History repeated -- The Battles of Majuba (1881) and Spion Kop (1900): the art of war is at best a choice of difficulties.

In the twenty years between 1881 and 1901, the names Majuba and Spion Kop became widely known throughout the British Empire. Both battles were defeats, yet there were sufficient similarities to suggest that there is some validity to the cliche that `history repeats itself'. Perhaps in this Centenary Year of the Second Boer War it is instructive to consider two similar battles that occurred between the British Army and the Boer forces in two separate wars, namely the battle of Majuba Hill which took place on 28 February 1881 and effectively ended the war in favour of the Boer Republics; and the battle of Spion Kop which occurred on 24 January 1900, and although a victory for the Boers, the ultimate results were quite different from the earlier battle.

Majuba

An examination of the First Boer War shows that it was a war fought by the British, with limited resources and a diminishing political will. The British Government in London showed little enthusiasm for the conflict, and once news of the Majuba disaster was received, it quickly terminated hostilities and agreed to a settlement, which provided the Boer Republics with a large measure of independence.

When the British Army under General George Colley, moved into northern Natal in order to crush the local Boers, it was assumed that the introduction of a small regular force would soon put an end to the hostilities. Although Colley's army had been all but beaten at Laing's Nek on 28 January 1881, Colley doggedly pressed forward, with the intention of capturing the high ground at Majuba Hill, referred to by the Boers as Spitzkop and the Zulus as Amajuba `the hill of doves', the capture of which would probably render the Boer hold on Laing's Nek untenable. Unfortunately, as he left camp, Colley failed to disguise his intentions of a night march, thus alerting the Boer lookouts who occupied Majuba only during daylight hours, to the fact that his army was on the move.

Majuba can best be described as a forbidding old volcanic crag, which by its very size and shape, discourages occupation. The summit of Majuba consists of a saucer-like basin, with several knolls scattered along its kilometre long circumference. The approaches to the summit are hazardous, and in some places the near-vertical cliff faces suggest that scaling would be impossible. Colley decided to occupy Majuba by scaling the slopes from the direction of Imquela Col, which lay to the south of the summit. He assembled a force of almost 600 men, but made the mistake of selecting detachments from his army, rather than using one or preferably two of his complete regular battalions. To undertake a night approach march up a mountain such as Majuba was a hazardous enough enterprise and it would be difficult to maintain any semblance of coordinated command and control over the column. Colley's force included three companies (180 men) from the 92nd Regiment (Gordon Highlanders), three companies (150) from the 58th, two companies (150 men) from the 3rd/60th Rifles, and a naval detachment of 65 men led by Commander Romilly, RN. This hotch-potch force of 545 infantrymen and sailors, together with support troops, assembled on the night of 26 February 1881.

Under a cloak of secrecy, only matched by the darkness of the night, Colley's troops, carrying rifles at `the trail', each man burdened with 75 rounds ammunition, water and three days rations, left Mount Prospect camp at 10 pm. Few of the officers apart from Colley and several of his staff officers were even aware of their objectives due to an almost paranoiac fear of Boer spies. Although it would have been almost impossible to bring up any artillery quietly, it would have been possible to provide the force with rocket support. However, Colley confidently concluded, albeit incorrectly, that Majuba could be captured and held without the need for any other supporting fire.

By 1.30 am, the British force had commenced their final climb up the steep, rocky slopes which led to the summit. During the early climb a company of the 92nd Regiment under Captain Robertson, had been stationed south-east of the Majuba summit at Imquela Col to guard the route up to the summit. The steep, rocky ground soon forced the troops to change formation from fours to single file. The fact that it took until 3.30 am before the summit was reached, and about another hour before all the force was ensconced on the summit, gives an indication of the terrible conditions facing the climbers. The kilted Gordons in particular, suffered severely from the coarse thorny scrub and tall grass, which tore at their bare legs. The troops soon scattered across the vast plateau, and took up positions, but without establishing a cohesive defensive position, or digging in. Thomas Carter, the journalist who accompanied the force to Majuba, claims that although men did some digging, it was unsystematic, and suggests that this was due to Colley and his senior officers regarding their hold on the summit as unassailable. Colley sited the naval troops and about fifty men of the 58th Regiment in a central position on the plateau for use as a reserve in case of enemy attack. Despite the noisy ascent, Colley managed to adhere to at least one principle of war, that of surprise! However, Colley's haphazard siting of his force, meant that the high ground around the edges of the plateau was left undefended, an error which would later cost the lives of many soldiers as they were later picked off by Boer snipers. From their positions on Majuba, the British could see in the distance, the twinkling camp fires of the Boers at Laing's Nek.

