Hiroshima & Nagasaki: one necessary evil, one tragic mistake.

Winston Churchill and Harry Truman found biblical metaphors to describe their first reaction to the atomic bomb. Churchill asked rhetorically, "What was gunpowder? Trivial. What was electricity? Meaningless. This atomic bomb is the Second Coming in Wrath!" Truman reflected in his daily journal, "We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley era, after Noah and his fabulous ark."

America's use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki fifty years ago unleashed a debate that has not subsided. Historian Charles Mee damned the use of the atomic bomb as wanton murder" and Hanson Baldwin, former military editor of the New York Times, lamented, "we are now branded with the mark of the beast." In its August 24, 1945, issue [see page 3], Commonweal declared: "The name Hiroshima, the name Nagasaki are names for American guilt and shame." Despite such condemnations, a Gallup poll on August 15 showed that 85 percent of the American people approved "using the new atomic bomb on Japanese cities."

Today, as then, President Truman's defenders agree with Secretary of War Henry Stimson that "this deliberately premeditated destruction was our least abhorrent choice. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an end to the Japanese war. It stopped the fire raids and the strangling blockade; it ended the ghastly specter of a clash of great land armies."

The debate continues in 1995, not only in the academic journals and the mass media but in high-level diplomatic exhanges. President Bill Clinton refused a request from Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama to apologize for dropping the bomb, but his administration, responding to complaints from Japan, directed the Postal Service to cancel a commemorative mushroom-cloud postage stamp. The official language of anniversary ceremonies will drop the traditional "V-J Day" in favor of "End of the Pacific War." At the same time, however, the design of an exhibit at the Smithsonian, centered on the B-29 bomber that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, was curtailed after veterans' groups protested the inclusion of "revisionist" material that would have described the United States as waging a war of vengeance.

It is because of the enormous consequences of the decision to use the bomb in the way it was used that controversy has continued for five decades; it may be that there will never be a consensus about either the facts of the case or the morality of the decision. The main questions still debated include the following:

* Was using the bomb on civilian-inhabited Japanese targets necessary to compel Japan's surrender?

* If the atomic bomb had not been used, would the Allies have launched an invasion of the Japanese homeland? If so, how costly, in terms of Allied and Japanese casualties, would the operation have been?

* By making clear that the Allies would allow Japan to retain its emperor, could President Truman have negotiated a surrender without dropping even the first bomb?

* Was the bomb used primarily as a diplomatic device for dealing with the postwar Soviet Union or primarily as a weapon to end the war?

* Having dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, should the United States have dropped the second on Nagasaki? This issue has been largely neglected in the debate, even though, in my judgment, an account of the decision to use both bombs throws needed light on all the other unsettled questions.

For some, the issues of historical fact raised by these questions are central to the making of a moral judgment on the use of the atomic bomb, or, rather the use of both bombs. If it can be shown that using the bomb shortened the war, averting the need for a land invasion and the loss of many thousands of lives on both sides, the moral issue is settled.

For others, to be sure, that is not a sufficient moral criterion. For them any deliberate attack on noncombatants is wrong regardless of consequences, including the possibility that dropping the bomb saved lives, even civilian lives, overall. That is the view of the just-war tradition. In fact, the principle of noncombatant immunity was held by American political and military leaders until it gave way before the passions and military pressures of defeating Germany and Japan.

