How not to punish China.

If foreign policies had a death wish, the U.S. policy on China enunciated last May could be said to have fulfilled it. It seemed designed to founder. China gained Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status under President Jimmy Carter. This MFN status, which has been subsequently renewed through the Reagan and Bush administrations, was threatened when President Bill Clinton turned a campaign promise into an executive order that linked its further extension to "overall, significant progress" on human rights in China. No such improvement, no MFN. The State Department's evaluation of such progress, or the lack of it, is scheduled to land on the president's desk on June 3, a date that also marks the fifth anniversary of the massacre of Tiananmen Square. The closer that date approaches, the more uneasiness the administration shows about the comer into which it has boxed itself. For if the policy has the advantage of being clear-cut and unqualified, it also has the concomitant disadvantages.

The Clinton administration is being forced to look more closely at some home truths. China now has the third largest and the fastest-growing economy in the world. Last year it exported $33 billion worth of goods to the United States from which it imported about $9 billion worth, for a very favorable surplus. This trade involves a significant number of workers on both sides of the trade balance, and further billions in future contracts. A serious rupture in this trade--the withdrawal of MFN status and the imposition of broad sanctions--would cause severe losses for both Chinese and American interests, although China could look to other trading partners.

The policy declared in the executive order was intended to use these interests as a lever to force China to improve its human rights practices, its handling of political prisoners, its relations with Tibet, and its disruption of foreign news broadcasts. When Warren Christopher made his much publicized trip to China in March, he stated these concerns directly to his hosts. Even more bluntly, his hosts told the secretary of state they did not welcome his intrusions into their internal affairs and that the importance of trade between the two countries had been overstated. (Foreign Minister Qian Qiche later said that during the twenty-three years in which there was no trade between China and the United States, "I think you lived quite well. And so did we.") To add to this sharp rebuff, the Chinese authorities harassed dissidents on the occasion of Christopher's visit. Part bluff, part traditional sensitivity to foreign influences, but not beyond anticipation.

China's clear lack of interest in displaying improvement in its human rights practices is confirmed by organizations such as Asia Watch and Puebla Institute, which have documented specific human rights abuses and particular people who have suffered them. The latter organization has reported that, in fact, "repression of Christians by the Chinese government increased significantly since mid-1993." (In the interest of full disclosure: I am chairman of Puebla.) Given this record there can be no fair finding that China has made overall significant progress in human rights during the last year.

On the basis of these facts, many commentators as well as policymakers have described the situation as a head-on conflict between expediency and principles, between commercial and moral interests. In fact, the Clinton policy seems to set up that very confrontation--which is why the policymakers are unhappy and why the policy is inadequate to the reality.

Some of the factors that have been left out of the equation include the real interests of other Asian countries, including U.S. allies; the role of China in cooperative political ventures with the U.S.; the effect of further market economy inroads in China; and the effect of a prospering, peaceful China in Asia.

No Asian country supports the U.S. policy linking MFN and human rights improvement in China. This is partly because they do not give human rights as much weight in formulating foreign policy as does the U.S., but also because they fear the possible consequences of a U.S.-China confrontation. This fear is measured not only in economic terms--trade, money, and jobs, all of which depend on a prospering China--but in terms of the Asian balance of power, stability, and chances of long-range peace. The United States has an important role to play if these goals are to be achieved, a role that would be grievously impaired by a Sino-American conflict. North Korea may prove intransigent in its refusal to allow proper oversight of its nuclear facilities, but there is a better chance of changing its present stance if China and the U.S. cooperate in the effort.

Perhaps the most important factor, however, is the deleterious effect extensive sanctions would have on the Chinese people themselves--the people, not the government. One of Karl Marx's most penetrating insights is pertinent here: "The bourgeosie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most backward, nations into civilization...it batters down all Chinese walls...it forces the underdeveloped nations' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate."

One of the most effective ways to improve the condition of human rights in China is to increase, not diminish, trade with China. Improvement within China during the last ten or twelve years supports this judgment. Not only does such trade help produce a middle class, with increasingly sophisticated political and social views, but it introduces new information and values into an insular society. Tiananmen Square remains a great blot on China's record, but it is well to note that the world would have known little of that event if advanced communication technology had not transmitted it almost instantly to every comer of the globe. China's subsequent denials fell on informed ears that knew better. Increased trade means an increase in hightech communications both in China and between China and other countries. It is a potent lever to open that society to outside values.

Anyone still skeptical about the transforming effect of modern communications should consider the last years and days of the Soviet Union. In early 1991, before the failed coup attempt of August, independent Soviet coal miners initiated a series of strikes across the country. They spoke in the name of democracy and reform in a voice that could not be entirely ignored. They were able to do this because the AFL-CIO in this country had but recently helped them procure computers, faxes, modems, etc. This technology allowed groups of miners who were united in spirit but separated by vast distance to do what was previously impossible, to communicate rapidly and coordinate their activities. As one of the most powerful forces fighting for democracy, they helped defeat the coup planned by the State Committee for the State of Emergency and paved the way for the election of Boris Yeltsin as president. Without the efforts of the workers' movement--made possible only by rapid internal communication--it is doubtful that this transforming event in Soviet/Russian history would have developed as it did.

For these reasons, the linkage between MFN and a marked improvement in human rights should be broken. The United States should not force itself to choose between drastically reducing trade with China, on the one hand, and on the other, justifying continued MFN status by devising the most transparent fig-leaf of supposed improvement in its human rights record. This most emphatically does not mean dislodging considerations of human rights from U.S. interests and policies. That plank should be firmly in place. Violations of human rights should be disclosed and condemned in various forums. Pressure for reform should come from both governmental and nongovernmental agencies. The work of organizations such as Asia Watch and Puebla deserves strong support and encouragement. But their efforts should not be made to contest with other desirable, even necessary, policies. JAMES FINN

James Finn is senior editor of Freedom Review, the bimonthly, magazine published by, Freedom House.