History and Philosophy of Science.

Chair: Robert Hamilton, Mississippi College 

Vice-chair: Bud Donahue, Northwest Community College 

FRIDAY MORNING

Classroom C

8:00 FUNCTION IN BIOLOGY--WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

Robert Waltzer, Belhaven College, Jackson, MS 39202

The concept of function is foundational within any discussion of biology and other sciences. Function is considered the normal or characteristic action of a structure. For example, the heart pumps blood. But it also makes a thumpathumpa sound. We acknowledge that it does both, but we consider its main function to pump and view sound production as accidental. But what do we mean by accidental? Not planned? According to evolution nothing is planned. So even though both sound and pumping are a result of accident, one is a function of the heart and the other isn't. How can this be? In this presentation I will overview a number of views on function, consider their strengths and weaknesses, and consider the role of naturalism in understanding function. Accounts of function may be placed in 3 categories: (1) function as an explanation of why a structure is present (2) function as a causal contribution to a complex process (3) and function as a historical concept. In account 1, the heart is there because it pumps the blood. In account 2, the heart functions as a pump because it delivers blood through vessels to other vital systems. In account 3, the heart pumps because it did a similar action in ancestors of the organism in which it is found. Antiteleological naturalism limits discussion of function and a loosening of restrictions may lead to fruitful solutions.

8:30 SCIENCE IS SENSE, NON-SCIENCE IS NONSENSE NOT

S. Kant Vajpayee, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39406

Science truly makes sense since its results are verifiable everywhere. Does it therefore transpire that non-scientific knowledge is nonsense? I think not. Though we are mesmerized by the material world science has helped us create, the non-scientific world-both visible and invisible-remains fascinating to scientists and non-scientists alike. The visible world is full of phenomena we can't explain. For example, why do all the living things have the urge to procreate-probably the purpose of life itself? As scientists, we are deservedly proud of our achievements during the last three hundred years. But we must not be blind to our limitations, especially those of our senses that enable us to observe and experiment with nature. We are discovering that in comparison to our senses the mind is more powerful than the credit we have been giving it. Could it be that we are so focused on science having immediate utility, especially in a free-market economic system, that we are not letting our minds roam freely, beyond the scientific domain! While science finds the material world fascinating, non-science prefers the complexities of the immaterial one. Science helps us build and furnish a house, it is the non-science that renders the house a home. Science is powerful enough in explaining the material world, but fails miserably even in imagining anything beyond.

9:00 SCIENCE'S CONSCIENCE: THE METAEPISTI-MOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM

Michael Dodge, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39406

All forms of skepticism make knowledge their primary concern; for this alone, they should never be flippantly rejected. This presentation will focus on metaepistimological tools that enable philosophers to analyze epistemological claims, specifically the 'modes' developed by Pyrrhonian skeptics, in the attempt to avoid scientific dogmatism-overconfidence in the certainty of scientific propositions. Science is filled with propositions; for example: Matter on Earth is accelerated towards the globe's center at -9.8 m/s2. In some cases, the belief that x is certain can be justified; however, this is not the same as claiming x's certainty, thus it may be concluded that justified belief, even justified true belief, is not a sufficient condition for the metaepistimological claim that we have knowledge of epistimically interesting propositions (such as the future can/cannot be known; other minds can/cannot be known). This is pertinent, since lapsing into dogmatism can put up a shield of protectionism over any given scientific discourse, making it more difficult to investigate seemingly outlandish claims that could, upon further investigation, open up new roads to scientific knowledge. I will show Pyrrhonian methods cause us to balk at proclaiming knowledge as certain, but instead will argue that we might have knowledge, which I equate with 'scientific knowledge'. I conclude that Pyrrhonian skepticism is a tool to enhance scientific knowledge, and that skepticism as a philosophy should be carefully considered by scientists and philosophers alike as Science's conscience.

9:30 Break

9:45 DARWIN'S THEORY OF SEXUAL SELECTION: A HISTORY

John D. Davis, Mississippi Museum of Natural Science, Jackson, MS 39202

Darwin recognized that Natural Selection could not account for differences in the ornamentation and behavior of the sexes in many animals. In 1871 he proposed his theory of Sexual Selection operating at two levels (1) same sex competition and (2) mate choice. The abolitionist Darwin proposed that sexual selection could account for the origin of human "races" from a common ancestor and used this concept to oppose pro-slavery 'polygenists" who claimed that human "races" were separate species. Sexual Selection was the first "scientific" defense of the equality of humankind and ascribed human variation to female choice! A.R. Wallace broke with Darwin over Sexual Selection. The Peckham's (1889) study of female choice in jumping spiders was the only 19th century work supporting Sexual Selection. In 1930 the mathematical geneticist Ronald Fisher proposed a model for the origins of mate choice and its consequences as "runaway selection." Little research was done in this area until R. Trivers (1972) concept of parental investment; the time, or energy expended to aid the survival and reproduction of one offspring at the expense of other requirements. Parker (1979) showed that mating systems may lead to antagonistic coevolution with adaptations in one sex being detrimental to the other (Sexual Conflict Theory). An immense experimental literature (2,400,000 references in Google alone) now exists on the role of Sexual Selection in genetics, evolution and social systems.