The case against the bomb is strongest, of course, if it can be made in terms of both overall consequences and noncombatant immunity - and the adherents of traditional just-war rules would naturally prefer to find these two considerations in harmony. That, along with concerns about the very manner of American wartime decision making, has drawn just-war adherents, no less than others, including pacifists, to scrutinize the details of the historical record.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt made the basic decision to use the bomb in October 1939, when he initiated the Manhattan Project to counter Germany's atomic program and, in FDR's words, "to see that the Nazis don't blow us up." Roosevelt planned to use the atomic bomb. Secretary Stimson recalled, "At no time from 1941-45 did I ever hear it suggested by the president, or any other responsible member of the government, that atomic energy should not be used in war." If the atomic bomb had been ready it would have been dropped on Germany. General Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan Project, recounted a meeting with Roosevelt in December 1944 in which the president "was concerned that the Battle of the Bulge might upset the timetable for ending the war in Europe and remarked that maybe this would force us to use the bomb against Germany." At another meeting, Groves recalled, "President Roosevelt asked if we were prepared to drop bombs on Germany if it was necessary to do so and we replied that we would be prepared to do so if necessary." Germany surrendered three months before the atomic bomb was ready.

Roosevelt assigned responsibility for planning the use of the atomic bomb to the Top Policy Group, composed of Secretary Stimson, General George C. Marshall, Army chief of staff, Vice-president Henry Wallace, and General Groves. Groves emerged as the leader in selecting targets and preparing to use the bomb. General Marshall told Groves, "I don't like to bring too many people into this matter. Is there any reason why you can't take this over and do it yourself?" Said Groves, "My 'No, sir, I will' concluded the conversation, which constituted the only directive I ever received or needed."

The decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan was formulated by Groves late in 1944. According to Groves, "I concluded sometime in December 1944 that two bombs would conclude the war after several discussions with Rear Admiral William Purnell, who was a member of the Military Policy Committee. He had served in the Philippines and the Orient. He had spent a great deal of time in 1940-41 as well as before in studying the Japanese character and their probable reactions in time of war. As a result of our discussions I concluded that two bombs would end the war."

Groves explained, "I gave my conclusions to General Marshall, Secretary of War Stimson, and President Roosevelt and later to President Truman. None of them appeared to question them as being unreasonable." Groves described the unofficial nature of his conclusion to use two bombs: "There was never any definite approval of this conclusion and there was no limitation placed on our plans on the number of bombs to be used."

After Roosevelt's death in April 1945, final responsibility for using the atomic bomb shifted to Truman. For advice, Truman appointed an Interim Committee headed by Secretary Stimson. The Interim Committee recommended to Truman that (1) the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible; (2) the bomb should be used on a n-military installation or war plant near houses and buildings most susceptible to destruction; (3) the bomb should be used without prior warning of the nature of the weapon.

Scientists in Chicago protested strongly against the unrestricted use of the atomic bomb. If the bomb must be used, they suggested "a demonstration of the new weapon might best be made, before the eyes of representatives of all the United Nations, on a desert or a barren island." But opposition to the Chicago scientists came from the five-man Scientific Advisory Panel of the Interim Committee, including Arthur Compton and J. Robert Oppenheimer. They advised Truman, "We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we can see no acceptable alternative to direct military use."

Also in May, Groves named a target committee to select sites. According to Groves, "I had set as the governing factor that the targets chosen should be places the bombing of which would most adversely affect the will of Japanese people to continue the war." The committee of scientists and ordinance experts recommended targets that would assure "the greatest psychological effect against Japan" and would make the initial use of the bomb "sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it is released." Kokura, Hiroshima, Niigata, and Kyoto were named to the original target list, in part because they had suffered relatively less bombing damage than other Japanese cities, so that the impact of the atomic bomb would be more apparent. Incredibly, Kyoto was highly recommended because, "Kyoto has the advantage of the people being more highly intelligent and hence better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon." But Secretary Stimson vetoed Kyoto because it was an ancient capital and religious shrine. Nagasaki was substituted.

The atomic age began on July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, New Mexico. Minutes after witnessing the bomb test, General Thomas Farrell said to General Groves, "The war is over!" "Yes," replied Groves, "it is over as soon as we drop two bombs on Japan."