When daylight broke at about 6 am on 27 February, the Boers moved from their customary positions on the lower slopes only to find that the summit was held by the Redcoats. The Boer commander, General Joubert, realising that the Boer hold on Laing's Nek would be threatened if the British were permitted to hold the vital ground of Majuba, ordered an immediate attack upon the summit. As the Boers crept nearer to the summit, their fire had so little effect on the British due to the saucer-shaped rim, which permitted most bullets to whistle ineffectually over the heads of the defenders, that by 9.30 am, Colley's staff officer sent a flag signal to the main camp at Mount Prospect (about 10 km SE of Majuba), advising, `All very comfortable. Boers wasting ammunition'. These comfortable conditions were soon to change, as small parties of Boers climbed up the steep gullies, which were usually in dead ground and thus invisible to the defenders, until by late morning they were able to bring aimed rifle fire upon the exposed British troops.

The outer positions were gradually forced inwards, and since no attempt had been made by Colley to coordinate his hold on the summit, the Boers successfully nibbled away at the British position. When Lieutenant Ian Hamilton of the Gordons sought Colley's permission to launch a bayonet attack in an attempt to restore the position, Colley refused to countenance such a move. With Commander Romilly dead, the British hold on the summit was collapsing as the Boers, by skilfully using fire and movement, crept safely from rock to rock. By early afternoon, Colley was killed, and the thirsty, bewildered British troops having taken many casualties, and bereft of senior leadership, were starting to panic. By mid-afternoon, British soldiers were retreating from the plateau, content to leave Majuba in Boer hands. British losses that day totalled 96 killed, 132 wounded and 56 captured, while Boer losses were two killed and five wounded.

The humiliation was followed by a capitulation by the Gladstone Government which saw the Transvaal being granted self government, a perceived slur upon the British Empire, which was not erased until the British victory at Paardeburg exactly 19 years later.

There were several reasons for the British defeat:

* A faulty reconnaissance of the objective, and an almost total unawareness of the limitations of the ground to be occupied.

* The attacking force was a makeshift, disorganised force composed of seamen, and troops from three different battalions, with regimental officers lacking knowledge of what was required of them. Lieutenant Ian Hamilton who was recommended for the Victoria Cross for his role during the battle, observed that: `Behind the force that scaled Majuba Hill stood no tradition, no cohesion, no confidence. A common interest even was lacking, for no one had been told what was happening. Neither order nor superior officer came near my part of the line from first to last.'

* The lack of any orders from Colley to dig in and prepare a defensive position.

* No fire support plan, no artillery, rockets or Gatling guns to assist in the defence.

* Once Majuba was captured, Colley's refusal to bring up reinforcements from Mt Prospect, removed any chance of holding on throughout the day.

Let us now consider the battle of Spion Kop, a major British defeat of the Second Boer War.

Spion Kop

The Battle of Spion Kop was conducted over 24-25 January 1900, only 19 years after the defeat on Majuba Hill. Like the earlier war, the Boers had inflicted a series of heavy defeats upon the British, particularly during the period known as `Black Week'. General Sir Redvers Buller, VC, a veteran of the Zulu and First Boer Wars, was advancing toward Ladysmith with the aim of relieving the town, which had been under siege by the Boers since 2 November 1899. Having successfully crossed the Tugela River, at two places, Potgeiter's and Trichardt's Drifts, Buller was faced by a series of natural obstacles--the ridges of Tabanyama and Spion Kop, which posed the last major obstacles to his advance to Ladysmith. Having failed in an attempt to capture Tabanyama on 20 January, Lieutenant General Clery was urged by General Warren to make a further attempt on the following day. This attack likewise failed, due to the entrenchments dug by the Boers under the command of General Louis Botha. Buller's army, which was now north of the Tugela, was constantly harassed by shell fire from the Boer positions.

