How to rule Britannia? Welshman Paul Williams asks what Scotland's and Wales's votes for devolved parliaments will mean for Britain.

Most countries contain different ethnic, language or historic national groups. How to accommodate this diversity politically is one of the hottest issues in the modern world. The price of failure may be the break-up of the state, as happened in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

Systems so far evolved to meet this challenge range from straightforward federalism, as in India or the United States; to `quasi-federalism' as in the Russian Federation, where a mixture of regions and nations have varying degrees of autonomy; to the many models of devolution to be found in Europe.

In Britain, arguments over the relationships between England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales have been going on for a long time. In the past they were frequently dealt with on the battlefield. Feelings, often running back to such bloody episodes, go deep.

There have been many attempts to readjust the constitutional relationships between the four nations. It was in the years before 1707 (when Scotland and England were finally welded together in the Act of Union) that the issues of federalism and devolution, as against a unitary system of government, were first aired publicly. Would it be a `federal union', with Scotland retaining its historic parliament, or would it be an `incorporating union'--the option favoured by the English state? In the end incorporation won out, and the Scots were allocated 45 seats in the Westminster House of Commons, while England and Wales had 513. `They were,' says Prof John Kendle in his book Federal Britain: a history(*), `absorbed into an essentially English Parliament.'

Seventy years later Robert Burns railed against the `betrayal', writing of `a parcel of rogues in the nation' who had caved in to English pressure for the sake of commercial advantage. Although it signed away its Parliament, Scotland kept some separate institutions and has never lost its sense of history.

It was the late 1790s when the issues were raised again--this time over Ireland. Once more, incorporating union won the day. The 1801 Ireland Act gave the Irish 100 (later 105) seats in the London Parliament. There was to be no representative body sitting in Ireland.

Less than 100 years later the Irish question was again forcing debate over devolution. Gladstone, the Liberal Prime Minister, advocated `home rule (ie self-government) all round'--for Seotland, Ireland and Wales. But his successive bills were defeated. When a Home Rule Bill was finally passed, in 1912, it dealt only with a parliament for Ireland. The First World War intervened and it was finally the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 that delivered the first measure of devolution within modern Britain. There was to be a parliament for Ulster in Belfast (Stormont) and for the rest of Ireland in Dublin. The devolved parliament in Dublin never really got off the ground and the (independent) Irish Free State came into existence in 1922, but the troubled Stormont Parliament lasted until 1972.

Now, major constitutional change is underway, with Tony Blair's new Government determined to establish devolved parliaments or assemblies in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

No wonder, therefore, that when Donald Dewar, the Secretary of State for Scotland, unveiled his Bill paving the way for a parliament in Edinburgh, he spoke in historic terms. `The eyes of the world are on us,' he said. `This is a historic document in which the nation can take pride.... It represents the biggest change for 300 years of Scottish history.'

The momentum for change in Scotland had been building up for the past six years under the leadership of the Scottish Convention--an umbrella organization that combined the support of three political parties with that of non-political bodies such as the churches and trade unions. Not surprisingly, the referendum on devolution in Scotland produced a clear-cut and confident endorsement (74 per cent in favour) of the Government's proposals for a Parliament with some legislative and tax raising powers.

But Wales's perilously narrow majority--a mere 6,700 votes--in favour of a Welsh Assembly (with fewer powers than its Scottish counterpart) revealed all the fears and uncertainties about devolution and identity. Would it lead to the break up of the United Kingdom, as many (particularly Conservatives) predicted? Would it encourage the growth of narrow nationalism? Or was it more a question of healthy pride in your identity and a sense of responsibility for yourself? As Welsh professor Gwyn A Williams put it some years ago, `We as a people have been around for 2,000 years. Isn't it time we got the key to our own front door?'

The aim of the Government is eventually to extend devolution to the regions of England as well as to the Celtic nations. One reason, of course, why full-blooded federalism (as exemplified in the United States) has never been a popular idea in Britain is the imbalance in population between England and the other three nations. As Prof Kendle points out, `England, undivided, would dominate any federation, but England divided was neither desired nor acceptable to the English.'

While outright federalism is not an option, the consensus at the moment seems to be to settle for a measure of devolution for the Celtic nations and leave devolution to the English regions (except London) on hold. This is certainly in accord with what is happening throughout the European Union, where a great variety of devolved parliaments exist even within a single country. (Germany, France, Spain and Italy have more than 60 elected regional governments between them.)

Fear of change should not, in itself, be sufficient reason to block these new initiatives. While a few Welsh people and rather more in Scotland hope that devolution will eventually lead to full independence, it is more likely that, properly handled, it will diminish calls for outright separation. Donald Dewar, says The Times of London, `has always believed that devolution would assuage Scotland's frustrations enough to secure the nation within the United Kingdom. If he can prove to the Scots that, by running their own affairs, they can become a more self-confident and contented nation, he may be able to reduce support for independence.' Unity in diversity may be a better option than the forced uniformity of a unitary state which makes no allowance for national identity nor for vibrant regional democracy to flourish.

Many feel that the establishment of a parliament in Edinburgh and an assembly in Wales will see a release of new energy and confidence in both nations.

For Scotland the new parliament will be the first for nearly 300 years. For Wales, the assembly will be the first truly national elected body ever. Even the strongest of the Welsh princes never succeeded in creating an institution representing all of Wales. It is a significant landmark. `For the first time in centuries we will have some little governance of our own affairs,' says Glyn James, a former Mayor of the Rhondda. `It is not enough for some people, but perhaps it is enough to instil confidence and give hope. Now we have to make the dream come true.'

Although there is certainly the possibility of clash and confrontation with Westminster, there is no reason why this has to be the pattern. Much will depend on the quality of those elected to the Scottish and Welsh bodies and the type of leadership generated. As an editorial in the Western Mail (of Wales) put it, `The Assembly demands a new type of politics, drawing on experience from all areas of Welsh life. Therefore it demands a new type of politician ... a different animal altogether, who takes an overview of the nation as a whole.' As an Edinburgh friend said to me, `All the parties have first-class people in their ranks. Whether enough of them can be found to form an effective, energetic and wise parliament is an unknown factor.'

In Wales, although the referendum campaign highlighted many divisions and suspicions, some commentators see the assembly as a means of forging a new unity. `For the first time,' wrote Mario Basini in the Western Mail, `we shall have a national forum in which these differences can be debated, and reconciliations created. Among the most exciting possibilities created by the Assembly will be the prospect of forging a new national unity out of the rich mixture of race, colour, creed, class and cultures that is Wales.'

Perhaps, too, there will be the chance to heal some of the `wounds of history' in both Scotland and Wales that have perpetuated an underlying strand of bitterness and blame in relations with their mutual neighbour. As the managing director of a Scottish firm put it, `Once we start to make our own decisions, we won't be able to go on blaming the English for everything that goes wrong.' What a gift it would be, felt delegates from all over Wales to a `Dialogue on Wales's role', if we in Wales could move into the new millennium with a new sense of responsibility for ourselves, free from the baggage of hurt, blame and petty divisions we have so often carried with us.

(*) `Federal Britain: a history' by John Kendle, Routledge, London, 1997.