Honest brokers? American and Norwegian facilitation of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (1991-93).

The official Israel-Palestinian talks in Washington, which commenced in December 1991 in the wake of the Madrid conference, proceeded through ten rounds without arriving at an agreement. As a mediating power, the United States failed to use its considerable influence to bring the two sides together. While the U.S. had been aware of the Oslo channel, the revelation in August 1993 that Israel and the PLO had initialed an agreement negotiated via the secret talks in Norway stunned the U.S. administration.

This article examines the extent to which the respective success and failure of the Oslo and Washington negotiations can be attributed to the mediating powers involved - though the notion of the success of the Oslo channel is queried. The contrasting styles and intentions of the mediators are explored, and the article poses the question of whether Norway implemented a U.S. agenda, and whether a mediator's neutrality can constitute complicity in the nature of an agreement reached between a strong and a weak negotiating party.

The American mediators of the official Israel-Palestinian talks in Washington were as stunned as the rest of the world when it was revealed in August 1993 that Israel and the PLO had secretly negotiated a peace agreement. Although the U.S. had been kept informed of the progress of the Oslo negotiations, it had seriously underestimated the prospects of Oslo succeeding where the official talks were not. The contrast between the stagnant Washington talks, poised to enter their eleventh round, and the success facilitated by Norway, a minor power with little strategic interest in the Middle East, served to highlight America's failure to bring Israel and the Palestinians together. While a convergence of international, regional and domestic forces on both sides had ripened the climate for negotiations, it was only the strict secrecy, careful Norwegian facilitation, and the direct inclusion of the PLO which permitted those forces to culminate in an agreement.

As the end of the Oslo interim period approaches, the hindsight of five years allows for more definite conclusions to be drawn regarding the nature and consequences of the secret negotiations in Norway. The Oslo channel's initial success in leading to an Israel-PLO agreement must be qualified by its commensurate failure to secure a substantive or enduring peace. The success itself was bought at the heavy price of deferring a resolution on the conflict's core issues: the refugee right of return, settlements, sovereignty, and the status of Jerusalem. This is an irony of Oslo; the very factors critical to its initial success have impeded subsequent progress towards peace.(1) Negotiated within a framework set by an imbalance of power, and permeated with the sterile and calculating pragmatism of 'Realpolitik', it was evident from the outset that the accords contained the strong potential to simply embody "war by other means."(2) This article, therefore, seeks to distinguish between the initial success of the Oslo process and its long-term failure, and also between the varying motivations of the individual players.

There is much about the Oslo channel and indeed the public Washington talks that remains unknown or disputed; the researcher must allow for competing narratives, the vicissitudes of participants' memories, and the desire to reconstruct and reinterpret events in a more complementary manner. Nonetheless, a generally consistent picture of both channels has emerged. With the above caveats in mind, this article addresses the ways in which American and Norwegian facilitation shaped the course of the two negotiating tracks. To what extent does each bear responsibility for the outcomes? What would have been the consequences had either acted differently? The focus is upon the contrasts between the U.S. and Norway's motivations and methods and on the interplay between the channels. Although Norway acted with relative autonomy, it was not immune from American influence. To what extent, therefore, may Norway be argued to have implemented a U.S. agenda?

AMERICAN MEDIATION AND THE WASHINGTON NEGOTIATIONS

"The United States will act as an honest broker in trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict." U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians, 18 October 1991(3)

The Washington talks pitted Israel against an official Palestinian delegation, comprised of Palestinian figures from inside the occupied territories with no formal links to the PLO. The talks emerged from the Madrid conference of October and November 1991, which the U.S. and Russia convened in the hope that it would lead to a comprehensive Middle East peace. On 6 March 199 l, U.S. President George Bush stated that the projected settlement was to be grounded in resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of 'territory for peace', providing for Israel's security and recognition for legitimate Palestinian 'political' rather than territorial or national rights.(4)

Although Russia was no more than a nominal sponsor, the United States had a strong strategic interest in the regional stability anticipated to follow a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict (with the Palestinian issue at its hub). The inclusion of the Palestinians was necessary to achieve U.S. objectives, but difficult to manage. Negotiating with the PLO was anathema to both U.S. and Israeli foreign policy, yet the official Palestinian delegation did little to conceal that it operated under PLO direction. This lent a farcical element to the talks and seriously impeded the possibility of a negotiated agreement. The Palestinian delegation had little autonomy, and Arafat felt threatened by the prospect of being superseded by an alternative leadership.(5) As Jan Egeland, Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister during the Oslo negotiations, has observed, the official Madrid formula "meant that the PLO controlled the negotiating team without feeling identity with them."(6)

Although Dennis Ross, a high-level official involved in the Washington talks, characterized the American role as "catalyst, clarifier, reassurer, facilitator and guarantor,"(7) the U.S. remained committed to Israel and broadly adhered to the latter's agenda. The examples of the conflict over Palestinian representation and the U.S. bridging proposals will illustrate this.

Secretary of State, James Baker, had stated in his 18 October 1991 letter of assurance to the Palestinians that: "The United States does not seek to determine who speaks for Palestinians in this process. . . . Only Palestinians can choose their delegation members, which are not subject to veto from anyone."(8) Yet the U.S. also promised Israel that it would not have to meet with any 'unacceptable' Palestinians, which the Likud government interpreted as any Palestinians from the Diaspora or East Jerusalem. This set the scene for a conflict over representation that was avoided only when the Americans effectively exercised a veto on Israel's behalf. The U.S. thus accepted Israel's definition of acceptable Palestinians and abrogated its own letter of assurance. During a meeting with the delegation on 10 October 1991, Hanan Ashrawi has recalled that Baker "told us point-blank that Faisal [Husseini] and I would not be part of the official negotiations because the Israeli delegation must not be subjected to Palestinians carrying Jerusalem identity cards." Baker attempted to mollify the delegation by declaring that "We will continue to meet with you. Everybody will know who is leading and directing the negotiations, but the Israelis cannot be forced to meet with people they find unacceptable."(9) The Bush administration later recognized Faisal Husseini as 'Head of the Palestinian Team to the Peace Conference,'(10) but the pattern of sensitivity to Israel's viewpoint persisted.

The Americans continued to pressure the Palestinians to accept whatever 'autonomy' Israel offered, no matter how small the responsibility. The U.S. also decreed that rather than "expressing general views, the Palestinians had to take each specific item (for example, each sphere of operation), and state in detail to the Israeli side their points of agreement and disagreement."(11) In effect, the U.S. was driving the Palestinians to merely react to the Israeli agenda, despite Baker's rhetorical support of the delegation's formulation of interim self-government proposals.(12)

The style of U.S. mediation during the Clinton administration differed little from that under the Bush administration, though Clinton quickly established a reputation as the most pro-Israel of U.S. presidents. This reputation further encouraged Israel's hard-line negotiating stance. Despite a perception that Bush was tougher on Israel, his administration had adhered to the fundamentals of the strategic alliance. The Clinton administration's efforts to break the impasse between Israel and its Arab interlocutors were initially limited to the calling of weekly meetings between all delegations, but this failed to engender progress. In March 1993 the administration decided to take on the role of 'full partner', and its efforts to inject momentum included submitting draft proposals for joint Israel-Palestinian understandings on 12 May and, again, on 30 June 1993.(13) The proposals were ostensibly an attempt to clarify the aims of the negotiation process and synthesize the positions of each side. However, they exhibit the near-total American adoption of Israel's agenda. The proposals further alienated the Palestinian delegation, though in hindsight it is noteworthy that some minor details concede more to the Palestinians than Israel granted the PLO at Oslo.