General Buller, exasperated by the lack of progress, told General Warren, that unless he attacked, his force would be withdrawn across the Tugela, Warren, faced with this ultimatum, agreed to a compromise plan which involved an attack on Spion Kop, located to the east of Tabanyama. If the attack were successful, Tabanyama would quickly be quickly captured or abandoned by the Boers. Although a formidable obstacle, it was hoped that the sheer difficulty of such a climb by a large body of men, would persuade the Boers to hold Spion Kop with a minimal force. As with Majuba, surprise would the key to capturing the summit, but alas, like Majuba, the attackers failed to bring up any artillery to support their position once daylight arrived. The obvious similarities of the two hills prompted Lieutenant Colonel Charles a'Court, one of Buller's staff officers attached to Warren's column, to enhance Warren's plan by arranging for artillery support to commence as soon as the summit was captured.

Warren entrusted the task of capturing Spion Kop to Major General Sir E Woodgate and his Lancashire Brigade. During the night of 23/24 January, Woodgate's force of some 1,800 rain drenched men from the 2nd Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment (part of Thorneycroft's Horse), and troops from the Connaught Rangers, the Imperial Light Infantry and the Royal Engineers, marched from camp in fours, then at about midnight, led by Colonel Thorneycroft (of Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry), started climbing the mist-covered steep slopes of Spion Kop in single file. Shortly before 4 am, they overwhelmed the Boer sentries of the Vryheid Commando, with the loss of only ten men wounded, and took possession of what they thought was the summit. Prior reconnaissance would have revealed the true configuration of Spion Kop, but unfortunately the summit of Spion Kop remained a mystery to Woodgate and his troops, due to the thick mist that covered the feature for another three hours.

The main summit of Spion Kop was roughly 700 x 350 metres, with a smaller plateau of 200 x 200 in the centre. Five distinct peaks existed along the feature, and the further peculiarities of the ground were to have dire consequences for Woodgate. At the western end of Spion Kop lay a smaller plateau some seven metres lower than the main summit, 700 metres to the north was Conical Hill, and on the eastern side was a small saddle leading to Aloe Knoll, only 400 metres away from the summit. Some three kilometres further east were the peaks of Drielingkoppe, known to the British as Twin Peaks. If Woodgate's men failed to capture and hold each of the three closer features, they would be brutally exposed to enemy fire, plus long range rifle fire from Twin Peaks, a fire that would enfilade any British troops seeking to reinforce Spion Kop.

Despite the heavy mist, Woodgate's men commenced to dig shallow trenches in preparation for the coming day--trenches that later in the day would prove fatal to their occupants, as the Boer rifle fire enfiladed their position. In addition, the British perimeter was too small and the trenches dug in the wrong position due to the fog. While the British were consolidating their precarious position, General Botha having been alerted to the presence of the British upon Spion Kop, took steps to remove this dangerous threat. However, Botha only had at his disposal, five field guns and two pom-poms, the firepower of which could safely harass the British but was unlikely to drive them from the summit. To achieve that aim, he would need to attack the summit with his burghers. Assaults of strongly-held enemy positions were, if possible, always avoided by the burghers, and Botha was mindful of the reluctance of his troops to engage in attacks that could lead to heavy casualties. Botha's predicament was temporarily solved when Hendrick Prinsloo and his Carolina Commando volunteered to capture the unoccupied Conical Hill and Aloe Knoll.

By 8 am, the mist had cleared and the hot African sun began to beat down on the soldiers atop Spion Kop. Although the Boers managed to capture the two adjacent hills, they failed in their attempts to wrest control of the summit from the British. Neither side at that stage realised the vulnerability of the British position. If only the summit had not been shrouded in fog, then Woodgate would have realised that Alop Knoll and Conical Hill would have to be captured and incorporated in the defensive line, and thus probably would have rendered any Boer attacks futile. But Botha's swift reaction ensured that these two features were denied to the British.

