Hoosier Redlegs train Afghan Kandaks: Semper Gumbi.

"Chotur as ti?" ["How is your health?"]

"Khub. As, ti?" ["Good. And Yours?"]

"Bkhail as. Ti?" ["(and) Your body fitness?"]

"Bkhail. Jonny jur as?" ["Healthy. And your well being?"]

"Jur as. Ti?" ["It is well. And yours?"]

"Khub, tashakur." ["Good, thank you."]

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

These repetitive Afghan greeting phrases are now standard for a number of Redlegs from the three Indiana Army National Guard (INARNG) artillery battalions: 3d Battalion, 139 Field Artillery (3-139 FA), in Crawfordsville, part of the 38th Infantry Division Artillery; 2-150 FA in Bloomington, a corps support battalion; and 1-163 FA in Evansville in direct support (DS) to the 76th Infantry Brigade (Separate). The Hoosier Redlegs are deployed to Afghanistan until August 2005. Yet none of the phrases used to execute the missions are fire commands or elements of a call-for-fire. This is because none of the Hoosier Redlegs are involved with artillery missions or artillery training.

All are mentors to the Afghan National Army (ANA) infantry kandaks (battalions), serving in both battalion staff and company advisor positions. These nonstandard missions represent the continuing evolution of the role of the Field Artillery in the contemporary operating environment (COE).

In March 2004, plans were finalized to send the 76th Brigade to Afghanistan to lead Task Force (TF) Phoenix III. The TF had embedded training teams to accomplish its mission: advise, train and mentor ANA officers and NCOs from the corps down to company levels. This training was conducted "down range" and at training centers in Kabul: Kabul Military Training Center and Pole-Charki Compound. Each team consisted of 12 to 18 officers and NCOs from up to 17 different states for a total of more than 400 trainers.

Indiana provided the bulk of the infantry embedded trainers (six kandak teams) with 20 percent of the infantry officer slots filled by Hoosier artillery officers.

While one would like to think these artillerymen were chosen for their knowledge of infantry tactics and flexibility, the truth is closer to a need for any combat arms officers. With increasing deployments and commitments, Indiana found itself short of senior infantry captains and majors.

General Organization. Organized much like a fire support or an observer/controller (O/C) training team, each kandak team advises its respective Afghan Army counterpart. The team has two advisors (officer and NCO) per line company (tulai) and an advisor each for the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), S1, S3, S4, XO, sergeant major and kandak commander.

Similar to fire support, the embedded training teams are the liaison between the kandaks and US forces from the 25th Infantry Division (Light) out of Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Special Forces and Marines; and forward observers (FOs) for artillery and close air support (CAS). The team also coordinates with German, Romanian and Mongolian embedded trainers.

The embedded teams provide emergency purchasing power for the kandaks, deploying on missions with $50,000 at a time. This money buys the kandaks fuel, building supplies and the Afghan equivalent to A-rations: rice, milk and goats.

Helping is a pool of interpreters, called "Terps" or tarjimans, who range in age from 18 to 45. Many have grown up in Europe or Pakistan during the Russian occupation, civil war or Taliban regime. They all speak at least two of the Afghan languages in addition to English.

While Afghanistan has as many languages as all of Europe, the primary ones are Dari (Farsi) and Pashto. The ANA uses Dari and most of the southern province civilians speak Pashto. In addition, the Terps must understand US military jargon, a difficult task for anyone.

Functions. On one embedded team for the 3d Kandak. 1st Brigade, 205th Corps (3/1-205 Kandak) (Nightfighters), artillerymen make up 25 percent of the team. They serve as mentors for HHC and the 2d Tulai Commander, S1 and S4.

On another team, 2/1-205, the kandak commander, S3 and S4 mentors are Redlegs. On a third, 1/2-205 Kandak, two of the three tulai mentors are experienced artillery staff officers.

The tulai mentor's primary mission is advising the tulai commander and his first sergeant on individual and collective training as outlined in Field Manual 7-8 Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, administration and attendance procedures, logistics planning and accountability, and leadership as outlined in Field Manual 22-100 Army Leadership.

One focus is the use of military decision-making process (MDMP) at the tulai level. This is coupled with afteraction reviews (AARs) following training exercises, combat patrols, village assessments and larger combat operations and stability and support operations (SASO).

The secondary mission is training tulai NCOs and officers in their duties and responsibilities. Critical to this is fostering the ability for individual decision-making at the platoon and squad levels.

The ANA has experienced a mixture of leadership training--Russian, Mujahadeen and French--none of which are very compatible with the US philosophy of individual initiative. This proves to be one of the toughest challenges. Not only does this mixture of military styles affect how the team trains the company, it also affects how the team monitors attendance, slots modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) positions and plans missions.

A third nonstandard mission for the tulai mentors is in field ordering officers/pay agents (FOO/pay) operations. Each team is trained on the drawing, spending and clearing procedures for operational funds (OPFUNDS) of $50,000 dollars in Afghani (roughly 2, 350,000 Afghanis). These funds often directly support kandak and tulai logistics at both base camps and on missions.