The 12 May 1993 draft 'Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement' is a wide-ranging document. It reiterates the centrality of resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of a final status settlement, to be implemented subsequent to an interim period of Palestinian "self-government arrangements" in "the territories." Significantly, there is no reference to the territories as 'occupied'. The adherence to the idea of interim 'autonomy' is in line with Israel's policy of fragmenting the negotiating process into stages, which would allow Israel more time to consolidate its position on the ground.(14) According to the proposal, the interim and final status phases are to be interlocked and all options for the final status "within the framework of the agreed basis of negotiations should remain open." Whether this entails an adherence to resolution 242's basis of Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967 is (perhaps deliberately) unspecified. Since the resolution was passed on 22 November 1967, the U.S. position has changed from the understanding that 242 mandates a full withdrawal, subject to minor and reciprocal border adjustments, to a more equivocal stance whereby the U.S. has refrained from expressing a view on the withdrawal clause.(15) Israel interprets the resolution as requiring only that it withdraw from some of the territories occupied.(16) The refusal of the U.S. to specify full withdrawal, in tandem with its support for all options remaining open, provided tacit support for Israel to insist on its own blueprint, including ongoing de facto control over the Palestinian territories, provided this offers a measure of the stability sought by the U.S.

The proposal essentially condones the continuance of the occupation, granting Israel "overall security responsibility as well as the responsibility for Israelis in the territories" during the interim period. The subsequent gesture to the Palestinians is merely rhetorical; the U.S. notes that "It is the Palestinian view that the objective of security arrangements is to achieve regional stability and respond to mutual needs, as well as to create the conditions of real peace."

The Palestinian delegation boycotted a trilateral meeting called for 12 May to discuss the U.S. initiative, in reaction to the proposal's prior amendment after consultation with the Israelis.(17) The Palestinians did meet with the Americans the next day; their comments were passed on to the Israelis but no agreement was reached. Thus, the talks remained deadlocked through the tenth round in June 1993, prompting State Department officials to submit a second compromise proposal. The framework and discourse of the 30 June 1993 'U.S. Draft Israeli-Palestinian Joint Declaration of Principles', was broadly reminiscent of the previous proposals, although there was a new emphasis on implementing resolutions 242 and 338 in "all their aspects" (these aspects remaining unspecified).

The June proposal reiterates that all options within the framework of resolutions 242 and 338 will remain open until negotiations on permanent status begin and "each side can raise whatever issue it wants, including the question of Jerusalem." This is a concession to Israel's refusal even to discuss the status of occupied East Jerusalem, a principal point of conflict throughout the talks, though the U.S. was evidently also trying to appeal to the Palestinians by listing Jerusalem on a possible final status agenda. In practical terms however, the Palestinians had nothing to gain from merely placing Jerusalem on an agenda for talks hazily slated to commence some years hence, while Israel benefited from additional time to consolidate its grip on greater Jerusalem.

The U.S. did move beyond Israel's agenda in calling for both sides to "make their best efforts to avoid actions during the interim period that undermine the environment for the negotiations," and the envisionment of Palestinian autonomy as leading to a mutually respectful relationship "in which both sides eschew violence." Such a requirement, if legally encoded and enforced, would have drastically curtailed Israel's ability to exercise force in the territories; it also recognized that Israel, too, was capable of provocation and violence. There was little chance that Israel would accept this, as its outright rejection of the PLO's demand at Oslo that both sides renounce violence demonstrates.(18)

This point, however, remains essentially symbolic. Although the U.S. proposal calls for equal restraint and for the security of both sides to be respected, it nevertheless grants Israel concrete authority over security matters, citing international law as justification. The proposal reads:

Recognizing Israel's responsibility for its nationals and for overall security of the territories (Hague Regulations of 1907), and recognizing the interim self-government's responsibility concerning Palestinians during the interim period per the agreement to be negotiated, there will be arrangements and mechanisms, particularly related to security, such as police functions, that will enhance mutual security and address the needs of both sides.

The reference to the Hague Regulations of 1907 is extremely significant. Israel is not a signatory to the regulations but its High Court has accepted them as representing customary international law and considers them binding on the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.(19) Nevertheless, Israel remains in clear contravention of the regulations concerning the legal requisition of property.(20) The selective application of international law, applying the regulations where they reinforce Israel's occupation, yet ignoring Israel's contravention of those same regulations, as well as the Fourth Geneva Convention - through the continued colonization of the territories and usurpation of Palestinian land, water and property - weakened the authority of the U.S. position.

Such inconsistency may have facilitated, perhaps implicitly, the transference of negotiations from operation within a paradigm at least theoretically set by international law to one set by the dynamics of asymmetrical bilateral negotiation. This is evident, for example, in the June proposal's relegation of a lasting solution to "the issue of jurisdiction over the territories" to be decided by the "outcome of permanent status negotiations." The conflict is thereby removed from the arena of international law or justice. This supports Amr G. E. Sabet's observation that the U.S.-sponsored 'peace process' has facilitated an "issue transformation" or shift from a 'closed agenda', based on immutable core values, to an 'open agenda', in which all issues are open for bargaining. This was an attempt to "circumvent, transform, and conceptually obliterate the justice principle of the Arab-Israeli conflict by resorting to conventional Western conflict resolution mechanisms."(21) Israel's consistent aim has been to reconceptualize the Palestinian 'problem' into an issue to be negotiated bilaterally; or, as PLO negotiator in Oslo, Maher El Kurd, noted, to transform it merely into an "internal" Israeli issue.(22)

The overall slant of the U.S. proposal was noted by the PLO, and possibly influenced Arafat's decision to bypass the Washington channel and negotiate directly with Israel, though his prime motivation was to retain his own preeminence. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal has written that when the Norwegian facilitators visited Arafat in Tunis in July 1993, during a crisis in the Oslo talks, they found the PLO leader upset about the recent U.S. proposals:

An analysis prepared in Arafat's own handwriting and colored with red and yellow fluorescent markers showed that 65 per cent of the points in the US synthesis had been taken from an Israeli paper, 28 per cent from an earlier American paper, and only 7 per cent from the Palestinian delegation's paper. Fuming over this lack of even-handedness, Arafat said that the PLO was having to negotiate against not one but two delegations, the Israelis with Israeli accents and the Israelis with American accents.(23)

Despite the PLO's evident dissatisfaction with the U.S. in July 1993, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen, who directed the PLO's negotiating efforts from Tunis), has remarked that American policy under the Clinton administration not only remained unchanged but that the U.S. stood by its letters of invitation and assurances. "Their [the U.S.] view," Abbas said, "was that the goal of the negotiating process was to grant authority to the Palestinian people, to end the Israeli occupation."(24) Whether Abbas' assessment is based on naivete or is the result of a retrospective alteration of perception adapted to the post-Oslo realities of U.S.-Palestinian relations, is open to speculation. The U.S. had not pressed for complete adherence to the terms of its letter of assurance to the Palestinians, which had opposed settlement activities and unilateral acts that sought to predetermine the final outcome, and had addressed the need to end the Israeli occupation.(25)

Abbas has implied that the decision to continue with the Oslo channel was based upon both Israel and the PLO's rejection of the May and June American proposals:

We were convinced that such proposals could not achieve the results we desired and we wanted to convince the Israelis of that too. I believe that they finally arrived at the same conclusion and realized that the hopes for a solution lay in Oslo after all, especially as the negotiators had already laid a solid foundation. . . having turned down the American proposal, the two sides turned their sights on Oslo."(26)

This is somewhat disingenuous. There is sufficient evidence that both sides had turned their sights to Oslo some months previously, though Rabin's preference for the Washington channel lingered until there was no hope that success would emanate from the official track.