In Potsdam, Germany, where he was attending a summit conference with Churchill and Joseph Stalin, Truman, according to Stimson, "was tremendously pepped up" by news of the successful test. After he studied a full report of the New Mexico test, Truman met with his advisers to make final plans for the use of the bomb. Truman explained, "I called a meeting to discuss what should be done with this awful weapon. I asked General Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokyo plain and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that such an invasion would cost, at a minimum, one quarter of a million casualties and might cost as much as a million on the American side alone with an equal number of the enemy. The other military and naval men present agreed."

General Dwight Eisenhower and Admiral William Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, opposed using the bomb. Eisenhower believed the A-bomb was unnecessary to defeat Japan and he joined Leahy in rejecting its use on moral grounds. But Truman gained Churchill's unequivocal support. Churchill explained "there was never a moment's discussion as to whether the atomic bomb should be used or not. The final decision now lay in the main with President Truman, who had the weapon, but I never doubted what it would be nor have I doubted that he was right."

Before leaving Washington late in July to command the actual bombing operations from Tinian Island, General Carl Spaatz demanded official orders. Said Spaatz, "If I'm going to kill 100,000 people, I'm not going to do it on verbal orders. I want a piece of paper." General Groves wrote this critical "piece of paper." His order commanded the 509th Composite Group to "(1) deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945, on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki. (2) Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff" [emphasis added]. From Potsdam, Secretary Stimson cabled Groves, "S/W [Secretary of War Stimson] approves Groves directive."

General Groves's role in the decision-making process is crucial. He originated the two-bomb plan, and he wrote the order directing that a second bomb (and succeeding bombs) be used as soon as possible after August 3. After Groves's directive was sent to the bomb team on July 25, only a countermanding order from Marshall, Stimson, or Truman could halt the process.

On July 26, President Truman and the Allies issued the Potsdam Proclamation - the last-chance ultimatum to Japan. The proclamation is revealing in its omissions. The president rejected Stimson's suggestion to include a concession on the emperor. Instead, Truman called for a government "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government." Truman also ruled out warning Japan of the coming atomic attack. He called upon "the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." Because Japan did not surrender, the order of July 25 remained active. Truman told Stimson the directive to drop the bomb "would stand unless I notified him that the Japanese reply to our ultimatum was acceptable."

On August 6, Hiroshima was destroyed. More than 100,000 Japanese and two American POW's were killed. The world learned of the atomic bomb from a White House press release written by Groves. The president's announcement was staggering: "Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese army base. It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East." In a later radio address, Truman warned, "we shall continue to use it until we completely destroy Japan's power to make war. Only a Japanese surrender will stop us."

Meanwhile, the bomb team hurried to obey the order to "use additional bombs as soon as made ready by the project staff." The second bomb was scheduled for August 20, but the date was moved to August 11 when the necessary fissionable material arrived. According to Groves, "It became apparent that we could probably slice another day from our schedule." A round-the-clock effort readied the second bomb on August 9, less than three days after Hiroshima. Time was the sole controlling factor in determining when the second bomb would be dropped. Groves stressed, "Admiral Purnell and I had often discussed the importance of having the second blow follow the first one quickly so that the Japanese would not have time to recover their balance."

On August 9, Nagasaki was obliterated. More than 35,000 Japanese were killed immediately and approximately 25,000 have since died as a consequence of the bomb. Forty-four percent of Nagasaki was destroyed.

Was the atomic bomb necessary to compel Japan to surrender? Or were the merciless bombardment of the Japanese coast and the strangling blockade of Japan by the Pacific fleet the key factors? Or were the ferocious fire bomb raids on Japan's cities by fleets of B-29s the basic reason for surrender? Did Japan finally capitulate because the Soviet Union declared war against her on August 8?

All these factors were important in defeating Japan, but in my opinion a defeated Japan was forced to surrender by the Hiroshima atomic bomb. Japan finally gave up because the Japanese emperor ordered surrender.