Budget constraints and attempts at fiscal responsibility drive what the FOO/pay teams can purchase. These purchases are managed directly by a kandak staff mentor, usually the S4, and processed through TF Phoenix J4. During an initial occupation of an area or on an extended mission, much of the team's time can be taken up by FOO/pay activities rather than actual mentoring.

At the kandak level, embedded mentors' primary mission is to implement cohesive staff operations, supervising mission-essential task list (METL) development and the MDMP. Again, the previous military leadership models of the kandak soldiers are barriers to this implementation.

For example, during combat operations, decisions and planning often take place in the mind of the kandak S3 or XO only and then are disseminated to the commanders and staff. While this is a direct, clear approach, it creates a reactive environment for the staff.

At the kandak level, the mentors' secondary mission is to develop each staff officer and staff section. While many kandaks have good accountability of personnel and equipment, they have not developed clear disciplinary actions for soldiers' failing to show up or losing equipment.

A third mission is to help manage and pay ANA personnel, which is in excess of one million dollars each month. As in our Army, a soldier's pay and record keeping are critical retention tasks.

Hoosier Redlegs serve as S4 mentors in four infantry kandaks and for a brigade (lewa). Of all the mentors deployed from Indiana, those in the artillery have the most experience with battalion-level logistics. Most have served either as S4s, headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) commanders or battalion motor officers, and all have extensive experience in the battery XO position. Most of the infantry mentors come from line unit command slots or secondary staff positions.

Logistics for the ANA is based on donations from various countries, primarily former Soviet satellites and eastern countries eager for a new market. This results in a fill-or-kill system of supply (fill immediately or kill the requisition) for Class II, V, VII, VIII and IX, which does not keep pace with the needs of the forward-deployed kandaks. US supply assets or OPFUNDs are used for Class I, III, VIII and IX. Due to the Afghan terrain and sudden mission shifts, supplies often are available only by cash purchase from and Afghan vendor.

The kandak transport vehicles include US 2.5 ton trucks. Russian Kamaz and Zil trucks, Chinese Hinos, German Mercedes, European Ivecos and Indian Tatas while the non-tactical vehicles include Ford Rangers, Russian Jeeps, Indian Mahindra Boleros and Toyota Land Cruisers for ambulances. This makes Class IX ordering difficult and prescribed load list (PLL) maintenance a major challenge.

In August 2004, only one-half of the 5/1-205 Combat Service Support (CSS) Kandak performed support functions. The other half of the kandak served as infantrymen. This was true for the other CSS kandaks as well. Only in the second quarter of 2005 has a conscious effort been made to train and use the CSS kandaks in other than infantry roles.

Train-Up. Before deploying, the 76th Brigade embedded trainers trained at Camp Atterbury Maneuver Training Center (CAMTC) outside Edinburgh. The training consisted of three phases: standard Soldier tasks, embedded trainer tasks and an in-country orientation. See the figure on Page 34.

Key Traits for Success as Embedded Trainers. Success depends on a number of personal traits. These traits, for the most part, are those ingrained in every artilleryman at FA Officer's Basic Course (OBC). Some have been developed through civilian occupations or individual experiences. Also important for success were some military skills.

Flexibility. This trait is the hallmark of the embedded trainer mission. With changes in focus and mission occurring daily in both the ANA and US forces, flexibility allows the trainer to maintain both his sanity and focus on the kandak level.

Willingness to Learn. Such a trait sets the example for the officers and soldiers being mentored. Whether it is a function check on an AK-47 rifle, a crew drill for the SPG-9 anti-tank gun or a demonstration of how to use pepper and egg white to stop a radiator leak, opportunities to learn present themselves daily.

Self Evaluation. This is a related trait. Realizing personal areas of strengths and weaknesses allows the trainer to continue development. While mission AARs help the tulai and kandak, self-AARs enable the mentor to better advise and coach the ANA.

Infantry Tactics Proficiency. All of ficers must be proficient in basic infantry tactics. Whether training or in an actual operation securing the firing position or conducting a dismounted patrol or a cordon and search, artillerymen must be prepared to call. "Follow Me!" and be followed.

Physical Fitness. This complements the growing role of artillerymen as infantrymen. It is the basis for survivability in Afghanistan.

Cultural and Religious Knowledge. These add a new dimension to the battlefield. Artillerymen currently are executing missions demanding the ability to think outside a military context. Information officers target civil issues and unrest. Embedded trainers interact daily with civic leaders and businessmen. Demonstrating understanding of others lowers cultural barriers and increases opportunities for mission success.

Lessons Learned. The key embedded trainer lesson is the same one artillerymen are learning in every theater of operation: Semper Gumbi (Always Flexible). Like no other branch, the FA is required to take on tasks outside its normal lanes. From infantry tactics to landing zone (LZ) preps to civil affairs management, embedded trainers cover more ground and more non-military occupational specialty (MOS)-specific tasks than any other branch.