The U.S. was supposed to be a "catalyst" of understanding between the two sides, as Maher El Kurd has observed. However, U.S. officials were frustrated that the nature of public diplomacy and the power of domestic lobby groups limited their options and prevented flexibility;(27) without them, the Americans may have pushed harder for a resolution more in line with longer-term U.S. interests. Former Israeli Foreign and Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, on the other hand, has contended that the American coordinators did not take sides even as they remained actively involved in the talks. Peres has stated that the U.S. posed more diplomatic wording for draft agreements and made tactful threats to withdraw from the talks if progress was not made.(28) Peres has also maintained that the U.S. "became preoccupied with what is called in diplomatese the "DOP," or declaration of principles. The more drafts were perfected, the wider the gap became between the sides."(29) However, the May and June proposals indicate that the gap may have had more to do with the U.S. failure to equitably synthesize the positions of both sides.

American support for Israel within the 'peace process' framework extended beyond the Washington negotiations to the Oslo channel. Although there was no formal connection between the Oslo and Washington routes, and State Department officials aware of Oslo did not expect it to amount to anything, the U.S. still consciously aided Israel in achieving its objectives vis-a-vis negotiations with the PLO.

The Israelis used a visit to the region by Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in August 1993, which aimed to facilitate progress on the Israel-Syria track, to highlight Israel's implicit threat to marginalize the PLO by striking a deal with Syria.(30) Christopher's public statement to the effect that Arafat was concerned about this potential development(31) reveals that he understood his role in this bargaining ploy. The Syria 'threat' was again used to pressure the PLO during the mutual recognition talks:

To ensure that Arafat felt the heat, Ross suggested that Christopher return to Damascus after visiting Jerusalem, thereby creating the appearance of so-called "shuttle diplomacy" and thus of movement on the Israel-Syria track. Peres even wrote a letter to [Johan Joergan] Holst that he hoped would be shared with the Palestinians, saying that if the negotiations were not completed, "the vacuum may be filled by opposing forces, or with other initiatives, including the possibility of desired progress between Israel and Syria. Secretary Christopher is at this very moment visiting our region.(32)

Once it was informed of the Israel-PLO agreement, the U.S. took an active role in the Oslo process and ensured that it would host the signing ceremony. This necessitated that America also recognize the PLO. An obstacle to this was the 'PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989', commonly known as the Mack-Lieberman Act, which had been passed by Congress in response to the short-lived Reagan Administration-PLO dialogue. The act had important ramifications for U.S. recognition of the PLO and the Americans were glad to coordinate with the Israelis on this issue. Christopher, Ross and Joel Singer, an Israeli negotiator at Oslo, together reviewed the text of the act. Ross noted that under this law the PLO was required to "evict or otherwise discipline the individuals or groups taking acts in contravention of the Geneva commitments."(33) Hence, he suggested to Singer that the PLO letter specify not only that the PLO renounce violence but that it would also discipline its violators; this was "language that Singer readily embraced."(34) Corbin's account confirms that Ross suggested the PLO be held responsible for preventing acts of violence on the part of its constituent organizations.(35) Such cooperation highlights the generally coterminous interests of the U.S. and Israel in bringing the PLO into the equation as a moderate and compliant actor, with the aim of bolstering Israel's security. These parameters were quietly influential throughout the Oslo process and the Norwegians were evidently aware of them.

Constrained by its 'special relationship' with Israel, and the domestic pro-Israel lobby, the Americans have rarely placed pressure on the Israelis to make more than symbolic concessions. While this has impeded Washington's long-term objective of a stable Middle East, the immediate ramifications of a policy shift in favor of pressing for the implementation of resolution 242's implementation, in its original understanding of full withdrawal, would have been a most 'courageous' decision,(36) entailing a pitched battle with the pro-Israel lobby and the elite opinion-shaping consensus. Thus, whether such an alteration of the U.S. stance could have saved the Washington negotiations is a moot question. In any case, the official talks were held between parties with scarce common ground (since the Palestinian delegation wanted tangible gain for Palestinians and recognition of their right to statehood, which Israel was not prepared to concede), under the auspices of a superpower that was neither neutral nor disinterested. The indications are that, U.S. mediation notwithstanding, the channel was destined to fail, particularly because of Arafat's determination that the official delegation not supersede him in administering any resultant Palestinian 'autonomy'. Haidar Abd al-Shafi, head of the official Palestinian delegation, has affirmed that the dynamics at Washington were unlikely to have produced success, stating that "Washington could not have come to an agreement; that was obvious."(37)

In time, the early 1990s may come to be seen as the high water mark of U.S. support for Israel. After the unparalleled disasters of the Nazi period, U.S. public opinion, like that of Western Europe, came to accept that the West had a moral responsibility to ensure that nothing similar should ever occur again. The U.S. seemed prepared at times to underwrite Israel's own definition of its national interests, even at the risk of damaging its own broader strategic interest in the Middle East.

By the time of the Oslo talks, the Soviet Union had ceased to be perceived as a threat, and Israel had to a considerable extent shored up its military/strategic position in the region. Arab hostility, though still sharp, had moderated slightly, and the fact of Israel's existence, however unpalatable, was coming to be accepted.

While West European countries had already become more critical of Israeli actions, Washington continued to be reluctant ever to substitute its own views of what needed to be done to preserve Israel for those of the Israeli government. The Bush administration's impatience with the Shamir government was perhaps the first major sign that Washington would not always underwrite Israeli policies. While Clinton began as the most pro-Israel president, his administration, too, became increasingly critical of the Netanyahu government. It remains to be seen whether this more critical approach will mark U.S. relations with the government led by Ehud Barak.

THE OSLO CHANNEL AND NORWAY'S ROLE IN ITS SUCCESS

It might seem strange and disagreeable to say that the minnow was able to perform the miracles which the whale could not. Norway is not on the list of influential countries which have capabilities and influence in the new world order or the old. In spite of this Norway achieved what the giants could not and accomplished what the great ones could not. We record that the events in Oslo that led to the historic Declaration of Principles were one of the twentieth century's most notable milestones. We must give this small country full credit for assuming an outstanding, positive and effective role in bringing this document to the lawn of the White House.

Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen)(38)

Hyperbole aside, Abbas has aptly assigned credit where it is due. The Norwegian role was integral to the 'success' of the Oslo channel, which was originally established as a "supportive and complementary secret tool for the public and official Washington negotiations."(39) However, the Oslo channel quickly achieved its own momentum. The PLO had previously sought direct talks with Israel through Russia, Egypt,(40) and Norway(41) but these advances had been rebuffed. Israel's position changed gradually as the Peres-Beilin faction in the Rabin government was able to quietly maneuver Israel's acceptance of the PLO as prime interlocutor.

Commencing in January 1993, the Oslo channel arose from personal contacts between individual Norwegians, Palestinians and Israelis. It burgeoned from informal talks between PLO officials, namely Abu Ala (Ahmed Quri'e), Hassan Asfour and Maher El Kurd, and two Israeli academics, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik, close associates of Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister, Yossi Beilin. The channel was upgraded to official status with the inclusion in May and June 1993 of Uri Savir, Director-General of Israel's foreign ministry, and Joel Singer, a top Israeli legal expert.

The Norwegian team was comprised of a small number of closely linked and dedicated individuals; an incalculable advantage in maintaining the channel's secrecy and momentum. The primary actors were Terje Larsen, a Norwegian academic who had studied the Israel-Palestinian conflict and believed the climate was ripe for peace. Larsen was married to Mona Juul, a high-level Norwegian diplomat with expertise on the Middle East. Juul worked directly for Norway's Foreign Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, and was instrumental in persuading him that the PLO was serious about wanting to negotiate directly with Israel.(42) Stoltenberg committed the Norwegian government to full support of the secret channel and, when he left the foreign ministry in April 1993 to work for peace in Bosnia, his successor, Johan Joergen Holst, involved himself actively in the Oslo channel. Deputy Foreign Minister, Jan Egeland, also remained highly involved throughout. Egeland has been described as an idealist in the Scandinavian tradition,(43) and previous study at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem had led him to sympathize with Israel - yet he also possessed solid PLO contacts. Others involved included Marianne Heiberg, Holst's wife and an academic colleague of Larsen's, and trusted Foreign Ministry officials, such as Evan Aas and Geir Pederson. Egeland has observed that "This kind of cooperation between government and non-governmental institutions has become a 'Norwegian model'."(44)

The channel was characterized by a shared vision and acceptance of the necessity for an Israel-Palestinian agreement. The Norwegians were able to draw on this through their close links with both sides. Norway possessed excellent relations with Israel through the Socialist International and Norway's own trade union movement which was close to the Histadrut in Israel. Corbin adds that two-thirds of Norway's parliamentarians also belonged to the lobby group Israel for Peace.(45) The PLO leadership also had reason to trust the Norwegians who, while friendly to Israel, had striven to establish cordial links with the PLO.(46)

The personal trust each side held in the individual Norwegian facilitators built upon their good relations with Norway. The PLO had already had contact with Larsen and Juul, who had met with Arafat's brother Fathi while Juul was stationed in Cairo in 1989. Juul and Larsen had also met and been impressed with Abu Ala at this time. The PLO's trust in the Norwegians is evidenced by Abbas' statement that in December 1992, when he was considering the merits of the Oslo channel, a decisive point in its favor was that Norwegian involvement, in his words:

indicated a serious desire to keep the dialogue away from the eyes and ears of the media. Furthermore, the Scandinavian countries . . . did not arouse American sensibilities, because of their minimal political ambitions and their limited political influence.(47)

While the Israel Labor Party was still in the ranks of the opposition, Larsen had met with Beilin and discussed the idea of Norway facilitating secret meetings between Israel and the PLO with the aim of breaking the deadlock in the official talks. Beilin spoke of the possibility of a two-state solution or a loose Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian confederation; the commonality of this vision with Larsen's(48) paved the way for Beilin to approve Israel's participation in the tentative talks in Oslo.

The Norwegians took care to inform the United States of their intentions, even in the preparatory stages, as did the Israelis. Norway lacked the capability to offer the incentives and disincentives that superpowers traditionally use to change the equation of negotiations,(49) and the Norwegians were adamant that they "would act as a facilitator of secret talks, but would not attempt to mediate."(50) Corbin has argued that the Norwegians differed from the U.S. officials, in that they would not actually participate in the negotiations or suggest routes that should be taken.(51) Rather, they would remain outside the negotiating room, though remaining available if needed for help and to offer and receive briefings with both sides,(52) Larsen and Juul would organize the meetings, Egeland would sometimes attend, and Holst often arranged to meet with the separate delegations in his home after each round, taking time to listen without trying to influence them.(53) Abu Ala, chief PLO negotiator, stressed the importance of Norwegian neutrality.(54)

Unlike the Americans, the Norwegians placed great emphasis upon the prenegotiation phase, in which trust and a sense of mutual seriousness is established between participants. They felt that the absence of a successful prenegotiation phase had contributed to the failure of the Washington channel because there was no personal trust or emotional investment in the talks that might have smoothed over difficulties.(55) Juul and Larsen implemented their theory of building trust via small groups,(56) an emphasis they maintained even beyond the Oslo channel itself.(57)

The Norwegians consciously attempted to create an atmosphere conducive to social interaction between the negotiators, and they placed great importance on physical space, carefully ensuring that each delegation was allocated facilities of an equal standard.(58) Circumstances also necessitated that the Norwegians act as mediators in the non-spatial arena of telecommunications. Since there was no direct phone connection between Israel and Tunisia, Larsen assumed a go-between role when the talks were not in session. This provided the Norwegians with some leeway in selecting or adapting the phrasing, emphasis and interpretation of the messages being passed.(59) The Norwegians also acted as physical go-betweens on several occasions, for example when Hoist traveled from Tunis to Jerusalem in September 1993 with Arafat's official letter recognizing Israel.

The sort of information the Norwegians conveyed to each side is perhaps indicated by Abbas' account of a telephone call from Larsen on 12 April 1993. At this time, the channel was still in the prenegotiation phase. Abbas quotes Larsen as informing the PLO that "Rabin said this channel is the most important and that the negotiations now have full authorization." While this could be a reflection of Larsen trying to boost PLO morale, it is more likely to be an exaggeration on Abbas' part. As noted previously, Rabin regarded Washington as the optimal track until late-July/August 1993. Only then, as Hirschfeld noted, did it become fully evident that the PLO "was willing to come to an agreement on practically all our terms."(60) Similarly, Abbas' contention that Larsen told him that Rabin and Peres regarded the PLO as their most important partner, and that the Americans considered Oslo to be "the crucial channel,"(61) is probably also exaggerated. Abbas does not explain why, had this been the case, the Americans were so surprised by Oslo's success.

