Halt and show your papers!

The idea of a national identity (ID) card seems simple enough. Take the photographic and alpha-numerical information on our birth certificates, Social Security cards, driver's licenses, and voter registration card; add a bar code, magnetic strip, fingerprint, microchip, or other biometric identifier; and display all that information (and more) on a neat plastic card no larger than a credit card. Our lives would be simplified. We'd always know for sure who we are and who everyone else really is.

But beneath this smooth surface lurks a complex terrain of issues and perhaps the greatest threat to personal freedom Americans have ever confronted.

The concept of a national ID card has been debated in the United States for over three decades. In the past, the opposition has been strong and bipartisan and has always prevailed. Extension of the Social Security number to the status of an ID card was rejected in 1971 by the Social Security Administration. In 1976, the Federal Advisory Committee on False Identification rejected the idea of a national identifier. The Carter and Reagan administrations both went on record as opposed to a national ID system.

In 1996, uniform national driver's license standards--which some considered tantamount to a national ID card--were enacted into law. However, their implementation was delayed, and a permanent repeal of the proposal was contained in the FY2000 Transportation Appropriations Act signed by President Clinton. In October 1999, House Majority Leader Dick Armey's website featured an article entitled "Good Riddance to the National ID Card." Armey's accompanying statement included these words:

   This is a classic victory of freedom over "Big Brother." Because we acted
   quickly, no American will have to carry a National ID Card. A national
   driver's license with "biometric identifiers" or social security numbers is
   more suited to a police state than to a free country. It took three years
   of hard work, but we finally laid this disturbing idea to rest.

Not.

As a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the debate has been renewed and elevated to a higher and much more dangerous level. Just look at this sampling of headlines from recent newspaper articles around the country:

* "Support Grows for National ID Card Proposal" (San Jose Mercury News, October 16)

* "National ID Card System Failing to Attract Supporters" (Los Angeles Times, October 24)

* "U.S. Security Advisor: National ID Card Not Feasible" (NewsFactor Network, November 8)

* "National ID Card Gaining Support" (Washington Post, December 17)

Members of Congress, security experts, and high-tech executives have rushed to endorse the idea of some new form of identification system as a critical weapon in the "fight against terrorism." Unfortunately, little of this discussion has been open to the public (no surprise there), so it has been difficult to determine where the concept currently stands in the minds of the nation's decision-makers.

George W. Bush, thankfully, has publicly stated his opposition, saying that national ID cards are unnecessary to improve security. Richard Clarke, Bush's chief of cyberspace security, agrees and does "not think it's a very smart idea." Fierce opposition comes from a wide range of privacy advocates, the American Civil Liberties Union, and even conservative organizations like the CATO Institute, Eagle Forum, and the John Birch Society.

And yet, as Roger Gay headlines his article in the November 29, 2001, conservative Toogood Reports, perhaps "It's Too Late to Stop a National I.D. Card." Marty Abrams, an information technology specialist at the law firm Hunton and Williams and a former senior credit bureau executive, summarizes the current state of the U.S. psyche well: "We're willing to accept this immense flow of data to law enforcement and their proxies to make sure we feel safe and secure.... The equilibrium point has shifted [as a result of September 11 ]7

Most disturbingly, recent Pew Research Center and Harris polls show strong support for a national ID card by those polled: 70 percent and 68 percent, respectively. This preference is undoubtedly hinged on the assumption that such a system would largely prevent terrorists and other "evil-doers" from entering the county--an assumption that is, at best, extremely dubious.

Other ID card supporters include the Department of Defense (which already has such a system in place), Oracle CEO Larry Ellison (who has offered to provide the ID software for free and would be glad to offer his company's services to maintain the system and its massive databases--for a fee, of course), the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (which sees this as an opportunity for a national driver's license system), the Air Transportation Association, the Justice Department, lawmakers in U.S.-Mexico border states, and all those in charge of immigration committees in Congress. To my absolute horror, even Bill of Rights champion Alan Dershowitz has recently endorsed the concept, claiming it would reduce racial profiling!

The single best overview I've found of the basic questions about national ID cards and concepts involved in their debate is contained on the objective "Frequently Asked Questions" (FAQ) page of the Privacy International website at www.privacy.org/pi/ activities/idcard/idcard_faq.html. Its points are summarized below.