And it was the Hiroshima atomic bomb that spurred Emperor Hirohito to make this bold decision. Before Hiroshima, none of the horrors of war visited upon Japan prompted the emperor to act - not the defeat of the Japanese army on Okinawa in June, the destruction of Japan's cities, the starvation blockade, or the threat of a massive allied invasion of the home islands. After Hiroshima, nothing else - neither the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan on August 8 nor the Nagasaki bomb on August 9 - was needed to convince Hirohito to order surrender.

A study of the frantic last days of World War II shows clearly the indispensable role played by the Hiroshima bomb and proves the irrelevance of the Nagasaki bomb. Japan's military situation in August 1945 was desperate. Her cities had been devastated by B-29 attacks. The air massacre of Tokyo on March 9 by 350 B-29s dropping tons of magnesium, phosphorus, and napalm bombs was the single most destructive air attack of the war. Over 100,000 Japanese perished in the fire storm where ground temperatures reached 2,000 degrees. By May, three more mass bombings of Tokyo leveled half of the city.

Japan's supply of weapons was nearly depleted by the summer of 1945, her oil reserves were drained, and the country was isolated by a tight naval blockade of the coast. Food was scarce; starvation was imminent. Japan's once proud navy rested on the Pacific floor, and her army had been beaten back to the home islands in an unbroken series of shattering defeats. More than 3 million Japanese had been killed, 1 million in the last eight months of the war.

But despite all this carnage and ruin, Japan clung to the Homeland Battle Strategy Plan, approved by the cabinet and sanctioned by the emperor in February 1945, to fight "a decisive battle in the homeland even at the cost of self-destruction of the entire Japanese race." In June, Japan's military leaders secured cabinet and imperial approval for "The Fundamental Policy to Be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of the War" calling for "100 million people to arise from the vantage ground of their sacred land to strike the invaders dead."

Japan's civilian leaders favored surrender, but even after the fall of Okinawa and the demolition of Japan's cities by B-29 raids, they could not convince the powerful military chiefs. Keeper of the Privy Seal Koichi Kido knew "only the intervention by the emperor" could overrule the military leaders and end the war.

Because of this deadlock, surrender through normal channels was impossible. Decision-making power in wartime Japan rested exclusively with the fifteen-member cabinet, composed of military and civilian leaders, where unanimous consent was required. The Japanese emperor merely heard and automatically approved unanimous decisions already reached by the cabinet. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Toshikazu Kase, "The emperor was always a dummy who sat through the sessions without ever taking an active part."

But in August 1945, Emperor Hirohito, through his prestige as a high priest and "father of the Japanese people," decided the issue of peace or war. However, before Hirohito could be stimulated to end the war he needed to be shocked. The Hiroshima atomic bomb provided that shock.

On August 7, Tokyo learned that "the whole city of Hiroshima was destroyed instantly by a single bomb." Dr. Yoshio Nishina, Japan's leading atomic scientist, flew to Hiroshima and confirmed the atomic explosion. Kido, the emperor's closest adviser, told Hirohito of the Hiroshima blast and described the powerful impact the atomic bomb had on the emperor. "He was overwhelmed with grief" and told Kido: "Under these circumstances we must bow to the inevitable. No matter what happens to my safety, we must put an end to this war so this tragedy will not be repeated" [emphasis added].

Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo conferred with the emperor on August 8 and confirmed Hirohito's determination to end the war. Togo wrote: "On the eighth I had an audience with the emperor, whom I informed of the enemy's announcement of the use of the atomic bomb and I said that it was now all the more imperative that we end the war, while we could seize this opportunity to do so. The emperor approved my view, and warned that since we could no longer continue the struggle, now that a weapon of this devastating power was used against us" [emphasis added], Japan must surrender.

Hirohito instructed Togo to "tell [Prime Minister Kantaro] Suzuki it is my wish that the war be ended as soon as possible on the basis of the Potsdam Proclamation." On August 9 military and civilian leaders disagreed sharply over surrender terms. "All agreed on one point, namely the preservation of the Imperial House," recalled Deputy Foreign Minister Kase: "Should the Allies refuse that, we had no choice but to fight to the end."