A vital factor for the Norwegians in setting up the channel was:

the willingness of both the Palestinians and the Israelis to approach the talks in good faith. They had to be ready to do a deal; then the Norwegians would be prepared to help them reach an accommodation, by building trust and using their unbiased stance to interpret and clarify positions when the going became difficult.(62)

The sense of good faith and community that the Norwegians cultivated between the participants was pivotal to the progress of the channel. It also, possibly inadvertently, aided Israel. As the most powerful actor in the channel, Israel undoubtedly fostered an impression of goodwill in order to increase its bargaining power. As one example, Ron Pundik has recalled that, as academics rather than officials, he and Hirschfeld possessed an advantage in that "We could put ourselves on the so-called emotional side," and reassure the PLO that "We are not officials, so we are not going to throw you down the drain." This, Pundik has confirmed, helped to temper Palestinian demands and exemplified a good cop/bad cop paradigm.(63) An aspect of the PLO's weakness at Oslo was that it accepted verbal reassurances rather than striving for all guarantees to be defined in the Declaration of Principles. Good faith was essential to the course of the negotiations, but the use of it was neither unequivocal nor unfailingly well-intentioned. The Israelis demonstrated that good faith can be as powerful a negotiating technique as any other.

DID NORWAY IMPLEMENT A U.S. AGENDA?

The Oslo channel would not have been successful had the PLO and Israel not regarded Norway as a disinterested party. While this worked to the Oslo channel's advantage, it did not allow Norway wide operational latitude. Strict parameters were set by the asymmetrical relationship between the negotiating parties, and Washington's strategic interest in the region and its alliance with Israel. The United States' blessing was essential if any agreement was to be implemented. The Oslo participants were aware of the potential for the Americans to scuttle a deal if they felt that the actors were too independent, or that U.S. regional control was threatened.

Considering the American wariness of 'interference' from other powers, particularly the Europeans, whom the U.S. perceived as a potential threat to its dominance of the Middle East, Noam Chomsky has contended that, at Oslo:

Europe's only role was to implement American rejectionism, which is the role that Norway played. Then, of course, as soon as the agreement was made, it was immediately shipped back to Washington where the money and the power are, and the US took over.(64)

While Chomsky is correct in noting that Washington swiftly appropriated supervision over the Oslo process, his assessment of Norway's role is more contentious. The Oslo Accords certainly embody an American-Israeli blueprint, but to what degree can Norway be held responsible for this? There is no simple answer to this question, which requires an analysis of the extent to which Norway acted according to U.S. interests, supported Israeli interests, and whether neutrality in this case constitutes complicity.

The Norwegians were highly sensitive to American interests in the Middle East. Larsen understood that the United States' strategic aim was to shift the region towards pro-Western secularism, centered on a core axis of cordial relations between Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinians, hopefully to be followed by Syria and Lebanon, and eventually encompassing Iraq (post-Saddam Hussein). The U.S. recognized that an Israel-Palestinian peace was fundamental to the stability of the core axis.(65) This basically accords with Chomsky's assessment of fundamental U.S. goals, as follows:

The US always had a certain strategic perception of the region in which the main concern was obviously control over . . . the profits from the oil. . . . The general arrangement that the US would like to implement is to bring Syria into it, to subdue the Palestinian problem, which has been an irritant. It's been hard for the dictatorships to bring the deal with Israel out in the open. As long as the Palestinian issue isn't settled, they face problems with their populations. But, if they can put that to one side and leave the job to the PLO, then they can move to bring to the surface the tacit relationships that have existed all along . . . this is part of the reason why the US is so intent on making sure that this thing [Oslo] works.(66)

According to Maher El Kurd, the Oslo negotiations did not differ greatly from those in Washington since participants were aware that they could not deviate from the Madrid formula, and were reminded of this by Egeland, who possessed a keen grasp of the realities of U.S. power. When the Oslo participants would occasionally try to go outside this framework, El Kurd has recalled, Egeland would tell them "no, you have rules, a specific frame of reference you cannot cross."(67) Egeland also stressed the importance of keeping the U.S. updated about the Oslo process, arguing that the Americans would not permit the implementation of an agreement reached without their involvement. Thus, El Kurd has aptly referred to the U.S. as a fourth player in the Oslo talks,(68) and there was a clear understanding that in return for its support for the Oslo Accords the U.S. would obtain the glory and host the signing ceremony (at which the Norwegians were thoroughly marginalized). While the U.S. was not willing to impose a settlement during the Washington talks, it retained sufficient power to veto any solution that clashed with its vision or deprived it of a central role in the region.

That the participants were aware of this possibility is evidenced by Abu Ala's minutes (published by Abbas) of talks in Norway on 6 July 1993.(69) The minutes claim that the "Israelis were very worried that the Americans would wreck" the Oslo agreement, "just as they had torpedoed the (Hussein-Peres) London agreement of 1987 for purely internal reasons, especially since negotiations were now being directly held with the PLO."(70) Revealingly, Abbas has placed great significance on Israel's rejection of the 30 June 1993 American draft declaration of principles: "We too found it lacking but we had to discuss it so as not to offend the American Administration. It seemed that the Israelis shared our views."(71)

When Stoltenberg had presented Christopher with a copy of the first draft declaration of principles emerging from Oslo, on 28 February 1993, he had been careful to portray the Oslo track as complementary to Washington. According to varying accounts, Christopher's response was either "noncommittal,"(72) or positive, promising follow-up discussions that did not materialize.(73) In May 1993 Holst briefed Christopher, informing him that the channel had been upgraded to official level and reassuring him that "Norway would not upstage the US or the Washington process."(74) While the Americans were never actively involved in the Oslo channel, Christopher and other U.S. officials were regularly briefed on the progress of the negotiations, though they were nevertheless stunned when Peres revealed to them that a declaration of principles had been agreed to and initialed in Oslo.

Abbas has also noted that the Norwegians went beyond the role of facilitators as they were drawn into the dynamics of the channel and the need to keep it going:

We saw them go . . . right up to direct intervention between the negotiators: to reconcile viewpoints and provide suggestions, alternatives and sometimes different scenarios. They adopted the role of a full partner in the negotiations. . . . Sometimes they would travel to gain first-hand understanding of the thoughts of the leaderships of the negotiating teams and to try to convince them of what their representatives had brought to the negotiating table.(75)

This is evidenced by events occurring towards the end of the channel; particularly the July crisis and the negotiations over mutual recognition, which took place between the initialing and signing of the Declaration of Principles.

On 10 July 1993 both the Israelis and Norwegians were optimistic about the prospects of soon arriving at an agreement. The PLO, however, unexpectedly presented a new draft for consideration that contained around twenty-five new demands, among them that the PLO would have control over an extraterritorial passage linking Gaza and Jericho.(76) The Israelis refused to even negotiate the new demands and the stalemate continued to the next day and so participants returned home. Although some of the PLO demands were minor, some were considered "outrageous" by the Israelis, particularly the demand for Palestinian control over the physical corridor.(77)

The channel could well have collapsed at this point but the Norwegians refused to let it disintegrate. Foreign Minister Holst utilized a serendipitously scheduled official visit to Tunisia to confer with Arafat. Juul and Larsen accompanied him. Their intention was to gauge Arafat's seriousness about the channel.