10:15 A REVIEW OF THE NEW SYSTEMATICS 

Robert Hamilton, Mississippi College, Clinton, MS 39058

The ongoing discussion of species has begged the introduction of the basic species concept in biology. Ernst Mayr's species concept as described in the the new systematics developed in the mid 20th century seems to have been forgotten. The new systematics requires the description of the range of variation present among the populations of species. The typological species concepts that pre-date the new systematics were supplanted by the new systematics at the time. It appears, however, that many philosophers have forgotten the new systematics when presenting arguments as to the meaning and use of species concepts in general. The basic definition of a species as a group of potentially interbreeding individuals still stands as a viable concept in an evolutionary sense, and as such still stands as a central concept in biological theory.

10:45 Break

11:00 THE BIOLOGICAL SPECIES UNDERSTOOD AS A RELATIONSHIP OF PARTS TO A WHOLE

Paula Smithka* and Kenneth J. Curry, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39406

Philosophical accounts of biological species cast them either as concrete individuals explained in terms of parts to a whole or as concepts explained in terms of members to a set. The current most popular philosophical argument for biological species taxa, i.e., groups of organisms with a formal binomial name, cast the species as an individual explained in terms of concrete parts of a concrete whole. We argue here that understanding species taxa as parts to a whole is misleading. The popularity of this approach may lie in the notion that concrete things, because they are more tangible than conceptual things, offer more compelling accounts of similarity. The species-as-an-individual thesis is a part to whole argument by analogy. Cells are to organisms as organisms are to species. We argue that the analogy is flawed and leads to various confusions. Consider this example. Parts of wholes are also properties of the whole when taken in the context of possession by the whole. Hence a tree has leaves (possession) and a leaf is a part of a tree. Leaves can be specific, individual properties of a particular tree or they can be generic properties of trees in general. Note that (some) individual properties are concrete parts, while generic properties are always abstractions. But a species cannot have individual properties, so the species as an individual is characterized by generic (abstract) properties. If the properties are all abstractions, the species cannot be a concrete individual; it must be conceptual.

11:30 THE BIOLOGICAL SPECIES UNDERSTOOD AS A RELATIONSHIP OF MEMBERS TO A SET

Kenneth J. Curry* and Paula Smithka, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39406

We argued in the accompanying presentation that the popular account of species taxa found in terms of parts to a whole as embodied in the notion of the species as an individual is misleading. Here we argue that a more compelling account is found by explaining species conceptually in terms of members to a set. We start by arguing that a compelling account of similarity among organisms considered members of a species flows from W. V. Quine's argument for natural kinds. The world the way it is contains certain patterns that are more likely to obtain than others. We recognize these similar patterns as natural kinds. Richard Boyd suggested that species are that type of natural kind he called a homeostatic property cluster kind (HPCK). By this he meant that certain groups of properties tend to occur together and hold together. Here homeostasis is a metaphor. The homeostatic property cluster kind does not require any particular property for admission to the group. Membership is based on having a large number of the properties recognized as the core of the cluster. Boyd's concept only applies to living members of extant species. This is the horizontal dimension of species. We refine Boyd's concept by considering the vertical dimension of species as embodied in ancestral lineage. The HPCK seen in both horizontal and vertical dimensions represents a compelling account of biological species taxa.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON

Classroom C

1:30 LINGUISTIC AND ONTOLOGICAL CONFUSIONS IN THE SPECIES-AS-INDIVIDUALS HYPOTHESIS

Paula Smithka, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39406

In the recent debates concerning the ontological nature of species taxa, the species-as-individuals (SAI) hypothesis has gained much popularity. Michael Ghiselin and David Hull have argued that because species taxa are like individual organisms, they are historical entities, i.e., they have a beginning and an end, a birth and a death. Hence, species taxa must be individuals and not natural kinds or classes, as Michael Ruse and Martin Mahner and Mario Bunge maintain. More recently, Keith A. Coleman and E. O. Wiley have defended the SAI hypothesis, based on the way biologists actually talk about species. Coleman and Wiley suggest that when biologists use the term 'species', they use it as a singular term. For example, when biologists say, "Species are the units of evolution," the term 'species' here is not a general term; it is really a singular term. Furthermore, they suggest that binomial terms are indispensable in biological theories and biologists' general discourse. Therefore, species taxa are denoted by binomials. Hence, SAI is true. Even though Coleman and Wiley are correct in their observations concerning biological talk about species taxa, and in their claim that binomial terms cannot be replaced by descriptive or predicative phrases, their "objectual account" of species taxa falls prey to a simple category mistake. Simply because biologists, (or anyone else for that matter), happen to employ grammatical subject terms to denote (or refer to) an object, does not imply they necessarily denote an object. Merely because we employ language in ways that suggest we are referring to "things," does not guarantee that we are actually referring to concrete, real, individual things.