As embedded trainer Redlegs, we have learned other important lessons from this deployment that are applicable to all.

* Individual mobilization training (IMT) and squad live-fire training provide the individual warrior spirit and team fire control skills. As we continue to take on force protection and infantry missions, we must revisit the basic skills of the infantry Soldier. Our ability to engage the enemy, once again, is based on direct fire and close range actions.

* Combat lifesaver (CLS) training is a must for every Soldier. The enemy can strike anytime, anywhere. Too often this training is neglected or only provided to a limited number of Soldiers. The skills gained allow the Soldier to act when a buddy goes down or a mine throws a vehicle off the road. The fog of battle is reduced and lives are saved when Soldiers know they can quickly dress a wound or prevent shock by giving an intravenous (IV).

* The new environment in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) requires us to look at convoys from a totally different perspective. For artillerymen, conducting convoys is part of basic FA operations: move, shoot and communicate. We practice many tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) involving actions to be taken if a convoy is hit. Most focus on the convoy's ability to either fight through an ambush or stand and fight.

As the threat has changed from ambushing friendly forces to emplacing mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), so too have the TTPs changed to emphasize, among other things, site clearance and security, and medical evacuation procedures.

* As we learn daily with the ANA, logistics is a showstopper if not properly forecasted, planned and executed. The key is not the numbers in the daily logistics and personnel reports, but what those numbers mean to push packs, short tons and numbers of vehicles to send on a log push.

Officers and senior NCOs also must be trained on nonstandard logistics--OPFUNDS and purchase request and commitment (PR & C) forms. These are the methods maneuver units use to extend their influence over civil affairs and civilian reconstruction projects.

The time to train is not two days before a unit deploys by air to a remote portion of a foreign country--it is now.

The role of the artilleryman in battle is a dynamic, ever-changing one. From effects cells in Iraq to infantry embedded trainers in Afghanistan, Redlegs must prepare for every contingency. As missions change, so must training and mindsets.

To be the King of Battle calls for political savvy, logistical planning and the ability to perform any task anywhere as well as or better than those formally trained in that task. Semper Gumbi!

Phase I: Basic Soldier Tasks
* Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)
* Weapons Qualification
* Physical Fitness
* Driver's Training
* Individual Mobilization Training (IMT)
* Mine Marking and Minefield Extraction

Phase II: Embedded Trainer Tasks
* Combat Lifesaver Skills
* Use of an Interpreter
* Mortar Call-for-fire
* Operations of Tactical Satellite Radios for Close Air Support (CAS)--
  Harris 117 and 150
* Defensive Driving (J-turns, Deadman Exchanges and Reverse Handbrake
  Turns)
* Checkpoint Operations
* Dismounted Patrols
* Squad Live-Fire Assault on an Objective

Phase III: In-Country Orientation
* Afghanistan -- geographically, geologically, socially, politically and
  militarily. It is a complex country as the result of standing at the
  crossroads of Asia for thousands of years. The country is divided by
  the Hindu Kush Mountains, deserts and dry river beds waiting for
  spring floods.
* The people are divided by distinct ethnic and religious lines with the
  only common point of reference the Afghan National Army (ANA).
* The ANA is an army influenced by the Russian communist model,
  Mujahadeen tactics and organization, British instructors for soldiers,
  French instructors for officers and US mentors "down range." This
  polyglot of military styles often creates confusion and friction in
  expectations and standards.

Three phases of pre-deployment training for the Indiana Army National
Guard (INARNG) trainers of the 76th Infantry Brigade (Separate) who are
embedded in Afghan Kandaks.

By Majors Kellard N. Townsend, Jonathan E. Marion and Joseph W. Boler and Captain Madison M. Carney, All INARNG

Major Kellard N. Townsend is the S4 Mentor for the 3d Kandak, 1st Brigade, 205th Corps (3/1-205 Kandak) in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. He was a Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) in 3-139 FA, Indiana Army National Guard (INARNG), in Crawfordsville. He also was a Company Fire Support Officer in 2-3 FA for 4-34 AR in the 3d Armored Division during Operation Desert Storm. He teaches English in a high school in Indianapolis.

Major Jonathan E. Marion is the S3/S1 Mentor for 3/1-205 Kanda in OEF. He was the Battalion Executive Officer (XO) for 1-163 FA, INARNG, in Evansville. He is a high school History Teacher in Martinsville.

Major Joseph W. Boler, who is the XO/Headquarters and Headquarters Company Mentor for 3/1-205 Kandak in OEF, was the Division Artillery (Div Arty) S2 for the 38th Infantry Division, INARNG, in Indianapolis. He is a Police Officer in Spencer.

Captain Madison M. Carney, INARNG, is the 2d Tulai Mentor for 3/1-205 Kandak in OEF. He was a Div Arty Fire Direction Officer (FDO) for the 38th Division. He also was a Radar Platoon Leader for the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. He is a Police Officer in Zionsville.