Throughout the morning, the Boer artillery from positions along the Tabanyama ridge, shelled the trapped British force. An added terror came from the rifle fire that swept over the shallow trenches, claiming any soul who ventured his head above the parapet. By 8.30 am, Woodgate had received a mortal wound to the head and command was reluctantly assumed by Colonel Crofton of the Royal Lancasters. Realising that the summit could not be held unless he was reinforced, Crofton sent the following dismal signal to General Warren: `Reinforce at once or all is lost. General dead'. In response to Crofton's plea, Warren despatched help. During the course of the morning, reinforcements in the form of the 2nd Battalions of the Dorset and Middlesex Regiments plus the Imperial Light Infantry, all under the command of Major General Talbot-Coke who was recovering from a broken leg, braved the enemy fire and climbed the mountain, only to be confronted by a chaotic situation. One officer wrote; `I crawled along a little way with half my company, and then brought up others in the same manner. The men of the different regiments already on the hill were mixed up, and ours met the same fate. It was impossible under the circumstances to keep regimental control. One unit merged into another'.

Once the mist had cleared, Buller and his staff could watch the battle upon Spion Kop. The situation was obviously desperate, and the somewhat timid Crofton was obviously not the man to maintain a resolute defence of the summit. Buller then suggested to Warren that he appoint Lieutenant Colonel Alex Thorneycroft to command of the summit. Thorneycroft was certainly a man recognised for his dynamic leadership, but the situation on Spion Kop, was soon to prove too much even for an officer of his talents. On this occasion, Warren responded to Buller's advice and sent a message up to Thorneycroft informing him that he had been promoted to brigadier general, but failed to advise Talbot-Coke, who had by now established his headquarters on the southern slopes of Spion Kop, that Thorneycroft had been placed in charge of the summit. Warren's communication lapses were soon to prove costly!

Attacks against the British trenches by the Boers, were fought off, but at the cost of casualties including prisoners. At 2.30 pm, Thorneycroft sent a message to Warren, seeking water and reinforcements and with a plea for action against the enemy guns. Warren conceded that ways had to be found to bring mountain guns up to the beleaguered summit. Confronted with the predicament on Spion Kop, Warren felt he could ease the pressure on his garrison by attacking the Boers at Tabanyama in the east, or at Twin Peaks to the west. Ignoring the obvious attack route to Tabanyama, possibly because of his earlier unsuccessful attacks, Warren chose to capture the formidable Twin Peaks. By shortly after 5 pm that afternoon, General Lyttleton's men of the 3rd Battalion, King's Royal Rifles had scrambled up and dislodged the Boer defenders from both the peaks, while the Scottish Rifles swung left to reinforce Spion Kop.

With the British now in possession of the main summit of Spion Kop as well as Twin Peaks, it appeared to many Boers that defeat was inevitable! During the night, General Shalk Burger withdrew his commandos from the battlefield and fled. Unfortunately, General Buller failed to recognise the predicament that faced the Boers following Lyttleton's advance and capture of Twin Peaks, and recalled the troops. Once darkness fell, the captors of Twin Peaks slowly and quietly made their way from the battlefield, little realising that their efforts that afternoon were to be the only successes of that fateful day.

Meanwhile, on Spion Kop, the situation had become critical. The lack of water, medical facilities and small arms ammunition was sapping the determination of the defenders. It was not until 9 pm on the night of 24 January that Warren despatched his engineer commander with a view to building emplacements for the mountain guns and two naval guns due to arrive by the following day. Warren also sent a message up to Coke, requesting him to report to Warren's headquarters, a decision that would leave Thorneycroft in sole charge of the shambles upon Spion Kop, though unbeknown to Thorneycroft, Coke had delegated his authority to Colonel Hill. In the late afternoon, Spion Kop received an unexpected visitor--Winston Churchill, journalist and part-time officer in the South African Light Horse. Bored by the inactivity due to Warren's reluctance to use his mounted troops, Churchill rode over to Spion Kop and climbed up close to the summit, noting that: `Men were staggering alone, or supported by comrades, or crawling on hands and knees. Corpses lay here and there'. Without climbing right up to the bullet-swept summit, Churchill hastily returned to Warren, where he expressed his concerns about the conditions on Spion Kop.