Because they opposed surrender, Japan's military leaders demanded three additional conditions they knew would be rejected by the United States. War Minister Korechika Anami, Army Chief of Staff Yoshijiro Umezu, and Navy Chief of Staff Soemu Toyoda, the most powerful men in Japan (after the emperor), insisted that Japan disarm its own armed forces and try her own war criminals, and that the occupation of Japan was to be limited to a minimum time and place.

Truman's critics have argued that he could have negotiated an end to the war without using the atomic bombs if he had conditioned surrender by allowing Japan to preserve the imperial institution. But the Japanese military chiefs demanded all four conditions. Anami argued, "In case it is impossible to include all four conditions we should continue the war." General Umezu agreed that "the four conditions are the minimum concessions." Foreign Minister Togo knew the demands of the generals prevented surrender, declaring the United States "would reject the proposals outright and refuse to negotiate further."

Considering the American people's hatred for Japan in August 1945, after four years of brutal war, it is inconceivable that the United States would have tolerated Japan's four surrender terms, especially after Germany had just accepted unconditional surrender. Truman had renewed Roosevelt's policy of unconditional surrender after Germany had surrendered in May, pledging, "Our blows will not cease until the Japanese military and naval force lay down their arms in unconditional surrender." The American people supported the president. A Fortune poll in June 1945 found that 84 percent wanted to "fight on until Japan is completely beaten," and only 9 percent would "accept a peace offer."

Americans had been conditioned by Japan's wartime atrocities and our intense wartime propaganda to despise the Japanese. They probably agreed with Truman, who described the Japanese in his journal as "savages, ruthless, merciless, and fanatic," and, in a letter to Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, as "beasts."

While Japan's leaders were debating surrender terms, they learned that Nagasaki had been bombed. Still, Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda would not give way. General Umezu argued that Japanese soldiers could not surrender, explaining that they were indoctrinated to believe that "if they lost their weapons they should fight with their feet; if they couldn't fight with these, they should bite, and if they could not, should cut out their tongues and kill themselves." American Marines had many ghastly experiences with the fanatical military code of Japanese soldiers. In the Battle of Iwo Jima in February and March 1945, of 21,000 Japanese defenders only 216 surrendered. On Okinawa, all but 7,000 of Japan's 120,000 troops fought to the death. Six members of the Japanese cabinet favored accepting the Potsdam Proclamation with the single provision protecting the imperial institution, but Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda held out for the three additional conditions.

The night of August 9, by prearranged plan, Prime Minister Suzuki convened an imperial conference, even though the cabinet was unable to report a decision to the emperor on surrender. General Anami made a vehement plea for a last-ditch fight on the Japanese mainland, predicting, "the decisive homeland battle could be a tossup. The battle would cause the Allies to suffer greatly. If we cannot halt the enemy, 100 million Japanese would gladly prefer death to the dishonor of surrender and they would thus leave the Japanese people's mark on history."

General Umezu stubbornly supported Anami's appeal for a final battle, arguing, "the enemy's use of the atomic bomb might be checked if proper anti-aircraft measures are taken." Umezu reminded the emperor that "preparations for the decisive battle of the homeland are already completed and we are confident of victory."

After three hours of impassioned but inconclusive debate, Prime Minister Suzuki asked the emperor to resolve the issue of surrender. Hirohito's words startled the military leaders: "I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. I swallow my own tears and give sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the foreign minister."

The emperor's godlike status and his spiritual influence with the people was overwhelming; Emperor Hirohito's will could not be denied. Therefore, the cabinet approved the emperor's decision to surrender. Suzuki informed the United States on August 10 of the cabinet's acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation "with the understanding that the said declaration does not compromise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of his majesty as supreme ruler."

