High Court narrowly blocks `no air bag' lawsuits.

In what the dissent called an "unprecedented extension of the doctrine of preemption," the U.S. Supreme Court in May held that a federal regulation requiring automakers to phase in passive restraints in the 1980s bars plaintiffs from suing auto manufacturers for failing to install air bags during the years that the regulation was in effect.

Ruling 5-4, the majority held that "this kind of `no air bag' lawsuit conflicts with the objectives" of the 1984 version of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208, issued under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, "and is therefore preempted by the act." (Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., No. 98-1811, 2000 WL 645536 (U.S. May 22, 2000).)

The Court acknowledged that the act's preemption provision, which bars states from imposing their own auto safety standards, contains a "savings clause" expressly stating that compliance with a federal safety standard "does not exempt any person from any liability under common law." Nevertheless, the majority--agreeing with American Honda Motor Co. and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)--found that preemption is implied because state tort suits over the lack of air bags would conflict with the stated purposes of FMVSS 208.

"[T]hat standard deliberately sought variety--a mix of several different passive restraint systems," Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the majority. "It did so by setting a performance requirement for passive restraint devices and allowing manufacturers to choose among different passive restraint mechanisms, such as air bags, automatic belts, or other passive restraint technologies, to satisfy that requirement."

State tort suits establishing a duty to install air bags "would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation sought," Breyer wrote.

In an amicus brief, ATLA had argued that jury verdicts are not the equivalent of state-mandated standards and that Congress did not intend to preempt common law causes of action when it preempted state regulations.

Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the four dissenters, criticized the majority's "unprecedented use of inferences from regulatory history and commentary" to arrive at its conclusion, noting that "neither the text of the statute nor the text of the regulation contains any indication of an intent to preempt [Geier's] cause of action."

Stevens said that DOT's goal of improving auto safety by requiring the use of passive restraints "would not be frustrated one whit by allowing state courts to determine whether in 1987 the lifesaving advantages of air bags had become sufficiently obvious that their omission might constitute a design defect in some new cars."

The case arose out of a 1992 crash in the District of Columbia, in which Alexis Geier, who was wearing a lap-shoulder belt, was seriously injured when her 1987 Honda Accord collided with a tree. In her suit against Honda, Geier claimed that the lack of a driver-side air bag in the vehicle constituted a design defect. The D.C. trial court dismissed the case on preemption grounds.

Arthur Bryant, executive director of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice in Washington, D.C., who argued the case in the Supreme Court, said the decision was "disappointing for the Geier family." But he said the ruling's reach is likely to be limited.

"Congress plainly stated its intent not to preempt," Bryant said. "The Court created a `no air bag' exception to that clear, bulletproof language." But he added that the Court's focus on the government's desire to allow a number of passive restraint options makes the decision "extremely narrow" and difficult to apply to other auto safety regulations.

The ruling "plainly affirms crash victims' rights to sue auto manufacturers over other design defects," Bryant said. "In fact, the decision makes clear, for the first time ever, that automakers' compliance with minimum federal safety standards does not generally create any immunity from tort liability."

The Court may have an opportunity to revisit the issue. In a decision last April, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing the act's savings clause, held that a seat belt defect claim was not preempted by FMVSS 208.