1. Who uses ID cards now? About a hundred countries currently utilize official, compulsory, national IDs for various purposes. These include Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, and Spain. Among the developed countries that don't have such a card are Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States. Most countries that don't have a national universal card do have a health or social security card or other documents of identity.

2. What are the primary purposes of ID cards? Race, politics, and religion are often at the heart of older ID systems. Card systems have been instituted to control the threat of insurgents or political extremists, to facilitate religious discrimination, to enforce quota systems, and to allow for social engineering. The FAQ notes: "At the heart of such plans is a parallel increase in police powers. Even in democratic nations, police retain the right to demand ID on pain of detention."

3. What is the cost of an ID card system? The expense of implementing such a system has been at the forefront of both political and public opposition in a number of countries, including Australia, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom. Cost estimates to create and issue national ID cards in the United States are around $3 billion.

4. Can ID cards assist law enforcement? The usefulness of ID cards to law enforcement has been marginal. Little evidence has been advanced to demonstrate that they would either reduce the incidence of crime or enhance the success of prosecution. Police authorities in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have stated their reluctance to administer a compulsory card that might erode relations with the public. Furthermore, forgeries would be inevitable. Obviously, the more an ID card is used, the greater the value placed on it and, consequently, the higher its value to criminal elements.

5. Can ID cards help to control illegal immigration? The impact of such cards on controlling illegal immigration has been patchy. The use of a card for purposes of checking resident status depends on the police and other officials being given very broad powers to check identity --either a vastly increased level of constant checking of the entire population or a discriminatory checking procedure that would undoubtedly target minorities (numerous examples are included in the FAQ).

6. Which countries have rejected proposals for ID cards? The most celebrated campaign against a national ID card occurred just over a decade ago in Australia. In response to proposed legislation, tens of thousands of people took to the streets in opposition, and the government became dangerously split over the issue. The proposal caused such hostility that it was withdrawn in 1987. A similar proposal was presented in New Zealand a few years later and, under the leadership of the Auckland Council for Civil Liberties, an opposition campaign was formed and the proposal was abandoned.

In summary, the benefits of a national ID card are highly questionable, while the risks threaten the very heart of a free, democratic society. The national ACLU provides one of the most succinct summaries of the rights issues by boiling down the debate to five major reasons why a national ID card will keep us neither safe nor free:

Reason #1: a national ID card system won't solve the problem: it won't prevent terrorism. It wouldn't have thwarted any of the September 11 hijackers, for example, many of whom reportedly had identification documents on them and were in the country legally. Terrorists and criminals will continue to be able to obtain--by legal and illegal means--the documents needed to get a government ID, such as a birth certificate.

Reason #2: an ID card system will lead to a slippery slope of surveillance and monitoring of citizens. While such a system cannot protect us from terrorism it would create a system of internal passports that would significantly diminish the freedom and privacy of law-abiding citizens. Once put in place, it is exceedingly unlikely that such a system would be restricted to its original purpose. For example, the original Social Security Act contained strict prohibitions against using Social Security cards for unrelated purposes, but those strictures have been routinely ignored and steadily abandoned over the past fifty years. A national ID system would threaten the privacy that Americans have always enjoyed and gradually increase the control that government and business wields over everyday citizens.

Reason #3: a national ID card system would require the establishment of a database of all people in the United States. What happens then when an ID card is stolen? What proof may be used to decide who gets a card? The records of every individual would require continuous updating; would likely contain many errors, any one of which could render someone unemployable and possibly much worse until they get their "file" straightened out. And once created, the use of such a database would almost certainly expand. Law enforcement and other government agencies would soon ask to link into it, while employers, landlords, credit agencies, mortgage brokers, telemarketers, private investigators, civil litigants, and a long list of other parties would begin seeking access, further eroding the privacy that people have always expected in their personal lives. We already see this happening with a proposed airline security database of passenger profiles that would be designed to rate the security risk posed by each passenger.

Reason #4: ID cards would function as "internal passports" that monitor citizens' movements. Americans have long had a visceral aversion to building a society in which the authorities could act like totalitarian sentries and demand "your papers please!" That everyday intrusiveness would be conjoined with the full power of modern computer and database technology. For example, if a police officer or security guard scans your ID card with a pocket barcode reader, would a permanent record be created of that check, including the time and your location? The end result could be a nation where citizens' movements inside their own country are monitored and recorded.

Reason #5: ID cards would foster new forms of discrimination and harassment. Rather than eliminating discrimination, as some have claimed, a national identity card would foster new forms of discrimination and harassment of anyone perceived as looking or sounding "foreign." That is exactly what happened after Congress passed the Employer Sanctions provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985; it resulted in widespread discrimination against foreign-looking U.S. workers, especially Asians and Hispanics. A 1990 General Accounting Office study found almost 20 percent of employers engaged in such discriminatory practices. A national ID card would have the same effect on a massive scale, with Latinos, Asians, Arabs, and other minorities becoming subject to ceaseless status and identity checks from police, banks, merchants, and others. Failure to carry a national ID card would likely come to be viewed as a reason for search, detention, or arrest of minorities. The stigma and humiliation of constantly having to prove that they are U.S. citizens or legal immigrants would weigh heavily on such groups.

New York attorney Duncan Frissell writes in the Sierra Times:

Most critics of a national ID card mention Hitler, police stops, and personal privacy to argue against the proposal. Those are certainly good reasons to oppose a national ID card, but they miss the idea's worst features. A national ID card is not really about identity. It is about authorization. A modern national ID system will:

* Require Americans to obtain federal government authorization to travel, work, rent or buy housing, obtain medical care, use financial services, and make many purchases.

* This federal authorization could be denied for many reasons, including database errors, a suspicious transaction profile, being a deadbeat parent, failure to pay taxes or fines, and any other social control measures Congress wishes to hang on the system.

* The system will almost certainly create an outlaw class--as large as 10 to 20% of the population---cut off from 'normal" life in America. This class will include political refuseniks, as well as those whose behavior has caused the system's software to deny their transactions. This outlaw class will sustain the underground economy for the use of future terrorists (and ordinary criminals).

These effects are easy to predict because they've already happened on a smaller scale.

Robert Ellis Smith, a lawyer and privacy specialist, says the push for a national ID card is based on the false belief that there can be a simple, high-tech solution to an immensely complex problem. "One way to predict the effectiveness of a national ID number or document is to look at environments where the true identity of all residents is known: prisons, the military, many workplaces, many college campuses," he writes in a new paper about national ID cards. "And yet these places are far from crime free."

Ari Schwartz, a policy analyst for the Center for Democracy and Technology, supports a national ID program that is done in a way to allow individuals to control the information held about them. But he is still concerned about the unintended consequences of a central database. "There are some measures that we should definitely be moving forward on today, and then there are some other ideas that we need to have a longer-term discussion about," he said. "This is definitely one of those longer-term ideas."

A similar message is offered by Peter Neumann and Lauren Weinstein, moderaters of the RISKS Forum (www.risks.org) and the PRIVACY Forum (www.privacyforum.org), respectively, and co-founders of People For Internet Responsibility:

   We have noted here before that technological solutions entail risks that
   should be identified and understood in advance of deployment to the
   greatest extent possible, regardless of any panic of the moment, The
   purported (yet unproven) `benefits' of a national ID card system
   notwithstanding, these risks deserve to be discussed and understood in
   detail before any decisions regarding its adoption in any form should be
   made.

The specter of a national ID card has been cropping up in my nightmares for years. On top of the current horrifying attack on the Bill of Rights under the guise of "fighting terrorism," the potential imposition of this ultimate "Big Brother" tactic in my America leaves me in virtual despair.

But according to the Attorney General of the United States John Ashcroft, by writing such articles as "Invading the Bill of Rights" (the Humanist, November/December 2001) and this one, I'm "scaring peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty" and "aiding the terrorists." When I first heard this accusation, I was outraged. Upon reflection, however, I've decided I don't mind. In John Ashcroft's America, where everything is literally turned on its head, being called un-American has become the mark of a citizen who truly loves and defends the principles of the United States. (Not to mention that the company is most gratifying.)

Barbara Dority is president of Humanists of Washington, executive director of the Washington Coalition Against Censorship, and cochair of the Northwest Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force.