With the mountain now shrouded in darkness, Churchill volunteered to once again climb up Spion Kop and deliver a message to Thorneycroft, advising him that the naval guns and a large digging party were coming. When Churchill reached the summit, he found that although casualties had fragmented the battalions into small groups, morale was still holding. Churchill was dismayed to find that a shocked Thorneycroft had decided to evacuate the summit rather than lose the remainder of his troops once daylight reappeared. This decision was contested by Lieutenant Colonel Hill of the Middlesex Regiment, who disbelieved Thorneycroft's rapid promotion, and insisted that, as he was senior to Thorneycroft, command of the summit was in his hands, and opposed any evacuation of Spion Kop. None the less, Thorneycroft's view prevailed, and during the night, the remaining garrison of British troops silently made their way off the summit. The finale in this tragic comic opera, was that just as Thorneycroft neared the base of Spion Kop, he met up with the engineer officer who was bringing up the digging party for the guns. Although Colonel Sims urged Thorneycroft to return to the summit, he refused saying `I have done all I can'. Faced with the task of digging gun emplacements for a garrison which was no longer in possession of Spion Kop, Sims likewise withdrew. At 2 am on 25 January, Thorneycroft reported in to Warren. The confusion on Spion Kop had been compounded by Warren's reluctance to firmly assert his command, which led to a situation in which following Woodgate's death, Talbot-Coke, Crofton, Thorneycroft and Hill each thought that they were in command of the summit.

The Boers, who were facing a decisive defeat due to the capture of Twin Peaks, were also preparing to concede victory, particularly as many had already evacuated the area. Such an approach was anathema to Louis Botha, who managed to rally enough burghers to remain at Spion Kop and fight on despite the gravity of the situation. In the hours before dawn, the burghers started the climb up to their precarious positions near the British-held summit. Young Denys Reitz wrote how `almost unbelievably, defeat had turned to victory--the English were gone and the hill was still ours'. When Reitz reached the summit he found a ghastly sight: `In the shallow trenches where they had fought the soldiers lay dead in swathes, and in places piled three deep. The Boer guns in particular had wrought terrible havoc and some of the bodies were shockingly mutilated'.

British casualties at Spion Kop totalled 383 killed, 1,154 wounded and 305 missing or captured. Boer casualties were claimed to be 51 killed and 123 wounded. Thorneycroft's unexpected capitulation was to create an uproar in England, and subsequently led to the termination of the military careers of both Buller and Warren. In addition the conduct of the war, and in particular battles such as Spion Kop and Black Week, generated such public disapprobation that a Royal Commission was established and sat from October 1902 to June 1903.

The Battles of Majuba and Spion Kop, although different in scale, bear some uncanny resemblances to each other. Although the summits of both mountains were easily captured due to the element of surprise, other similarities such as the inadequate prior reconnaissance, abysmally poor communication with the base camp, lack of artillery support to assist in holding the summits, failure to suppress enemy shell and rifle fire, and inadequate entrenching, tend to confirm a view that history does repeat itself. At Majuba and Spion Kop, defeat may have been avoided if both commanders had made the effort to examine the actual configuration of the ground and adjust their defensive lines accordingly. In both battles the commanding generals paid the ultimate price. However, at Spion Kop, the final responsibility for the failure of the operation lay with the indecisive Generals Buller and Warren, not Woodgate. Over the last century, historians have harshly dealt with these generals. Amery attacked the `general feebleness, the palpable lack of will-power exhibited' by the two senior generals, while Conan Doyle pondered over Warren's failure to ascend Spion Kop and bring up reinforcements and engineers to dig deeper trenches. More recently, Nasson claims that `if there is an oddity about Spion Kop, it is that neither side grasped how badly its adversary was doing' and that `strategically ground lost or taken in this battle was of trivial significance' Perhaps the last word should rest with the hapless General Warren, who later claimed that `the retirement from Spion Kop is a unique episode in our military history, and seems unaccountable'.

These two military disasters, both in reality and public perception, tarnished the reputation of the British Army until the advent of the Great War of 1914-18, when the crippling losses of that conflict completely overshadowed these relatively insignificant South African battles.

Bibliography

Majuba

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Spion Kop

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Reitz, D, Commando, Faber & Faber, London, 1932.