In what would have been a costly blunder, Truman considered rejecting Japan's sole condition for surrender. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes opposed Japan's offer because "it appeared to me that they were trying to add a condition to their surrender." Admiral Leahy argued for accepting Japan's sole condition, stating: "Some of those around the president wanted to demand his [Hirohito's] execution. If they had prevailed, we might still be at war with Japan. His subjects would probably have fought on until every loyal Japanese was dead, and at the moment there were more than 5 million Japanese soldiers in the field." In his answer to Japan's surrender proposal, Truman hedged on the status of the emperor, ordering that "from the moment of surrender the authority of the emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the supreme commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate surrender terms."

Even Japan's moderates opposed Truman's provision that the emperor "shall be subject to the supreme commander of the Allied powers." Japan's leaders again disagreed over conditions for surrender. Fanatical officers clamored for a fight to the finish with the United States. Admiral Takijiro Onishi, vice-chief of the Naval General Staff, pleaded with Foreign Minister Togo to "let us formulate a plan for certain victory, obtain the emperor's sanction, and throw ourselves into bringing the plan to realization. If we are prepared to sacrifice 20 million Japanese lives in a special attack effort, victory shall be ours."

After the cabinet was again unable to reach a decision on surrender, a second Imperial Conference was held on August 14. This time the emperor's decision finally ended World War II. Hirohito explained sorrowfully, "I cannot endure the thought of letting my people suffer any longer. A continuation of the war would bring death to tens, perhaps even hundreds of thousands of persons. The whole nation would be reduced to ashes."

Twenty years after the war, Kido, the emperor's close adviser, explained, "the presence of the atomic bomb made it easier for us politicians to negotiate peace. Even then the military would not listen to reason. The only reason the Japanese Army stopped fighting was because the emperor ordered them to do so." Without the emperor's intervention, Japan would not have surrendered, and without the Hiroshima bomb, the emperor would not have intervened.

If the Hiroshima bomb caused the emperor to order Japan to surrender, what role did the Nagasaki bomb play? None. The Nagasaki bomb had no influence on Emperor Hirohito's determination after Hiroshima to end the war, nor did it convince Japan's military leaders, who opposed surrender to the end. The Nagasaki bomb was irrelevant in ending World War II. Obviously, Truman did not know the details of Japan's internal struggle to surrender in August 1945, but based on information available to American leaders at the time the second bomb was dropped, no moral, military, or diplomatic standard justified its use.

Truman explains his reason for dropping the second bomb in his memoirs: "On August 9, the second atom bomb was dropped, this time on Nagasaki. We gave the Japanese three days in which to make up their minds to surrender and the bombing would have been held off another two days had weather permitted."

But Truman allowed Japan no time to surrender between atomic bombs; the Nagasaki bomb was used as soon as it was ready. Truman's order of July 25 commanded the bomb crew to use "additional bombs as soon as they are made available by the project staff." Had the second bomb been ready on August 7, it would have been dropped then, for General Groves admitted he wanted the second bomb to "follow the first one quickly so that the Japanese would not have time to recover their balance."

Groves's justification for the Nagasaki bomb was threefold. First, Groves stressed, "We did not know then whether Japan would surrender promptly if only one bomb were dropped. I thought not, and I do not recall that anyone expressed any contrary view. There was nothing to indicate that the original thesis of Admiral Purnell was in any way erroneous."

Perhaps elsewhere Groves answered his own argument. Testifying during the Atomic Energy hearings on November 27, 1945, only three months after Nagasaki, he declared, "I have forgotten now whether it was after the Nagasaki bomb or after the Hiroshima bomb that I realized that this war was not going to last much longer. I had always thought this would be the case once we dropped one." If Groves believed the war "was not going to last much longer ... once we dropped one," he conceded that the United States should have allowed more time for the Hiroshima blow to influence Japan's leaders. But Groves admitted, "As far as I know, no one ever considered allowing more time."

Groves's second argument for using the Nagasaki bomb was, "one bomb would be necessary to show the Japanese the power of the bomb, and the second would be needed to show them that we had the capacity to make more than one. In other words, that it is not a single laboratory achievement." But if the Nagasaki weapon was used to prove to Japan that the United States had an atomic arsenal, the second bomb could have been dropped on an uninhabited area, not on a densely populated city.

Groves's third reason for bombing Nagasaki was: "It was not at all obvious prior to this time [before the Nagasaki bomb] that the war was over. We had little information as to the damage the first bomb had inflicted in Hiroshima."

Perhaps Groves was unaware before August 9 of the full damage at Hiroshima, but Truman knew the extent of the destruction and had time to stop the Nagasaki attack. On August 6, Truman had been notified while returning by ship from Potsdam, that Hiroshima had been bombed successfully. Said Secretary of State Byrnes, "His report indicated that the results of the bomb were even more successful than the test had led us to expect." On August 8, Truman studied more information about the destruction of Hiroshima, including Air Force photographs that revealed clearly the vast area of devastation.

The Nagasaki story shows that America's leaders, understandably obsessed with ending the war quickly, failed to use the second atomic bomb rationally or tactically. No high-level discussion was held to consider the second bomb. Nobody challenged or reviewed the informal, unofficial, and premature judgment of General Groves, reached in December 1944, to drop two atomic bombs.

Undoubtedly, Truman and Groves were concerned about the terrible destruction caused by the atomic bombs. At a cabinet meeting on August 10, the president ordered atomic bombing stopped because, he said, "the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible." Truman said he didn't like the idea "of killing all those kids." However, after the atomic bomb attacks the United States continued "killing all those kids" with conventional bombs. For fourteen hours on August 14 and 15, even as Japan proclaimed surrender, the Army Air Force launched the largest bombing raid of the war, with more than 1,000 planes attacking seven cities.

Regrettably, General Groves and President Truman acted one atomic bomb too late. After Hiroshima, their fingers were frozen on the atomic trigger despite rational arguments that shouted for delay and reconsideration.

The United States has been wrongly condemned for needlessly introducing atomic war. Without the Hiroshima bomb to spur the emperor to demand surrender, an allied land invasion of Japan would have been launched. The invasion plan had been completed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1945, and approved by President Truman on June 18. The plan called for an assault on Kyushu, Japan's southernmost island, on November 1, and a landing on Honshu, the main island, on about March 1, 1946. Had an invasion of Japan occurred, the carnage on both sides would have been catastrophic. Japan was prepared for a kamikaze defense of the home islands. In August, Japan had 2.5 million troops on the main islands backed by 9,000 kamikaze planes and a 32-million civilian militia sworn to fight for the emperor with spears, muskets, bows and arrows, and even so-called "Sherman carpets," children with dynamite strapped to their bodies and trained to throw themselves under American tanks.

Against Japan's defense, General Marshall said the United States planned to invade with an initial strike force against Kyushu of 770,000. The invasion army, for what General Douglas MacArthur called "the main assault against Honshu," would have swollen to 2.5 million American troops and half-a-million British troops, an army larger than the allied force in Europe after D-Day and concentrated in a much smaller area.

Based on earlier experiences with Japan's fighting tactics, American leaders expected a massacre. General Marshall explained, "We had to assume that a force of 2.5 million Japanese would fight to the death, fight as they had on all those islands we attacked. We figured that in their homeland they would fight even harder."

Historians have criticized Truman for exaggerating, after the war, the potential American casualties (dead, wounded, and missing) of an invasion of Japan to justify his use of the atomic bomb. In a letter in 1948, Truman said he decided to use the atomic bomb "to save 250,000 boys from the United States." In his memoirs in 1955, Truman said "half-a-million American lives" were saved by the bomb." Truman's critics claim he was told by the Joint War Plans Committee on June 15 that only about 40,000 Americans would die in an invasion of the home islands.