Various accounts of the Oslo channel differ in their interpretation of this meeting and the extent to which Holst influenced the PLO to back down from its new demands, though all agree that the crisis was, at least temporarily, resolved by the visit. Makovsky has contended that, knowing Israel would not accept the PLO's demand, Holst "convinced Arafat to accept 'safe passage', otherwise known as 'guaranteed access'."(78) Corbin, on the other hand, has portrayed Holst as merely having "suggested they incorporate the term 'safe passage' into the agreement" and has noted that "Arafat seemed satisfied with this."(79) Abbas' account contains only the most oblique reference to the crisis, noting that Holst and Arafat "touched on various details related to the articles of the Declaration of Principles, especially the points of disagreement."(80) Abu Ala, who was present at the meeting, has denied that Holst tried to influence Arafat, maintaining that he merely wished to ascertain Arafat's seriousness about the Oslo process.(81) Larsen has confirmed Corbin's account, noting that Holst impressed on Arafat that the demand for PLO control over a physical air and land corridor connecting Gaza and Jericho was simply unacceptable to the Israelis, and that he persuaded Arafat to defer the issue to a later stage of negotiations, in line with the formula of stages established by the draft declaration of principles. Holst also suggested the inclusion in the declaration of principles of the term 'safe passage' between the autonomous areas, and this proved acceptable to Arafat.(82)

Following this meeting, the Norwegians flew to Israel and were personally able to reassure the Israeli leadership of Arafat's commitment to a negotiated agreement. They returned to Tunis and met again with Arafat and subsequently reassured the Israelis that he had agreed to drop the demand for PLO control over a connection route between Gaza and Jericho. The active intervention of the Norwegians overcame the gulf between the two sides, and the reassurance they were able to give to each of the other side's commitment was vital for the channel's survival. Abbas has confirmed this:

These intensive contacts undertaken by Holst . . . contributed to the reconciliation of viewpoints. Holst's honesty in relaying ideas and in choosing the subjects he discussed with both sides played an important role both in laying the groundwork for mutual trust and in consolidating that trust, a vital ingredient in reassuring each side of the other's intentions.(83)

Holst also played an important role in clarifying the language for the Israel-PLO mutual recognition agreement,(84) assuming a more direct involvement in these negotiations. Corbin has written that the "ground rules of non-active participation by the Norwegians were being changed"(85) at this time, though this dynamic had been evident since the July crisis. Corbin's account of meetings held in Norway as part of the mutual recognition negotiations, indicates that Holst was again willing to intervene to persuade the PLO to alter its position, so as to facilitate progress in the negotiations:

The two days at the Oslo Plaza were difficult. There were obvious tensions in the Norwegian ranks. Holst's approach, unlike Larsen's, involved spending time with each side alone and then sitting in with Savir and Abu Ala as they negotiated. Holst even gave a letter to the Palestinian suggesting it was time to give way on certain points. This aroused anger and suspicion that Holst was siding with the Israelis. Yet Holst was clearly anxious to get things moving; the Americans were talking of a signing ceremony within two weeks.(86)

In order to preserve the Oslo channel, Holst led the Norwegians beyond their original intention not to involve themselves in the actual process of negotiation. There is no doubt that Norway's tireless efforts kept the channel together. Norway thereby helped Israel to achieve its long-term strategic goals and enabled the PLO leadership to re-enter the spotlight, whatever the deleterious prospects of the deal for the Palestinians and the prospect of lasting peace. However, it could be argued that the Norwegians had very little influence over the content of the negotiations, with the possible exceptions discussed herein. Norway also had little to gain from deliberately implementing an American agenda nor any significant strategic interest in the nature of an agreement. What is apparent is that Norway was concerned to keep the proceedings within parameters that would be acceptable to the Americans. This stemmed from its understanding of the reality that, in order to succeed, an agreement had to have the support of the most powerful actor in the region.

Whether or not the Norwegians remained completely neutral, they nevertheless performed a valuable service for Israel. The secret talks, facilitated by a power that could not impose a solution on either party, enabled the unfettered expression of Israeli bargaining power whilst freeing Israel from obligation. As Peres notes, "we would negotiate with Arafat without acknowledging his authority. Absolute secrecy was a necessity, and the Norwegians were a gift from heaven."(87)

Norway's overall neutrality was central to the preservation of the Oslo channel. It may be argued that for a mediator to remain neutral in negotiations between unequal sides, and in which the stronger side is in contravention of international law, is to allow that party to impose its will. While this contention is applicable to the Oslo channel, the inevitable question arises: what could the Norwegians realistically have done to redress the imbalance between Israel and the PLO? Should they have employed their expertise and influence to help the PLO wring greater substantive concessions from Israel, or pressure the Israelis to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip? There can be no doubt as to the consequence of any such action; Israel would have swiftly aborted the Oslo channel.

The Norwegians' commitment to maintaining dialogue between Israel and the PLO, and their evident belief that each side wanted peace, both encouraged and necessitated a broadly neutral stance, in which pressure may have appeared necessary to contain PLO demands within limits acceptable to Israel. There is no indication that Norway was acting upon motives other than employing its good offices to utilize a unique opportunity to bring the two enemies together. On the contrary, it appears that the Norwegians generally acted in good faith and anticipated that the so-called 'Oslo spirit', the personal camaraderie that permeated the negotiations, would engender lasting good relations between the PLO and Israel. That the PLO certainly took the Israeli delegation's verbal assurances as concrete guarantees is clear; likewise, that the Israelis consciously used this as a bargaining technique. What is more surprising is that the Norwegians, with their solid understanding of the realities of power, should have accepted this also.

CONCLUSION

The Oslo Accords embody the fruits of negotiation between two markedly unequal partners. The realist nature of the Oslo blueprint lies at the core of the impediments to its securement of a just, lasting or comprehensive peace between Israel and the Palestinians. This is why an analysis of both the Washington and Oslo negotiations carries importance beyond the arena of academic study. The negotiations reveal much about the dynamics shaping the Middle East, and highlight the significance of a variety of factors affecting negotiations between adversaries, such as: levels of trust and commitment; a successful prenegotiation phase; the utility of overt and secret diplomacy; the balance of power between all parties; and, not least, the intentions and actions of a facilitating or mediating agent. William Quandt's observation that "Success as a mediator requires a feeling for process - the procedures for bringing the parties to the negotiations - and for substance,"(88) aptly reflects the Norwegian model. Norway's effectiveness in bringing the PLO and Israeli delegations together at Oslo denotes the necessity for constructive involvement on the part of a mediator. However; even the most adroit of mediators must have a basic commitment from the opposing parties to build upon. The Oslo talks reached an initial agreement primarily because Israel and the PLO had an overwhelming interest in their doing so, and because negotiations over the core issues were deferred. Oslo's chickens have now come home to roost; the end of the interim period has intensified pressure to address the deferred issues and commence the overdue final status negotiations. The opportunity to reach a permanent status agreement that has a realistic chance of succeeding depends upon the willingness of both sides to address the fundamental issues in an equitable and principled manner. Whether the United States will meet the challenge raised by final status talks, and succeed in bringing Israel and the Palestinian Authority together, hinges upon its inclination to engage with both parties and maintain a consistent approach based on a clear understanding that only a solution providing for a just settlement of the Palestinian issue, while also safeguarding Israel's security, will foster the emergence of regional stability.

