November and the next class beginning 15 January 2007. Soldiers must ensure their S3s enter them in the Army training requirements and resources system (ATRRS), course number 9E-F14/950-F10, to receive credit for attendance and an additional skill identifier (ASI). Marines and Airmen can contact Major McDaniel at DSN 639-1668 or commercial [phone] or via email at [e-mail].

Endnotes:

1. COL Ralph O. Baker, "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations," Military Review, May-June 06 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College), 13-32.

2. White paper by the 1st Information Operations Command Field Support Division, "TTPs for Tactical and Operational IO Planning," February 2006, 3.

3. FM 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army), August 2003, 6-4.

4. White Paper, Chapter 9.

5. FM 3-0 Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army), June 2001, 6-22.

6. FM (Interim) 5-0.1 The Operations Process (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army), March 2006, Chapter 5.

By Major Erin A. McDaniel and Captain Julio A. Perez

* How does the population in the area of operations (AO) get its
information?
* What events will influence the populace's decision making?
* What anti-Coalition actions are shaping the information environment?
* How can we influence the local population's perceptions, decision
making and behavior?

Figure 1: Commander's Analysis of the Battlespace in Terms of
Information Operations (IO)

Information Infrastructure
* What print media is produced in the area? Is it local, regional,
international?
* What are the TV and radio outlets in the area?
* What is the telephone status in the area, to include the status of
cell phones?
* What is the Internet status in the area?
* What are the key mosques in the area, and over the last three months,
what types of religious and political messages has the local imam been
emphasizing?
* What faction of Islam is prominent in those mosques?
* Who are the influential religious leaders?

Population
* How many people live in the AO?
* Where are they located?
* What are the high-density areas?
* What is the ethnic breakdown?
* Where are the ethnic lines in the area?
* What is the religious breakdown?
* Where are the religious lines drawn?
* What are the major tribes?
* Who are the key tribal leaders?
* Who are the key community leaders with influence in the AO (formal and
informal)?
* Can we overlay tribal boundaries onto the AO?
* Are there any outside players, groups or organizations that have an
influence in the AO?

Political Situation
* How is the local population controlled (tribal, government, religious,
etc.)?
* What is the status of the local government? Is it functional?
* Who are the local officials?
* What is the range of authority of the local officials?
* How is the national political situation impacting the targeted area?
* Is the local population actively participating in the political
process?
* What laws (sharia, secular, tribal, etc.) does the population follow?
* What is the populace's attitude toward key religious, civic, tribal
leaders?

Economical Situation
* What is the current economic status of the local population?
* How do the people in the area traditionally earn a living?
* Is there industry or agriculture in the area?
* What is the major industrial infrastructure?

Enemy Actions
* Who are the insurgent groups in the area? What is their desired end
state?
* What are the primary means of posting their information (command and
control and propaganda)?
* What are the methods of communicating among themselves (command and
control)?
* How do they interact with the local population?
* Is the population accepting their disinformation?
* Do the insurgents use intimidation extensively to coerce the local
support?
* Do the insurgents conduct any type of civic action?
* Do the insurgents force their causes and beliefs on the local
population?

Figure 4: Elements of the IO Environment. The commander and his staff
must consider these elements when analyzing the environment.

Decide
* Who: Political Leader (Mayor of Town X, Abdullah Farkman)
* Where: Town Hall
* What: BCT Commander
* When: Desired Date/Time
* Why: Influence to Gain Cooperation

Detect
* Who (unit) will collect information on the target?
* Based on PIRs and IRs, what information is to be collected?
* When is the most likely time the target can or will be acquired for
collection?
* How will the information be collected on a target (asset/system)?

Deliver
* What are the number and type of munitions (if applicable)?
* What individual or element will engage the target (commander,
maneuver, PSYOP, CA, etc.)?
* What is the response time of the engaging unit?
* What engagement asset or system will be used MLRS, TPT, HUMINT,
negotiations, etc.)?
* What is the time of the engagement?
* What are the desired effects (destroy, disrupt, influence, deceive,
deny or exploit)?

Legend:
CA = Civil Affairs
IRs = Intelligence Requirements
HUMINT = Human Intelligence
MLRS = Multiple-Launch Rocket System
PIRs = Priority Intelligence Requirements
PSYOP = Psychological Operations
TPT = Tactical Psychological Operations Team

Figure 7: Analysis for Determining Whether to Engage a Target by Lethal
or Nonlethal Means