Admiral Leahy understood Truman's concern about American casualties in the invasion of Japan. After meeting with the president, Leahy told the Joint Chiefs on June 14. 1945, "It is his intention to make his decisions on the campaign with the purpose of economizing to the minimum extent possible the loss of American lives."

Truman asked his military advisers for casualty estimates. General Marshall suggested American casualties in the first thirty days on Kyushu "should not exceed the price we paid for Luzon." That battle in the Philippines produced 31,000 American casualties. The Joint War Plans Committee's prediction of 40,000 dead was considered by Truman, but the planners conceded "the costs in casualties in the main operation [on Honshu] are not subject to accurate estimate."

Admiral Leahy suggested using Okinawa as a basis for determining American casualties on the mainland. Leahy estimated that American casualties on Okinawa were about 35 percent of the total U.S. force of 120,000. After considering Leahy's estimate, Truman told the Joint Chiefs he hoped to prevent "an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other."

Using Admiral Leahy's "Okinawa formula" (but correcting Leahy's numbers to a more correct 29-percent casualty figure), and considering an American force of 2.5 million for the invasion of Japan, American casualties would have been about 725,000 with about 200,000 dead. Figuring the "Okinawa formula" another way, if 120,000 Japanese soldiers killed 13,000 of 170,000 Americans on Okinawa, then 2.5 million Japanese soldiers on Kyushu and Honshu would kill about twenty-one times as many Americans, or 270,000, with more than a million American casualties. The number of American troops killed in an invasion of Japan would certainly have doubled the 50,000 who died in combat in the entire Pacific war.

The potential civilian losses are even more grim. On Okinawa, approximately 140,000 of the island's 450,000 residents (31 percent) were killed as the American and Japanese armies ravaged the island. For the homeland battle, millions of Japanese civilians were trained and determined to "strike the invaders dead." Using the "Okinawa formula," approximately 27.9 million of Japan's 90 million people might have died in the final battle.

Whether 40,000 or 500,000 American troops would have been killed in an invasion of Japan, for moral and political reasons the president could not allow American fighting men to die in battle while he withheld the atomic bomb, a weapon he believed would end the war. Truman explained, "The use of the atomic bomb was a military decision to end the war and save millions of lives. It was just the same as getting a bigger gun than the other fellow had to win the war and that's what it was used for. I never lost any sleep over my decision."

President Truman's critics argue that the bomb was dropped for diplomatic, not military reasons. They quote Truman's remark that "the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms" to the Soviet Union after the war, and Secretary Byrnes's statement that "our possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make Russia more manageable in Europe."

But military and diplomatic motives for using the bomb are not mutually exclusive. Truman dropped the atomic bomb to force Japan to surrender and also used the bomb as a diplomatic tool for dealing with postwar Russia. To believe that the United States used atomic bombs on heavily populated cities solely, or even primarily, to impress Stalin makes no sense. The United States, to paraphrase Secretary Byrnes, could easily have shown "our possessing and demonstrating the bomb" for Stalin's benefit by exploding one or two on a deserted Pacific atoll after the war.

In my view, which is one based ultimately on the overall loss of life and not on the principle of noncombatant immunity, the United States was justified in using the atomic bomb. The Hiroshima bomb shocked Emperor Hirohito into breaking the political impasse in the Japanese cabinet and ordering surrender. The Hiroshima bomb ended World War II in the Pacific, and thus, prevented a ferocious land battle on mainland Japan. But America's stature today would be higher, and 60,000 lives would have been saved at Nagasaki, had President Truman waited for the Hiroshima bomb to work its effect on Japan's leaders.

When General Eisenhower expressed his strong opposition to dropping the bomb on Japan, telling Secretary Stimson, "It wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing," he was wrong. It was - once, but not twice.

BRUCE LOEBS is professor of rhetoric and public address at Idaho State University, Pocatello, Idaho, where he is chairman of the Department of Communication.