This article has argued that the American and Norwegian roles were pivotal to the outcome of each channel. The U.S. consistently failed to pressure Israel to adhere to the basic international consensus on the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and in procedural matters it tended to adopt Israel's viewpoint and cater to its sensitivities. The Norwegians clearly did not favor one side over the other but their commitment to the maintenance of the Oslo channel apparently led them to influence the PLO to make concessions to Israel. As noted above, Norway's general neutrality within a framework of asymmetrical power arguably constitutes complicity in a solution that embodies the blueprint of the stronger actor. Thus, both channels in quite different ways favored the Israelis; the U.S. through its adoption of the Israeli agenda and reluctance to pressure Israel, and Norway because of its careful neutrality which provided a safe arena for Israel to optimize its bargaining power vis-a-vis a weakened and ill-prepared PLO. The alternative courses of action for either facilitator were fraught with difficulties. The U.S. administrations would have faced a powerful domestic lobby group and angered their ally in the Middle East, while the Norwegians would simply have faced the abandonment of the Oslo channel.

NOTES

1. It was the deferment of a decision over the core issues that allowed the two sides to agree at Oslo, but leaving the core issues still in hot dispute has only exacerbated tensions on the ground. Likewise, the frequent ambiguity of the language of the Declaration of Principles sparked conflict in ongoing negotiations, even though Abu Ala is quoted as saying that the vagueness and ambiguity of the Declaration of Principles was one of the strengths that made the initial agreement possible (see Lamia Lahoud, 'Larsen: Oslo's Still the Only Way to Go', The Jerusalem Post (23 August 1995), 7.

2. See Jeremy Salt, 'War by Other Means', Arena Magazine (December 1994-January 1995), 24-27.

3. 'James Baker's Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians, 18 October 1991'. Reprinted in William Quandt Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (New York & Berkeley: The Brookings Institution & University of California Press, 1993), 497-501.

4. Baker reiterated this in his letter of assurance to the Palestinians on 18 October 1991, stating that the "United States continues to believe firmly that a comprehensive peace must be grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace," (Baker, in Quandt, ibid).

5. Yair Hirschfeld, an Israeli negotiator in Oslo, has observed that Arafat's evident fear was that if Israel reached a deal via Washington then the Palestinian delegation would receive the glory and administer a Palestinian authority in the territories. Arafat, therefore, maintained tight control over the Washington talks; he would let them take two steps then pull them back in order to prove to the Israelis that he was a better interlocutor than either the official delegation or Hamas (author's interview, 25 February 1997). Maher El Kurd, a PLO negotiator in Oslo, has confirmed that the 'internal' leadership posed a potential challenge to the PLO because they would be the ones to govern any autonomy deal produced by Washington. Thus, one motive for Oslo's strict secrecy was to avoid opposition from the Washington delegation (author's interview, 3 March 1997.)

6. Jan Egeland, 'Norway's Middle East Peace Channel - an Insider's View,' Security Dialogue 25, no. 3 (1994), 349-351.

7. Dennis Ross, 'From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond', Address to the National Association of Arab Americans (Abridged) 29 October 1993, in The Season of Peace: The Israeli-Palestinian Accord and the U.S. Commitment to the Middle East Peace Process (n.a., n.p, 1994), 24.

8. Baker, in Quandt, op. cit.

9. Hanan Ashrawi This Side of Peace (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) 117-118. Mahmoud Abbas writes that there "was a slight improvement on the matter of Palestinian representation in the fourth round. On 10 February 1992 Secretary of State James Baker sent a letter to Faisal Husseini in his capacity as the head of the Palestinian team in the peace conference. We considered this a positive step taken by the American Administration regarding Palestinian representation at the conference." (Mahmoud Abbas Through Secret Channels (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1995), 89). Just why this symbols over substance effort by the U.S. was considered a positive step is less certain. The later official inclusion of Husseini in the delegation was apparently facilitated by Shimon Peres, who perceived Husseini as a moderate with whom Israel could negotiate, in quiet collusion with the Americans. Due to his longstanding rivalry with Rabin, Peres suggested to Christopher in February 1993 that Rabin would be more amenable to the idea if it was suggested by the U.S.: "Peres' subterfuge proved successful when, during the prime minister's first trip to Washington in early March to meet with President Bill Clinton, Rabin assented to 'Christopher's' proposal to include Husseini in the talks." (David Makovsky Making Peace with the PLO (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996) 25-26). The U.S. also proved more forthcoming when it granted Nabil Sha'ath, who coordinated the negotiations for the PLO, a visa to the U.S. in January 1992.

10. See 'Secretary of State James Baker, Letter to Faisal Husseini, Washington, D.C., 10 February 1992', reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies 21, no. 4 (Summer 1992), 167.

11. Camille Mansour, 'The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Overview and Assessment', Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no. 3 (Spring 1993, 5-31), 15.

12. 'Secretary of State James Baker, Letter to Faisal Husseini, Washington, D.C., 10 February 1992', op. cit.

13. See 'U.S. Draft of 'Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement', Washington, D.C., 12 May 1993', reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no. 4 (Summer 1993), 158-159; and, 'U.S. Draft of 'Israeli-Palestinian Joint Declaration of Principles', Washington, D.C., 30 June 1993, reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies 23, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), 111-113.

14. As Mansour has noted, "For whereas Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon were to conclude a final settlement with Israel as quickly as possible, the Palestinians had to negotiate in two separate stages - the first to reach an agreement on five-year "interim self-government arrangements" in the occupied territories, and the second to reach a final settlement based on resolution 242 that would begin only in the third year of the interim period." (Mansour, op. cit., 6).

15. Donald Neff, 'The Clinton Administration and UN Resolution 242', Journal of Palestine Studies 23, no. 2 (Winter 1994, 20-30), 28.

16. Israel does not accept that UNSC Resolution 242 requires it to withdraw from all the occupied territories and it is has always been careful not to formally commit itself to the full implementation of land for peace and a return to the 1967 borders. According to PLO negotiator, Hassan Asfour, the PLO did attempt to insert a specification in the Oslo Declaration of Principles that it considered resolution 242 as embodying the principle of 'land for peace' but the Israelis refused to accept this. (Hassan Asfour, author's interview, 17 March 1997).

17. Editorial comment, Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no. 4 (Summer 1993), 158.

18. Corbin has noted that Abu Ala proposed that Israel should renounce violence and terror (Jane Corbin Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Peace Between Israel and the PLO (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1994) 149), and Makovsky has maintained that the PLO wanted both sides to renounce terrorism and violence, which Israel rejected. (Makovsky, op. cit., 79).

19. Jeffrey D. Dillman, 'Water Rights in the Occupied Territories', Journal of Palestine Studies 19, no. 1 (Autumn 1989, 46-71), 59.

20. Dillman, ibid., 59.

21. Amr G. E. Sabet, 'The Peace Process and the Politics of Conflict Resolution', Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 4 (Summer 1998, 5-19), 5-6.