2:00 JAMES BLUNDELL: FATHER OF HUMAN TO HUMAN TRANSFUSION

Carolyn Beck, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39406

The documented history of blood transfusion dates to the 1600s beginning with the transfusion of blood from one dog to another by Richard Lower. These early experiments were expanded by Jean Denys in France with the transfusion of blood from sheep or calves to humans. When his fourth patient died of the treatment, Denys was charged with murder and malpractice by the victim's wife. Although Denys was later exonerated, the scientific and medical societies of England, France and Italy outlawed transfusion. Although transfusions were discussed in medical literature in the mid-1700s, the procedure was not revived until 1818 by the British physiologist and physician James Blundell (1790-1878). Blundell is credited with publishing the first articles describing the benefits and mechanics of performing human to human transfusion. Between 1825 and 1830 Blundell performed a series of transfusions in an attempt to save women with severe postpartum hemorrhages. Blundell adressed problems of transfusion such as clotting and described in his publications mechanical devices he developed. The success rate of these transfusions was not high due to the lack of knowledge concerning ABO blood groups and the severity of blood loss before therapy was instituted. Other physicians have been cited as performing human to human transfusions earlier than 1818, but their attempts were not documented or published. Therefore, James Blundell is regarded as the father of blood transfusion.

2:30 Divisional Business Meeting

2:45 THE BIOLOGICAL "INDIVIDUAL": PHILOSOPHICAL RUMINATIONS ON AN ENDURING QUANDARY

Malachi Martin* and Michael Dodge, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39406

How are biological organisms individuated? The commonsense or concrete notion of individuality suggests that the biological "individual" is a singular, discrete, spatiotemporally bounded entity. Metazoan organisms are easy to individuate on this basis, but a variety of biological entities challenge the concrete notion of individuality; for example, some fungi and colonial organisms which lack obvious boundaries. Linguistic confusions compound the problem (for example, by equating "individuals" with "particulars"), and discussions of Darwinian "individuals" as units of selection lead us into quite disparate philosophical territory. Casting what might be termed "conceptual individuals" as legitimate, concrete individuals leads to further confusions (enter the species-as-individuals thesis). Some biologists and philosophers of biology have attempted to embellish a useful notion of concrete individuality for myriad kinds of organisms. In his book "Biological Individuality," Jack Wilson (1999) advances multiple types of individuation, and in an article of the same title, De Sousa (1997) proceeds from the concept of a "minimal individual" as a "potentially competitive space-occupier." However, such approaches exemplify the difficulties inherent in any approach to individuation which nets all species and is biologically useful without pluralizing notions of individuality or furnishing overly simplistic requisites. It is our contention that useful criteria for individuation should remain remain constant in all essentials while possessing sufficient plasticity to account for all taxa.

3:15 THE HAND ON THE WEDGE: ANTI-MATERIALISM, INTELLIGENT DESIGN, AND THE PROSPECTS OF CULTURE

Malachi Martin, Unversity of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39407

The Intelligent Design (ID) movement is perhaps the most sophisticated offshoot of creationism. Organizations like the Discovery Institute have recently won modest victories in states such as Ohio, where high school biology curricula have been modified to reflect so-called objectivity in teaching evolution. The emphasis is on science, not the Bible, and ID precludes religious connotations in favor of "teaching the controversy." How have these efforts influenced the ongoing controversy and how do they differ with respect to classic creationist approaches? Understanding the philosophical arguments of the ID movement, its aims and goals, is crucial for scientists who may be confronted with the issue. Contemporary ID seeks to drive a wedge into scientific materialism, contending that materialism delimits science and is corrosive to our culture and values. ID also seeks to compel the scientific community to cede ground to the possibility of supernatural explanations and argues that school curricula should be reorganized to reflect actual controveries over evolution. If the goal is to drive a wedge into materialism by discrediting evolution, then the "thin end" of the wedge is, as the Discovery Institute has proclaimed, the supposed scientific evidence in favor of ID. It then becomes apparent that the hand steadying the wedge is a holdover from creationism: Moral and existential qualms over evolution, its negative impact on culture and society, and broader philosophical misgivings over methodological materialism.