22. Maher El Kurd, author's interview, 20 March 1997.

23. Mohamed Heikal Secret Channels (London: Harper Collins, 1996), 449. Corbin's account concurs with this (Corbin, op. cit., 120). The genuine extent of Arafat's anger with the U.S. proposals is, however, implicitly questioned by Israeli negotiator Uri Savir's account. Based on what he says the Norwegians told him about the meeting, Savir writes: "At first, in the presence of his advisers, the chairman had laid on a grand performance, flaying the United States for its pro-Israel bias. But in a more intimate meeting (with only Abu Ala at his side), the Norwegians met a different, quite realistic Arafat." (Uri Savir The Process (New York: Random House, 1998) 42) Savir's account is reinforced by Mahmoud Abbas, who has written that: "I recall that many Palestinian negotiators and members of the follow-up committee had found it strange that I had treated the American draft with indifference and inattention, and that I had accepted all the amendments suggested to me by my colleagues without much thought. This apathy had been due to two considerations: first, I had known the Israeli position on it, and secondly, I had regarded the events in Washington as irrelevant when we had been on the verge of a breakthrough in Oslo." (Abbas, op. cit., 160).

24. Abbas, op. cit, 96.

25. See Mansour, op. cit., 30-31.

26. Abbas, op. cit., 97.

27. Maher El Kurd, author's interview, 3 March 1997.

28. Shimon Peres (with Arye Naor) The New Middle East (Longmead: Element Books, 1994) 9-10.

29. Peres, ibid, 9-10.

30. See Makovsky, op. cit., 64-66.

31. Corbin, op. cit., 145.

32. Makovsky, op. cit., 65. Makovsky has quoted from: Shimon Peres Battling for Peace: Memoirs (London: Orion Books, 1995) 343.

33. See Makovsky, op. cit., 74, n. 37.

34. Makovsky, op. cit., 74-75, n. 37.

35. Corbin, op. cit., 177.

36. Courageous decisions as defined by Sir Humphrey Appleby in the BBC Yes Minister and Yes Prime Minister television series. See also, Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay The Complete Yes Minister: The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister/By the Right Hon. James Hacker MP (London: BBC Books, 1989), and Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay The Complete Yes Prime Minister (London: BBC Books, 1989).

37. Haidar Abd al-Shafi, author's interview (conducted jointly with James Turpin), 17 March 1997.

38. Abbas, op. cit, 103.

39. Egeland, op. cit.

40. Abbas, op. cit., 96.

41. Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, Jan Egeland, has noted that "Several emissaries from chairman Arafat had therefore signaled to us already in 1991 the PLO interest in direct negotiations with Israel." (Egeland, op. cit.).

42. Lawrence Joffe Keesing's Guide to the Middle East Peace Process (London: Cartermill International, 1996), 301.

43. Joffe, op. cit., 268.

44. Egeland, op. cit.

45. Corbin, op. cit., 18.

46. This was under Thorvald Stoltenberg who, while deputy foreign minister, had visited Arafat in 1981. Arafat had appealed to him to aid the PLO in establishing direct links with the Israel Labor Party. Though Israel's response was not favorable Stoltenberg continued his efforts. (Corbin, op. cit., 18).

47. Abbas, op. cit., 113.

48. Corbin, op. cit., 21.

49. Makovsky, op. cit., 15.

50. Heikal, op. cit., 436.

51. Corbin, op. cit., 40.

52. Makovsky, op. cit., 22.

53. Abu Ala, author's interview, 19 March 1997.

54. Ibid.

55. Terje Larsen, author's interview, 3 February 1997. Israeli negotiator Yair Hirschfeld has emphasized the importance of understanding the Oslo channel in the context of its phases (author's interview, 25 February 1997), as has PLO negotiator Mailer El Kurd, who has added that the literature on Oslo has failed to sufficiently analyze the various stages of the negotiation process (author's interview, 3 March 1997).

56. Terje Larsen, author's interview, 3 February 1997.

57. Makovsky has revealed that in August 1995 Larsen and Juul were involved in secretly trying to build a channel between Binyamin Netanyahu and Yasir Arafat: "Larsen's interest in serving as a bridge between the new government and the Palestinian Authority stemmed from his fear that the peace process could collapse simply because nobody in the Netanyahu government knew the members of the Palestinian Authority. Without informal contacts, where relationships are formed and trust is built, formal talks would flounder." (David Makovsky, 'The Secret Back-Channel Talks that Led to the Arafat/Netanyahu Breakthrough', The Jerusalem Post. Reprinted in The Australia/Israel Review (13-27 May 1996), 6-8).

58. Terje Larsen, author's interview, 3 February 1997.

59. Ibid.

60. Yair Hirschfeld, author's interview, 25 February 1997. It has been well established in the literature that while Rabin consented to the Oslo track being upgraded in May 1993, he favored reaching an agreement via the Washington channel until either late July (Terje Larsen, author's interview, 3 February 1997), or August 1993.

61. Abbas, op. cit., 137.

62. Corbin, op. cit., 40.

63. Ron Pundik, author's interview, 12 February 1997.

64. Noam Chomsky, in Mouin Rabbani, 'The Standard Colonial Pattern: An Interview with Noam Chomsky', Race & Class 37, no. 2 (1995), 97.

65. Terje Larsen, author's interview, 21 February 1997.

66. Chomsky, op. cit., 97.

67. Maher El Kurd, author's interview, 3 March 1997.

68. Ibid.

69. There has been some contention about the extent to which the minutes published by Abbas are an accurate reflection of the meetings in Norway. Abu Ala has claimed that they are accurate, "After all, they are my minutes," (author's interview, 19 March 1997), while Yair Hirschfeld has stated that the minutes are not accurate or reliable (author's interview, 25 February 1997).

70. Abbas, op. cit., 159. Abbas has claimed he was struck by the Israelis' privately expressed criticism of the Americans, noting that they "named certain individuals in the American Administration whom they felt were trying to derail the Washington negotiations for personal reasons." (Ibid) Abbas has also stated that the Israelis were singling out Dennis Ross and saying that his efforts were motivated by "personal advantage." (Abbas, ibid, 167).

71. Abbas, ibid, 160.

72. Corbin, op. cit., 66.

73. Makovsky, op. cit., 27.

74. Corbin, op. cit., 96.

75. Abbas, op. cit., 104.

76. Corbin, op. cit., 116.

77. Ron Pundik, author's interview, 12 February 1997.

78. Makovsky, op. cit., 60.

79. Corbin, op. cit., 121.

80. Abbas, op. cit., 106.

81. Abu Ala, author's interview, 19 March 1997.

82. Terje Larsen, author's interview, 4 January 1999.

83. Abbas, op. cit., 108.

84. Makovsky, op. cit., 79.

85. Corbin, op. cit., 180. This dynamic, though, was apparent since July.

86. Corbin, ibid, p. 182. Tensions also arose following the official announcement of the existence of the Declaration of Principles when Holst and Egeland appeared at a press conference and "Holst called Larsen up to the table but not Juul, and also indicated that Heiberg had been a part of the team. This seemed to some as if history was already being rewritten," (ibid, 179).

87. Peres (1994), op. cit., 18.

88. Quandt, op. cit., 420. (Italics Quandt's).

Jacinta Sanders is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, Canberra, and a visiting postgraduate scholar in the Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne.